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Abstract
This thesis aims to re-conceptualise the law as it relates to end-of-life practices; to defend the 
law’s prohibition of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide; and to examine the 
perceived need for legal ‘control’ of assisted death. It draws on the results of a small 
qualitative study with Motor Neurone Disease patients, their families and doctors in a 
Chronic Care Unit to probe and re-evaluate the law and ethics of end-of-life decisions. It 
integrates this analysis with an examination of relevant empirical research and published 
research from a range of disciplines.
Part One of this thesis explores the problem of definition: what are euthanasia and physician- 
assisted suicide and are they legally, ethically and clinically different from other end-of-life 
practices such as pain relief and treatment refusal? The philosophical tradition which informs 
my analysis grounds personal moral responsibility in a person's intention. I argue that the 
intention to cause death must be central to the definition of euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide. I contend that the much-maligned double effect principle is consistent with 
established criminal law principles. Referring to case studies from my interviews, I 
demonstrate that double effect reasoning provides practical guidance about the appropriate 
use of pain relieving medication. I challenge the prevailing meanings of futile and 
burdensome treatment, with their underlying notion of the ‘worthless life’, and argue that in 
some circumstances a doctor’s cooperation with a patient’s refusal of life-sustaining 
treatment amounts to physician-assisted suicide. I suggest how doctors can respond to a 
suicidal refusal within the bounds of what should be legal.
Part Two of the thesis presents a critical examination of two competing claims in the debate 
about voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide: first, the claim of autonomy as a 
basis for seeking access to an assisted death; and secondly, the claim of vulnerability which 
cautions that assisted death poses special risks to the weak or marginalised. I argue that a 
patient’s expressed desire for autonomy or control can disguise, rather than explain, the 
underlying physical and psycho-social drivers of the request for assisted death. Examining 
women as a case study of a population identified as vulnerable, I point to evidence that 
certain dimensions of vulnerability, including a patient’s social, economic and cultural
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circumstances, can operate as controlling influences that subvert genuine autonomy and 
explain some decisions for assisted death.
Part Three of the thesis considers the reality of the so called euthanasia underground, in 
jurisdictions where assisted death is prohibited. Presenting data from interviews within a 
Chronic Care Unit, I demonstrate how the prevailing organisational culture facilitates what 
may amount to illicit euthanasia within the institutional confines of a hospital.
Using three key indicators of legal control -  voluntariness, visibility and accountability -  I 
provide a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of legal control under prohibition and the 
Dutch and Belgian regimes which have legalised voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide. Prohibition has serious shortcomings, but the evidence is that legalisation also fails to 
achieve effective control. I also examine the dispute about two significant quantitative studies 
in the Netherlands and Australia, which underscores the complexity of evidence-based 
analysis.
This thesis highlights the limitations of legal control in any form, but argues that the 
symbolism of criminal prohibition is still an important safeguard of the social norm which 
forbids intentional killing. On balance my findings support a policy of criminal prohibition of 
voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. I propose a clinical based, ‘non-law’ 
strategy which both targets the underlying motivators of patient demand and doctor 
involvement in assisted death, and expands medical education about palliative care. I 
conclude that requests for physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia can be more effectively 
and compassionately addressed, not with philosophical or legal arguments, but with practical 
clinical skills.
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I PRIVATE TRAGEDIES, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES
In December 2007, a woman I call ‘Melanie'1 2was admitted to an Australian hospital. She did 
not want to make it home for Christmas. She wanted to die. Melanie was one of 
approximately 1400 Australians“ who at any given time are suffering from Motor Neurone 
Disease (MND). MND is a term used to describe a family of diseases resulting from selective 
loss of function of the motor neurones that transmit nerve impulses from the brain or the 
spinal cord to the muscles.3 Patients experience progressive paralysis. Death is commonly 
associated with respiratory failure, choking, malnutrition and complications such as 
pneumonia.4 There is no known cure.
It had been five years since Melanie’s diagnosis, somewhat longer than the average survival 
time of just two to three years. 5 Melanie endured swallowing, walking and minor respiratory 
difficulties and daily enemas. After numerous hospital admissions, interventions and 
prescriptions, Melanie informed her neurologist, Dr Blackburn, that she had had enough. 
Within hours of her last admission, she said goodbye to her husband and children and was 
dead. Melanie’s death is more than an individual tragedy among the approximately 600 
people who die annually from MND in Australia.6 Her story has far reaching public 
consequences. I argue that her death may have been a case of euthanasia, a criminal offence 
the equivalent of murder.
Melanie’s death was one of the stories to emerge from a small qualitative study I conducted 
with MND patients, their families and doctors in a Chronic Care Unit within a hospital. In 
this thesis I use the results of my study to facilitate a critical analysis of the law and ethics of
1 Not her real name. The names and other significant identifiers of all interview participants have been changed 
to protect confidentiality.
2 Motor Neurone Disease Australia, Background Information on Motor Neurone Disease (2012) 2.
3 MND is also known as Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) and Lou Gehrig’s disease.
4 See generally Linda Ganzini, Wendy S Johnston and William F Hoffman, 'Correlates o f Suffering in 
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis' (1999) 52 Neurology 1434.
5 Motor Neurone Disease Australia, above n 2, 2.
6 In 2007 595 people died from MND in Australia; in 2008, 611 people; in 2009, 596 people; and in 2010, 648 
people: Motor Neurone Disease Australia, What is MND? (2012) <http://www.mndaust.asn.au/what-is-mnd/>.
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end-of-life-decisions. My aim is to re-conceptualise the law as it relates to end-of-life 
practices; to defend the law’s prohibition of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide; and to critically examine the perceived need for legal ‘control’ of assisted death.7
My arguments about the legal status of some of the interviewee’s clinical practices and 
conduct represent my own opinion and have not been tested by any court and are not 
definitive legal findings.
In this introductory chapter I outline the structure of this thesis; summarise the legal 
approaches to voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide in Australian, European and United 
States jurisdictions; and describe the design and methodology of my study.
II CHAPTER STRUCTURE
This thesis is in three parts. Part One considers the vexed problem of definition. In chapter 1 I 
ask what is euthanasia? Is it different from other end-of-life practices that hasten death such 
as pain relief? The philosophical tradition which informs my analysis grounds personal moral 
responsibility in a person's intention. I argue that the intention to cause death must be central 
to the definition of euthanasia. I contend that the much-maligned double effect principle is 
consistent with established criminal law principles. Drawing on case studies from my 
interviews, I demonstrate that double effect reasoning is workable in clinical practice. It 
provides the legal and moral ‘bright line’8 to distinguish between the use of drugs for 
unlawful killing, as may have occurred in Melanie’s case, and their use for lawful palliation, 
even when death is hastened as a foreseen result.
In chapter 3 I examine the meaning of assisted suicide. I challenge the common law’s routine 
assumption that a refusal of life-sustaining treatment is always an appropriate expression of 
self-determination. I analyse some treatment refusal cases which emerged from my
7 Throughout my thesis I refer to ‘assisted dying’ or ‘assisted death’ as a shorthand reference to any act or 
omission that intentionally hastens or causes death, upon request of the patient, including voluntary euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide. Suicide can be assisted by a person other than a physician, for example, a family 
member. However, this thesis focuses on physician-assisted suicide: first, because this practice is highlighted by 
my interviews; secondly, because in nearly every jurisdiction where assisted suicide is legal, assistance is 
limited to that provided by physicians.
8 Roger Magnusson, The Devil's Choice: Re-Thinking Law, Ethics and Symptom Relief in Palliative Care' 
(2006) 34 Journal o f Law, Medicine and Ethics 559, 566.
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interviews and argue that in some circumstances a patient’s refusal of life-sustaining 
treatment is a form of suicide. I suggest if a patient has a moral duty to accept treatment, then 
the common law should recognise a corresponding legal duty; if the patient also has the 
specific intention to cause his or her death, the refusal should be regarded as suicide. I argue 
that ordinarily a patient has a duty to accept treatment unless the treatment is burdensome or 
futile. I examine the meanings of burden and futility and criticise the prevailing analysis that 
relies on a value judgment about the worth -  or otherwise -  of a patient’s life. If a doctor 
encourages or counsels a treatment omission, knowing that the patient’s specific intent is to 
die, this amounts to physician-assisted suicide. However, when a doctor is faced with a 
suicidal refusal, forced treatment may be unreasonable. I propose ways that a doctor can 
respond to these situations within the bounds of what should be legal.
Part Two of my thesis is a critical examination of what I call the autonomy and vulnerability 
arguments, two essential claims that can be discerned in the euthanasia debate. The claim of 
autonomy demands the choice to access assisted death, and the claim of vulnerability 
cautions that assisted death poses special risks to the weak or marginalised. My analysis tests 
these competing claims.
In chapter 4 I argue that a patient’s expressed desire for autonomy or control can disguise, 
rather than explain, the underlying drivers of the request for assisted death. These drivers 
include depression, hopelessness, low family cohesion, fear of being a burden, lack of social 
support and unrelieved physical symptoms. Chapter 4 gives voice to the MND patients of my 
study and their families, and compares their experience with accounts and arguments in the 
existing literature.
The vulnerability argument has powerful rhetorical force in democratic societies which 
profess a concern for their weakest members. But is it anything more than rhetoric? In 
chapter 5 I consider how the concept of vulnerability is relevant to the common law principle 
of voluntariness. I argue that, even if disproportionate numbers of people from vulnerable 
groups do not choose euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide, their susceptibility to these 
practices could nevertheless be reflected in the underlying reasons for some of these choices. 
Drawing on a range of feminist, criminological, sociological and other intersecting 
perspectives, I examine women as a case study of a vulnerable population, noting that across 
the world many of the most publicised assisted deaths have been women. I point to evidence
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that dimensions of vulnerability, including a patient’s social, economic and cultural 
circumstances, can subvert genuine autonomy and sometimes explain the decision to seek 
assisted death.
In Part Three I consider the reality of the ‘euthanasia underground’ under prohibition and 
examine the alternative: legalisation. Chapter 6 reports the findings from my interviews with 
doctors and healthcare workers which revealed the organisational culture that facilitates what 
may amount to illicit euthanasia within a hospital. I argue that the motivation for some 
doctors to facilitate euthanasia is their desire to control the manner and timing of their 
patients’ deaths. My interviews highlight the serious deficiencies of a policy of prohibition, 
including the culture of deception, hidden decision making, a lack of professional 
accountability and cases of non-voluntary euthanasia.
I begin chapter 7 by examining the quantitative and qualitative literature which exposes the 
disturbing abuses which occur wherever assisted death is prohibited. Would legalisation more 
effectively protect patient autonomy at the end of life and safeguard against the risks to the 
vulnerable? I examine the dispute about two significant quantitative studies in the 
Netherlands and Australia which highlights the complexity of evidence-based analysis in this 
highly charged debate. I identify three key indicators of legal control of voluntary euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide: voluntariness, visibility and accountability.
In chapter 8 I take up the challenge of a comparative analysis between prohibition and 
legalisation. Adopting the Netherlands and Belgium as case studies of legalised regimes, I 
examine what the data show about the control of assisted death in these jurisdictions. 
Measured against the three legal control indicators, I argue that while prohibition has obvious 
and very serious deficiencies, legalisation also fails to achieve effective control of assisted 
death. In the Netherlands in particular, there is evidence of non-voluntary, intentional 
termination of life, much of which remains hidden, and a lack of accountability of doctors.
Ultimately I conclude that voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide should not be 
legalised. In chapter 9 I argue that removing the symbolism of criminal prohibition would 
erode the social norm which forbids intentional killing. Recognising the limitations of legal 
control in any form, I propose a ‘non-law’ strategy to confront the euthanasia underground. 
First, this would utilise clinical interventions to target the underlying psycho-social and
4
physical motivators of patient demand for assisted death. Secondly, it would address doctor 
involvement in assisted death with expanded medical education about palliative care.
In chapter 10 I summarise the main themes and findings of this thesis and consider 
opportunities for further research. I conclude that requests for physician-assisted suicide and 
euthanasia can be more effectively and compassionately addressed with practical clinical 
skills, rather than philosophical or legal arguments.
Ill THE INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE
Throughout this thesis I refer to ‘prohibition’ and ‘legalisation’ in broad terms to describe the 
competing legal approaches to voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. I use 
‘prohibition’ to refer to the criminalisation of euthanasia and assisted suicide, within 
jurisdictions including Australia, the United Kingdom,9 and most of Europe and North 
America.
I use the term ‘legalisation’ to refer to any system that permits voluntary euthanasia and/ or 
assisted suicide in some fonn; in other words, any alternative to absolute prohibition. In these 
jurisdictions, euthanasia and/or assisted suicide which comply with prescribed conditions are 
permitted, but practices that occur outside the legal framework are subject to criminal 
penalties. Legalisation may take place by statute or by case law.
In Oregon, United States, legalised physician-assisted suicide has been in effect since 199710 
and in Washington State since 2009.* 11 In 2008 the Montana District Court ruled that its 
residents have the legal right to physician-assisted suicide. On appeal, the Montana 
Supreme Court held that physician-assisted suicide is not against public policy in that state.13 
In Colombia, the Constitutional Court ruled in 1997 that euthanasia is not a crime. It is 
permitted in circumstances where a patient requests death and suffers from a terminal illness
9 In 2010 the Director of Public Prosecutions in the United Kingdom issued a policy for prosecutors setting 
guidelines about when to prosecute cases of assisted suicide: The Director of Public Prosecutions, Policy fo r  
Prosecutors in Respect o f Cases o f Encouraging or Assisting Suicide (The Crown Prosecution Service, 2010) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.html>.
111 The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Oi^Rev Stat 127.800-995 (1994).
II The Washington Death with Dignity Act, 70.245 RCW (2008).
12 Baxter v State o f Montana (Mont First Judicial Dist Ct, Lewis and Clark County, Cause No. ADV-2007-787,
5 December 2008).
13 Baxter v State o f Montana, DA-09-0051, 2009 MT 449 (Mont Sup Ct, 2009).
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for which no medical treatment exists.14 Both euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide were 
legalised by statute in Luxembourg in 2009.15
In Switzerland, assisted suicide is only illegal if it is done for selfish reasons. Swiss law thus 
condones assisted suicide for altruistic reasons, even by non-physicians.16 Swiss courts have 
clarified the role of the doctor in assisted suicide. For example, a doctor is required to 
ascertain the competency of the patient and to obtain a psychiatric report if the patient has a
mental disorder.17 However, euthanasia -  defined as ‘murder on request by the victim’ -
18remains a crime in Switzerland.
In 2002, Belgium legalised euthanasia by creating exceptions to the crime of murder. Doctors 
commit no offence if they comply with statutory ‘due care’ requirements; for example, that 
the patient’s decision is voluntary and well considered and their suffering constant and 
unbearable.19 Physician-assisted suicide is considered a legal form of euthanasia by the
Belgian Review Committee responsible for overseeing the implementation of the
20legislation.
Legislation enacted in the Netherlands in 2001 effectively codified the case law which had 
developed over the preceding two decades. Williams and others point out that the Dutch 
statute does not legalise voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, and nor does the
14 Corte constitutional de Colombia [Constitutional Court of Colombia], Sentencia C-239/97, 20 May 1997.See 
also Sabine Michlowski, 'Legalising Active Voluntary Euthanasia through the Courts: Some Lessons from 
Colombia' (2009) 17 Medical Law Review 183, 183. Colombian Congress is currently debating a Bill which 
would legalise euthanasia and assisted suicide.
15 Loi du 16 mars 2009 sur l'euthanasie et l'assistance au suicide [Law of 16 March 2009 on Euthanasia and 
Assisted Suicide] (Luxembourg) 16 March 2009.
16 Strafgesetzbuch [Swiss Criminal Code] (Switzerland) art 115.
17 John Griffiths, Heleen Weyers and Maurice Adams, Euthanasia and Law in Europe (Hart Publishing, 2008) 
473.
18 Sarnia A Hurst and Alex Mauron, 'Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Switzerland: Allowing a Role for Non- 
Physicians' (2003) 326 British Medical Journal 271, 272.
19 Loi relative à l'euthanasie 28 Mai 2002 [Act on Euthanasia of May 28th 2002] (Belgium) 28 May 2002.
20 Mette L Rurup et al, 'The First Five Years of Euthanasia Legislation in Belgium and the Netherlands: 
Description and Comparison of Cases' (2012) 26 Palliative Medicine 43, 47, citing Federale Controle en 
Evaluatie Commissie Euthanasie [Federal Control and Evaluation Committee on Euthanasia], Eerste Verslag 
aan de Wetgevende Earners 22 September 2002—31 december 2003 [First Report to Parliament September 22, 
2002-December 31, 2003] (2003)
<http://www.leif.be/doc_professioneeEEUTHANASIE%20VERSLAG%202004.PDF>.
21 Maurice Adams and Herman Nys, 'Comparative Reflections on the Belgian Euthanasia Act 2002' (2003) 11 
Medical Law Review 353, 354.
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Belgian legislation. Technically these practices remain criminal offences. However, like 
most other researchers in this area, I will refer to the situation in both countries as 
legalisation.23 In the Netherlands and Belgium a physician is explicitly permitted to perform 
voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, provided he or she observes certain due 
care requirements and reports the death to the relevant authorities. Thus, rather than the 
absolute prohibition of these practices, the Dutch and Belgian legal systems attempt to 
control euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide by regulating the conditions under which 
they can be performed. I analyse these legalised control systems in detail in chapter 8.
IV METHODOLOGY
Methodology is defined as ‘a way of thinking about and studying social reality’24 and refers 
to ‘the principles underlying particular research approaches’. This thesis is a ‘convergence’ 
of different methodologies. A purely ‘black letter’ legal analysis could not by itself account 
for the complex social, cultural, medical and ethical phenomenon of euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide. Whether and how the law should exert legal control over assisted 
death is a question which pushes investigation beyond traditional academic boundaries. 
Therefore this thesis combines an analysis of the legal and ethical issues with an examination 
of the published research, including quantitative data, from a range of disciplines. I integrate 
this with the results of my own qualitative study.
The empirical literature about assisted death is extensive. There are a significant number of 
quantitative studies examining why terminally ill patients desire and/or request assisted death. 
I examine many of these studies in chapter 47 There are also surveys of the attitudes of
97MND patients and their carers towards assisted death. There is a vast body of quantitative
22
22 Glenys Williams, Intention and Causation in Medical Non-Killing (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 180. See also 
Jurriaan de Haan, The New Dutch Law on Euthanasia' (2002) 10 Medical Law Review 57, 60; Roger S 
Magnusson, Angels o f Death: Exploring the Euthanasia Underground (Melbourne University Press, 2002) 64.
22 See, eg, Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 16; Agnes van der Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Practices in the 
Netherlands under the Euthanasia Act' (2007) 356 New England Journal o f Medicine 1957, 1958.
24 Anselm Strauss and Juliet M Corbin, Basics o f Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for  
Developing Grounded Theory (Sage Publications, 1998) 3.
25 Kevin Dew, 'A Health Researcher's Guide to Qualitative Methodologies' (2007) 31 Australian and New 
Zealand Journal o f Public Health 433, 433.
2(1 See, eg, Brian J Kelly et al, 'Factors Associated with the Wish to Hasten Death: A Study of Patients with 
Terminal Illness' (2003) 33 Psychological Medicine 75.
27 See, eg, Linda Ganzini et al, 'Attitudes of Patients with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis and their Care Givers 
toward Assisted Suicide' (1998) 339 New England Journal o f Medicine 967; Marie A Achille and James R P
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research about attitudes towards voluntary euthanasia and its legalisation, and about the 
incidence of euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide and other behaviour that hastens death, 
from jurisdictions including Australia, the Netherlands and the United States. I review this 
research in chapters 7 and 8. Nevertheless, there are still gaps in our knowledge.
Although quantitative research provides valuable insights about the distribution of assisted 
death within populations, as Mak and Elwyn point out, it cannot account for ‘the complexity 
of the subjective experience.’ My study of the Chronic Care Unit seeks to build on the 
existing evidence-base by giving voice to and reporting the lived reality of the people most 
directly affected by the assisted death debate: patients, their carers, doctors and healthcare 
professionals. A qualitative approach is appropriate because, as Blignault and Ritchie state, 
‘[qualitative research methodologies ... are oriented to better [understand] ... the context, 
meaning and experiences of people’s lives.’31
Although numerous studies confirm the reality of underground euthanasia, only a few have 
explored the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of euthanasia and assisted suicide in jurisdictions where such
^9practices are criminalised. Even fewer have examined the practice of assisted death within 
institutional settings, such as hospitals. A qualitative approach can provide an in-depth 
understanding of this phenomenon and is particularly useful when examining organisational 
dynamics, clinical leadership and team interaction, all relevant to my study of the Chronic 
Care Unit in chapter 6.
Ogloff, 'Attitudes toward and Desire for Assisted Suicide among Persons with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis' 
(2003) 48 Omega: Journal o f Death and Dying 1.
28 See, eg, Helga Kuhse et al, 'End-of-Life Decisions in Australian Medical Practice' (1997) 166 Medical 
Journal o f Australia 191; van der Heide et al, above n 22; Diane Meier et al, 'A National Survey o f Physician- 
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the United States' (1998) 338 New England Journal o f Medicine 1193.
2i> Yvonne Yi Wood Mak and Glyn Elwyn, 'Voices of the Terminally 111: Uncovering the Meaning of Desire for 
Euthanasia' (2005) 19 Palliative Medicine 343, 343.
30 There are a few studies that aim to do this: Marit Karlsson, Anna Milberg and Peter Strang, 'Dying Cancer 
Patients’ Own Opinions on Euthanasia: an Expression o f Autonomy? A Qualitative Study' (2012) 26 Palliative 
Medicine 34; Marianne K Dees et al, '‘Unbearable Suffering’: a Qualitative Study on the Perspectives of 
Patients who Request Assistance in Dying' (2011) 37 Journal o f Medical Ethics 727; James Lavery et al, 
'Origins o f the Desire for Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in People with HIV-1 or AIDS: a Qualitative Study' 
(2001) 358 Lancet 362.
31 Ilse Blignault and Ian Ritchie, 'Revealing the Wood and the Trees: Reporting Qualitative Research' (2009) 20 
Health Promotion Journal o f Australia 140, 140.
32 See, eg, Russell D Ogden, Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in Persons with Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS) or Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) (Peroglyphics Publishing, 1994); Magnusson, 
above n 22.
33 Leslie A Curry, Ingrid M Nembhard and Elizabeth H Bradley, 'Qualitative and Mixed Methods Provide 
Unique Contributions to Outcomes Research' (2009) 119 Circulation 1442, 1443.
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One of the aims of my study is to explore the illegal practice of assisted death and 
perceptions of legal control. As in all research about criminal behaviour, the perspective of 
the offender is critical in formulating evidence-based policy that eschews assumptions and 
ideologically driven claims.34 This qualitative approach is situated within the tradition of 
offender-based research pioneered in criminology and poses special challenges for data 
collection and analysis, which I discuss below.
Although the human ethics application required me to state a hypothesis, my study design
T Awas influenced by grounded theory which emphasises theory building, rather than theory
-y 7
testing. I wanted to challenge the constraints of familiar ‘pro/anti’ euthanasia rhetoric and 
generate my arguments from new data. Grounded theory has been adopted by a number of 
studies into health policy, end-of-life decisions and patients’ desire for assisted death.39 I 
approached the interviews as broad inquiries that might encourage the emergence of data: 
why do patients desire (or not desire) assisted death? What are the influences on their end-of- 
life decisions? What are doctors’ perceptions of patient preferences, including assisted death? 
What is the role of family and carers in decision making? What dynamics arise among the 
treating team if a patient seeks assistance to die?
34 See, eg, Richard Wright and Trevor Bennett, 'Exploring the Offender's Perspective: Observing and 
Interviewing Criminals' in Kimberly L Kempf (ed), Measurement Issues in Criminology (Springer-Verlag, 
1992) 138.
35 See Wim Bemasco, 'Learning about Crime from Criminals: Editor's Introduction' in Wim Bemasco (ed), 
Offenders on Offending: Learning about Crime from Criminals (Routledge, 2010) 3, 3.
36 Barney G Glaser and Anselm L Strauss, The Discovery o f Grounded Theory: Strategies fo r  Qualitative 
Research (Aldine Publishing, 1967). For a summary o f criticisms of the theory see Clive Seale, The Quality o f 
Qualitative Research (Sage Publications, 1999)101-103.
37 Lyn Richards and Janice M Morse, Readme First fo r a User's Guide to Qualitative Methods (Sage 
Publications, 2007) 62.
38 Strauss and Corbin, above n 24, 8.
39 See, eg, Barney G Glaser and Anselm Strauss, Awareness o f Dying (Aldine Publishers, 1965); Anselm 
Strauss, Negotiations: Varieties, Contexts, Processes and Social Order (Jossey-Bass, 1978); Juliet M Corbin 
and Anselm Strauss, Unending Work and Care: Managing Chronic Illness at Home (Jossey-Bass, 1988); 
Yvonne Denier et al, 'Communication in Nursing Care for Patients Requesting Euthanasia: a Qualitative Study' 
(2010) 19 Journal o f Clinical Nursing 3372; Lavery et al, above n 29; Charlotte Verpoort, Chris Gastmans and 
Bernadette Dierckx de Casterle, 'Palliative Care Nurses’ Views on Euthanasia' (2004) 47 Journal o f Advanced 
Nursing 592.
9
V STUDY DESIGN
A Sample
As Rosenfeld points out, there may be important differences among diverse patient 
populations regarding their involvement in assisted death.40 I chose patients with MND, their 
families and doctors as my sample for a number of reasons.
First, across all patient groups, dependency and perceived loss of dignity are influential 
motivators of the desire for assisted death. 41 These motivators may be particularly prominent 
for MND patients as they gradually deteriorate to the point of complete paralysis. Secondly, a 
number of studies report that requests for assisted death and its performance are strongly 
associated with MND.42 Thirdly, the incurable and debilitating nature of MND means that 
patients, families and clinicians are likely to give early consideration to end-of-life decisions.
Fourthly, MND is arguably the clinical context that provides the most rigorous testing ground 
for the respective claims of advocates and opponents of assisted death. Although MND 
patients typically retain their mental faculties, they gradually lose all control of voluntary 
functioning. Faced with this inexorable decline, cries of ‘death with dignity’ and ‘choice in 
dying’ are a potent challenge to those who would deny a patient’s request for death. At the 
same time, the pressures on families and carers create the risk that legalisation might subtly 
become an escape route from the daily burden of care. For all sides of the assisted death 
debate, MND is the ‘hard case’.
40 Barry Rosenfeld, 'Methodological Issues in Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia Research' (2000) 6 Psychology, 
Public Policy, and Law 559, 566.
41 See, eg, Maud Maessen et al, 'Requests for Euthanasia: Origin of Suffering in ALS, Heart Failure, and 
Cancer Patients' (2010) 257 Journal o f Neurology 1192, 1197.1 discuss the notion of dignity in Chapter 3.
4: Ibid; Bregje D Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'The Last Phase of Life: Who Requests and Who Receives 
Euthanasia or Physician-Assisted Suicide?' (2010) 48 Medical Care 596; Oregon Public Health Division, Table 
1. Characteristics and End-of-Life Care o f596 DWDA [Death with Dignity Act] Patients who have Died from  
Ingesting a Lethal Dose o f Medication as o f  February 29, 2012, by Year, Oregon, 1998-2011 (29 February 
2012) Oregon Health Authority
<http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Documen 
ts/yearl4-tbl-l ,pdf>.
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B Participants
Between April 2007 and January 2008 I conducted semi-structured interviews with ten 
patients diagnosed with MND being treated through the Chronic Care Unit. Six interviewees 
were women and four were men. The length of time between first diagnosis and the interview 
ranged between six months and eight years. Six carers of these patients, one a close friend of 
a patient, and the other five spouses of patients, were also interviewed.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted between September 2007 and February 2008 with 
12 doctors and healthcare professionals (six females and six males) attached to the Unit 
which operates as a multi-disciplinary, out-patient clinic. The sample comprised: two 
neurologists; two palliative care specialists; one respiratory physician; two respiratory 
registrars; one nurse who was the coordinator of the Unit; one respiratory clinical nurse 
consultant; one dietician; one occupational therapist; and one social worker.
Throughout this thesis I have used pseudonyms for all interviewees so as to respect privacy 
and confidentiality. I have changed the sex of some interviewees and altered the descriptions 
of the roles and identities of some interviewees so as to ensure anonymity.
C Ethical Issues
I obtained permission to conduct interviews from the Human Research Ethics Committees of 
the University of Sydney and from the authority which governs the hospital at which the 
Chronic Care Unit is located.
An initial ethical concern was the appropriateness of conducting interviews with terminally ill 
people. MND patients are often physically and emotionally fragile; the same can be true of 
their families who experience the chronic stresses of caring. Many researchers have noted 
that even very brief interviews can be exhausting for seriously ill patients, who might be 
preoccupied with coming to terms with their impending death.43 My interviews confronted 
patients and families with unpleasant issues, risking personal distress. On the other hand, as
43 See, eg, Donna Fitzsimons and Patricia H Strachan, 'Overcoming the Challenges of Conducting Research with 
People who Have Advanced Heart Failure and Palliative Care Needs' (2012) 11(2) European Journal o f  
Cardiovascular Nursing 248; Julia Lawton, 'Gaining and Maintaining Consent: Ethical Concerns Raised in a 
Study of Dying Patients' (2001) 11 Qualitative Health Research 693.
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other researchers have noted, some patients welcome the opportunity to reflect upon their 
experience and contribute to knowledge about end-of-life care which might benefit others.44
Another ethical issue was the risk to clinicians of disclosing their participation in, or 
knowledge of, possibly illegal activities. Despite undertakings of confidentiality, researchers 
of illegal activities have been subpoenaed to supply participant data. For example, Scarce was 
imprisoned for five months when he refused to provide information about a study of an 
environmental organisation accused of illegal activity.45 His commitment of confidentiality to 
the participants was not a defence. In Canada, Russell Ogden fought a lengthy, and ultimately 
successful, legal battle when his research materials on assisted suicide were subpoenaed by 
the coroner.46 Israel details a number of Australian cases where the confidentiality of 
sensitive research information faced legal challenge.47 In one example, the ethics approval of 
a study into assisted suicide by researcher Suzanne Bermingham was challenged because of 
the risk of prosecution for concealing a criminal offence. Although it is likely that in such a 
case the undertaking of confidentiality would constitute a ‘reasonable excuse’, this has not 
been tested in Australia. However, the risk in not conducting such research is that social 
policy, clinical practice, the scholarly and public debate and the end-of-life experiences of 
patients and their families will be driven by assumptions, conjecture, vested interests and 
even by ignorance.
D Recruitment Strategy
The initial referral to the Chronic Care Unit came from an oncologist to whom I was 
introduced as part of early discussions regarding my proposed project. He suggested that I 
might find useful data at the Unit and gave me the name of a neurologist who in turn referred
44 Hayley Pessin et al, 'Burden and Benefit o f Psychosocial Research at the End of Life' (2008) 11 Journal o f 
Palliative Medicine 627; Susan Lee and Linda Kristjanson, 'Human Research Ethics Committees: Issues in 
Palliative Care Research' (2003) 9 International Journal o f Palliative Nursing 13.
45 Rik Scarce, '(No) Trial (But) Tribulations: When Courts and Ethnography Conflict' (1994) 23 Journal o f 
Contemporary Ethnography 123. See also Joseph R DiFranza et al, 'RJR Nabisco's Cartoon Camel Promotes 
Camel Cigarettes to Children' (1991) 266 Journal o f the American Medical Association 3149.
40 Roger Magnusson, 'The Researcher as Criminal: the Case of Russel Ogden' (2003) 22(2) Monash Bioethics 
Review 27.
47 Mark Israel, Ethics and the Governance o f Criminological Research in Australia (New South Wales Bureau 
of Crime Statistics and Research, 2004) 21.
48 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 316 makes it a criminal offence, without reasonable excuse, to fail to bring to the 
attention of the police, information which might be of material assistance in securing the apprehension or 
prosecution of an offender. See also ibid 63-64.
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me to Dr Blackburn. The other participating doctors and healthcare workers were referred by 
Dr Blackburn and I contacted them to arrange an interview.
According to the approved selection criteria, patient and family participants were aged over 
18 years and came from English speaking backgrounds to avoid communication problems. Dr 
Blackburn and the Unit’s nurse coordinator acted as gatekeepers for the patients, only 
referring those who they assessed to be physically and mentally well enough. Initially, ethics 
approval was granted on the basis I would not directly approach patients or families seeking 
recruitment: they would be left to call me to arrange an interview. I was also required to 
conduct the interviews in the hospital with a doctor or nurse present to monitor the patient’s 
comfort. However, over many months only one patient was recruited by this method. 
Therefore I obtained an amendment to the ethics approval to contact patients and family 
directly and to conduct the interviews away from the hospital at a location convenient to the 
patients.
E Data Collection and Analysis
My original intention was to collect data using in-depth interviews and observations of 
interactions between patients, families and medical staff at the Unit’s monthly out-patient 
clinic. However, after a few attendances at the Chronic Care Unit it became clear that 
conducting observations would be unduly time consuming. For this reason, I confined data 
collection to the interview method.
Prior to each interview, I provided participants with the Participant Information Sheet and 
Consent Form approved by the institutional ethics committees. I obtained participant consent 
in writing, or orally on tape. The Consent Form assured participants that all data would be de- 
identified, including for the purposes of publication. The Participant Information Sheet 
explained that euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are criminal offences and noted the 
criminal penalties. Both the Participant Information Sheet and the Consent Form assured 
interviewees that individual participants would not be identifiable in any report of the 
research study.
The patients’ Consent Form informed participants that the interview could be physically 
tiring and would raise issues that might cause distress. The Consent Form assured patients
13
that their decision whether or not to participate would have no bearing on their medical care. 
Patients were given the contact details of the Head of Neurology and the independent 
Patient’s Representative if they wished to raise concerns about the conduct of my study. 
Family participants were given similar information and assurances in their documentation. 
The Consent Form told participants that they could suspend or terminate the interview at any 
time and for any reason. I reminded them of this at the beginning of each interview and at key 
points throughout the interview.
The interviews were semi-structured and audiotaped. I interviewed each participant alone, to 
ensure that the presence of others did not influence the data. I asked a series of open-ended 
questions related to key themes and pursued new themes as they emerged, seeking 
clarification or elaboration when necessary. I used dialogue and active listening, doing my 
best to be reflective and to empathise with the experiences of the participants, particularly the 
patients.
This interview format facilitated the collection of rich, narrative data as participants opened 
up and shared their stories. ‘Sometimes’, declared patient ‘Isabel’, T think it would be nice if 
everybody knew just how really shitty it is.’49 Family and carers described the daily impact of 
living with the disease. The clinical staff spoke of ‘walking the journey’ with their patients. 
My collection and analysis of data was an iterative process: themes which emerged in earlier 
interviews were explored in subsequent interviews, a technique known within grounded 
theory as theoretical sampling.50
I interviewed several patients and carers and then began my interviews with doctors and other 
health professionals. This enabled me to explore the patients’ themes and concerns from a 
different perspective. One of the first doctors I interviewed was Dr Blackburn. He identified 
other doctors associated with the Chronic Care Unit. In interview, I explored their 
perceptions about his practices, without revealing his identity. This strategy of theoretical 
sampling facilitated a deep analysis of key themes by testing and investigating them from 
multiple perspectives.
44 Interview with Isabel Wright (26 June 2007). I have omitted the locations of all interviews from these 
citations in order to preserve confidentiality.
50 ‘Theoretical sampling is the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly 
collects, codes and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to 
develop his theory as it emerges’: Glaser and Strauss, The Discovery o f Grounded Theory: Strategies for  
Qualitative Research, above n 36, 45.
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All interviews were transcribed. I analysed the interviews using a constant comparative 
method typical of grounded theory. I extracted significant text such as phrases and quotations 
and assigned them a code or label to catalogue them into key themes. I created new codes as 
necessary to refine my analysis. Thus the code structure emerged inductively from the data.51
F Validity
Self-reported behaviour always raises the issue of validity: to what extent are statements 
accurate representations about what happened? When criminal behaviour is reported, threats 
to data validity are compounded. One of the most significant challenges is that participants 
could be actively or passively misleading the interviewer by withholding important 
information, providing false information, down-playing their role in the offence, or even 
bragging.52
The assurances of anonymity given orally and in writing were obviously essential 
prerequisites for winning trust and facilitating openness and honesty. Dr Blackburn provided 
strong support for my study and encouraged his colleagues to participate. Nevertheless, some 
doctors expressed hesitation at providing details of questionable clinical practices, due to the 
risk this would pose to colleagues and professional relationships. Similarly, despite the 
assurances of confidentiality in the Participant Information Sheet and during interviews, some 
patients refused to provide what they considered to be incriminating information about end- 
of-life discussions with their doctors, due to concern that it might get their doctors 'into 
trouble’.
In contrast, Dr Blackburn was quite open in describing his clinical practices. This raised the 
question in my mind of whether he was embellishing his involvement.
Elffers advises researchers to obtain ‘outside information’ to compare with self-reports. 
Similarly Brookman argues that interview data should be supplemented with other forms of 
information and insight, including interviews with other key ‘players’ such as co-offenders,
51 Strauss and Corbin, above n 24.
52 Henk Elffers, 'Misinformation, Misunderstanding and Misleading as Validity Threats to Offenders' Accounts 
o f Offending' in Wim Bemasco (ed), Offenders on Offending (Routledge, 2010) 13, 18.
53 Ibid 20.
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witnesses, family and friends.54 Chapter 6 in particular demonstrates how I adopted such a 
strategy. I examined the operations of the Chronic Care Unit from multiple perspectives: 
patients, their families, doctors and other healthcare workers, to test and validate Dr 
Blackburn’s description of assisted death. In chapter 9, I juxtapose Dr Blackburn’s account 
of one particular death with the account of Dr Richards to shed further light on this event. I 
have also relied on the accounts of other participants to generate an analysis of the 
organisational culture which facilitates possibly illegal practices. Using these strategies I was 
able to minimise risks to data validity.
VI CONCLUSION
This chapter has introduced the key issues of my thesis and highlighted its aim: to re­
conceptualise the law as it relates to end-of-life practices. I have provided an overview of the 
structure of my argument and the international ‘landscape’ regarding the legal status of 
assisted death. I have explained my methodology and study design. My qualitative study is a 
reminder that the assisted death debate can never be purely theoretical. The debate is raw and 
messy because amidst the tug of competing ethical, medical and legal arguments, there are 
real lives and very sad deaths. I now go on to examine a foundational question: what is 
euthanasia and what might it Took like’ in clinical practice?
Fiona Brookman, 'Beyond the Interview: Complementing and Validating Accounts of Incarcerated Violent 
Offenders' in Wim Bemasco (ed), Offenders on Offending (Routledge, 2010) 84, 97-98.
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2Euthanasia And Other Acts That Hasten Death
I INTRODUCTION
The word euthanasia derives from Greek, meaning ‘good death’.1 2However, beyond this 
simple etymology, there are varied understandings of the terminology and this tends to cloud 
both the public and legal debate. Euthanasia has no legal status per se: there is no offence of 
‘euthanasia’. However, clarifying the terminology is very important because there is a lively 
literature and heated debate about whether assisted dying -  in circumstances where it 
amounts to ‘euthanasia’ -  is morally and legally defensible.
Part II of this chapter puts forward a legal definition of euthanasia and examines how it is 
understood by the clinical staff at the Chronic Care Unit: those at the ‘coal face’ of end-of- 
life decision making. I analyse two particular end-of-life practices at the Unit which emerged 
from my interviews with medical staff, patients and their families. First, in part III, the use of 
pain relieving drugs with the intention to cause death; secondly, in part IV, the administration 
of medication to relieve pain with the knowledge it will probably hasten death. While I will 
demonstrate that the first may be euthanasia and thus the offence of murder, I argue that the 
second is legitimate palliative care. The distinction between these two practices is defined by 
double effect reasoning which I analyse at length in part V.
II WHAT IS EUTHANASIA?
A The Views o f Clinical Staff
Dr Blackburn, the only member of the Chronic Care Unit team who described practices 
which I will argue may amount to euthanasia, was hesitant to define the word because to him
1 Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution to the Euthanasia 
Debate (University Of Notre Dame Press, 1979) 86.
2 Margaret Somerville, 'Euthanasia by Confusion' (1997) 20 University o f New South Wales Law Journal 550.
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• » 7it has ‘negative connotations’. Rather than a definition, he offered examples to illustrate the 
‘de-personalised aspect’3 4 which he thinks is at the essence of the word:
Jack Kevorkian or Philip Nitschke or storing barbiturates and taking them ... the guys in Switzerland. 
You know, you fly in on a plane, they’ve never seen you before, you walk in the room, sign a book, pay 
them the 6,000 euros, get a lethal dose of barbiturates, and then you go out in a pine box.5
To others, such as social worker Robyn Kelly, the word has a more favourable nuance: 
‘...peaceful. I see euthanasia as a positive thing.'6 In Dr Barron’s understanding, the 
interruption of the ‘natural course’ was the key characteristic: ‘ [e]uthanasia is the assistance 
of somebody, usually with a terminal illness, to die possibly prior to when the natural course 
of illness would have taken them away...’7
For Dr Evans, the very question of defining euthanasia provoked hearty laughter: ‘Such a 
lawyer! Such a lawyer question!’ When I answered in protest, ‘But I can’t help it!’ he added, 
‘Oh I know, it goes with the territory doesn’t it.’8 His amusement highlighted some serious 
questions: can the reality of clinical practice accommodate itself to the definitions, 
classifications and designations which so concern the law? Is the very meaning of euthanasia 
a peculiarly legal question with limited relevance to those at the coal face of medical care? Dr 
Nixon, although strongly opposed to euthanasia, like many interviewees struggled with the 
‘grey areas’: ‘You really have to take [it] case by case. I don’t think there are any hard and 
fast rules.’9
B Legal Definition
The law, however, does look to rules. In every Australian jurisdiction and across most of the 
common law world, euthanasia, which is commonly envisaged as the hastening of a patient’s 
death for compassionate motives, is illegal. It is not, however, a special category of homicide. 
Rather, the law of murder applies.
3 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
(> Interview with Robyn Kelly (10 December 2007).
7 Interview with Andrea Barron (8 January 2008).
8 Interview with Paul Evans (18 December 2007).
9 Interview with Colin Nixon (10 December 2007).
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There are some variations in the meaning of murder across common law jurisdictions, but the 
elements are essentially the same. The physical elements are an act or omission which causes 
the death of a human being. 10 The accused's act or omission must be a substantial or 
significant cause of death, although it need not be the single cause. 11 In the context of the 
present discussion, the term ‘active euthanasia’ is sometimes used to refer to an act which 
causes death, for example, the administration of drugs.
An omission to act which causes death will only attract criminal liability if the accused had a 
legal duty to act. 12 At common law, a duty to act will exist in limited circumstances,
. . I Tincluding in a doctor-patient relationship and when one undertakes the care of a dependent 
person. 14 It is widely acknowledged that a doctor does not have a legal duty to treat a patient 
if the treatment is burdensome to the patient or the treatment is futile, or is otherwise not in 
the patient’s best interests.1^ The meaning and application of these concepts is contested and 
will be examined in the next chapter. Suffice to note here that if a doctor does have a duty to 
provide life-sustaining medical treatment and does not, this can constitute the physical 
element of so called ‘passive’ euthanasia. 16
The principal actor in a case of euthanasia is the doctor or other healthcare professional. This 
is in contrast with assisted suicide -  considered in the next chapter -  where the patient takes 
the more active role, for example, by self-ingesting a lethal dose of drugs.
At common law the mental element of murder is ‘malice aforethought’ . 17 This encompasses 
either the intent to kill or intent to cause grievous bodily harm. 18 In New South Wales and the 
Australian Capital Territory, the mental element can also be satisfied by reckless indifference
10 See, eg, Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 18(1); Lord Coke, Institutes o f the Laws o f England (1797) 3 Inst 47, 
quoted in Law Commission, A New Homicide Act for England and Wales?, Consultation Paper (2005) [1.52].
11 Royall v R (1991) 172 CLR 378; R vPagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279.
12 R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; R v Gibbons (1918) 13 Cr App R 134; People v Beardsley 113 NW 1128 
(1907).
13 Margaret Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (Oxford University Press, 2000) 26.
14 R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; People v Beardsley 113 NW 1128 (1907).
15 See, eg, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 (‘Bland')-, Gardner; Re BWV[2003] VSC 173 
(‘Gardner’).
16 See, eg, Grisez and Boyle, above n 1, 86, 139; Otlowski, above n 13, 5.
17 Lord Coke, above n 10, [1.52].
18 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 18(1); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 12(l)(a); Criminal Code 1983 (NT) ss 161-2; 
Criminal Codel899 (Qld) s 302; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) ss 156-7; Criminal Code 1913 (WA) ss 279-9. 
In South Australia and Victoria the common law is relevant: Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107. An 
intention to cause grievous bodily harm is not a fault element for murder in the Australian Capital Territory: 
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 12(1).
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to human life, where the accused had knowledge or foresight that his or her act or omission 
would probably cause death.19
Some of the Chronic Care Unit staff identified intention as significant to the definition of 
euthanasia. Dr Richards defined euthanasia as ‘a medical intervention with the intent of 
actively ending a person’s life.’ Similarly, Dr Nixon: ‘there has to be the will and the intent 
to end life’.21 Others alluded to the significance of intention but did not use the actual word. 
According to respiratory nurse, Sally Donalds, euthanasia is when ‘you deliberately, in a 
designated time, know when that person is going to die because of the intervention that you 
are going to give.’22
Whether or not the patient consents to euthanasia is not legally relevant. However, a general 
distinction is drawn in the literature between ‘involuntary’ euthanasia where euthanasia is 
performed against the wishes of the patient; ‘non-voluntary’ euthanasia where it is performed 
on incompetent persons who lack capacity to consent; and voluntary euthanasia where 
euthanasia is performed at the request of the person. This chapter and this thesis focus on 
voluntary euthanasia.
I will now go on to examine one of the practices at the Chronic Care Unit: the administration 
of pain relieving medication with the intention to cause death. I argue that this may be a form 
of euthanasia that also satisfies the criminal offence of murder.
19 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 18(l)(a); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 12(l)(b); RvSoloman  [1980] 1 NSWLR 321. 
In South Australia and Victoria knowledge of the probability of serious bodily harm will also satisfy the mental 
element: R v Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464 (‘Crabbe’). So called ‘constructive' or ‘felony’ murder where the 
conduct causing death is associated with an offence carrying a penalty o f 25 years imprisonment or life is not 
relevant to the present discussion of euthanasia.
211 Interview with Elizabeth Richards (6 February 2008).
21 Interview with Colin Nixon (10 December 2007).
22 Interview with Sally Donalds (10 December 2007).
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Ill THE ADMINISTRATION OF PAIN RELIEVING MEDICATION
WITH THE INTENTION TO CAUSE DEATH 
A Melanie
In chapter 1, I introduced Dr Blackburn’s patient, Melanie. Dr Blackburn explained to me 
what led up to her death:
Bruce, her husband, had been on the phone to me and said: ‘She’s in agony ... she’s having these daily 
enemas, she doesn’t want to live anymore.’ ... I had a long chat with Bruce and Melanie when she 
arrived [at the hospital] and she made it very clear ... that she didn’t want to live. [Her children] were 
coming in ... the next day ... we talked about Midazolam-morphine. Midazolam is a commonly used 
sedative. Morphine is ... a routine narcotic which we often use. And her [children] came in ... and the 
rest of her family... So on the next day we started a very low dose of Midazolam-morphine just to 
control the pain. ... She was in hospital. ... she died that night.24
I asked Dr Blackburn: ‘So how did she die? What did she die of?’ His answer suggests that 
his administration of Midazolam-morphine may have been a substantial and contributory 
cause of Melanie’s death, possibly satisfying the physical elements of murder:
... the respiratory drive is primarily driven by C02 and you blunt that with narcotics and with 
benzodiazepines. Once you get to a certain level, the C02 just goes exponentially up and you develop 
C02 narcosis, you eventually just stop breathing and you die.24
Because the intention to cause death is essential to murder, I asked him: ‘So what was the 
purpose of giving her the Midazolam-morphine?’ He answered: ‘To control her pain and
9 Sdiscomfort and to her allow her to die peacefully.’
I needed clarification: ‘And was one of the aims in giving her that combination to suppress 
her breathing and to increase the C02 and to hasten her death?’ Dr Blackburn answered: 
‘When I wrote the prescription of Midazolam-morphine I knew that she was going to die in
96the next day or two, so yeah.’
23
24
25
26
Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008). 
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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As I will go on to argue in the next section of this chapter, knowledge of likely -  or even 
certain -  death does not of necessity require an inference of intent to kill. However, the total 
context of this interview suggests that Dr Blackburn may have administered Midazolam- 
morphine with the intent to cause Melanie’s death, not merely to relieve pain. Melanie, Dr 
Blackburn said, ‘made it very clear that she didn’t want to live.’ He confirmed in the 
interview that her pain could have been controlled with a lesser dosage of drugs:
KG: So could you have ... given her less of the [Midazolam-morphine] and still controlled her pain but 
she would have taken longer to die?
TB: Yep.
KG: So the pain could have been controlled with a lesser dose?
TB: Yep
KG: So maybe a day ...
TB: Yeah, A week 
KG: Rather than hours...
TB: A week, yeah. A week, two weeks. ... She just wanted to go to sleep ... She didn’t want to wake
28up.
Further questioning made clear that one of the intentions -  or ‘goals’ -  underlying Dr 
Blackburn’s provision of pain relief to Melanie was to cause her death:
TB: ... the prime goal [is] the person’s comfort and dignity.
KG: That’s the prime goal. Would you say that equally your goal in that example was to hasten her 
death?
TB: Definitely that was my goal.
KG: OK.
TB: Which I don’t have any trouble with. Some people do.29
B Joshua
The death of another patient, Joshua, also suggests the presence of an intent to kill. Again, 
Dr Blackburn’s account makes it clear that his method of achieving death is to gradually 
increase the intravenous dose of Midazolam-morphine so that the patient’s respiratory 
function is suppressed. Dr Blackburn was more explicit in describing his intention in Joshua’s
29
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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case: ‘he had decided that it was time for him to die and so we exponentially went up with the 
Midazolam-morphine every 12 hours.’30 Dr Blackburn related how a nurse challenged the use 
of this medication. The nurse said to him: ‘He appears to be comfortable and what you are 
doing is prematurely hastening his death.” 1 Dr Blackburn did not answer the nurse’s question 
directly. But in the interview he agreed that Joshua’s pain was under control and the 
increasing doses were given with the intent to hasten death:
KG: At that stage when you ... [increased] the dose, his symptoms were under control, he was 
comfortable ...
TB: More or less, yeah ...
KG: And you increased the dose to hasten his death?
TB: Yeah.32
Like Melanie, while the underlying MND was a cause of Joshua’s death, Dr Blackburn’s 
description indicates that the Midazolam-morphine was likely a substantial and significant 
cause. Therefore, because both the physical and mental elements of murder appear to have 
been present in the cases of Melanie and Joshua, I argue that their deaths may amount to the 
offence of murder.
My interviews disclosed other instances where the administration of Midazolam-morphine 
hastened the death of patients and was arguably a legal cause of those deaths. While the 
doctors and nurses involved knew that death was the possible or probable outcome of the 
drug, in these cases it was not their intention to cause death, but to relieve pain. In part V I 
argue that double effect reasoning highlights the bright line between euthanasia and the legal 
use of pain relieving drugs in clinical practice. Despite persistent criticism, I demonstrate that 
double effect reasoning is ethically defensible and consonant with established criminal law 
principles.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 T U i / l
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IV THE ADMINISTRATION OF PAIN RELIEVING MEDICATION WITH THE 
KNOWLEDGE IT WILL PROBABLY HASTEN DEATH
A Types o f Palliation at the Chronic Care Unit
The Unit’s medical staff explained that MND produces different types of pain and 
discomfort, including a sensation of gagging or choking in patients who cannot cough up 
secretions, as well as muscular ache due to their immobility. As respiratory function fails, 
patients experience considerable anxiety. Thus in the final stages of death, opioids are used to 
relieve the distress of breathlessness and improve the effectiveness of mechanical ventilation. 
This can take place in the patient’s home or in a hospice. Alternatively, patients may be 
admitted to the acute care ward of the hospital under the care of Dr Blackburn.
Patients may also need relief from the discomfort of thirst and hunger which occurs after the 
removal of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) tube, used to deliver food and 
fluids directly to the stomach. In a case that I describe in more detail in the next chapter, 
Jackie was initially given a long lasting narcotic, Duragesic, via a skin patch, after the 
withdrawal of her PEG. Dr Blackburn explained that as Jackie became more unsteady on her 
feet, she was given an infusion of Midazolam-morphine which he thought had the effect of 
hastening death.
B Views o f Clinical Staff
Dr Nixon, a palliative care specialist, pointed out that pain relieving medication will not 
necessarily accelerate the death of every patient.34 Research indicates that the tendency of 
opioids like morphine to hasten death has been overestimated and that even in high doses, 
opioids do not effect a patient’s survival. ' However, the experience of the Chronic Care Unit 
staff is that pain relief will suppress the respiratory drive in some patients and thus hasten
33 Ibid.
34 Interview with Colin Nixon (10 December 2007).
35 Daniel Azoulay et al, 'Opioids, Survival, and Advanced Cancer in the Hospice Setting' (2011) 12 Journal o f 
the American Medical Directors Association 129;P D Good, P J Ravenscroft and J Cavenagh, 'Effects of 
Opioids and Sedatives on Survival in an Australian Inpatient Palliative Care Population' (2005) 35 Internal 
Medicine Journal 512; Danuta Mendelson, 'Euthanasia' in Russell G Smith (ed), Health Care, Crime and 
Regulatory Control (Hawkins Press, 1998) 149, 150-151. Some palliative care specialists argue that good 
palliative care need never accelerate a patient’s death: see, eg, Michael Ashby, 'The Fallacies o f Death 
Causation in Palliative Care' (1997) 166 Medical Journal o f Australia 191.
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death, usually by a matter of hours or days. The potential of hastening death was accepted as 
sometimes necessary to achieve symptom relief. For example, Dr Richards, another palliative 
care specialist, explained: ‘If the intent is to relieve suffering and the doses that are given are 
proportionate ... if it happens to hasten their life by a matter of hours or minutes or whatever, 
that’s perfectly fine.’36
The administration of drugs in these circumstances thus lacked the intent to cause death, one 
of the mental states that could constitute the crime of murder. Dr Sanger highlighted that it is 
the intention to cause death which would be problematic, remarking: ‘I recognise that there is 
that secondary effect of the morphine [to hasten death]. But if you’re giving it with the 
intention of also hastening death, then ... I don’t agree with that.’ Thus, hastening death was 
not their purpose in administering the drugs, but it was a foreseen -  and sometimes probable 
-  secondary effect.
V DOUBLE EFFECT REASONING
A Definition
In justifying their administration of pain relief which hastens death in such circumstances, the 
interviewees were implicitly drawing on double effect reasoning. According to this 
philosophical approach, it is morally acceptable to act in a way that one foresees will result in 
bad consequences provided that the following conditions are satisfied:
the bad consequences occur only as side-effects to the intended purpose (that is, whilst 
the actor must not intend the bad consequences, he or she may foresee them); 
the intended purpose must itself be morally good or (at the very least) morally neutral; 
the bad consequences must not be a means of achieving the good end (that is the 
intended purpose); and
38the bad consequences must not be so serious as to outweigh the good effect.
36 Interview with Elizabeth Richards (6 February 2008).
37 Interview with Simone Sanger (12 December 2007).
38 Double effect reasoning (sometimes referred to as ‘the doctrine of double effect’ or ‘the principle of double 
effect’) is usually attributed to Thomas Aquinas in his discussion of self-defence: see John Finnis, Aquinas: 
Moral, Political and Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 1998) 275-278. Despite its origins in Roman 
Catholic moral philosophy, double effect reasoning is still relevant in contemporary secular societies: ‘double­
effect reasoning is not a religious doctrine. The ... intuitive support given double effect by common morality ...
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TIhe last of these criteria requires that the bad consequences be proportionate to the good 
achieved. This involves a ‘weighing up’ of the consequences involved. When the good 
sought cannot justify or outweigh the bad effects of an action, then one should avoid acting 
even though the bad side-effects are unintended.
Sulmasy and Pellegrino explain that administering pain relief such as morphine with the 
foresight that it will hasten death is licit according to double effect reasoning because: it is 
not immoral to administer morphine; the morphine is administered with the intention of 
relieving pain (not with the intention of killing the patient); the morphine does not need to 
first kill the patient in order to relieve pain; and the relief of pain is a sufficiently noble end to 
justify the risk of hastening death.39
B The Distinction Between Intended and Foreseen Consequences
The distinction between intention and foresight of consequences -  essential to double effect 
reasoning and central to the interviewees’ views on the use of pain relief -  has been widely 
criticised. There is no scope here to offer a comprehensive defence of the distinction because 
the literature about double effect reasoning is complex and wide ranging.40 In essence, the 
distinction lies in the nature of one’s commitment to the consequences of one’s conduct:
One commits oneself to the intended results of one’s chosen actions or omissions in a way in which one 
is not in general committed to the foreseen consequences of one’s actions or omissions. It is in the 
nature of that commitment to be character-shaping and therefore of crucial moral significance.41
and the weight given to double effect by contemporary secular philosophers ... indicate its non-religious 
character. It is simply a non-consequentialist way of thinking about hard cases.’ T A Cavanaugh, Double-Effect 
Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil (Oxford University Press, 2006) 184-185. See also Daniel P 
Sulmassy, ‘’Reinventing’ the Rule of Double Effect’ in Bonnie Steinbock (ed), The Oxford Handbook of 
Bioethics (Oxford University Press, 2007) 114.
39 D P Sulmasy and Edmund Pellegrino, 'The Rule of Double Effect: Clearing up the Double Talk' (1999) 159 
Archives o f Internal Medicine 545, 550. Cf. Roger Magnusson, 'The Devil's Choice: Re-Thinking Law, Ethics 
and Symptom Relief in Palliative Care' (2006) 34 Journal o f Law, Medicine and Ethics 559, 561.
40 For a representation of the debate see the exchange between John Harris (who criticises double effect 
reasoning) and John Finnis (who defends it): John Finnis, 'A Philosophical Case against Euthanasia' in John 
Keown (ed), Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 
1995) 23; John Finnis, 'The Fragile Case for Euthanasia: a Reply to John Harris' in John Keown (ed), 
Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 46; John 
Harris, 'The Philosophical Case against the Philosophical Case against Euthanasia' in John Keown (ed), 
Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 36.
41 Luke Gormally, 'The Living Will: the Ethical Framework of a Recent Report' in Luke Gormally (ed), The 
Dependent Elderly: Autonomy, Justice and Quality o f Care (Cambridge University Press, 1992) 53 .
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Thus the law has long accepted a distinction between intended and foreseen consequences42 
which delineates the different degrees of moral and legal responsibility which can be 
assigned to human conduct. As Finnis explains:
To choose ... is essentially to adopt a plan or proposal which one has put to oneself in one’s practical 
reasoning and deliberation on the merits of alternative options ...Whatever ... is included within one’s 
chosen plan or proposal, whether as its end or as a means to that end, is intended ... 43
Moral norms (such as the norm against murder) exclude the choice (or intent) to harm or 
impede goods (whether as a means or as an end) that are fundamental to human flourishing. 
Theorists have identified fundamental goods to include not just life itself, but also, for 
example, the contemplation of truth and beauty, knowledge, friendship and the exercise of 
choice.44 As Cavanaugh highlights, double effect reasoning ‘reflects the unique status of 
persons as ends-in-themselves, a status that refers to and makes demands upon the intentions 
constituting acts. ' 45 According to this view, intentional killing, whether of another person or 
oneself, is wrong because it amounts to a choice to treat a human being as a mere means to 
some further objective.46
Yet while it is always within a person’s power to refrain from the choice (in other words, 
intent) to harm a fundamental good in a person, every choice to pursue one particular 
fundamental good necessarily involves the choice not to pursue another. ‘Thus every choice 
we make involves a diminishing or at least a non-enhancing of some basic goods as a side- 
effect of what we directly (intentionally) do. ’47
In other words, according to double effect reasoning, it is sometimes appropriate to accept 
harms caused as side-effects of one’s choice and thus recognise ‘the inevitable limits we face
42 See, eg, Crabbed 1985) 156 CLR 464; R v Moloney [1985] AC 905; R v Hancock , R v Shankland [1986] AC 
455; and the analysis of Glenys Williams, Intention and Causation in Medical Non-Killing (Routledge- 
Cavendish, 2007) 11-14.
43 John Finnis, 'Intention and Side-Effects' in R G Frey and Christopher W Morris (eds), Liability and 
Responsibility: Essays in Law and Morals (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 32. See also John Finnis, 
'Intention in Tort Faw' in David G Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations o f Tort Law (Oxford University Press, 
1997) 229.
44 Gormally, ‘The Living Will: the Ethical Framework of a Recent Report’, above n 41, 64; See also John 
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 1980) 85.
45 Cavanaugh,above n 38,162.
46 See, eg, John Finnis, 'The "Value Of Human Life" and "The Right To Death": Some Reflections on Cruzan 
and Ronald Dworkin' (1993) 17 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 559, 569-570.
47 Patrick Lee and Robert P George, Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 157.
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as rational agents.’48 In certain circumstances a person is caught between the proverbial ‘rock 
and a hard place’: while the intended purpose of their conduct is morally good (for example 
the relief of pain), bad effects (such as hastening death) are unavoidable. Double effect 
reasoning guides decision making when conduct has both good and bad effects.49
Thus the philosophical tradition which underpins the intention/ foresight distinction does not 
discount the significance of consequences or effects. But unlike the theory of 
consequentialism, it does not regard consequences as paramount in decision making.80 
Instead it upholds ‘the moral primacy of intention’,51 an approach to responsibility which 
‘takes seriously the moral psychology or moral character of the one who acts.’ In sum, I 
argue that double effect reasoning rests on sound -  albeit contested -  philosophical and 
ethical foundations which justify the use of pain relief in circumstances when death is 
foreseen but not intended.
4X Finnis, ‘A Philosophical Case against Euthanasia’, above n 40, 30.
49 The application of double effect reasoning does not always permit choices which have bad side-effects. 
Sometimes an option should be rejected because accepting the side-effects would be equally harmful, unjust or 
unfaithful: Finnis, ‘Intention and Side-Effects’, above n 43, 63.
50 A review of the massive literature on consequentialism is beyond the scope of this chapter. It is a highly 
contested moral theory, but it dominates contemporary bioethics. For a range of views see, eg, Peter Singer, 
Practical Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1993); Helga Kuhse, The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine: 
A Critique (Clarendon Press, 1987); John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (Georgetown University Press, 1983); 
David S Oderberg, Applied Ethics: A Non-Consequentialist Approach (Blackwell Publishers, 2000).
51 David S Oderberg, Moral Theory: A Non-Consequentialist Approach (Blackwell Publishers, 2000) 88. The 
moral argument that condemns euthanasia as a kind of intentional killing does not condemn the longing some 
people have for death. Intention is not the same as desire in the sense of an appeal to one’s feelings: see Finnis, 
‘Intention and Side-Effects’, above n 43, 35. Thus whether a consequence or side-effect is desired or undesired 
is irrelevant. Side-effects may even be welcomed as a “bonus” without being intended: see Rachael Patterson 
and Katrina George, 'Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: A Liberal Approach Versus the Traditional Moral View' 
(2005) 12 Journal o f Law and Medicine 494, 506.
52 Helen McCabe, 'End-of-Life Decision-Making, the Principle of Double Effect, and the Devil’s Choice: A 
Response to Roger Magnusson' (2008) 16 Journal o f Law and Medicine 74, 75.
28
C Double Effect and the Common Law
1 Recognised by the Courts
English cases reflect double effect reasoning and there is consensus among legal scholars that 
double effect reasoning does form part of the English common law.53 The cases make clear 
that if medication is administered with the intention to relieve the patient’s pain (not with the 
intent to cause death) and the patient dies as a result, the act is lawful, even if the doctor or 
healthcare worker foresees that the drugs will hasten death.
In the first English case which, as Huxtable notes, ‘effectively enshrined the ... doctrine of 
double effect in law’,54 Dr Adams was charged with the murder of an elderly patient.55 Expert 
medical evidence stated that there was no clinical justification for the level of palliation 
administered to the patient in her final days, although this was challenged by the defence. Dr 
Adams was acquitted, presumably because the prosecution failed to prove that he had 
administered the drugs with the intent to kill, rather than with the intent to palliate.56 Devlin J 
drew on double effect reasoning: he directed the jury that palliation with the incidental effect 
of shortening life could be permissible, while ruling out the intentional termination of life:
If the first purpose o f medicine, the restoration of health, can no longer be achieved, there is still much 
for a doctor to do and he is entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering, 
even if the measures he takes may incidentally shorten life. ... But . . .  no doctor, nor any man, no more 
in the case o f the dying than o f the healthy, has the right deliberately to cut the thread of life.57
In R v Arthur a doctor was acquitted of attempted murder after ordering the non-treatment 
and sedation of a newborn with Downs Syndrome. Addressing the jury, Farquharson J
53 See, eg, Andrew McGee, 'Double Effect in the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld): A Critical Appraisal' (2005) 4 Law 
and Justice Journal 46, 48; Richard Huxtable, 'Get Out of Jail Free? The Doctrine of Double Effect in English 
Law' (2004) 18 Palliative Medicine 62, 63; Ben P White, Lindy Willmott and Michael Ashby, 'Palliative Care, 
Double Effect and the Law in Australia' (2011) 41 Internal Medicine Journal 485.
54 Richard Huxtable, 'Logical Separation? Conjoined Twins, Slippery Slopes and Resource Allocation' (2001) 
23(4) Journal o f Social Welfare and Family Law 459, 467.
55 R v Adams (Bodkin) [1957] Crim Law Rev 365, 375.
56 White, Willmott and Ashby, above n 53, 488. There is evidence that Dr Adams ‘eased the passing’ of up to 
400 of his elderly women patients, 132 o f whom listed him as a beneficiary in their will: Herbert G Kinnell, 
'Serial Homicide by Doctors: Shipman in Perspective' (2000) 321 British Medical Journal 1594, 1596.
57 R v Adams (Bodkin) [1957] Crim Law Rev 365, 375.
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characterised the ‘excessive’ use of drugs with the intent to kill as murder. In an implicit 
reference to double effect reasoning, he distinguished this from appropriate palliation:
Where, perhaps, somebody is suffering from the agonies of terminal cancer and the doctor is obliged to 
give increasing dosages of an analgesic to relieve the pain, there comes a point where the amounts of 
those doses are such that in themselves they will kill off the patient; but he is driven to it on medical 
grounds. There again, you will, undoubtedly say that that could never be murder. That would be a 
proper practise of medicine.58
Double effect reasoning is evident in a number of subsequent United Kingdom cases. In Re J  
(A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) (‘Re f ) ,  the Court of Appeal held that the 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from a baby with severe brain damage was permitted. 
Lord Donaldson stated:
What doctors and the court have to decide is whether, in the best interests of the child patient, a 
particular decision as to medical treatment should be taken which as a side effect will render death 
more or less likely. This is not a matter of semantics. It is fundamental. At the other end of the age 
spectrum, the use of drugs to reduce pain will often be fully justified, notwithstanding that this will 
hasten the moment of death. What can never be justified is the use of drugs or surgical procedures with 
the primary purpose of doing so.59
In R v Cox, a doctor was convicted of attempted murder after administering a large dose of 
undiluted potassium chloride to a patient who was near death. In instructing the jury, Ognall J 
stated:
If ... it was, or may have been, his primary purpose in acting as he did to alleviate her pain and 
suffering, then he is not guilty. That is so even though he recognises that, in fulfilling that primary 
purpose, he might or even would hasten the moment of her death.60
Consistent with the double effect proviso I highlighted above, that bad consequences (in this 
situation, death) must not be a means of achieving the good end (pain relief), the judge in Cox 
noted that to ‘shorten life intentionally ... is unlawful, even though it may be the only means 
of alleviating the patient's suffering or pain.’61
58 R v Arthur (1981) 12 BMLR 1,5.
59 [1991] Fam 33, 46. Similar observations were made by Balcombe LJ at 51 and Taylor LJ at 53.
60 R v Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38, 41.Dr Cox was convicted of attempted murder.
61 Ibid 42.
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Double effect reasoning also finds expression in at least one judgement in Bland, where the 
House of Lords ruled that life-sustaining treatment could be withdrawn from a patient in a 
persistent vegetative state because the treatment was not in his best interests. Lord Goff of 
Chieveley saw double effect reasoning as underpinning the best interests test which was 
central to the court’s decision. He referred to
the established rule that a doctor may, when caring for a patient who is, for example, dying of cancer, 
lawfully administer painkilling drugs despite the fact that he knows that an incidental effect of that 
application will be to abbreviate the patient's life. Such a decision may properly be made as part of the 
care of the living patient, in his best interests; and, on this basis, the treatment will be lawful.03
In Regina (Pretty) v Director o f Public Prosecutions (‘ Pretty') the House of Lords dismissed 
the appeal of a woman with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis who had sought immunity from 
prosecution for her husband, should he assist her suicide.64 Referring to ‘the existing position 
under English law’, Lord Steyn said that ‘[ujnder the double effect principle medical 
treatment may be administered to a terminally ill person to alleviate pain although it may 
hasten death ... This principle entails a distinction between foreseeing an outcome and 
intending it. ’ 65
Although double effect reasoning mostly finds expression in United Kingdom case law, 66 it 
has been employed in Canada.67 In the United States, ‘double effect analysis is a pervasive, 
albeit generally unacknowledged, principle employed regularly in American case law’, 
particularly in constitutional rights cases about assisted suicide.69 Skene states that 
‘[although there is no Australian case law directly on point, there seems little doubt that the
62 [1993] AC 789.
63 Bland [ 1993] AC 789, 867.
64 [2002] 1 AC 800.
65 Ibid 831.
66 Ian Kerridge, Michael Lowe and Cameron Stewart, Ethics and Law for the Health Professions (Federation 
Press, 2009) 648.
07 In Rodriguez v British Colombia (Attorney General) [1993] 3 SCR 519, the Supreme Court held the criminal 
prohibition of assisted suicide was constitutional. Sopinka J (with the majority concurring) employed double 
effect reasoning when he distinguished between intention and side-effect: ‘ in the case of palliative care the 
intention is to ease pain, which has the effect of hastening death, while in the case of assisted suicide, the 
intention is undeniably to cause death’: at [57].
08 Edward C Lyons, 'In Incognito: The Principle of Double Effect in American Constitutional Law' (2005) 57 
Florida Law Review 469, 473.
69 In Vacco v Quill 521 US 793, 802 (1997), for example, the court distinguished assisted suicide (where the 
doctor must intend the patient’s death) from permissible medical care ‘when a doctor provides aggressive 
palliative care; in some cases, painkilling drugs may hasten a patient's death, but the physician's purpose and 
intent is, or maybe, only to ease his patient's pain’; see also Washington v Glucksberg, 521 US 702 (1997).
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principle forms part of Australian law, due to its widespread acceptance in other 
jurisdictions.’ The 2011 decision in Baby D (No 2) appears to be the first reported 
Australian case explicitly to express double effect reasoning.71 Justice Young of the Family 
Court supported the decision to remove an endotracheal tube from a newborn with serious 
disabilities. He also held that it was in the baby’s best interests to sedate her to alleviate the 
pain of respiratory distress. The judge accepted evidence that the suppression of her breathing 
and possible acceleration of death was a ‘double effect’ of palliation but that this was 
permissible as good medical practice.
2 Legal Status o f Double Effect Reasoning
While it is clear, therefore, that double effect reasoning is recognised by the common law in 
the context of end-of life-care, its exact status in the law is debated. There are three key 
explanations for the legal status of double effect reasoning and its relevance to end-of-life 
decisions: first, that double effect undermines the causation element of murder; secondly, that 
it undermines the mental state of murder; and thirdly, that it provides a defence to murder. 
Below, I will argue that double effect reasoning is best understood as a defence.
(a) The Causation Explanation
One explanation which finds support in R v Adams73 is that the administration of palliative 
sedation does not constitute a cause of the patient’s death. According to Devlin’s directions to 
the jury, ‘[t]he cause of death is the illness or injury, and the proper treatment that is 
administered and that has an incidental effect on determining the exact moment of death is 
not the cause of death in any sensible use of the term.’74 I have already referred to research 
which shows that palliative drugs rarely shorten the survival of patients. However, as 
Otlowski asserts, ‘it is simply legal sophistry to say that this is never the relevant cause of 
death in law.’75
70 Loane Skene, Law and Medical Practice: Rights, Duties, Claims and Defences (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
2008) 303. See also White, Willmott and Ashby, above n 53, 487.
71 [2011] Fam CA 176.
72 Baby D (No 2) [2011] Fam CA 176, [81], [97], [139],
73 R v Adams (Bodkin) [1957] Crim Law Rev 365.
74 Quoted in Glanville Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (Faber & Faber, 1956) 289.
Glanville Williams provides a transcript of the instructions to the jury. This quotation is not reported in the 
Criminal Law Review, see R v Adams (Bodkin) [1957] Crim Law Rev 365.
75 Otlowski, above n 13, 182.
32
Under the criminal law, the doctor’s act would not need to be the factual cause of death in 
order to constitute murder; rather, it need only be a substantial or significant cause of death.76 
As Grubb says, ‘[a]t best, therefore, this argument must have it that the doctor's action while 
a cause in fact is not a cause in law.' The argument that palliative sedation is lawful because 
the factual cause of death is ignored for legal purposes is unsatisfactory: it tends to disguise 
the policy reasons and value judgments that are involved in the assessment. As I will argue 
below, it is more transparent to consider those policy and value judgements as relevant to 
double effect as a justificatory defence.
(b) The Mental State Explanation
Another view is that double effect reasoning undermines the mental state of murder because 
doctors who administer drugs for the purpose of palliation, while sometimes foreseeing death 
as a result, do not intend to kill. But, critics argue, if death is foreseen as the almost certain 
result of palliation, legally this is equivalent to intent: double effect therefore conflicts with 
established principles. As Magnusson expresses it, in criminal law ‘consequences that are 
virtually certain to follow from one’s voluntary actions will be treated as intended.’76 This is
incorrect and, as I will explain, is based on what has emerged to be a misdirection in the
80English case of R v Woollin, unfortunately repeated in Re A (the Conjoined Twins case).
(i) Virtual Certainty Is Not the Same as Intent
The weight of case law is clear: if death is the virtually certain consequence of an act or 
omission, the jury should be directed that it is entitled to infer that the defendant intended to 
kill.81 Indeed the courts have long affirmed the jury’s discretion in determining, on the
76 Royall v R (1991) 172 CLR 378; R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279. Quilter takes a similar approach, 
pointing out that a doctor’s act is just one part of the causal story: John Quilter, ‘Killing and Letting Die: 
Philosophical Ethics in Theory and Common Sense in Practice’ (Paper presented at the Australasian Association 
for Professional and Applied Ethics Conference, Newcastle, August 1993).
77 Andrew Grubb, 'Attempted Murder of Terminally-Ill Patient' (1993) 1 Medical Law Review 232, 234.
78 See, eg, P D G Skegg, Law, Ethics and Medicine (Clarendon Press, 1988) 136; Glenys Williams, above n 42, 
106.
7l) Magnusson, above n 39, 562. See also, eg, Suzanne Ost, ‘Euthanasia and the Defence of Necessity: 
Advocating a More Appropriate Legal Response’ [2005] Criminal Law Review 355, 355; Grubb, above n 77, 
233; Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart, above n 66, who state that ‘[foreseeing death is intending’: at 649.
811 R v Woollin [1998]4 All ER 103 (‘ Woollin')', Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] 
Fam 147 (‘Re A’).
81 RvMoloney [1985] AC 905; RvNedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025; R v Walker andHayles{\9%9) 90 Cr App R 
226. See also Glenys Williams, above n 42, 11-13.
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evidence, a defendant’s subjective state of mind. For example, in the 1985 case of R v 
Moloney, the defendant discharged a shot gun directly at the deceased.82 The court set down 
guidelines on what constitutes the mental element of murder. It stated that foresight of 
consequences is a matter of evidence, not of substantive law. Lord Hailsham expressed
the pious hope that your Lordships will not again have to decide that foresight and foreseeability are not 
the same thing as intention although either may give rise to an irresistible inference of such, and that 
matters which are essentially to be treated as matters of inference for a jury as to a subjective state of 
mind will not once again be erected into a legal presumption. They should remain, what they always 
should have been, part of the law of evidence and inference to be left to the jury after a proper direction 
as to their weight, and not part of the substantive law.83
The following year in R v Nedricks4 the Court of Appeal again affirmed the jury’s discretion 
in determining the presence or otherwise of intent. Lord Lane CJ observed that
if the Jury are satisfied that at the material time the defendant recognised that death or serious harm 
would be virtually certain ... to result from his voluntary act, then that is a fact from which they may 
find it easy to infer that he intended to kill ...Where a man realises that it is for all practical purposes 
inevitable that his actions will result in death or serious harm, the inference may be irresistible that he 
intended that result, however little he may have desired or wished it to happen. The decision is one for 
the Jury to be reached upon a consideration of all the evidence.’85
In R v Walker the Court of Appeal again stated that foresight was an issue from which the 
jury could infer intent, a matter of evidence and not of substantive law.86 This was again
87confirmed five years later in R v Seal ley.
Although Lord Steyn in Woollin did review these cases and purported to follow the 
accepted jury direction, as Williams recounts he ‘then totally misunderstood its meaning by 
confirming that “[its] effect ... is that a result foreseen as virtually certain is an intended 
result”.’89
82 R v  Moloney [1985] AC 905.
83Ibid 913.
84 [1986] 1 WLR 1025
85 R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025, 1028 (emphasis added).
86Äv Walker (1990) 90 Cr App R 226, 231, 233.
87 [1995] Crim L R 504.
88 Woollin [1998]4 All ER 103.
S‘J Glenys Williams, above n 42, 13, quoting ibid 110. See also Glenys Williams and Gavin Dingwell, 'Inferring 
Intention' (2004) 55 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 69, 72.
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This error was maintained by two of the three judges in the Conjoined Twins case where the 
court approved an operation to separate ‘Siamese’ twins which would inevitably result in the 
death of Mary, one of the babies.90 Ward LJ thought the court was bound by Woollin:
The test I have to set myself is that established by that case. I have to ask myself whether I am satisfied 
that the doctors recognise that death ... will be virtually certain ... to result from carrying out this 
operation. If so, the doctors intend to kill ...It is common ground that they appreciate that death to 
Mary would result ... Unpalatable though it may be ... to stigmatise the doctors with "murderous 
intent", that is what in law they will have if they perform the operation and Mary dies as a result.91
Similarly, Brooke LJ considered Woollin as authoritative and concluded that ‘an English 
court would inevitably find that the surgeons intended to kill Mary, however little they 
desired that end, because her death would be the virtually certain consequence of their
A Court of Appeal case, R v Mathews and Alleyne, has since gone some way to redress the 
error.9’ Considering the effect of Woollin, Rix LJ held that ‘the law has not yet reached a 
definition of intent in murder in terms of appreciation of a virtual certainty ...’ and rejected 
the proposition that Woollin laid down a substantive rule of law.94 Rather, Rix LJ again 
affirmed that the accepted jury direction was a rule of evidence.95
Thus when foresight of death is virtually certain, and when as a result a jury is entitled -  but 
not compelled -  to infer that the accused intended to kill, there is no inconsistency between 
double effect and the criminal law. In situations where palliative sedation is administered, a 
properly instructed jury could and should conclude that there was no intent to kill. As Norrie 
says, the word ‘entitled' is ‘permissive rather than obligatory.’96 This has been recognised by 
the United Kingdom Law Commission in its 2005 review of the law of homicide. In its final 
report, the Commission stated that ‘the following rule has been developed at common law. 
The jury may -  but not must -  find that the defendant (“D”) intended the result if D thought it
90 Re A [2001] Fam 147, 199 (Ward LJ), 252 (Brooke LJ).
91 Ibid 198-199.
92 Ibid 216.
93 [2003] WL 117062. See also Glenys Williams and Dingwell, above n 89; Charles Foster et al, The Double 
Effect Effect' (2011) 20 Cambridge Quarterly o f Healthcare Ethics 56, 65.
94 R v Mathews and Alleyne [2003] WL 117062, 10.
95 This view also finds expression in an earlier House of Lords decision: R v Moloney [1985] AC 905.
96 Alan Norrie, 'After Woollin' [1999] Criminal Law Review 532, 537.
97 The Law Commission, above n 10, 103.
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would be a certain consequence ... of his or her actions... ’ The Commission noted that ‘this 
approach gives the jury an element of discretion’.99
(ii) Why the Mental State Explanation Fails
While the foresight that death is the virtually certain consequence of one’s action is not 
automatically equated with intent in the criminal law, the mental state explanation fails for 
different reasons. First, as I have explained, double effect reasoning encompasses more than 
just the intention/foresight distinction: there is also the fourth essential requirement of 
proportionality. Thus when the good sought does not outweigh the bad effects of an action, 
then a moral actor should avoid doing that action, even though the bad side-effects are merely 
foreseen, not intended.100
There is also a second reason why the mental state explanation does not account for the 
operation of double effect. As I have argued, although foresight of virtually certain death is 
not automatically the equivalent of intent, in some jurisdictions foresight of probable death, 
while distinct from intent, is an alternative mental state for murder. As I explained at the 
beginning of this chapter, jurisdictions which recognise this alternative mental state include 
New South Wales but do not include the United Kingdom. It follows that if a doctor is to 
avoid a conviction of murder in those jurisdictions for administering palliative sedation with 
the foresight of probable death, then or she will need to plead a defence, since the mental 
state for murder will be proved.
(c) The Defence Explanation
A better explanation for the lawfulness of palliative sedation emerges from a joint judgement 
of the Australian High Court. Crabbe established that there are exceptional situations when a 
person who does foresee probable death will not be guilty of murder.101 Although Crabbe’s 
case did not concern medical treatment, obiter comment points to the third -  and correct -  
explanation for the status of double effect in law: that it acts as a justificatory defence.
,x The Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, Report No 304 (2006) 55.
99 Ibid 57.
100 If there is a proportionate reason (such as pain relief) for pursuing the bad effect, this could also support the 
inference that there was no intent to kill. Thus the criterion of proportionality also acts as a safeguard that can 
guide a jury’s deliberations about the presence or absence of intent.
101 (1985) 156 CLR464.
36
In an implicit reference to double effect reasoning, the court said that a person can in some 
circumstances be ‘justified or excused by law’ when they do an act knowing that it will 
probably cause death. The court gave the example of a ‘surgeon who competently performs a 
hazardous but necessary operation [and] is not criminally liable if the patient dies, even if the 
surgeon foresaw that his death was probable. . . . ,ll)2 The court explained that ‘... in deciding 
whether an act is justifiable its social purpose or social utility is important . . . ,103 This is 
suggestive of one of the conditions of double effect reasoning: the good effect of the 
administration of sedation should be proportionate to the bad effect. In a strong indication 
that double effect does operate as a defence, the court said ‘[i]t should ... be made clear that 
lack of social purpose is not an element of the mental state ... though it may bear on the 
question whether the act is justifiable.’ 104
On this reasoning, the ‘social utility’ of assuring adequate pain relief for the sick and dying 
provides an excuse or justification for a doctor acting with the foresight of probable death. As 
Otlowski suggests, in ‘the present medico-legal environment, it is quite possible that the 
courts would accept that the need to minimize pain and suffering is paramount and that a 
defence to homicide is thus made out. ’ 105 However, contrary to some commentary, 106 the 
relevant defence is not necessity because as I now explain, the defence of necessity is 
incompatible with double effect reasoning.
(i) The Defence Is Not Necessity
Although its limits are not readily defined, the defence of necessity does form part of the 
common law. According to an often quoted exposition of the doctrine from Stephen’s 
Digest, necessity operates to excuse a crime if it was done only to avoid consequences which 
would have inflicted ‘inevitable and irreparable evil’ upon the accused or others whom the
102 Ibid 470.
103 Ibid; See also Brent Fisse, Howard's Criminal Law (Lawbook, 5th ed, 1990) 62-63, 490.
104 Crabbe (1985) 156 CLR 464, 470.
105 Otlowski, above n 13, 181.
106 See, eg, Glanville Williams, above n 74, 324; Magnusson, above n 39, 566; Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart, 
above n 66,652.
107 See, eg, In re F  (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1 ; R v Bournewood Community and Mental 
Health Trust, E xp  L [1999] 1 AC 458; Re A [2001] Fam 147.
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accused was bound to protect; that no more was done than was reasonably necessary; and the
108evil inflicted was not disproportionate to the evil avoided.
At first glance necessity might sound very similar to double effect. The last requirement of 
proportionality is suggestive of double effect’s requirement that the bad consequences should 
not outweigh the good effect. However, double effect reasoning is about more than just 
avoiding bad or evil consequences: it requires the purposeful choice of a morally good (or at 
least neutral) outcome. Moreover, the defence of necessity lacks what I have argued is the 
morally significant distinction between intended and foreseen consequences, a distinction 
central to double effect reasoning. Necessity therefore could excuse the deliberate infliction 
of morally bad consequences, as long as they were proportionate to the bad consequences 
which are avoided as a result: in other words, the choice of the lesser evil. 109
This is strikingly evident in the Conjoined Twins case where there were many references to 
Mary’s death being the ‘lesser of two evils’ . 110 The court reasoned that even without the 
separation, Mary was ‘self-designated for a very early death“ * 111 and her intentional killing 
would be justified because it would avoid the death of Jodie. Dudley v Stephens “ and R v 
Howe'13 were long understood as authority that necessity can never be a defence to murder. 
However, in Conjoined Twins the Court of Appeal distinguished these cases on their facts 
and indicated that necessity could be a defence to murder, at least in some circumstances such 
as those before the court. 114 This completely contradicts double effect reasoning which
108 Lewis Frederick Sturge, Stephen's Digest o f the Criminal Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 9th ed, 1950) ch 2, art 11. 
See also, eg, R v Davidson [1969] VR 667, 670; R v Loughnan [1981] VR443, 448; Re A [2001] Fam 147, 240.
109 For a discussion of necessity as a utilitarian theory see Alan Brudner, 'A Theory of Necessity' (1987) 7 
Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies 339.
110 Re A [2001] Fam 147. For example, Ward LJ said ‘I can see no other way of dealing with it than by choosing 
the lesser of the two evils and so finding the least detrimental alternative’ (at 191) and ‘the law must allow an 
escape through choosing the lesser of the two evils ... the conclusion has to be that the carrying out of the 
operation will be justified as the lesser evil and no unlawful act would be committed’: at 203.
111 Ibid, 252 (Walker LJ).
112 (1884) 14 QBD273.
113 [1987] AC 417.
114 Re A [2001] Fam 147, 224 (Brooke LJ); Ward LJ adopted Brooke’s judgment and ‘his full exposition of the 
law’: at 198. In a Canadian case the Supreme Court left open the possibility that necessity could be a defence to 
homicide: R v Latimer (2001) 193 DLR (4th) 577, 596. In March 2012 the High Court of Justice in London ruled 
that legal action brought by ‘locked-in syndrome’ sufferer, Tony Nicklinson, for a declaration that a doctor 
could lawfully end his life could proceed. Mr Justice Charles ruled that Nicklinson had established an arguable 
case that necessity could provide a defence to a charge of murder and that Re A provided support to his 
argument: Nicklinson v Ministry o f Justice [2012] EWHC 304 (QB). However, in August 2012, the court ruled 
finally against his application. Nicklinson died of natural causes a week later.
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always forbids intentional killing because it amounts to a choice to treat a human being as a 
mere means to an end. 115 As Uniacke explains:
[t]he [doctrine of double effect] arises from a position of moral absolutism -  the view that some types 
of intentional actions are always morally impermissible. Such acts, it is said, cannot be justified 
instrumentally, even as necessary means of achieving a good or legitimate aim.116
(ii) A Justificatory Defence
Therefore, while double effect operates as a defence, it is not the defence of necessity. It 
operates as a common law defence in its own right, as has been widely recognised. 117 Some 
commentators criticise this interpretation of double effect as a defence because it implies that 
doctors are ‘sometimes murderers, albeit justified murderers. ’ 118 However, such criticism 
misconceives the nature of double effect as a defence: it doesn’t ‘overlook’ or merely excuse 
otherwise murderous conduct but justifies and vindicates the decision of a doctor to palliate 
his patient. 119 There has been much debate over many years about the difference between a 
defence that operates as a justification and a defence that operates as an excuse. Moore 
summarises the standard explanation of the justification/ excuse distinction:
[Justifications answer a different moral question than do excuses......When an action is justified, any
prima facie wrongfulness is eliminated by the other (and good) attributes of the action; when an action 
is excused, it is still wrongful but the actor cannot be held responsible for it because she is not 
culpable.121
115 Whether the operation to separate the twins could be justified on a basis other than necessity is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. For some views on this question see, eg, Helen Watt, 'Conjoined Twins: Separation as 
Mutilation' (2001) 9 Medical Law Review 237; Jonathan Rogers, 'Necessity, Private Defence and the Killing of 
Mary' [2001 ] Criminal Law Review 515.
116 Suzanne Uniacke, 'The Doctrine of Double Effect' in Richard E Ashcroft et al (eds), Principles o f Health 
Care Ethics (John Wiley & Sons, 2007) 263, 264.
117 See, eg, Glenys Williams, above n 42, 34; J C Smith, 'A Comment on Moor's Case' [2000] Criminal Law 
Review 41; White, Willmott and Ashby, above n 53, 487; The Law Commission, above n 10, 117.
118 Huxtable, ‘Get Out of Jail Free? The Doctrine of Double Effect in English Law’, above n 53, 62. See also, 
eg, Glenys Williams, above n 42, 193.
119 This is also demonstrates that, contrary to criticism by Glenys Williams, double effect does take into 
consideration the context in which end-of-life decisions are made and the need for a doctor to act in the patient’s 
best interests: Glenys Williams, above n 42, 8.
120 See, eg, George P Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2000); Alan Norrie, Crime, 
Reason and Histoiy: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2001); Paul H Robinson,
'A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability' (1975) 23 UCLA Law Review 
266.
121 Michael S Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory o f the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) 
483. See also Alafair S Burke, 'Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, Out 
of the Battered Woman' (2002) 81 North Carolina Law Review 211, 242-243.
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Thus I argue that double effect is best understood as a justificatory defence. This makes it 
clear that there is nothing wrongful or ‘murderous’ about a doctor providing pain relief, even 
when it incidentally hastens death. To the contrary, as Robinson says, ‘[¡Justified conduct is 
correct behaviour that is encouraged or at least tolerated.’ “ Moreover, as a justification, 
double effect focuses on the act itself (rather than some characteristic of the particular actor 
who is merely excused)124 and thus exempts ‘certain subsets of generally proscribed 
categories of conduct from ... condemnation.’ ‘ In other words, as a justificatory defence, 
double effect does more than just validate a particular treatment decision of an individual 
doctor: it upholds, even encourages, a medical culture where adequate pain relief, even when 
it foreseeably hastens death, is a treatment priority.
3 Manipulation, Inconsistency and Inequality?
(a) Does Double Effect Reasoning Manipulate Causation and Intention?
Double effect reasoning is widely criticised as inconsistent with established criminal law 
principles because, it is argued, it manipulates the concepts of causation and intention to 
legitimate widely accepted medical practices. These criticisms are largely misconceived.
It is true, as I explained above, that explanations that rely on double effect to undermine 
causation are incorrect and use ‘legal sophistry’ to avoid the conclusion that palliation could 
be a cause of the patient’s death. However, such manipulation of causative factors is 
unnecessary when double effect is correctly conceived as a justificatory defence which 
recognises that the elements of murder are indeed present.
Criticisms that double effect reasoning manipulates the concept of intention are based on 
what I have explained was a misdirection in Woollin and a mistaken view that the law 
treats foreseen or virtually certain consequences as the equivalent of intent. As I have
122
122 As Glenys Williams, for example, argues: Glenys Williams, above n 42, 186-187.
122 Paul H Robinson, Criminal Law Defences (West Publishing, 1984) 100.
124 See, eg, Michael Bayles, 'Reconceptualizing Necessity and Duress' (1987) 33 Wayne Law Review 1191, 
1203.
125 Robert F Schopp, Justification Defences and Just Convictions (Cambridge University Press, 1998) 29.
126 See, eg, Otlowski, above n 13, 181; Glenys Williams, above n 42, 31, 110; Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart, 
above n 66, 650.
127 [1999] AC 82.
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explained, when death is foreseen as a virtual certainty, a jury has the discretion to infer the 
presence of intent to kill, but it is not compelled to do so. Thus even if the provision of 
symptom relief is certain to shorten a patient’s life, an intention to do so is not a necessary 
inference.128 This does not mean that the courts ‘manipulate’ the concept of intention to 
achieve a certain result, in sympathy with the motives of doctors. " It simply means that 
intent to cause death may not be an appropriate inference, depending on the evidence. Norrie 
notes that:
there are cases where there is a "moral threshold" such that even though the accused could foresee a 
result as virtually certain, it is so at odds with his moral conception of what he was doing that it could 
not be conceived as a result that he intended.130
It follows that an inference of intent to kill might not be supported by the evidence of a 
physician who is ethically opposed to deliberate killing but in their commitment to palliative 
care administers a dose they know will unavoidably hasten death. Dr Evans, for example, 
then interviewed was adamant that his intention is never to cause death. However, at the same 
time he maintained that ‘[i]f I should administer a dose ... to relieve their pain and at some 
point a dose is reached where their respiratory drive falls and they stop breathing ...that was 
the right dose because they are not in pain anymore.’ This is an approach consistent with 
double effect reasoning.
(b) The Use o f Double Effect Reasoning Does Not Unfairly Favour One Class o f Persons
It has also been claimed that double effect reasoning produces an ‘inequality’ by 
manipulating the intention/ foresight distinction to exculpate one class of persons -  doctors -  
‘simply because of what they do.’ " However, such criticism misunderstands double effect 
reasoning. Huxtable, for example, refers to Woollin where the accused claimed in evidence 
that he had not intended to kill his baby son when he threw him across the room.
128 Cf Magnusson, above n 39, 567.
124 Glenys Williams, above n 42, 16, 17.
130 Norrie, above n 96, 538. An example o f an unintended but virtually certain death is a man blocking the exit 
of an escape ladder on a sinking ship who was pushed off and likely drowned: J C Smith, Justification and 
Excuse in Criminal Law (Stevens, 1989) 73-74 referred to in Norrie, ‘After Woollin’, above n 96, 538.
131 Interview with Paul Evans (18 December 2007).
132 Glenys Williams, above n 42, 34.
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Nevertheless, he was convicted of manslaughter on the basis that he foresaw the child’s death 
as a virtual certainty.133 According to Huxtable, this example ‘evinces ethical inconsistency’ 
in the law because ‘a doctor’s foresight of death can be innocent and a layperson’s foresight 
of death can be culpable.’134
Huxtable’s analysis incorrectly reduces double effect reasoning to the intention/foresight
1 T C
distinction. As I have explained above (and as Huxtable himself notes), double effect 
reasoning rests on more than this distinction and relies on four conditions, including 
proportionality between the good and bad effects. Needless to say, an accused in a case such 
as Woollin would have some difficulty convincing a jury that there was a good reason for 
throwing his baby towards a hard wall, proportionate to the child’s foreseen death.
This does not mean that doctors are treated as a privileged class. The reality is that there are 
limited situations in which the risk of foreseen death could be justified by a proportionately 
good reason. Unlike most laypersons, doctors involved in end-of-life care will often have a 
proportionate reason for the foreseen hastening of death, because dying patients require 
adequate symptom relief.
Moreover, the application of double effect reasoning is not limited to end-of-life decisions. 
Everyday clinical practice presumes the validity of the principle, although its application is 
more often intuited than articulated. For example, even routine general anaesthetic has 
serious, albeit rare, side-effects including stroke, kidney failure and quadriplegia. But these 
bad results are foreseen, not intended, by the surgeon and the benefit of anaesthesia is a 
proportionately serious reason for accepting the very small risk of complications.
In a different context, double effect reasoning is the foundation of the fundamental ethical 
and legal doctrine of self-defence. Thus a person who uses force against an attacker 
foreseeing the probability -  or even certainty -  that the act will kill is justified, provided the
133 Huxtable, ‘Get Out of Jail Free? The Doctrine of Double Effect in English Law’, above n 53, 63-64, referring 
to Woollin [1998]4  All ER 103.
134 Huxtable, ‘Get Out of Jail Free? The Doctrine of Double Effect in English Law’, above n 53, 64.
135 Ibid 62.
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degree of force was proportionate in the circumstances. Others have noted that double
1
effect reasoning, correctly understood, also informs the just-war theory.
(c) Legislative Intervention?
I have argued that double effect reasoning already operates as a common law justificatory 
defence in its own right and stands in harmony with established criminal law principles. 
Nevertheless, the misconceived critique of ‘manipulation5 and ‘inconsistency’ is widely held 
and errors about the meaning of intention, especially when foresight of death is virtually 
certain, extend to the highest levels of the judiciary. To clear up this confusion and to uphold 
the relevance of double effect reasoning in end-of-life decisions, the defence should be 
codified in statute.
Moreover, legislative intervention could help address clinicians’ ignorance of the double 
effect defence and their fear of litigation which can be a barrier to pain management. Despite 
the evidence I highlighted earlier that the life hastening properties of drugs such as morphine 
are exaggerated, there is a strongly held belief among patients, carers and health professionals 
that the use of opioids does hasten death. Studies show that while doctors recognise that 
opioids are effective in treating pain and symptoms such as breathlessness, opioids are often 
not administered or not administered adequately because of concerns about hastening 
death.139
There have been efforts to give statutory expression to double effect reasoning in four 
Australian jurisdictions, most explicitly in South Australia and Queensland. Recognising the 
double effect distinction between an intended effect and a (foreseen) incidental effect, section 
17 of the Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) states that
136 Finnis, Fundamentals o/Ethics, above n 50, 85. According to Aquinas, provided the intention is only to use 
necessary and proportionate force in warding off an unjust attack, the death is unintended. See also Uniacke, 
above n 116. Other commentators see necessity as the basis for self-defence: see, eg, Sir Matthew Hale, The 
History o f  the Pleas o f the Crown (1800) vol I, 51, quoted in Re A [2001] Fam 147, 221, per Brooke LJ.
137 See, eg, Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, above n 38, 284-287.
I 3S Kate Flemming, 'The Use o f Morphine to Treat Cancer-Related Pain: A Synthesis o f Quantitative and 
Qualitative Research' (2010) 39 Journal o f Pain and Symptom Management 139, 146; C M Reid, R Gooberman- 
Hill and G W Hanks, 'Opioid Analgesics for Cancer Pain: Symptom Control for the Living or Comfort for the 
Dying? A Qualitative Study to Investigate the Factors Influencing the Decision to Accept Morphine for Pain 
Caused by Cancer' (2008) 19 Annals o f Oncology 44.
139 M Gott et al, 'The Effect o f the Shipman Murders on Clinician Attitudes to Prescribing Opiates for Dyspnoea 
in End-Stage Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease in England' (2010) 18 Progress in Palliative Care 79.
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medical practitioners who are treating terminally ill patients do not incur civil or criminal 
liability if they administer treatment with the intention of relieving pain, even if an incidental 
effect is to hasten death. Section 18 unequivocally prohibits medical treatment administered 
with the purpose of causing death. Sections 282A(2) and s 282A(3)(a) of the Criminal Code 
1899 (Qld) are of similar effect. This reflects the double effect criterion that the ‘bad effect’ 
cannot be intended.140
These provisions do provide increased legal certainty for medical professionals; however, 
they are also more stringent than the common law defence.141 Whatever the precise form 
double effect legislation would take, the essentials of the codified defence should be this: that 
if a health professional administers medication with the intention to relieve a patient’s pain 
(not with the intent to cause death) and in a manner and dose that is proportionate, and the 
patient dies as a result, the act is lawful, even if the medical professional foresees with 
certainty that the medication will hasten death.
D Intended Consequences and Foreseen Consequences at the End-of-Life:
A Practical Distinction?
1 The Difficulties o f Determining State o f Mind
It is true that the difference between the legal provision of drugs as palliative care and the 
provision of drugs as euthanasia is not always easy to discern. In many cases the difference 
will rest on the intention of the doctor or healthcare worker. As Dr Blackburn’s practice 
suggests, ‘the foresight/ intention distinction can be manipulated at will in a way that permits
140 Legislative provisions in the Australian Capital Territory and Western Australia are arguably indicative of 
double effect reasoning, but with some variation from the classic double effect formulation I outlined earlier. 
Section 17 of the Medical Treatment (Health Directions) Act 2006 (ACT) is very limited in scope and refers 
only to patients with advance directives who have a ‘right to receive relief from pain and suffering to the 
maximum extent that is reasonable in the circumstances.’ There is no suggestion of the double effect distinction 
between intended and foreseen consequences in the ACT legislation, nor is there in section 259(1) of the 
Criminal Code 1913 (WA) which states that there is no criminal responsibility for ‘administering, in good faith 
and with reasonable care and skill, surgical or medical treatment (including palliative care): (a) to another 
person for that other person’s benefit... if the administration of the treatment is reasonable, having regard to the 
patient’s state at the time and to all the circumstances of the case.’
141 For example, in Queensland the defence is limited to the provision of palliative care and in South Australia to 
patients in the terminal phase of their illness, restrictions that do not apply to the traditional double effect 
formulation: Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s282A; Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 
(SA) s 17( 1 )(c). See also White, Willmott and Ashby, above n 53; McGee, above n 53.
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euthanasia to blend, seamlessly, into the spectrum of conventional palliative practices. ' 142 
However, this does not support the assertion that ‘the law endorses, indeed entrenches, 
hypocrisy. ’ 143 The criminal law often grapples with the practical challenge of determining the 
state of mind that underlies an act or omission and distinguish between intended and foreseen 
consequences. 144 This is not a difficulty unique to euthanasia. In the absence of an admission 
of criminal intent by an accused person, the law routinely demands that his or her state of 
mind be inferred from the surrounding circumstances of the conduct. 145 I asked the Chronic 
Care Unit staff whether the intention underlying drug provision could be inferred from 
evidence of the surrounding circumstances such as the level of dosage and the patient’s 
prognosis.
Some interviewees, such as Dr Sanger believe that what is and is not an appropriate dosage of 
pain relieving medication is a ‘grey zone’, with significant variables among patients such as 
their built up resistance to morphine. In her view there is legitimate variance between 
doctors’ judgments about the level of pain relief: ‘you look at a dose differently and, you 
know, I’d start lower than other people, but just because I'm using a slightly lower dose 
[doesn’t] mean that the other person’s wrong. ’ 146 Dr Evans also pointed to the difficulty of 
delineating appropriate pain relief: ‘I don’t think you can define really the point ... At what
142 Magnusson, above n 39, 564.
142 Ian Kennedy, ‘The Quality of Mercy: Patients, Doctors and Dying’, (Upjohn Lecture, the Royal Society, 
London, 25 April 1994), quoted in Luke Gormally, 'Walton, Davies, Boyd and the Legalization of Euthanasia' in 
John Keown (ed), Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 
1995) 113, 139-140.
144 See for example Barwick CJ referring generally to the crime of murder in Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 
CLR 107, 126: ‘The state of mind of the accused is rarely so exhibited as to enable it to be directly observed.’ 
And in another example concerning a domestic assault, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal highlighted the 
sometimes difficult distinction between intent to cause a consequence (in that case, grievous bodily harm) and 
foresight of the probable consequences: McKnoulty (1994) 77 A Crim R 333. Regarding the problem of 
discerning what an agent intends in an action, as opposed to whether they merely foresee a side-effect (and 
specifically whether ‘a medical care-giver intends someone to die’), Garcia suggests a number of questions: ‘(i) 
Does the patient’s death figure in the agent’s plan not just as a presupposition, or a probable result, but as an 
objective (an interim or ultimate goal), a thing to be attained? (ii) Is she trying to attain the patient’s death (iii) 
Does she do anything in order to attain death? (iv)Does she perform the lethal action in order to derive some 
result (perhaps only an interim goal) from the death itself? (v) Does the death make her and her behaviour at 
least a partial success? (vi) Would survival make her and her behaviour at least a partial failure? When the 
answer to any of these questions is affirmative, the agent intends the death ...’: J L A Garcia, 'Intentions in 
Medical Ethics' in David S Oderberg and Jacqueline Laing (eds), Human Lives: Critical Essays on 
Consequentialist Bioethics (MacMillan Press, 1997) 161, 166.
145 See, eg, Parker v R (1963) 111 CLR 610, 648 (Windeyer J): ‘the question is what did the accused - the man 
before the court - intend. ... the acts he did may well provide the most cogent evidence. In some cases the 
evidence that the acts provide may be so strong as to compel an inference of what his intent was, no matter what 
he may say about it afterwards.’ See also Stokes and Difford (1990) 51 A Crim R 25, 30; G [2004] 1 AC 1034, 
1057 (Lord Bingham of Comhill).
146 Interview with Simone Sanger (12 December 2007).
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point is the dose of morphine ... an overdose -  euthanasia or murder -  or a dose at which ... 
they are relieved of their symptoms[?]’147
While there was some divergence among the Chronic Care Unit staff about the possibility of 
defining the boundaries of appropriate symptom control, there was agreement that what Dr 
Sanger called an ‘outrageous dose' would clearly indicate an intention to cause death. 
Thus, although he did highlight the ‘greys’, Dr Evans believed that ‘clearly there are 
circumstances in which the dose that has been administered far exceeds that which the patient 
was likely to have needed.’149
Nurse Sally Donalds said that the dose would need to be a very significant increase from an 
earlier measure to evidence that the amount of medication was not necessary for pain relief 
but instead provided to hasten death: ‘if you went up from 2.5 [mg] say to 10. I mean that’s 
... huge...’150 I put this issue directly to Dr Blackburn.
KG. The other doctors ... said, “well, ... there can be a big difference in legitimate opinion as to what is 
indicated or not.”
TB. Absolutely. But writing up 240mg o f morphine and 240 of Midazolam, that’s gonna kill him.151
This is the ‘bright line between palliative care and unlawful killing’ which critics of double 
effect reasoning demand.1^2 The doctor’s intention to relieve pain (as opposed to an intention 
to cause death) is evidenced by first, the selection of drugs that have proven pain relieving 
qualities; and secondly, their administration at levels necessary for symptom control. A 
survey of Australian surgeons has confirmed that the dose of medication is an important 
indicator of the doctor’s intention.154
147 Interview with Paul Evans (18 December 2007).
148 Interview with Simone Sanger (12 December 2007).
149 Interview with Paul Evans (18 December 2007).
150 Interview with Sally Donalds (10 December 2007).
151 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
152 Magnusson, above n 39, 566.
153 Similarly, Mendelson describes clinical principles which can provide the basis for a court to establish 
reasonable standards of competent morphine management that will control a patient’s symptoms without 
hastening death: Mendelson, above n 35, 150-151.
154 Charles D Douglas et al, 'The Intention to Hasten Death: A Survey of Attitudes and Practices of Surgeons in 
Australia ' (2001) 175 Medical Journal o f Australia 511. See also Sulmasy and Pellegrino, above n 39, 548; 
David C Currow, 'MEDicine or MADness' (2002) 176 Medical Journal o f Australia 190, 190; Select Committee 
on Medical Ethics, House of Lords, Report (1994) 150: ‘...juries are asked every day to assess intention in all 
sorts of cases ... We have confidence in the ability of the medical profession to discern when the administration 
of drugs has been inappropriate or excessive.’
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Magnusson argues that the only way to differentiate between ‘doctors and killers’ is to 
enshrine these criteria in a new defence of necessity.155 However, this is not necessary. The 
existing criminal law can readily accommodate these criteria by using them to infer a doctor’s 
state of mind in administering pain relief. Indeed, this explains the verdict in Dr Cox’s case. 
In addressing the jury, Ognall J asked how it could discern Dr Cox’s intention:
The answer is that you do so by looking at all the circumstances of this case as you find them proved. 
You will look at Lillian Boyes's medical history, especially in those last days up to the day she died ... 
and, o f course, especially including that day. You will look at the expert evidence from the doctors and 
others experienced in drugs and toxicology. And you may think it of fundamental importance to 
consider the nature o f the substance finally injected by Dr Cox, in those quantities, into Lillian Boyes's 
body.156
Dr Cox gave evidence that his intention in injecting his patient with potassium chloride was 
to relieve her pain. The jury rejected his argument. There was evidence that Dr Cox knew the 
drug lacked pain relieving properties. A nurse gave evidence that Dr Cox noted the amount of 
potassium chloride on the patient’s chart and she recognised this as ‘a lethal dose’. In these 
circumstances, the only appropriate inference was that Dr Cox intended to kill. The verdict 
also gives the lie to criticism that the ‘legal application of the doctrine ... requires reliance 
upon physicians to truthfully report their primary intent.’157
2 The ‘Ambiguity o f Clinical Intentions ’
Another criticism of double effect reasoning is that it relies on an ‘idealized ethical 
perspective [where] intentions are clear and distinct’, which is allegedly at odds with the 
reality of clinical practice where intentions are ‘complex, ambiguous, and often 
contradictory.’ Some of my interviewees disagreed strongly with this view. Dr Richards, 
for example, asserted: ‘I don’t think it’s that grey. I think people kind of use that [as an] 
excuse...’139 Similarly Sally Donalds pointed out that ‘when you’re actually caring for 
someone you know the difference between ... giving medication and them ... being peaceful
155 Magnusson, above n 39, 566. Others have made a similar argument. See, eg, Glanville Williams, above n 74, 
324; Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart, above n 66, 652.
156 R v Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38,42.
157 Ost, above n 79, 359.
158 Timothy E Quill, 'The Ambiguity of Clinical Intentions' (1993) 329 New England Journal o f Medicine 1039, 
1039. See also Roger W Hunt, 'Intention, the Law, and Clinical Decision-Making In Terminal Care ' (2001) 175 
Medical Journal o f Australia 516.
159 Interview with Elizabeth Richards (6 February 2008).
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...to the other side of it where you give medication and before you leave the room they’ve 
stopped breathing.'160
Other interviews, however, did disclose a degree of confusion among the doctors about the 
underlying intentions of some practices. Dr Evans, for example, initially declared: ‘I am 
euthanising them. I am administering medication ... to a point where I will hasten the 
inevitable.’161 However, probing his meaning, I asked him: ‘What’s your aim? To bring about 
the death of the patient?’ He was adamant in answering ‘No’ and further questions revealed 
that he rejects the practice of ‘dialling up’ medication to hasten death, insisting that his 
intention in prescribing pain relief is always to ‘maintain a level of comfort’.162
Similarly, Dr Barron stated that she and colleagues practise ‘passive euthanasia’.16’ Again, 
explicit questioning clarified that Dr Barron did not endorse the intentional hastening of 
death, but was referring to her use of analgesics with the intention of palliation, foreseeing 
death as a side-effect. In other words, as Douglas et al point out, ‘it is possible to be 
unambiguous.’164 Their survey of surgeons’ practice of intentional hastening of death used 
questions ‘that were absolutely explicit about the agent’s intention’, thus distinguishing the 
use of drugs to intentionally cause death from accepted palliative care.165 This underscores 
the practical relevance of the foresight/ intention distinction which defines the acceptable use 
of pain relieving medication.
3 The Multiplicity o f Clinical Intentions
Timothy Quill poses another challenge to the coherence of double effect reasoning by 
highlighting what he sees as the multiplicity of intentions which can underlie medical 
practice. He lists seven different ‘true intentions’ present in his prescription of a lethal dose of 
barbiturates to his patient Diane: to cause her death, to relieve her pain and suffering and to 
‘enhance her range of choice...’, amongst others.166
160 Interview with Sally Donalds (10 December 2007).
161 Interview with Paul Evans (18 December 2007).
162 Ibid.
163 Interview with Andrea Barron (8 January 2008).
164 Douglas et al, above n 154, 514.
165 Ibid 511.
166 Quill, above n 158, 1040. See also Glenys Williams, above n 42, 19.
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Quill’s criticism suggests that these ‘multilayered intentions’ pose a special complexity for 
the law at the end-of-life. This is not correct. The criminal law is routinely confronted with all 
sorts of human acts (and omissions) which are animated by multiple intentions. Keown offers 
an example:
It would hardly do for a burglar caught red-handed in a bank vault, pockets stuffed with wads o f  
banknotes, to say: ‘I deny intending to commit burglary. My intention is simply to buy a villa on the 
Costa Brava and retire from a life o f crime.’ He may well intend a happy, sun-soaked retirement; but he 
intends to burgle the bank as a means o f paying for it.167
Thus the prohibited act (causing the death of the patient) can be intended as an end in itself or 
as a means to a further end (for example, to relieve pain). Either way, the prohibited intent is 
present and, as argued above, could be identified with explicit questioning and/or inference 
from the surrounding circumstances. Williams quotes Ashworth who explains that ‘[t]he 
approach of the criminal law ... is generally not to ask with what intentions [the defendant] 
committed the act, but to ask whether one particular intention was present when the act was 
committed. ’ 168
Moreover, Quill’s critique does not reflect the legal understanding of intention. In some 
circumstances what he perceives as ‘multilayered intentions’ will actually be a combination 
of intention(s) and motive. In criminal law, intention is the aim or purpose of causing the 
prohibited result, 169 in this context the patient’s death. Motive, however, is ‘a circumstance or 
thing which induces a person to act. . .’ 170 such as a patient’s pain or desire to enhance 
autonomy. Thus a doctor’s compassionate motive in hastening the death of a suffering patient 
is characteristic of euthanasia. However, an agent’s motive is rarely the ingredient of a legal 
offence, including homicide: at most motive might be evidence of the presence of the 
intention to commit a prohibited act (or omission) . 171
167 John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument against Legalisation (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 29.
168 Andrew Ashworth, Principles o f Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2006) 175 quoted in Glenys 
Williams, above n 42, 19.
169 R v Mohan [1976] QB 1, 8; LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws o f Australia (at 19 June 2009) 130 Criminal Law,
‘ 1 Principles o f  Criminal Liability’ [130-80].
17(1 Roderick N Howie (ed), Buttern’orths Australian Criminal Law Dictionaty (Butterworths, 1997) 1310.
171 See, eg, De G ruchyvR IU  CLR 85 [51], [53] (Kirby J).
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VI CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined the legal definition of euthanasia as murder: an act or omission 
which causes death with the intention to kill. I have demonstrated that the deaths of Melanie 
and Joshua may have been instances of euthanasia, where Dr Blackburn administered 
increasing amounts of Midazolam-morphine, suppressing the patients’ respiratory function, 
there being the suggestion of an intent to cause their deaths.
As discussed, there were other cases where the administration of Midazolam-morphine was 
arguably a legal cause of death; however, the underlying intent was to relieve pain, not to kill. 
In many of these cases, the clinical staff assessed that palliation would hasten death. 
Although foresight or knowledge of probable death is an alternative mental element for 
murder in some jurisdictions, I have argued that the ‘social utility’ of effective pain relief 
provides a justificatory defence for a doctor in these circumstances.
This is indicative of double effect reasoning which accounts for the acceptance of death 
hastening palliation among the Chronic Care Unit staff. I have argued that although the 
validity of double effect reasoning is contested as a challenge to the consequentialist ethic, its 
essential distinction between foreseen and intended consequences is ethically defensible and 
consistent with established criminal law principles. While discerning a physician’s state of 
mind is not always easy in practice, this is not a problem unique to end-of-life care: the 
criminal law routinely grapples with this issue. My interviews disclose that the foresight/ 
intention distinction is not just of ethical and legal relevance: it is of practical relevance and 
defines the acceptable use of pain relieving medication in clinical practice.
In the next chapter I explain the legal definition of assisted suicide. I examine some other 
end-of-life practices at the Unit: the withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining therapies 
such as artificial nutrition, hydration and ventilation. Can a competent patient who refuses 
such interventions be committing suicide? And does a doctor who facilitates such a refusal 
assist suicide?
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3Assisted Suicide And Refusal Of Treatment
I INTRODUCTION
It is well established in the common law that competent adult patients are entitled to refuse 
medical treatment, even if they will die as a consequence.1 The underlying principle is that 
every person’s body is inviolate. This basic right to physical integrity means that each person 
is best placed to decide whether contact - even the slightest -  is acceptable. For example, in 
Australia, McHugh J of the High Court has expressed it thus:
[T]he voluntary choices and decisions of an adult person of sound mind concerning what is and what is 
not done to his or her body must be respected and accepted, irrespective of what others, including 
doctors, may think is in the best interests of that particular person .. .2
Because MND causes progressive paralysis, a major decision to confront patients is whether 
they will commence therapies and interventions to augment declining muscle function, such 
as ventilator support and artificial nutrition and hydration. Another decision is whether at 
some point they will withdraw those interventions, knowing that this will bring forward their 
death.
My interviews revealed at least one patient who aimed to bring about her death by refusing 
life-sustaining treatment. Is such a refusal of treatment the equivalent of suicide? The 
common law has failed to confront this question squarely. In part II of this chapter I examine 
the definition of suicide. In a challenge to the existing law, I suggest that if a patient has a 
moral duty to accept treatment, the common law should recognise a corresponding legal duty: 
if the specific intent to die is also present, the refusal may well be the equivalent of suicide. In 
part III I argue that ordinarily a patient does have such a moral duty -  and the common law
1 For example, in the United States see Schloendoif v Society o f New York Hospital 195 NE 92 (1914); in 
Canada see Nancy B v Hotel-Dieu d ’Quebec (1992) 86 DLR (4lh) 385 (Que Sup Ct); in New Zealand see Smith 
v Auckland Hospital Board [1965] NZLR 191 (CA(NZ)); in England see Sidaway v Board of Governors o f 
Bethlehem Royal Hospital and Others [1985] AC 871; in Australia see Secretary, Department o f Health and 
Community Sendees (NT) vJWB and SMB [1992] 66 ALJR 300 (‘Marion's Case’); Brightwater Care Group 
(Inc) v Rossiter [2009] WASC 229 (14 August 2009) (‘Brightwater’); HLtd v J  [2010] SASC 176 (15 June 
2010).
2 Marion’s Case [1992] 66 ALJR 300, 337.
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should recognise an equivalent legal duty -  unless the treatment is burdensome or futile. I 
examine the meaning of these concepts, critique the current approach of the courts and apply 
th is analysis to some of the treatment refusals by MND patients at the Unit.
In part IV I examine the legal meaning of assisted suicide. I contend that a doctor’s 
knowledge of his or her patient’s suicidal ideation can in some circumstances infer an 
intention to assist the suicide, should the doctor facilitate the refusal. While it would not be 
appropriate to force treatment on a competent patient, I argue that such knowledge means that 
the doctor still has a moral and common law duty to act. I suggest ways in which that duty can 
be appropriately discharged.
II CAN A PATIENT’S REFUSAL OF TREATMENT BE SUICIDE?
A Definition o f Suicide
In common language suicide is understood as the deliberate taking of one’s own life. 
Williams provides a cogent statement of the elements of suicide, based on an analysis of 
various definitions in the literature:
(a) an intention to die (and by implication the competence to form that intention is a prerequisite);
(b) the suicide must have ‘caused’ his own death by initiating a course o f events specifically for 
that purpose;
(c) an act or an omission will suffice (although some would question the latter).3 
I now go on to analyse these three elements of suicide.
1 Intention to Die
As discussed in chapter 2, the mental state of murder can take a number of forms, including 
intention to kill and, in some jurisdictions, foresight or knowledge of probable death. 
However, the courts have held that for suicide, only evidence of a specific intent to die is 
sufficient.4 Otlowski clarifies:
3 Glenys Williams, Intention and Causation in Medical Non-Killing (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 117.
4 Re Davis [1968] 1 QB 72. See also, eg, R v City o f London Coroner ex p  Barber [1975] 1 WLR 1310; R v H  M  
Coroner for Northhamptonshire ex p  Anne Walker (1989) JP 356. In the United States, see, eg, Superintendent
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Mere knowledge or foresight o f death will not be sufficient. A person has the necessary suicidal intent 
in circumstances where conduct causing death is deliberately undertaken in order to end his or her life 
and not for some other purpose.5
Thus a patient who refuses treatment with the intention to end his or her life must be 
differentiated from a patient who refuses treatment with the intention to end the burden or 
futility of the treatment, concepts which I will analyse below. Otlowski gives another example 
of the Jehovah’s Witness patient who refuses a blood transfusion on religious grounds, but 
does not deliberately seek death.6 Even if such patients know that death is the certain 
consequence of their refusal, the intent to die is not a necessary inference. As I argued in 
chapter 2, in such cases double effect reasoning demonstrates that, while death might be 
foreseen as the probable or even certain ‘side-effect’, if it is not the intended result, the 
patient’s refusal is not suicide.7
Williams’ analysis of treatment refusal cases demonstrates that the courts8 have applied the 
‘specific intent’ element of suicide in a confused manner.9 A few examples are illustrative.10 
In the United States, the courts have ignored the absence of specific intent to suicide and 
authorised treatment in order to vindicate the state’s interest in preserving life. In Heston* 11 the 
court highlighted the difficulties in determining intent, but ignored the evidence that the 
particular patient, a Jehovah’s Witness who refused a blood transfusion, lacked the specific 
intent to die because she had clearly expressed that she wished to live. The court decided 
that the state’s interest in sustaining life and the hospital’s interest in upholding its 
professional ethical standards justified the transfusion.
In Erickson,13 another Jehovah’s Witness case, a different test was applied: the patient must 
believe that death is certain in order for suicidal intent to be present. The court ignored
o f Belcherton State School v Saikewicz 370 NE2d 417, 426, n 11 (1977); Brophy v New England Sinai Hospital, 
Inc 497 NE2d 626, 642, 644 (1986).
5 Margaret Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (Oxford University Press, 2000) 69.
6 Ibid.
7 See also, eg, Loane Skene, Law and Medical Practice: Rights, Duties, Claims and Defences (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2008) 113, 307.
8 Especially in the United States where most cases of refusals by competent patients have occurred. 
l) Williams, above n 3, 140.
10 For a more detailed analysis o f a wider range o f cases see Williams, above n 3, 117-135.
11 Heston (John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital) v Heston 279 A 2d 670 (1971).
12 Ibid 673.
13 Erickson v Dilgard 252 NYS. 2d 705 (1962).
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evidence that the patient lacked specific intent to die. 14 Instead the court decided the patient 
could not be certain of death, and thus upheld the patient’s decision to refuse treatment 
without being seen to endorse suicide. 15 In Georgetown College16 where the patient, again a 
Jehovah’s Witness, expressed a desire to live, the court rejected any discussion of specific 
intent to suicide as ‘quibbling’ and overrode the refusal when the patient lost consciousness. 17 
In other cases of terminally ill patients, the courts have simply avoided the central question of 
suicidal intent, highlighting that the patients would prefer to live, were it not for their 
suffering, but failing to make inquiry about whether those patients actually had the specific 
intent to die or not. 18
Conversely, in other cases where there was evidence of specific intent to suicide, the courts 
have ignored this and authorised withdrawal of treatment in circumstances where death would 
follow. In the Australian case of Brightw>ater, 10 the possibility of suicide was never canvassed 
by the court: the key issue was the right to autonomy or self-determination of a competent, 
fully informed patient. The court made a declaration that a care facility could not lawfully 
continue artificial sustenance once requested to cease by a quadriplegic patient. It emphasised 
that the case ‘is not about euthanasia. ... Nor is it about the right to life or even the right to 
death. ’20 The basis for this assertion is unclear, given the court’s observation that the patient 
was neither terminally ill nor dying and had ‘clearly and unequivocally’ indicated his wish to 
die on many occasions.
Again, in another Australian decision, H Ltd v J, the court ignored clear evidence of the 
patient’s specific intent to die. The patient was a diabetic who had written to the aged care 
facility where she lived, ‘informing it of her intention to end her life by ceasing to take any 
food, water and insulin.’ Nevertheless, the court held that the refusal of medication and
14 The patient had admitted himself to hospital suffering gastrointestinal bleeding and agreed to an operation, 
although he refused a blood transfusion: ibid.
15 Ibid 706.
10 Georgetown College (Application o f the President and Directors o f Georgetown College) 331 F 2d 1000 
(1964).
17 Ibid.
18 Satz v Perlmutter 362 So 2d 160 (1978); Matter o f Farrell 529 A 2d 404 (1987); Matter o f Conroy 486 A 2d 
1209 (1985). See also Williams, above n 3, 125; Otlowski, above n 5, 70.
19 Brightwater [2009] WASC 229 (14 August 2009).
20 Ibid [2].
21 Ibid [11].
22 [2010] SASC 176 (15 June 2010).
23 H Ltd  vT [2010] SASC 176(15 June 2010) [4],
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sustenance is not suicide and granted a declaration that the facility had no duty and no lawful 
justification to administer the treatment.
Thus it seems clear that Australian courts do not regard the patient’s specific intent to die (to 
the extent that it exists) as disentitling the patient to lawfully refuse life-supporting medical 
treatment. The decisions in Brightw'ater and H Ltd v J  are indicative of a general assumption 
that a patient has no duty to accept treatment they do not want, regardless of their intention. I 
will argue below that this assumption is incorrect.
The inconsistency apparent in the case law might be due to a concern that, if a patient is 
acknowledged to have suicidal intent, the doctors who assist the patient’s refusal could risk 
criminal liability. The answer, however, is not to manipulate the concept of intention as the 
courts have sometimes done, nor dismiss intention as a ‘very dubious, suspect and 
questionable concept,’ as does Williams.24 Intention is still relevant. As I stated in chapter 2, 
the mental state of intent highlights the significance of personal responsibility and the moral 
character of choices -  admittedly ambiguous when it is a question of suicide. The answer to 
the inconsistency of case law lies in the recognition of another marker between a legitimate 
refusal of treatment and suicide: the question of whether the patient has a moral and legal duty 
to accept treatment. This critical question is taken up later in this chapter.
2 An Act or Omission?
Much debate about the question of suicidal refusals turns on whether refusal of treatment is an 
act or omission. Clearly the refusal and withholding of life-sustaining treatment such as 
ventilation, dialysis or food and fluids amounts to an omission but the status of refusal and 
withdrawing such treatments once they have been commenced is more contested. In a 
number of cases the courts have viewed the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment as an 
omission and equivalent to an initial withholding of treatment.26 The weight of commentary
24 Williams, above n 3, 140.
25 See, eg, Otlowski, who says that turning off a ventilator or removing a PEG is a willed bodily movement and 
thus an act: Otlowski, above n 5, 153-155; But see, eg, George P Fletcher, 'Proloning Life' (1966) 42 
Washington Law Review 999, 1012.
26 See, eg, Barber v Superior Court 195 Cal Rptr. 484 (1983); Bland [1993] AC 789; In the Matter o f a Ward o f 
Court [1995] 2 ILRM 401; Re D [1997] 5 Med LR 225. A New Zealand case is exceptional in that the court did 
not focus on the act/ omission distinction in deciding whether to withdraw ventilator support, but saw the issue 
as whether the withdrawal would be justified, whatever its characterisation: Auckland Area Health Board vA-G  
[1993] 1 NZLR235.
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appears to favour the view that withdrawal of treatment is an omission." This feeds a general
28assumption that refusal of treatment does not amount to suicide.
However, I contend that these dichotomies are both false and irrelevant because they 
overlook, as I argued in chapter 2, the moral primacy of intention. Both action and omission 
can be deliberately -  intentionally -  employed to bring about one’s own, or another person’s, 
death. Grisez and Boyle explain:
If people act when they carry out a proposal which they have adopted by choice, certain cases of non­
performance must count as human actions. One can adopt a proposal and carry it out by deliberately not 
causing or preventing something which one could cause or prevent. One’s choice not to cause or 
prevent something can be a way of realizing a state of affairs one considers somehow desirable ... 
[therefore] if one adopts the proposal to bring about a person’s death and realizes this proposal by not 
behaving as one otherwise would behave, then one is committed to the state of affairs which includes 
the person’s death. This commitment, though carried out through non-performance, is morally speaking 
an act of killing.30
The dissenting judgment of Scalia J in the United States case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
Health Department, also articulates the irrelevance of the act/omission distinction:
Starving oneself to death is no different from putting a gun to one's temple as far as the common law
definition o f suicide is concerned; the cause of death in both cases is the suicide's conscious decision to 
. 31“put an end to his own existence”.
Therefore the debate about acts and omissions overlooks the distinctive element of suicide: 
the intention to cause one’s own death. As I argue below, the circumstances of a patient’s 
refusal of treatment -  particularly whether the treatment is burdensome or futile -  will often 
infer the presence or absence of suicidal intent.
27
27 Otlowski, above n 5, 154. But see, eg, Ian Kerridge, Michael Lowe and Cameron Stewart, Ethics and Law for 
the Health Professions (Federation Press, 2009), 339.
28 Otlowski, above n 5, 65. See also Luke Gormally, 'Walton, Davies, Boyd and the Legalization of Euthanasia' 
in John Keown (ed), Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge University 
Press, 1995) 113, 139.
2g Rachael Patterson and Katrina George, 'Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: A Liberal Approach Versus the 
Traditional Moral View' (2005) 12 Journal o f Law and Medicine 494, 507.
30 Germain Grisez and Joseph M Boyle, 'The Morality of Killing: A Traditional View' in Helga Kuhse and Peter 
Singer (eds), Bioethics: An Anthology (Blackwell, 1999) 213.
31 Cruzan v Director, Missouri Health Department (1990) 111 L Ed 2d 224 at 249.
56
3 Causation
Apart from suicidal intent, the other essential element of suicide is that the deceased must 
have caused his or her own death. The act/omission distinction resonates in a further 
distinction between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’, the withdrawal or withholding of treatment 
often being categorised as the latter. This conveys a sense that refusal of treatment does not 
cause death but merely allows death to take its natural course. The cause of death is seen as 
the patient’s underlying condition.
For example, in one of the many relevant cases from the United States, the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey has stated: ‘Refusing medical intervention merely allows the disease to take its 
natural course; if death were eventually to occur, it would be the result, primarily, of the 
underlying disease, and not the result of self-inflicted injury.’ “ There is similar reasoning 
found in other common law cases. In Canada the decision of a quadriplegic to withdraw life- 
sustaining ventilation was said not to be the cause of death, but rather the underlying 
condition was taking its natural course.
Similarly in Australia, the courts have been reluctant to acknowledge the causal significance 
of a patient’s refusal of treatment. In H Ltd v J,34 referred to earlier, the court endorsed the 
distinction drawn in a dissenting judgment of a United States case ‘between suicide and an 
individual merely speeding “the natural and inevitable part of life known as death” by 
refusing food and water.’ This is a convenient fiction, as has been widely noted. As 
Otlowski says:
32 In re Conroy 486 A 2d 1209 (1985). There are many other US cases that say similar: Superintendent o f 
Belchertown State School v Saikewicz 370 NE 2d 417 (1977), 427; Satz v Perlmutter 362 So 2d 160 (1978); 
Bartling v Superior Court (Glendale Adventist Hospital) 209 Cal Rptr 220 (1984); In re Colyer 660 P 2d 738 
(1983), 743; Bouvia v Superior Court (Glenchur) 225 Cal Rptr 297 (1986), 306; Brophy v New England Sinai 
Hospital Inc 497 NE 2d 626 (1986); Vacco v Quill 521 US 793 (1997), 801(Rehnquist CJ).
33 Nancy B v Hotel-Dieu de Quebec (1992) 86 DLR (4th) 385.
34 [2010] SASC 176 (15 June 2010).
35 In re Joel Caulk 125 NH 226, 480 A 2d 93 (NH, 1984) (Douglas J).
36 H Ltd  v /  [2010] SASC 176 (15 June 2010) [56], In B r i g h t e r  [2009] WASC 229 (14 August 2009), 
discussed above, the court emphasised the illegality of administering medication for the purpose o f causing 
death. This implies the view identified in the other cases discussed here: that refusal o f treatment, as a passive 
omission, cannot be regarded as a cause of death: at [54],
37 See, eg, Williams, above n 3, 135-136; Cameron Stewart, 'Public Interests and the Right to Die: Compelling 
Reasons for Overriding the Right to Self-Determination' (2001) (15) Topics fo r Attention 1,5.
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The reality is that where death results following the patient’s refusal of treatment, the death of the 
patient at that particular time is due to the patient’s decision to die rather than the underlying condition 
of the patient. ... what the courts are doing is presenting as a factual premise, what is in reality a 
normative conclusion about how such conduct should be characterized/8
It would be more transparent for the courts to first admit that the refusal of treatment is a 
factual cause of death; and, secondly, define the circumstances when that refusal will be 
recognised as a legal cause of death and thus suicide. The law of murder provides helpful 
guidance: the common law does not regard an omission to be a legal cause of death unless
IQ
there is a duty to act. By analogy, in treatment refusal cases the question should be whether 
the patient has a duty to receive treatment.40 If such a duty does exist, the refusal should be 
regarded as a legal cause of death and, assuming the necessary intent is also present, the 
equivalent of suicide. This begs the question: in what circumstances does a patient have a 
duty to accept treatment?
Ill WHEN DOES A PATIENT HAVE A DUTY TO ACCEPT TREATMENT?
In this section I argue that patients ordinarily have a moral duty to accept treatment that will 
preserve their life, except in two situations: when the patient believes the treatment is 
burdensome; and secondly, when the treatment is futile. And although a thorough analysis is 
outside the scope of this thesis, I suggest that an interesting consideration is whether the 
common law should recognise a corresponding legal duty. This is a challenge to the orthodox 
legal view which simply accepts that a competent patient never has a duty to receive 
treatment.
Therefore it is necessary to set out systematically my analysis of the meanings of burdensome 
and futile treatment. This involves a re-evaluation of end-of-life ethics and jurisprudence. In 
particular, the contentious debate about the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration 
from patients in a so called persistent vegetative state (PVS)41 raises complex issues about the
38 Otlowski, above n 5, 71.
39 R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; R v Gibbons (1918) 13 Cr App R 134; People v Beardsley 113NW 1128 
(1907)
4(1 Cf Cameron Stewart, The Right to Die and the Common Law (PhD Thesis, University of Sydney, 2001) 107. 
41 PVS is sometimes referred to as ‘post-coma unresponsiveness’ and is distinct from brain death because the 
patient retains mid-brain functioning: a PVS patient is still alive. PVS is a ‘condition in which a person has 
emerged from coma to the extent that he or she is observed to have sleep/wake cycles over a period of time but 
no purposeful responses to stimuli’: National Health and Medical Research Council, Ethical Guidelines for the
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definition of futility: this has relevance for all patients. At the end of this section I apply my 
analysis to some of the treatment refusals which emerged from my interview study.
A No Duty to Commence or Continue Treatment That Is Burdensome
It is well recognised that a patient does not have a moral or legal duty to accept or continue 
treatment if the patient considers the treatment to be burdensome.42 An assessment of the 
burden of treatment is to a large extent subjective, depending on the characteristics and 
sensibilities of the individual patient. For example, a particular treatment might involve 
excessive pain, discomfort, inconvenience or expense which is disproportionate to the 
therapeutic benefits (sometimes referred to as ‘extraordinary’ treatment).43 The treatment 
might be experimental or risky, or the patient might consider the treatment immoral, as in the 
cases of refusal of blood transfusions by Jehovah’s witnesses.44 In some cases the cost of the 
treatment could completely deplete the family’s resources.45
I argue that in such extraordinary circumstances a patient has no moral duty to commence or 
continue treatment. No corresponding legal duty should be inferred. Thus even if their refusal 
of such treatment hastens death, the refusal should not be regarded as a legal cause of death. 
Such a refusal is not suicide.
Moreover, a patient’s view that treatment is burdensome provides an inference against the 
presence of suicidal intent. A patient’s expressed rejection of burdensome treatment provides 
evidence of their intention to avoid those unacceptable burdens, but this does not imply that 
the patient is setting out to cause their own death.
Care of People in Post-Coma Unresponsiveness (Vegetative State) or a Minimally Responsive State (Australian 
Government, 2008) 4-5.
42 See, eg, Northridge v Central Sydney Area Health Service (2000) 50 NSWLR 549, [24]; Messiha v South East 
Health [2004] NSWSC 1061(11 November 2004); Australian Capital Territory v JT [2009] ACTSC 105 (28 
August 2009) (V F ); Slaveski v Austin Health [2010] VSC 493 (22 October 2010). See also Tom L Beauchamp 
and James F Childress, Principles o f Biomedical Ethics (Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2001), 135; Skene, 
above n 7, 325; John Keown, The Legal Revolution: From "Sanctity Of Life" to "Quality Of Life" and 
"Autonomy"' (1998) 14 Journal o f Contemporaiy Health Law and Policy 253, 259.
44 See, eg, National Health and Medical Research Council, above n 41,35; Edmund Pellegrino, 'Decisions to 
Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment: A Moral Algorithm' (2000) 283 Journal of the American Medical 
Association 1065, 1066; Luke Gormally, 'Against Voluntary Euthanasia' in Raanan Gillon (ed), Principles of 
Health Care Ethics (John Wiley & Sons, 1994) 763,771.
44 Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle, Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution to the Euthanasia 
Debate (University O f Notre Dame Press, 1979) 268.
45 Ibid 269.
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The burden of artificial ventilation is a likely factor in the decision of some MND patients 
about whether or not to withdraw their use of non-invasive ventilation. The burden of 
artificial ventilation has been noted:
Having a machine inflating and deflating one’s lungs and lacking control of one’s own circumstances to 
that extreme extent can be borne by some but for others it is a frightening, constricting experience. 
Some also fear that the machine will break down and that they will asphyxiate. It is a precarious, 
burdensome existence ...46
The delivery of food and hydration through a PEG can also pose burdens for a conscious 
patient, including discomfort, confinement and the risk of infection.47 Some patients in my 
interviews, although not currently using a PEG, rejected what they perceived would be the 
burdens of that intervention. Sophia Jensen, for example, described it as a ‘huge indignity’. 
Anna MacPherson asked whether I had ‘seen that glug that they put into you? I mean 
errghh!’49 Alexander Murray explained:
That’s when quality of life comes into question. I love my food and the idea of having to have fluid all 
the time I don’t find it very appealing at all. I also think that’s when it becomes just that much of an 
extra burden on others that I’ve got to be artificially fed.50
The distress of such burdens for some patients has been noted in at least one United States 
case.51 Similarly, Grisez argues that patients
who clearly and freely reject food ... need not be choosing to kill themselves. They can, instead, be 
choosing both to avoid being kept alive by a method toward which they feel psychological repugnance 
and to free others of the burden of the cost of caring for them.52
46 Nicholas Tonti-Filippini, 'Some Refusals of Medical Treatment which Changed the Laws of Victoria' (1992) 
157 Medical Journal of Australia 277, 277.
47 Christopher Tollefsen, 'Ten Errors Regarding End of Life Issues and Especially Artificial Nutrition and 
Hydration' in Christopher Tollefsen (ed), Artificial Nutrition and Hydration: The New Catholic Debate 
(Springer, 2008) 213, 221. Similarly, the New South Wales Department of Health notes the potential burdens of 
artificial nutrition and hydration such as ‘those related to having tubes in situ or regularly replaced.’ New South 
Wales Department of Health, Guidelines for End-of-Life Care and Decision Making (2005) 
<http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/policies/gl/2005/pdf7GL2005_057.pdf> 13.
48 Interview with Sophia Jensen (2 April 2007).
40 Interview with Anna MacPherson (25 June 2007).
50 Interview with Alexander Murray (31 October 2007).
51 Re Conroy 486 A 2d 1209 (NJ, 1985) 1236 (Schreiber J).
52 Germain Grisez, 'Should Nutrition and Hydration be Provided to Permanently Unconscious and Other 
Mentally Disabled Persons? ' (1989) 5 Issues in Law and Medicine 165, 176.
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However, the burdens of treatment should be distinguished from the burdens of the patient’s 
existence. For example, a patient with MND will suffer from the burden of severe physical 
limitations including eventual loss of motor function. This burden of physical decline lies in 
the nature of the disease itself, and is not caused by treatment such as assisted ventilation or 
artificial sustenance. A refusal of treatment should not be employed as a means to end the 
patient’s existence in circumstances where it is their existence that is judged to be 
burdensome, as distinct from the treatment they are receiving. Later in this chapter I argue 
that inherent to such refusals is the notion of the ‘worthless life’ which nearly always 
indicates an underlying intention to cause death.
B No Duty to Commence or Continue Treatment That Is Futile
There is also consensus that there is no moral obligation to accept or continue treatment that is 
futile. Therefore, even if a refusal of futile treatment might accelerate death, such a refusal 
should not be regarded as a legal cause of death and for this reason cannot be suicide. 
However, the meaning of futility is highly contested. For example:
I define futility specifically as the relationship among effectiveness, benefit, and burden of the 
treatment in question. This is not a quantitative relationship, but a judicious balancing of each 
factor against the others.... an assessment of the capacity of the procedure to alter the natural 
history of the disease.54 Murphy defines futile treatment as ‘treatment that gives no, or an 
extremely small, chance of meaningful prolongation of survival and, at best, can only briefly 
delay the inevitable death of the patient.’55 Similarly, Glare and Tobin refer to ‘a treatment 
that could make no significant contribution to the patient’s cure or improvement, nor sustain 
the patient in a tolerable condition...’56 Keown clarifies that [treatments do not need to be 
curative to be beneficial. Some treatments cure; others prevent deterioration; still others 
palliate symptoms.’57
53 See, eg, Beauchamp and Childress, above n 42, 133-135.
54 Pellegrino, above n 43, 1066.
55 Brendan F Murphy, 'What Has Happened to Clinical Leadership in Futile Care Discussions?' (2008) 188 
Medical Journal o f Australia 418, 418.
56 Paul A Glare and Bernadette Tobin, 'End-of-Life Issues: Case 2' (2002) 176 Medical Journal o f Australia 80, 
81.
57 John Keown, 'A Futile Defence of Bland: A Reply to Andrew McGee' (2005) 13 Medical Law> Review 393, 
399.
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1 Defining the Goals o f Treatment
These definitions highlight the essence of futility: it is an assessment of the benefits, burdens, 
goals and outcomes of treatment. Tollefsen emphasises the importance of carefully defining 
the goals of treatment:
... futility is itself a notion that makes sense only in a context in which we are trying to do something, 
only in a context in which we have some end in view. ... Something is futile ... if  it is strictly o f no 
benefit in the pursuit o f the end for which it has been chosen.58
For example, respiratory physician Dr Pitt explained that the aim -  or ‘end’ -  in ventilating a 
patient is to alleviate symptoms of breathlessness. However, he explained that the disease will 
progress to a point where mechanical ventilation can no longer do this: ‘you enter into non- 
invasive ventilation on the premise that you will help their symptoms. If at any time they 
don’t find it helpful for their symptoms [of breathlessness], then you stop.04 This, I will argue 
below, is the correct meaning of futility: treatment is futile when it cannot achieve the purpose 
it is designed to achieve.
However, as Tollefsen says, ‘mistakes about whether something is futile abound when the end 
is not carefully distinguished.’60 This is illustrated with an example offered by Schneiderman, 
Jecker and Jonsen who point out that it is futile to treat pneumonia with insulin. They explain 
that although insulin would produce an effect on the patient’s blood sugar, it would offer no 
benefit to the patient in terms of the pneumonia.61 Emphasising the distinction between an 
effect and benefit, they extend this analysis to nutritional support for PVS patients, arguing 
that although nutrition might produce an effect on the patient, it is futile as it offers no benefit 
to the patient through the restoration of ‘a conscious and sapient life.’
58 Tollefsen, above n 47.
59 Interview with Ray Pitt (18 December 2007).
60 Tollefsen, above n 47, 216.
61 Lawrence J Schneiderman, Nancy S Jecker and Albert R Jonsen, 'Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical 
Implications' (1990) 112 Annals o f Internal Medicine 949, 950.
62 Ibid.
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2 The Mistaken View o f Futility
However, I argue that Schneiderman et al’s analysis is incorrect and indicative of a 
widespread mistake about the meaning of futility. The futility of insulin in their example does 
not rest on a distinction between effect and benefit. Rather, the insulin is futile because, as 
Tollefsen says above, ‘the end has not been carefully distinguished’.
In other words, the insulin has been employed for an end (or purpose) it cannot possibly 
achieve. Insulin’s mechanism of action is to regulate the concentration of glucose in the 
blood. By its nature, insulin is not able to affect any change to the inflammation of the lungs 
and its application for that purpose is inappropriate. To extend Schneiderman et al’s example, 
suppose a patient with pneumonia also suffered from diabetes. The patient would be 
administered insulin. If the insulin succeeded in regulating glucose concentration, it would be 
nonsensical to discontinue the insulin because it did not cure the pneumonia and was therefore 
‘futile’.
Similarly, the ‘mechanism of action’ of artificial nutrition and hydration is to nourish and 
hydrate the patient. Except for some patients at the very end of life, artificial nutrition and 
hydration are able to achieve this end: they are not futile in the relevant sense. To label 
artificial nutrition futile because it cannot achieve the goal of ‘conscious and sapient life’ is to
c . 'i
judge artificial nutrition against criteria not relevant to its purpose. This is as nonsensical as 
declaring insulin futile because it cannot cure pneumonia.
C Futility and Burden o f Treatment — Or Futility and Burden o f Life?
Schneiderman et al argue for a concept of futility that focuses on whether the intervention can 
enhance the quality of the patient’s life. According to this standard, treatment that ‘merely 
preserves permanent unconsciousness or ... fails to end total dependence on intensive medical 
care’ is futile.64 Similarly, Quilter adopts a concept of burden that is based on the benefits or 
burdens of the continued maintenance of biological life to the person.65 As Kuhse expresses
63 C f John I Fleming, 'Euthanasia by Omission in Australia. What the Parliament Does Not Allow, the Courts 
Allow' (2003) 15(2) Bioethics Research Notes , 2.
04 Schneiderman, Jecker and Jonsen, above n 61,952.
65 John Quilter, ‘The Babies Doe: Sanctity or Quality o f Life?’ (1992) 3 Bioethics Outlook A, 6.
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it, life is ‘not...a good in itself but rather ... a precondition for “something else”... it is not 
mere life that is valuable, it is rather that we value those things that life makes possible. ’ 66
There are many other respected ethicists who share this instrumental concept of human life,67 
including some who oppose the intentional termination of life. O’Rourke, for example, 
affirms what he terms the ‘sanctity’ of human life. At the same time he argues that if a 
person does not have the present or future ability to perform acts of the intelligence or will, 
‘then that person can no longer strive for the purpose of human life and it does not benefit the 
person in this condition to have life prolonged. ’ 69 Similarly, McCormick states that ‘the 
person is always an incalculable value, but ... at some point continuance in physical life 
offers the person no benefit. ' 70
Whilst I acknowledge with respect the body of scholarship represented by these views, I do 
not agree. First, inherent to these views is the notion of the ‘worthless life’: the futility or 
burden of treatment is conflated with the futility or burden of the patient’s ///e.71 This is 
particularly evident in case law, as I demonstrate below. Secondly, I will argue that the 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment on this basis nearly always signifies an underlying 
intention to cause the death of the patient, whether as an end or as a means.
The analysis which follows is also relevant for competent patients. I argue that a patient has a 
duty to accept treatment unless it is burdensome or futile. Thus an assessment of the futility or 
burden of the treatment may assist to delineate between licit refusals and suicidal refusals.
66 Helga Kuhse, The Sanctity o f Life Doctrine in Medicine: A Critique (Clarendon Press, 1987) 20-21.
67 As Keown, a critic o f the concept describes it. ‘[Human life] is not absolutely good in itself but is only good 
in an instrumental way, as a means to an end. That end is leading a ‘worthwhile life” : John Keown, Euthanasia, 
Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument against Legalisation (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 45.
68 Kevin O'Rourke, 'Reflections on the Papal Allocution Concerning Care for Persistent Vegetative State 
Patients' (2006) 12 Christian Bioethics 83, 94.
69 Ibid 93.
70 Richard A McCormick, 'The Quality of Life, The Sanctity of Life' (1978) 8(1) Hastings Center Report 30, 34. 
See also, eg, Thomas A Naim, 'Reclaiming Our Moral Tradition: Catholic Teaching Calls Us to Accept the 
Limits o f Medical Technology' (1997) 78 Health Progress 36; Daniel Callahan, The Troubled Dream o f Life: In 
Search o f a Peaceful Death (Georgetown University Press, 2000) 184.
71 Indeed, Schneiderman et al endorse Plato’s concept of a ‘life not worth living’: Schneiderman, Jecker and
Jonsen, above n 61, 952.
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1 The Mistaken View o f Futility and Burden in Case Law
The instrumental view of human life dominates judicial decisions and commentary where the 
patient’s life itself is expressed to be futile or burdensome. This was noted by one doctor in 
expert evidence to Northridge v Central Sydney Area Health Service, a case regarding the 
provision of antibiotics to a patient believed to be in a persistent vegetative state: ‘...not 
infrequently, the context in which the term futility is introduced admits of no interpretation 
other than that the patient’s life itself is regarded as futile.’72
In Bland, for example, life-sustaining treatment was held to be futile because there was no 
prospect of improvement in Tony Bland’s PVS and a responsible body of medical opinion did 
not regard life in that condition as being of any benefit to the patient. Keown highlights how 
the concept of the worthless life is present in a number of the Bland judgements. He points to 
Sir Stephen Brown P at first instance who reduced Tony Bland’s life to ‘the shell of his 
body.’74 Hoffman LJ described Bland’s life as a ‘humiliation’ because he was ‘grotesquely 
alive’.77 In the House of Lords, Lord Mustill stated that Bland had ‘no interests of any kind.’76
77As Keown observes, Lord Keith of Kinkel in referring to medical opinion, clearly identifies 
that it was Bland’s ‘existence’, not the treatment, that was assessed as burdensome and futile: 
‘[ejxistence in a vegetative state with no prospect of recovery is by that opinion regarded as
7 0
not being a benefit...’
Subsequent United Kingdom cases have endorsed the reasoning in Bland that the futility or 
worthlessness of a patient’s life (as opposed to the futility of the treatment) can justify the 
cessation of life-sustaining interventions. For example, in Re D the court allowed the 
withdrawal of treatment of a patient who was ‘for all practical purposes’ in a ‘permanent 
vegetative state’ because ‘there is no evidence of any meaningful life whatsoever’.74 In Re R 
(Adult: Medical Treatment), a Do Not Resuscitate Order was applied to a man with
72 (2000) 50 NSWLR 549,[99],
73 Bland [1993] AC 789.
74 Quoted in John Keown, 'Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law After Bland (1997) 113 Law 
Quarterly Review 481, 493.
75 Quoted in ibid.
76 [1993] AC 789, 897.
77 Keown, ‘Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law After Bland, above n 74, 494.
78 Bland [ 1993] AC 789, 859.
79 Re D (1997) 38 BMLR 1, 10.
80 Re R (Adult: Medical Treatment) [1996] 2 FLR 99.
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profound disabilities and was held to be lawful, based on a ‘best interests’ assessment that if 
given life-sustaining treatment, his life would be so afflicted as to be intolerable.
In the United States, futility has not been central to judicial considerations about withdrawal 
of treatment because these cases are decided more on the basis of substitute decision making 
and patient autonomy.81 In Australia, there has been no clear acceptance of the reasoning in 
Bland. Although a number of cases have endorsed the cessation or refusal of life-sustaining 
treatment, the circumstances of the cases have varied.83 The theme of the ‘worthless life’ 
which is strongly evident in some of the United Kingdom pronouncements does not resound 
so clearly in the Australian decisions.
However, the instrumental view of human life is evident in Australian decisions, notably in
O A .
Gardner. Morris J ruled that it was lawful to withdraw a PEG from an elderly PVS patient, 
considering the medical evidence that continued hydration and nutrition was ‘futile, in the 
sense that it has no prospect whatever of improving her condition.’ Since in this case the 
PEG was achieving its purpose of hydration and nutrition, Morris J, like Schneiderman et al 
above, makes an implicit judgment about the worthlessness of the patient’s life and conflates 
the futility of the PEG with the futility of the patient’s life.86
81 See, eg, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department o f Health 497 US 261 (1990); In re Schiavo 851 So 2d 182 
(Fla, 2003); Darren P Mareiniss, 'A Comparison of Cruzan And Schiavo' (2005 ) 26 Journal o f Legal Medicine 
233. Commentators have noted the ‘the lack of a unified jurisprudence on medical futility and the absence of 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the subject’: Manuel A Eskildsen, 'Medical Futility: Ethical, Legal, and Policy 
Issues' (2010) 18(3) Annals o f Long-Tenv Care, 35.
82 In part because a number of cases have involved the interpretation of specific statutory provisions such as the 
Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) as in Gardner [2003] VSC 173 (29 May 2003).
82 For example, some cases concerned PVS patients, as in Gardner [2003] VSC 173(29 May 2003). and those 
with capacity to refuse treatment as in Brightwater [2009] WASC 229 (14 August 2009) and HLtd v J  [2010] 
SASC 176 (15 June 2010). The issues in these cases have been explained earlier in this chapter. Contrastingly, 
in JT [2009] ACTSC 105(28 August 2009) the court refused an application that all but palliative care be 
withdrawn from a patient. The patient who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia became obsessed with fasting 
and physically resisted naso-gastric intubation necessary to sustain his life. The court held that the patient’s 
resistance, whilst distressing to the medical personnel, did not render the intubation futile.
84 Gardner [2003] VSC 173 (29 May 2003).
85 Ibid [8],
86 This is notwithstanding a comment by the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in the earlier 
determination of this case that ‘the question is never whether the patient’s life is worthwhile but whether the 
treatment is worthwhile’: BWF[2003] VCAT 121, [21].
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2 ‘Vitalism Run Amuck’?'87
If, as I argue, artificial nutrition and hydration should be continued in such circumstances, the 
implication is that a patient like Tony Bland should be sustained in a persistent vegetative 
state indefinitely. There is strident criticism of this position which many reject as ‘vitalism’, 
an extreme position which holds that life must be preserved no matter the pain, suffering or 
expense involved.The prospect of oneself or a loved one living in a state of permanent 
unconsciousness and deprived of rational functioning is deeply disturbing. However, 
providing food and water to a human being is not a vitalistic demand for ‘life at all costs’. 
Should the patient be unable to assimilate them or should their provision cause unrelieved 
pain or unresolved complications such as aspirational pneumonia or infection,911 the nutrition 
and hydration may be withdrawn, even if this foreseeably hastens death.
Thus life need not be preserved at all costs. However, life should not be intentionally 
terminated because this would be a deliberate rejection of the intrinsic value of human life. In 
chapter 2 I argued in favour of the philosophical tradition that excludes the choice (in other 
words, the intent) to harm or impede fundamental human goods such as life. This is 
articulated in the moral norm which forbids intentional killing. When nutrition and hydration 
are successfully nourishing and hydrating a patient and do not impose unreasonable burdens, 
their withdrawal almost certainly signifies an underlying intention to kill the patient. This 
intention to kill may be present as an end in itself or as a means to some further end, for 
example, to liberate the patient, carers or society from the burden of disability. This was laid 
bare in Bland:
What is proposed in the present case is to adopt a course with the intention of bringing about Anthony 
Bland's death. As to the element of intention ... there can be no real doubt that it is present in this 
case: the whole purpose o f stopping artificial feeding is to bring about the death of Anthony Bland.91
87 Alicia R Ouellette, 'When Vitalism is Dead Wrong: The Discrimination against and Torture of Incompetent 
Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining Treatment' (2004) 79 Indiana Law Journal 1,21.
88 See, eg, Catherine Constable, 'Withdrawal o f Artificial Nutrition and Hydration for Patients in a Permanent 
Vegetative State: Changing Tack ' (2012) 26 Bioethics 157; see generally Kuhse, above n 66.
89 As defined by Keown who rejects vitalism: Keown, 'The Legal Revolution: From "Sanctity of Life" to 
"Quality of Life" and "Autonomy"', above n 42, 256.
90 Brian Smith et al, 'Hospital and Long-Term Outcome after Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastrostomy' (2008) 22 
Surgical Endoscopy 74.
91 Bland [1993] AC 789, 881 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). Similarly, Lord Mustill remarked that ‘the proposed 
conduct has the aim ... o f terminating the life of Anthony Bland by withholding from him the basic necessities 
of life’ (at 887). According to Lord Lowry, ‘the intention to bring about the patient's death is there’ (at 876).
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The existence of an underlying intention to terminate life in these cases is also revealed by the 
reflection that, should the patient somehow continue to live after treatment withdrawal, the 
decision to withdraw would be not be regarded as a ‘success’. It would be considered at least 
a partial ‘failure’ because the burden -  that is the patient him or herself -  had not been 
removed.92
Providing food and water to severely disabled patients such as Tony Bland can be seen as an 
expression of solidarity which upholds their dignity as persons, whatever indignities they 
might suffer.93 This is consistent with the philosophical tradition whereby every human being 
possesses an equal and inalienable dignity based on the morally significant capacity for 
rationality and free choice inherent in human nature.
This concept of human dignity is contested, particularly by consequentialists, but it is 
grounded in a long history of scholarship.94 The capacity for rationality and free choice is 
always present, even if a human being is not able to exercise that capacity due to infancy, 
disability or senility.95 As Finnis says, PVS patients are ‘gravely damaged yet their inability to 
participate in any other basic human good does not nullify their participation in the good ... of 
human life -  not even when participation is wounded and ... deficient.’96
3 Conclusion: Only Semantic?
Finnis’ view stands in blunt contrast to the ‘worthless life’ ethic which is inherent to what I 
have argued is an erroneous understanding of burden and futility because of the conflation of 
the burden or futility of treatment with the burden or futility of the patient’s life.
92 See generally J L A Garcia, 'Intentions in Medical Ethics' in David S Oderberg and Jacqueline Laing (eds), 
Human Lives: Critical Essays on Consequentialist Bioethics (MacMillan Press, 1997) 161, 166.
93 For example, some would see the patient’s extreme dependency or the need to be fed through a tube as 
indignities. Finnis argues that ‘the emotionally repugnant aspects of long-term coma’ should not be confused 
with lack of human dignity: John Finnis, 'The "Value Of Human Life" and "The Right To Death": Some 
Reflections on Cruzan and Ronald Dworkin' (1993) 17 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 559, 566.
94 Writing in the 6,h century, Boethius defined a person as ‘an individual substance of a rational nature’: 
Boethius, Liber De Persona et Duabus Naturis Contra Eutychen Et Nestorium , quoted in Patrick Lee and 
Robert P George, Body-Self Dualism in Contemporaiy Ethics and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
83. This definition was subsequently adopted by Aquinas: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I q. 29 a. IC, 
cited by John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 1998) 136. More 
recently see, eg, Patrick Lee and Robert P George, 'The Nature and Basis o f Human Dignity' (2008) 21 Ratio 
Juris 173.
95 Keown, 'The Legal Revolution: From "Sanctity o f Life" to "Quality of Life" and "Autonomy"', above n 42, 
257.
96 John Finnis, 'Bland'. Crossing the Rubicon?' (1993) 109 Law Quarterly Review 329, 334.
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While the quality of life the patient experiences as a result of their condition is necessarily 
relevant in determining whether a proposed treatment can achieve its therapeutic goal to cure, 
improve or palliate,97 this is different to a judgement about ‘quality of life’ which asks 
whether the patient’s life is burdensome, futile or worth living. As Keown notes, ‘[t]his 
valuation of human life grounds the principle that, because certain lives are not worth living, 
it is right intentionally to terminate them, whether by act or omission.’ Some have argued 
that
the distinction between considering the worth o f treatment, as opposed to the worth o f the patient’s 
life, is only semantic. When one asks the question about whether a treatment is worthwhile, one is 
inevitably led to an examination o f what the treatment is going to achieve for the patient."
McGee asserts that ‘quality of life considerations necessarily and inescapably enter into the 
judgement of whether to continue or withdraw treatment, and therefore of whether the 
treatment really is futile.’100 Similarly, Quilter argues that quality of life assessments 
necessarily come in to play in deciding whether proposed treatment is burdensome.101
It is true that ‘what the treatment is going to achieve for the patient’ is relevant to a proper 
assessment of futility and burden. However, as I have argued, it is meaningless to assess what 
the treatment can achieve against criteria not relevant to the purpose of the treatment. Thus 
semantics are avoided when the worth or futility of the treatment is assessed correctly against 
the purpose the treatment was designed to achieve. This avoids any recourse to value laden 
judgments about the worth of the patient’s life itself which go beyond the particular purpose 
of the treatment. As Keown states:
Were one to engage in judgements o f [this] ... sort, and to conclude that certain lives were not worth 
living, one would forfeit any principled basis for objecting to intentional killing.102
07 Keown, 'Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland , above n 74, 486.
98 Ibid.
99 Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart, above n 27, 338.
100 Andrew McGee, 'Finding a Way Through the Ethical and Legal Maze:Withdrawal o f Medical Treatment and 
Euthanasia' (2005) 13 Medical Law Review 357, 379
101 John Quilter, ‘The Babies Doe: Sanctity or Quality o f Life?’ (1992) 3 Bioethics Outlook A, 6.
102 Keown, 'Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland , above n 74, 485.
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D Case Studies
My interviews highlighted a number of patient refusals of life-sustaining interventions and the 
contested meaning of those decisions. I will now apply my analysis of burdensome and futile 
treatment to these treatment refusals.
1 Max and Sam - Withdrawal o f Artificial Ventilation
Respiratory decline is a particularly distressing aspect of MND. Non-invasive artificial 
ventilation (or BiPAP) -  where a mask is placed on the face, nose or mouth -  aims to support 
the patient’s breathing and relieve symptoms of breathlessness. However, the condition of the 
patient will decline to the point where mechanical ventilation is no longer effective. The 
patient’s death is not uncommonly preceded by the withdrawal of this support.
The Unit’s nurse coordinator, Helen Carlino, described the death of Max who at his request 
was admitted to the hospital in the final stage of his illness:
... he would have periods he’d be awake and was quite lucid ... but those periods were less and less and 
he was sleeping for longer and longer. So ... we had a discussion ... next time he wants to go to sleep 
and have a rest ... he could request not to put a BiPAP unit on and if he falls asleep he’s not likely to 
wake up and that’s exactly what happened.103
Similarly, Dr Evans spoke of Sam who had respiratory failure and died after the withdrawal 
of ventilation:
[He] sat in bed and watched his favourite movie with his wife. Had a few glasses of wine and took the 
mask off... How beautiful is that? ... With his wife sitting there, just quietly went to sleep ...104
Although the interviews were unclear as to the purpose of the patients in refusing continued 
ventilation, there was no indication that their intention was to cause the end of their lives. As 
noted earlier, artificial ventilation has its burdens for some patients. If their disease has 
progressed to such a point that the BiPAP can no longer support their respiratory function, 
there can be no duty to continue this intervention. It is likely that Max and Sam’s
103 Interview with Helen Carlino (28 November 2007).
104 Interview with Paul Evans (18 December 2007).
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discontinuance of ventilation was a valid refusal of treatment as opposed to a suicidal refusal. 
It appears that, in deciding the burdens outweighed the benefits, the patients were making a 
decision about the value of treatment.
2 Refusal o f Tracheotomy
When non-invasive ventilation fails, MND patients have the option of an invasive surgical 
procedure known as a tracheotomy where an incision is made towards the front of the neck, 
opening a site for a tracheostomy tube to be inserted. This allows the patient to breathe 
without the use of their nose or mouth. Dr Evans highlighted that, as at the date of the 
interview, only one MND patient in Australia had taken up this option.105
Dr Evans described this intervention as ‘the extreme’ because of the possible complications 
and the fact that the procedure destroys any ability for verbal communication. It was clear that 
for the vast majority of patients this procedure carries significant burdens which they refuse, 
accepting the inevitability of a respiratory death as a result.
3 Ada — Withholding o f Life-Sustaining Intervention
Dr Evans provided an example of withholding renal dialysis from a patient, Ada, who had 
been dialysed on an earlier occasion. However, her care was placing increasing strain on her 
very attentive husband, Patrick. Dr Evans confronted Ada with the need to enter a nursing 
home. However,
[t]hat night she went into acute unexplained renal failure and I came in ... the next morning and said, 
“I’m going to miss you.” She said, “I’m going to miss you too.” ... I said, “I’m not going to do anything 
for you. I’ll just make sure you’re comfortable.” She said, “I don’t want to go somewhere if it’s not 
with Patrick.” ... I wasn’t going to dialyse her again and she knew that. And it’s a nice way to go.106
Did Ada have a duty to accept renal dialysis? The interview did not reveal full details of her 
deliberations. On the one hand, her fear of being separated from her husband might indicate a 
sense that she considered her life was no longer worth living and the refusal of dialysis a 
means to bring about her death. On the other hand, there is a suggestion that for a patient in
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
71
such an acute state of kidney failure, coupled with the disabilities associated with MND, 
continued dialysis would have posed unacceptable physical and emotional burdens. The 
futility of dialysis might also have been a relevant factor since most people with chronic 
kidney failure do deteriorate to eventual death.
4 Jackie — Withdrawal o f Artificial Nutrition and Hydration
While I would argue that there are good reasons to conclude that the case studies discussed 
thus far do not evidence the elements of suicide, the case of Jackie stands in contrast. Jackie 
was a widow in her early seventies with two children. Dr Blackburn recounted that she had 
normal strength in her arms and legs, normal breathing, had lost her power of speech, had 
limited swallowing ability and was losing weight. Eating and drinking had become nearly 
impossible. Jackie took up the option of a PEG tube to deliver artificial sustenance, bypassing 
the need to swallow. However, six months later, after finalising her affairs, she returned to Dr
107Blackburn, on his account, determined to die.
There was nothing in the interview to suggest that Jackie considered the PEG burdensome, 
nor that it was futile in the sense of failing to provide effective sustenance. On my analysis, 
Jackie therefore had a moral duty to continue the PEG and preserve her life. In this situation 
the law should recognise a legal duty to accept treatment. Moreover, the conversation between 
doctor and patient lays bare that the intention underlying the withdrawal was to cause death. 
Dr Blackburn described how Jackie wrote down two questions: “‘right, now who decides 
when? ... how are we going to do this?’” Blackburn told me his response: “Fine, it’s easy, 
we’ll put you into hospital and we’ll stop your PEG feeds. No nutrition, no hydration, you’ll 
die in 14 days. Easy.”108
According to Dr Blackburn, Jackie was admitted to the hospital where she refused all 
nutrition and hydration and died within seven to ten days, supported by pain relieving 
medication. He estimated that the discontinuance of the PEG accelerated her death by one or 
two years.100 I argue that Jackie’s refusal had all the necessary elements of suicide: the
107 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
108 Ibid.
109 T V . 'J
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omission of life-sustaining treatment that was neither burdensome nor futile, with the 
intention to cause death.
The next section of this chapter takes up the question of Dr Blackburn’s role in Jackie’s death: 
do his actions -  and the actions of doctors in similar refusal of treatment cases -  amount to 
assisted suicide? If a legal duty to accept life-sustaining treatment is recognised in such 
circumstances, how should the law respond to refusals like Jackie’s? Would such a legal duty 
necessitate the forced treatment of patients who resist?
IV CAN A DOCTOR’S COOPERATION WITH A PATIENT’S REFUSAL OF 
TREATMENT AMOUNT TO ASSISTED SUICIDE?
Assisting or counselling suicide remains an offence across most jurisdictions.110 If a patient 
can suicide by refusing treatment, is it possible that a doctor’s cooperation in that refusal can 
amount to assisted suicide? For example, by admitting Jackie to hospital, ceasing her PEG 
feeds and providing palliation, was Dr Blackburn assisting what I have argued was Jackie’s 
suicide? In this section I argue that in some circumstances such cooperation can amount to 
assisted suicide.
A distinction between a doctor’s cooperation with a patient’s valid refusal of treatment and 
cooperation with a suicidal refusal is recognised by legislation in some jurisdictions. For 
example, in Victoria the Medical Treatment Act 1988 creates the offence of ‘medical trespass’ 
in the event a doctor treats a competent, fully informed patient who has clearly refused that 
treatment.* 111 However, the Act states that it does not affect the operation of the provision in 
the Crimes Act regarding the prohibition of assisted suicide.112 There are similar provisions in 
South Australia, the Northern Territory and Queensland which recognise the right to refuse
• 1 1 3treatment but affirm the prohibition of assisted suicide. Moreover, provisions such as s
110 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 31C; Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 162; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 17; Criminal 
Code 1899 (Qld) s 311; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 13A(5); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s
163; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 6B(2); Criminal Code 1913 (WA) s 288; Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 179; Criminal 
Code 1985 (Can); Suicide Act 1961 (UK) s 2(1).
111 The refusal must be in the presence of a witness and written in a prescribed form: Medical Treatment Act 
1988 (Vic) ss 5, 6.
112 Ibid, s4(3)(a).
113 Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative Care Act 1995 (SA) s 18; Natural Death Act 1988 (NT) s 7(2); 
Powers o f Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) s 37. Similar legislation does not exist in Tasmania but a Bill introduced in 
2005 (since lapsed) did contain similar provisions: Directions for Medical Treatment Bill 2005 (Tas) s 16. In
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574B Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) are explicit in allowing the use of reasonable force ‘to prevent 
the suicide of another person or any act which the person believes on reasonable grounds 
would, if committed, result in that suicide/114
A Criminal Responsibility for Assisted Suicide
It is a criminal offence to assist suicide in all Australian jurisdictions.115 While the wording of 
the relevant provisions prohibiting assisted suicide varies, the elements of the offence are 
essentially the same. For example, Crimes Act 1900 (NSW):
31C (1) A person who aids or abets the suicide or attempted suicide of another person shall be liable to 
imprisonment for 10 years.
(2) Where:
(a) a person incites or counsels another person to commit suicide, and
(b) that other person commits, or attempts to commit, suicide as a consequence of that incitement or 
counsel,
the firstmentioned person shall be liable to imprisonment for 5 years.
This provision - similar to other jurisdictions - thus creates three different offences: aiding or 
abetting the suicide; inciting suicide; and counselling suicide.116 
1 Aiding or Abetting Suicide
At common law aiding and abetting is a crime of complicity and an aider and abetter is 
considered a principal in the second degree.117 He or she must be present at the scene of the 
crime and must know that the crime is being committed or will be committed and with that
Western Australia, a health professional may provide urgent treatment to an incompetent patient after a 
suspected suicide attempt even though the patient (or guardian) had made an advance health directive that would 
be inconsistent with the treatment: Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) s 110ZIA.
114 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 574B. There are equivalent provisions in some other Australian jurisdictions: 
Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 18; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 463B; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 13A.
115 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 31C; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 6B; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 
13 A; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 288; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 108; Criminal 
Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 163; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 162; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 17.
116 It is also an offence to use a carriage service (which includes a telephone, fax, email or the internet) to 
intentionally counsel or incite a person to commit or attempt to commit suicide: Criminal Code Amendment 
(Suicide and Related Material Offences) Act 2005 (Cth).
117 Because suicide is not a crime, aiding and abetting suicide is not strictly speaking a form of complicity but is 
instead a principal offence: A- Gv Able [1984] QB 795; R v McShane (1978) 66 Cr App R 97. However, the law 
of complicity is relevant to assisted suicide by analogy.
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• • • • 118 knowledge, intentionally assist or encourage the principal in the first degree. It is irrelevant
that the person would have tried to commit suicide even without the assistance.119 
(a) Intention to Aid or Abet
In Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority f  Gillick’) “ the issue was 
whether a doctor had the intention to aid or abet unlawful sexual intercourse when he 
prescribed contraception to a girl under the age of consent. Lord Scarman found that the bona 
fide exercise of the doctor’s clinical judgment was ‘...a complete negation of the guilty mind 
which is an essential ingredient of the crime of aiding and abetting the commission of 
unlawful sexual intercourse.’ As Price has explained: ‘if the doctor knows that unlawful 
sexual intercourse will be encouraged by his actions, but it is not his purpose to aid unlawful 
sexual intercourse, he has no intention to aid.’122 Price notes that this reasoning has been 
criticised. However, it is consistent with what I have argued in the previous chapter is the 
correct understanding of intention: that even with knowledge that a consequence is a virtual 
certainty, an intention to bring about that consequence is not a necessary inference.
Thus, if a doctor provides some form of assistance which the doctor knows will likely (or 
even certainly) assist a suicide, the doctor’s intention to aid or abet that suicide is a possible 
inference. However, it is not the necessary inference. Analogously with Gillick, it might be 
the doctor’s genuine medical judgment, for example, that the assistance was required for 
effective pain management of a patient who persistently refused nutrition and hydration in an 
effort to die. Tollefsen suggests another possible intention of a doctor faced with such a 
patient:
Even in those cases in which the patient might have so desired for wrongful reasons, there is no need 
for those who withdraw [artificial nutrition and hydration] to formally cooperate in the patient’s 
wrongful choice; their intention can be rather to act so as to respect patient autonomy.1“4
118 R v Phan (2001) 53 NSWLR480; One of the leading cases about aiding and abetting suicide is A-G v Able 
[1984] 1 All ER 277. See also Skene, above n 7, 307; Otlowski, above n 5, 59.
119 A-G v Able [1984] 1 All ER 277, 288.
120 [1986] AC 112.
121 Gillick [1986] AC 112, 190.
122 David Price, 'Assisted Suicide and Refusing Medical Treatment: Linguistics, Morals and Legal Contortions' 
(1996) 4 Medical Law Review 270, 295.
123 Ibid.
124 Tollefsen, above n 47.
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(b) Types o f Assistance
Assistance can take many forms. Childress explains:
...there are many kinds and degrees of assistance, such as providing information about means of 
suicide, offering encouragement, providing means, helping a patient use the means...125
In R v Pitman, for example, a woman who suffered from arthritis asked her son to hold the 
barrel of a rifle to her head while she managed to pull the trigger.126 In R v Maxwell a man 
pleaded guilty to aiding or abetting his wife to commit suicide by providing her with 
sedatives. He then caused her to asphyxiate by feeding helium through a bag fastened around 
her head. In many cases the assistance consists of obtaining or supplying drugs and 
sometimes being present while the person ingests them.
(i) Aid or Abet by Omission?
There is little case law to clarify whether one can aid or abet suicide by an omission, such as 
in the case of a doctor who withdraws or withholds life-sustaining treatment at the patient’s
1 2q
request. Whilst the United States case of Bouvia v Superior Court suggests it cannot, 
Otlowski argues that there is no reason in principle or in the wording of relevant legislation 
why assisting suicide cannot be committed by an omission. She also points out that there 
are a few cases, not directly on point, which suggest that assistance with suicide can take the 
form of an omission. In Schneidas, for example, a prisoner on a hunger strike applied for
125 James F Childress, Who Should Decide? Paternalism in Health Care (Oxford University Press, 1982).
126 (Unreported) (1997) 4(9) Medical Law Monitor 2-3, cited in Williams, above n 3.
127 R v Maxwell [2003] VSC 278 (24 July 2003).
128 For example, R v Wallis (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 342; R v Larkin (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 
Nicholson J, 14 April 1983); R v Hood [2002] VSC 123 (12 April 2002). More recently Kay Gilderdale pleaded 
guilty to assisting the suicide of her daughter by crushing up pills and feeding them through a nasal tube, 
handing her morphine and injecting her with three syringes of air: Sandra Laville, 'Trapped by ME, Lynn 
Gilderdale made it clear she wanted to die', guardian.co.uk (online), 25 January 2010 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2010/jan/25/lynn-gilderdale-me-assisted-suicide?intcmp=239> ; In New 
Zealand, a 17 year old teen was convicted of assisted suicide by supplying his friend with ‘equipment’ and 
watching while he killed himself: Joelle Dally, 'The Teenager Who Helped his Friend Die: 'I'm Sorry", New 
Zealand Herald (online), 14 February 2010 <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/parole- 
board/news/article.cfm?o_id=600612&objectid=10626050>.
129 225 Cal Rptr 297 (1986).
130 Otlowski, above n 5, 78.
131 For example, Re Kinney (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Fullagar J, 23 December 1988).
132 Schneidas v Corrective Ser\>ices Commission (Unreported, Supreme Court of NSW, Lee J, 8 April 1983).
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an injunction to restrain the authorities from force-feeding him. The court refused the 
injunction because failing to feed the prisoner would be aiding and abetting his suicide.
By analogy, it could therefore be argued that a doctor who withholds or withdraws treatment at the 
request of a patient pursuant to a patient’s suicidal refusal of treatment, in effect assists (aids, abets etc.) 
the patient in committing suicide.133
Under the doctrine of complicity, being present at an offence does not by itself attract 
liability. However, physical presence could in some circumstances be evidence of 
encouragement or assistance which would amount to aiding and abetting.114 While there is no 
general liability for a failure to prevent the commission of an offence:135
[a] person may ... be liable for a failure to act where he or she is in a position of power or control, is 
aware that an offence is about to be committed or is being committed, has reasonable opportunity to 
intervene, and fails to take reasonable steps to prevent the offence being committed.136
1 77If a person has a duty to act and does not, liability might also arise. At common law, a duty
. . . . . .  • • 1 Tf tto act will exist in limited circumstances, including in a doctor-patient relationship and
1 7Qwhen one undertakes the care of a dependent person.
However, there are suggestions that even within these relationships, such a duty can be 
negated. This appears to be the case in the United States.140 In Australia, in H Ltd vJthe court 
rejected the proposition that an aged care facility would be aiding or abetting J’s suicide if it 
cooperated with her direction not to provide nutrition, hydration and insulin:
Respecting the right of personal autonomy recognised by the law cannot constitute that offence. 
Moreover, a person who is not under a duty to prevent the commission of an offence does not aid and 
abet it by failing to prevent it or by communicating that he or she will not act to prevent it, unless by so
133 Otlowski, above n 5, 80.
134 R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534, 539, 540 (Cave J), 552 (Lopes J), 560 (Hawkins J), 561 (Huddleston B); R v 
Mills (1985) 17 A Crim R 411, 440; R v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510, [69]-[70],
135 R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534, 539 (Cave J), 557-8 (Hawkins J); R v Mills (1985) 17 A Crim R 411,440.
136 LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia (at 5 December 2010) 130 Criminal Law, ‘V General Doctrines’ 
[130-7255]. See also Smith v R (Unreported, Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal, Crawford, Nettlefold and 
Cosgrove JJ, 6 March 1979) 34 (Crawford J); Randall v R [2004] TASSC 42 (12 May 2004).
137 R v Russell [1933] VLR 59, 77, 81-82; Ex parte Parker; Re Brotherson [1957] SR (NSW) 326, 330.
138 Otlowski, above n 5, 26.
139 R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226; People v Beardsley 113 NW 1128 (1907).
140 Otlowski, above n 5, 48; Barber v Superior Court 195 Cal Rptr 484 (1983); In re Quinlan 355 A2d 647 
(1976).
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doing he or she, as a matter o f fact, encourages the commission of the offence. ... A duty to take care 
for the welfare o f another is incapable of performance unless there is an element of co-operation on the 
part o f the person who is owed the duty. Where that co-operation is withdrawn, the effect will usually 
be to negate the duty and absolve the person who would otherwise owe the duty from any obligation.141
Williams’ reasoning is similar:
a patient’s possibly suicidal refusal would provide a doctor with a get-out clause from any charge of 
aiding and abetting suicide, because a voluntary refusal o f treatment by a patient releases the doctor 
from his duty o f care...142
This is consistent with Brighftwter. The court referred to section 262 of the Criminal Code 
1913 (WA) which ordinarily imposes a duty to provide the ‘necessaries of life’ to someone 
under one’s charge. However, it was held that the duty did not apply when a patient had 
refused the provision of such necessaries as food and water.143
2 Inciting Suicide
At common law incitement includes giving advice, suggestions, proposals or persuasion, 
commands or threats, all of which aim to encourage another to commit an offence.144 
Prosecutions for inciting suicide are very uncommon. In the United States there are a number 
of cases where the defendant supplied the means of death and then encouraged the victim to 
attempt suicide via taunts and verbal abuse. However, the defendants were convicted of 
manslaughter, not the offence of inciting suicide.145
In a rare prosecution, a New Zealand man was charged with inciting suicide pursuant to the 
Crimes Act 1961 s 179(a), a provision very similar to the NSW equivalent quoted above. His 
partner had committed suicide after an intense argument. The accused is reported to have told 
the deceased just prior to her suicide:
141 H L t d v J  [2010] SASC 176 (15 June 2010) [68], [74].
142 Williams, above n 3, 148. See also Price, above n 122, 293.
143 Brightwater [2009] WASC 229 (14 August 2009), [33]-[42],
144 Louis Waller, Brett, Waller and Williams Criminal Law: Text and Cases (Butterworths, 8th ed, 1997) 462.
145 People vDuffy 595 NE 2d 814 (1992); Persampieri v CommonwealthM5 NE 2d 387 (1961); People v 
Campbell 335 NW 2d 27 (1983).
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I suppose you want to go outside and hang yourself... I suppose you want me to go outside and help 
you look for a rope, do you? There's one in the garage ... I suppose you want me to go outside and help 
you up with the rope?140
The Court found that the essential elements of the charge were:
(1) knowledge that suicide was in contemplation; (2) an intentionally formed deliberate encouragement 
or urging that the act of suicide should take place; and (3) a causal relationship between the 
encouragement and the act itself. The encouragement must be at least a cause of the suicide.147
It is likely that these elements are also required in those jurisdictions, including NSW, which 
have essentially the same provision as New Zealand.
Although at first glance, ‘inciting suicide’ might imply some element of hatred or aggression 
usually irrelevant to medical treatment, the New Zealand case makes clear that ‘inciting’ 
includes encouragement and urging which could be applicable in a medical setting. Arguably, 
Blackburn’s answer to Jackie was a cause of her decision to cease sustenance and thus to die 
and may amount to a deliberate urging of suicide: “ ‘Fine, it’s easy, we’ll put you in to hospital 
and we’ll stop your PEG feeds. No nutrition, no hydration, you’ll die in 14 days. Easy.’” 148 
Although it is difficult to envisage a criminal prosecution of a doctor such as Blackburn in 
these circumstances, there is some evidence for the presence of the elements of this offence in 
Jackie’s death.
3 Counselling Suicide
The essence o f counselling suicide appears to be the provision of information and advice, for 
example, about the lethal dose of drugs.149 According to Hart and Honore, counselling a crime 
requires the accused to provide a reason for the principal to commit the act, such as pointing 
out the benefits of proposed conduct.150 They state that:
l4° 'Man Tells o f Sister's Rage before She Hanged Herself, New Zealand Herald (online), 18 June 2003 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=l&objectid=3507938>.
147 The evidence was that the accused’s words were used in the heat of the moment and there was no evidence 
that he formed an intention to deliberately encourage the suicide. The Court directed the jury to return a verdict 
of not guilty: R v Tamatea [2003] BCL 681.
148 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
149 Otlowski, above n 5, 60.
150 HLA Hart and A Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1985) 379.
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advice can be reduced to three forms: (i) advising another to do something, (ii) advising another how to 
do something, (iii) advising another about a proposed course of action.151
As with the offence of inciting suicide, there must be a causal connection between the 
counselling and the actual suicide.
In Donaldson v Lungren, a man with a malignant brain tumour wanted advice about the 
method of suicide which would best facilitate his cryogenic preservation so that one day he 
could be brought back to life. He and his cryogenic technician sought a declaration which 
would protect the latter from prosecution for advising a suicide. The court found that such 
advice would be illegal, pointing to the state’s interest in preserving the sanctity of life and 
guarding against abuses. It ruled that the plaintiffs constitutional right to free speech was not 
impaired by the decision.
On the face of his reported conversation with Jackie, I would argue that Dr Blackburn’s 
response to Jackie may constitute this offence of counselling suicide. She came to him 
determined to die and asked him how she could do this. Dr Blackburn’s answer to discontinue 
the PEG feeds was straightforward advice about how to achieve death. Again, there appears to 
have been a causal relation between this counsel and Jackie’s death, arguably satisfying the 
elements of this offence.
4 Homicide
The prosecution does have the option of proceeding with a charge of murder or manslaughter, 
rather than some form of assisted suicide.153 If the accused took an active role in the death, the 
charge is more likely to be murder or manslaughter. For example, in R v Hough the accused 
was ‘... too ready to play an active part in the procuring or using the paraphernalia of death’154 
and was convicted of attempted murder rather than assisted suicide. She had provided the
151 Ibid 380.
152 4 Cal Rptr 2d 59(1992).
153 Note that in New South Wales, the survivor of a suicide pact can only be charged with assisted suicide and 
not murder or manslaughter: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 3IB. In South Australia and Victoria, the charge can be 
reduced from murder to manslaughter: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1932 (SA) s 13 A; Crimes Act 1958 
(Vic) s 6B. Other Australian jurisdictions are silent on this issue.
154 R v Hough (1984) 6 Cr App R (S) 406, 409 (Lord Lane CJ).
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deceased with a lethal dose of tablets and when she was still breathing after several hours, the 
accused put a plastic bag over her head.
Similarly, in New Zealand, Lesley Martin lost her appeal against the conviction of the 
attempted murder of her mother after she administered morphine and smothered her mother 
with a pillow. 1:0 Also in New Zealand, an accused was convicted of manslaughter because he 
stabbed his mother to death in order to complete her failed attempt at suicide. 1>6 In the United 
States there have been convictions of homicide in cases where the accused ‘trussed’ the 
deceased so he could strangle himself. 1^ 7 In another case the accused suffocated his mother 
with a pillow after a failed suicide attempt.
If the deceased does the final act to cause his or her own death, the accused is likely to be 
charged with assisted suicide rather than homicide. In Carter v Attorney-General for the State 
o f Queensland',159 two heroin addicts, Marke and Smyth, wanted to end their lives. The 
accused supplied them with heroin. He injected Marke and was convicted of his murder. The 
accused was convicted of assisting the suicide of Smyth. Although the accused had inserted 
the needle, Smyth pushed the plunger in himself. His appeal against the murder conviction 
was unsuccessful. 160
Similarly, although Dr Kervorkian ‘hooked up’ suicidal patients to his suicide machine, the 
patients themselves completed the act of suicide when they pressed the button to activate the 
apparatus. The Supreme Court of Michigan stated that the appropriate charge was assisting in 
suicide. 161
In cases where the competence of the deceased is questionable the charge is also more likely 
to be murder or manslaughter, rather than assisted suicide. In R v Justins^2 there was 
evidence that the deceased suffered from mild to moderate dementia. The accused had given
155 Martin vR  [2005] NZCA 3 (14 February 2005).
156 R v  Stead (1992) 7 CRNZ 291.
157 People v Cleaves 280 Cal Rptr 146 (1991).
158 Gentry v State 625 NE 2d 1268 (1993).
159 Carter vA-G for the State o f Queensland [2003] QCA 515.
160 A petition for mercy to the Governor was unsuccessful: Carter v A-G for the State of Queensland [2012] 
QSC234.
161 People v Kevorkian 527 NW 2d 714 (1994). Similarly, in the United Kingdom see Kennedy v R [2005] 
EWCA Crim 685.
162 [2008] NSWSC 1194 (12 November 2008).
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the deceased a glass of Nembutal and watched him drink it. Although her conviction for 
manslaughter was overturned, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal highlighted 
that in such circumstances, if the deceased lacked the mental capacity to perform an act that 
caused his death, then the act causing death was not his, but the act of the accused, he offence 
would be murder or manslaughter.163
B How Should Doctors Respond To Suicidal Refusals?
As I have argued, Jackie had a moral duty to accept treatment because her PEG was neither 
burdensome nor futile. The current law -  at least in Australia -  would simply accept her right 
to refuse treatment. Yet her refusal was clearly suicidal. In this section I pose a contentious 
question: if ordinarily a competent patient has a moral duty to accept life sustaining treatment 
that is not burdensome or futile, what would be the implications if the law recognised a 
corresponding legal duty? The suggestion of such a legal duty might conjure fears of medical 
paternalism and therapeutic overreach, forcing patients to be kept alive against their will. 
However, I now argue that such a legal duty would not require the enforcement of the duty by 
mandatory treatment. After all, suicide is not illegal. However, if such a legal duty existed, 
there would be implications for clinical practice.
As explained in this chapter, if there is no moral duty to accept treatment, then the omission of 
treatment should not be regarded as a legal cause. Moreover, an assessment by the patient that 
the treatment is burdensome or, upon medical advice, that it is futile provides an inference 
that the intention underlying the refusal is not suicidal. A doctor who cooperates with a 
patient’s refusal in these circumstances is not assisting a suicide because, on this analysis, 
there is no suicide. Nor is the doctor necessarily intending death, even if he or she knows that 
death is the likely outcome.
So if one withdraws life-sustaining measures precisely because that has been requested by a competent 
patient on grounds of their burdensomeness, one need not be purposing, aiming at, or intending the 
patient’s foreseeably certain death. One’s purpose and intent is to honour the patient’s wish to be 
relieved o f (or free others from) their burden.164
163 Justins v Regina [2010] NSWCCA 242, [65]-[68], [94] (Spigelman CJ), [268] (Simpson J), [343] (Johnson
J).
164 Finnis, 'Bland: Crossing the Rubicon?', above n 96, 332.
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Similarly, if the reason for refusal is the futility of the treatment, then there is no suicide to 
assist. Dr Blackburn, however, knew that Jackie intended to suicide by rejecting sustenance. 
Although as I have outlined above, his intention to assist her suicide is not a necessary 
inference, his description of their conversation, in particular his initiative in suggesting the 
means of death, suggests that his intent may have been to assist her suicide. Not only may 
this be a criminal offence, but in my philosophical account, it is unethical because it is 
conduct which intentionally rejects the intrinsic good of human life.
As I have outlined above, ordinarily a patient’s refusal of life-sustaining treatment relieves a 
doctor of his or her duty to act. Faced with a competent patient’s rejection of food and water, 
the court in H Ltd v J , observed that ‘[generally, a person will not be liable to provide the 
necessary sustenance where the person whom he or she is otherwise liable to sustain 
withholds the mutual co-operation which is necessary to discharge that liability.’16> Indeed, 
feeding a person against his or her will, even via a PEG, is practically difficult, if not 
impossible, and imposes additional distress and burdens on the patient, family and medical 
staff.166 While the court in H Ltd v J  found that there was no duty to provide sustenance in the 
particular circumstances of the case, it did note that:
In some circumstances ... the duty may extend to taking steps to secure the co-operation of the person 
protected by the duty. It may also extend to ensuring the withdrawal o f co-operation is a voluntary and 
informed decision.167
Because Dr Blackburn knew that Jackie was refusing treatment with the intent to suicide, I 
argue that these are the sort of circumstances envisaged by H Ltd v J. For a doctor faced with 
a suicidal patient like Jackie, his duty to act remains and ‘extend[s] to taking steps to secure 
the co-operation of the person protected by the duty.’ What are those steps?
Certainly a doctor in that situation should begin by exploring the influences on the patient’s 
decision making. As I go on to explain in chapters 4 and 5, there are a myriad of intersecting 
psychological, existential, social and physical factors that can animate a patient’s wish for 
assisted death: depression, hopelessness, low family cohesion, self-perceived burden, lack of
165 H L t d v J  [2010] SASC 176(15 June 2010) [78],
166 J C Ahronheim and M R Gasner, The Sloganism of Starvation' (1990) 335 Lancet 278, 279; Robert A Burt, 
The Medical Futility Debate: Patient Choice, Physician Obligation, and End-of-Life Care' (2002) 5 Journal o f 
Palliative Medicine 249, 253.
167 H L t d v J  [2010] SASC 176 (15 June 2010) [75].
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social support and greater impact of physical symptoms. Moreover, I will refer to research 
which demonstrates that when these root causes are addressed, most requests for death abate. 
Dr Blackburn instead accepted Jackie’s request at face value and, it appears, intentionally 
assisted her death.
This approach does not suggest that a doctor must force treatment on a suicidal patient. 
Provisions such as s 574B Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) do not require the use of force to prevent 
a suicide, but permit the use of reasonable force. While a doctor could be justified in denying 
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment if this is a reasonable response to a suicidal refusal 
of treatment by a competent patient, there is nothing to compel him or her to do so. A doctor 
may instead assess that the use of any force would be unreasonable and attempt to secure the 
patient’s cooperation by other means.
I argue that a doctor in this situation does have a duty not only to explore the patient’s 
decision making, but also to counsel against suicide. If Dr Blackburn had conscientiously 
followed this course and Jackie still persisted in her request, the provision of pain relief and 
even her admission to hospital would not necessarily infer his intent to assist her suicide. As I 
have explained, it could alternatively evidence his intent to palliate her symptoms as she 
pressed on with her refusal of sustenance.
Nor does this approach require that a doctor interrogate all refusals of treatment. Legally, 
suicide cannot be presumed, it must be proved.169 Clinically the presumption should be that a 
refusal is licit, unless there is evidence of possible suicidal intent, in which case the patient’s 
refusal should be explored. Thus Keown rejects the suggestion that
denying legal validity to suicidal refusals would require doctors to investigate all refusals to ensure they 
were not suicidal, any more than the law against intentional killing requires the investigation of all 
cases of life shortening palliative care to ensure they are not murderous.170
The difficulties of discerning intent -  so often raised by critics -  are again acknowledged. But 
I have argued that the criminal law routinely grapples with this challenge and suggested that
168 See, eg, Brian J Kelly et al, 'Factors Associated with the Wish to Hasten Death: A Study of Patients with 
Terminal Illness' (2003) 33 Psychological Medicine 75.
169 R v City o f London Coroner; Ex Parte Barber [1975] 1 WLR 1310; Re Davis [1968] 1 QB 72.
170 Keown, 'A Futile Defence of Bland: A Reply to Andrew McGee', above n 57, 398.
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the circumstances of the refusal -  particularly whether the treatment is burdensome or futile -  
will often supply the required inference of intent. This approach is consistent with proper 
clinical practice:
Barring a very explicit statement ... [about] the intention of a patient, it will most often be difficult or 
impossible to tell whether a patient is acting morally or not. Now if the possibility of morally 
impermissible action were the paramount consideration for third parties, it might then seem 
impermissible to aid in an action that might itself be impermissible. Doctors and family members 
would be morally prohibited from withdrawing or omitting treatment. Yet this consideration is not 
paramount: it is the possibility of acting morally, o f uprightly refusing treatment, and the locus of  
authority for this judgment in the patient, that seem properly to guide deliberations o f third parties ...m
V CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined the legal meaning of suicide and in what circumstances a patient’s 
refusal of treatment can be equivalent to suicide. I argued that ordinarily a patient does have a 
moral duty to accept life-sustaining treatment and suggested that the law should recognise a 
corresponding legal duty. There is no such duty when the patient believes the treatment would 
impose unreasonable burdens or when the treatment is futile in the sense that it cannot achieve 
its medically indicated purpose. I rejected the dominant view of futility which focuses on the 
quality of life of the patient and its inherent judgment about the worthlessness of the patient’s 
life. Whether the patient has a moral duty to accept treatment is the ‘bright line’ between licit 
refusals and suicidal refusals. The existence or otherwise of a duty can also provide the 
inference of the patient’s intent, another indicator of the legal status of the refusal decision.
This chapter also argued that there is a distinction between a doctor’s cooperation with a 
patient’s valid refusal of treatment and cooperation with a suicidal request. Should a doctor’s 
response evidence intent to assist the suicide, this might attract criminal liability as a form of 
aiding or abetting suicide, inciting or counselling suicide. Faced with an apparently suicidal 
refusal of treatment, a doctor’s duty to act remains. This does not necessitate forced treatment 
of the patient, but it does require a doctor to fully assess the competence of the patient and 
counsel against suicide. In particular, there needs to be an examination of the underlying 
influences on the patient’s decision making. This is the subject of the next chapter.
171 Tollefsen, above n 47, 222.
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4Autonomy
I INTRODUCTION
The principle of autonomy is central to arguments in favour of voluntary euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide. This is underscored by the debate surrounding efforts to legalise 
these practices. For example, in the House of Lords there have been a number of private 
member’s Bills that aimed to legalise physician-assisted suicide. Right-to-die advocate Lord 
Joffe said in relation to one of these Bills that ‘[t]he underlying principle on which the whole 
Bill is based upon is personal autonomy and people making decisions for themselves.’1 
Similarly, when introducing the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 to the Western Australian 
parliament, Robin Chappie MLC said a key reason for voting in favour of the Bill was 
‘autonomy; that is, people’s right to largely control what they do with their life should, within 
reason, include the ability to choose when and how that life will end.’2
In a speech to the National Press Club, Dr Jack Kevorkian -  dubbed ‘Dr Death’ because of 
his campaign of assisted suicides -  described his underlying philosophical belief as 
‘[ajbsolute personal autonomy ... Do and say whatever you want to do and say at any time 
you want to do or say it, as long as you do not harm or threaten anybody else’s person or 
property.’3 4Dr Kevorkian encapsulates the liberal notion of autonomy that dominates right-to- 
die talk. In a society that places high value on freedom of choice in education, career, family 
and lifestyle, choice in dying may seem a consistent extension and assistance in doing so the 
logical corollary. Singer summarises the sentiment:
the principle of respect for autonomy tells us to allow rational agents to live their own lives according 
to their autonomous decisions, ... but if rational agents should autonomously choose to die, then 
respect for autonomy will lead us to assist them to do as they choose. 1
1 Quoted in Hélène Mulholland, ‘A Matter of Life and Death’, Guardian Unlimited (online), 24 October 2005 
<http://www.guardian.co.Uk/uk_news/story/0,, 1599498,00.html>.
2 Robin Chappie MLC, ‘Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010: Second Reading Speech’ (Speech delivered to the 
Legislative Council, Parliament of Western Australia, 25 May 2010) < http://www.robinchapple.com/voluntary- 
euthanasia-bill-2010-second-reading-speech >.
3 Quoted in Francis J Beckwith and Gregory Koukl, Relativism: Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-Air (Baker Books, 
1998) 130.
4 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1993) 195.
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Part II of this chapter begins by challenging the liberal concept of autonomy. When freedom 
is defined essentially as the ‘noninterference of others in the life of an individual’,5 patients 
who are dependent due to disease and disability can experience a compromised sense of self- 
worth and dignity. My interviews with MND patients disclosed that one of the key motivators 
for euthanasia was the perceived indignity of their dependence and the need of some patients 
for control. Part III demonstrates how the language of autonomy can conceal, rather than 
explain, some of the underlying drivers of patient desire for assisted death. I analyse my 
interview data and the existing literature to highlight these drivers: depression, hopelessness, 
low family cohesion, self-perceived burden, lack of social support and unrelieved physical 
symptoms.
II THE COMPLEXITY OF AUTONOMY CLAIMS
By privileging individual choice, the liberal ‘do and say whatever you want’ notion of 
autonomy obscures the complexity of some critical issues in the euthanasia debate. First, the 
context -  economic, social, cultural, familial -  in which choices are made can undermine 
meaningful choice. This creates special risks to the autonomy of vulnerable populations. I 
explore the problem of vulnerability in the next chapter. Secondly, individual choices can 
have profound social consequences: in chapter 9 I argue that legalised assisted death 
undermines the fundamental social norm which proscribes intentional killing.
Thirdly, when autonomy is upheld as ‘the supreme value’,6 self-sufficiency and self- 
affirmation are equated with a concept of dignity which is incompatible with physical 
disability and reliance on carers. This obscures what I argued in the previous chapter is the 
central meaning of dignity: the equal and intrinsic worth possessed by all humans, based on 
the capacity for rationality and free choice inherent in human nature.
Thus while a person’s own sense of their dignity might be compromised and although a 
person might not be able to exercise rationality and free choice due to impairment, 
dependence or a lack of control over bodily functions, dignity in its central sense is not 
diminished. As Lee and George explain, ‘[djignity in this sense derives from the kind of 
substantial entity one is, a human being ... Because it is based on the kind of being one is,
5 George Agich, Autonomy And Long-Teim Care (Oxford University Press, 1993) 8.
6 Max Charlesworth, Bioethics in a Liberal Society (Cambridge University Press, 1993) 1.
87
one cannot lose this dignity as long as one exists.’7
This view of human dignity is contested, and there are competing concepts of dignity at play 
in bioethical discourse. As explained in the previous chapter, many scholars, commentators 
and jurists affirm that human life has merely instrumental, not intrinsic worth.9 At the same 
time, as I highlighted then, the concept of human dignity which informs my analysis is 
underpinned by a robust tradition of scholarship.
According to this account of the human person, autonomy has important but contingent value, 
to the extent that its exercise is conducive to human flourishing.10 Not every autonomous 
choice warrants absolute respect: as I explained in chapter 2, choosing the intentional death of 
oneself or another is radically inconsistent with the good of life which is fundamental to 
human flourishing. In contrast, the liberal account privileges autonomy above any other 
value. I now go on to demonstrate that one result is a cultural aversion for dependence -  
dubbed ‘counterdependence’ -  where ‘any form of dependence is tantamount to a degrading 
submission.’11 This has significant implications for patients and their carers at the end of life.
A Counterdependence
The theme of counterdependence resonated strongly in my patient interviews. For some
patients, their loss of functioning was a challenge to their self-identity. Sophia Jensen, for
example, experienced her decline as a reversal of her previously independent, active lifestyle:
‘I’ve always been a very energetic person and I’ve always worked very hard, played hard and
1 ?enjoyed life. And now all of a sudden everything’s reversed.’
7 Patrick Lee and Robert P George, Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 171.
s See in particular the work o f Peter Singer, eg, Peter Singer, 'All Animals Are Equal' in Tom Regan and Peter 
Singer (eds), Animal Rights and Human Obligations (Prentice Hall, 1989) 148. See also Ruth Macklin, 'Dignity 
is a Useless Concept' (2003) 327 British Medical Journal 1419. Harris dismisses appeals to dignity as 
‘comprehensively vague’: John Harris, "'Goodbye Dolly?" The Ethics of Human Cloning' (1997) 23 Journal o f 
Medical Ethics 353, 354. Beyleveld and Brownsword also reject the meaning of dignity I have proposed here, 
arguing that the concept o f human dignity is ‘open to abuse’ and a ‘misguided paternalism’: Deryck Beyleveld 
and Roger Brownsword, 'Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Human Genetics' (1998) 61 Modern Law> Review 
661,661,680.
9 See, eg, Helga Kuhse, The Sanctity o f Life Doctrine in Medicine: A Critique (Clarendon Press, 1987).
10 See, eg, John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument against Legalisation (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 53-54.
11 Agich, above n 5, 8.
12 Interview with Sophia Jensen (2 April 2007).
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Mary Davis articulated the loss of control in her life as a role reversal in her marriage:
Bruce virtually has become his mother in the fact that he cooks meals, he feeds me, he dresses me, he 
washes me. When you’ve been the person who virtually controlled everything it’s hard to let go of 
control. It’s very hard to kind of take that control away from somebody when you’ve been the hub of 
the household.1'
For most of the patient interviewees, their loss of autonomy was felt most acutely in day to 
day activities such as personal care, eating and mobility. Some used words such as ‘baby’ and 
‘child’ to describe their increasingly dependent nature. They experienced this dependence as 
a loss of dignity and self-worth and, for Mary Davis, a loss of identity: ‘You’re not really a 
wife any more. You become the child.’14
Anna MacPherson, one of the strongest supporters of euthanasia, graphically expressed her 
aversion to dependence. She explained that MND was ‘the most degrading disease known. ... 
[because] you can’t wash your own face ... I can’t go out any more ... I can’t do any of the 
things that I used to do like going to the theatre ... can’t work. ... it’s a horrible, horrible 
existence. ... I have to be washed and dressed by carers ...,15 Anna also articulated her loss of 
sense of self: ‘That’s why it’s such a degrading thing because you become like a baby.’16 Her 
support for euthanasia was clearly driven by this loss of independence and the prospect of 
even further decline: ‘I’m not going on to be a vegetable. ... What’s the point?’17
Other interviewees who saw no dignity in a life of dependence echoed the ‘what’s the point’ 
response. John Mayberg defined dignity as ‘the right to attend to yourself. ... having your 
toilet [done for you] and ... having a PEG put in your stomach to allow you to eat is just sort 
of like, “Thanks very much but I’d prefer to go right now.” ... I just don’t see a great deal of 
value in that ... what’s the point?’ This highlights an observation in the literature that if 
autonomy is equated with dignity, the sense of dignity is lost when control cannot be 
exercised, even over what is uncontrollable: age, sickness, dependency, disability and
13
14
15
16
17
18
Interview with Mary Davis (27 April 2007).
Ibid.
Interview with Anna MacPherson (25 June 2007). 
Ibid.
Ibid.
Interview with John Mayberg (6 October 2007).
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suffering.19
Some patients experienced the loss of autonomy so acutely that they distinguished between 
the ‘life’ they once enjoyed and the ‘existence’ they now endured. Anna MacPherson grieved 
that ‘I don’t have a life any more. I have an existence.’ Later in the interview, explaining 
her desire for an assisted death, Anna asserted that ‘[i]t’s my life’ and then, immediately 
correcting herself, ‘My existence rather.’ Similarly John May berg, looking ahead to the 
prospect of supported toileting and artificial feeding, said ‘I would just be thinking “This is 
not living. This is not living.’”
This is a view shared by Dr Blackburn who highlighted patients’ loss of function as a 
justification for a hastened death. Dr Blackburn explained that a hypothetical patient, newly 
diagnosed with MND, would be ‘suicidal’ to request a hastened death at that early stage.23 
However, this description was not necessarily appropriate if death was hastened later during 
the disease process. This was illustrated by the case of Joshua, described in chapter 3. Dr 
Blackburn highlighted the significance of Joshua’s dependency:
KG: Why’s that patient suicidal and Joshua ... wasn’t?
TB: Well they don’t have a disability. Joshua couldn’t talk, he was losing his writing, he was bed 
bound, his kids were ... wiping up his shit.24
Isabel Wright was one of the strongest supporters of euthanasia and throughout the interview 
expressed serious distress at the difficulties of accessing euthanasia: ‘I feel very resentful 
because I feel the government has no right to decide whether someone should live or die.’25 
In Dr Blackburn’s account, Isabel’s desire for euthanasia was directly related to her anxieties 
about being dependent:
19 Sylvia Stolberg, 'Human Dignity and Disease, Disability, Suffering: A Philosophical Contribution to the 
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide Debate' in Margaret Somerville (ed), Death Talk: The Case against Euthanasia 
and Physician-Assisted Suicide (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001) 255, 258.
20 Interview with Anna MacPherson (25 June 2007).
21 Ibid.
22 Interview with John Mayberg (6 October 2007).
24 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
24 Ibid.
25 Interview with Isabel Wright (26 June 2007).
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She said, “Why the fuck do you do what you do? Why are you interested in keeping us well? You 
should be interested in letting us die.” Isabel has an unusual psychology of dependence and 
independence. And a lot of it is driven by autonomy and loss of independence.26
Foreseeing the trajectory of her decline and corresponding dependency, like a number of 
interviewees, Isabel used the graphic analogy of ‘wipe my bum’ to describe her ‘line in the 
sand’ .27 She related her instructions to her husband and children: ‘I always told them that I 
want to keep my independence and that ... when it got to the stage when I had to have 
someone wipe my bum, I would rather be dead. ' 28 Her husband Peter confirmed that Isabel’s 
desire for independence was a motivator for euthanasia:
She’s always been really independent. She doesn’t want to be basically ... a quadriplegic who has to 
be fed, who has to have her bum wiped. ... She wants her independence. ... when Isabel reaches her 
point... we’ve got to try and find someone who would help her ... A lethal injection.29
Like Isabel, Lydia Smith ‘would like to have that option if the time came when I felt I didn’t 
have any quality of life. ’30 When questioned, Lydia defined quality of life as ‘[independence 
and being able to enjoy my family. ’31 Her husband agreed and defined quality of life as 
‘being able to physically enjoy life as much as she can ... have all senses ... operating, and 
... mentally be able to cope and understand. ’32 Without the ability to maintain their 
independence and freely enjoy the aspects of life that defined them as persons, many patients 
lost meaning in life.
Thus the fear of dependency operated as a driver for euthanasia. As these patients became 
increasingly reliant on carers and technological supports to perform the most basic of human 
functions, they articulated a loss of dignity, a crippling failure of self-identity and loss of 
quality of life. In their accounts, euthanasia offered relief of that suffering and a means to 
stop the process of decline.
26 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
27 Interview with Isabel Wright (26 June 2007).
28 Ibid.
29 Interview with Peter Wright (6 October 2007).
30 Interview with Lydia Smith (28 November 2007).
31 Ibid.
32 Interview with Richard Smith (13 December 2007).
91
B Desire for Control as a Motivator for Euthanasia
The loss of independence acted as a driver of the desire for euthanasia in a second significant 
way. Without autonomy over their life conditions, euthanasia offered these patients autonomy 
over the conditions of their death. Members of the medical team identified this as the desire 
for ‘control’ and recognised it as the most significant motivator for euthanasia in their 
patients. As Blackburn stated: ‘It comes back to potency, to having some control over your 
destiny.’33
The literature confirms that the wish to control the manner and time of death is significantly 
associated with requests for euthanasia and assisted suicide.34 Dr Blackburn explained:
... there is an impotence to MND. It robs you of your ability, your strength, your speech, your 
breathing and ultimately of your life. So ... you have to try and give patients a sense of control over 
that. The last and ultimate sense of control is whether they live or die/5
Similarly Robyn Kelly explained:
... MND is something where you lose complete control over your bodily functions, over the timing of 
your own death ... there are patients who somehow want to hold on to some form of control, even if 
that ultimately means “I’ll control when I die.” '6
The same dynamic has been noted in other research about euthanasia and AIDS patients, a 
doctor interviewee observing:
Many patients speak about wanting to end their lives and not infrequently it’s a question of 
maintaining control over their lives. The great problem with [AIDS] is this lack of control. Their lives 
are controlled by the disease process and they have to hand over control of their lives to doctors, and 
his loss of control is a major issue for them. 7
33 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
34 See, eg, T Morita et al, ’Desire for Death and Requests to Hasten Death of Japanese Terminally 111 Cancer 
Patients Receiving Specialized Inpatient Palliative Care’ (2004) 27 Journal o f Pain Symptom Management 44, 
49; Robert A Pearlman et al, ’Motivations for Physician-Assisted Suicide: Patient and Family Voices' (2005) 20 
Jounal o f General Internal Medicine 234, 237; A Chappie et al, 'What People Close to Death Say about 
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: A Qualitative Study' (2006) 32 Journal o f Medical Ethics 706; Linda Ganzini, 
Elizabeth R Goy and Steven K Dobscha, 'Oregonians' Reasons for Requesting Physician Aid in Dying' (2009) 
169 Archives o f Internal Medicine 489, 490.
35 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
36 Interview with Robyn Kelly (10 December 2007).
37 Roger S Magnusson, Angels of Death: Exploring the Euthanasia Underground (Melbourne University Press, 
2002), 80.
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Dr Evans equated ‘dignity in death’ with autonomy and control over the manner and timing 
of death. He emphasised the importance of providing a patient with ‘the opportunity ... to 
choose that moment when they can withdraw from therapy, say their farewells, have their
T O
family with them. They can choose the time and place.’
1 Patients Who Did Not Desire a Hastened Death
The correlation between desire for control and desire for euthanasia was highlighted by those 
patients who did not desire euthanasia. The interviews suggested that one of the key reasons 
for their lack of desire was lower levels of distress or anxiety about their loss of 
independence. Rather than a need to assert ‘control’ over their circumstances, these patients 
indicated the opposite: that they had reached a position of acceptance of their loss and 
limitations.
For example, Bonnie Rycliff opposed euthanasia. At the time of the interview, she had been 
diagnosed with MND for less than a year and had increasing difficulties speaking, eating, 
writing and driving. Notwithstanding these limitations, Bonnie told me that ‘I haven’t had
• i omany difficulties accepting it. ... there is a peace that I have about it.’ This attitude was 
particularly notable given Bonnie’s personality which her friend and carer, Joan Walker, 
described as ‘very independent ... [she] has held down a very responsible job...’40 Unlike the 
patients who also valued their independence but desired the option of euthanasia, Bonnie did 
not express distress at her increasing dependence. She explained:
I don’t dwell on [it]. I know that it will come and yes when that happens I’ll be facing more than I’m 
facing now. At the present 1 feel 1 can do things ... but I know that the time will come when I can’t. 
Until it happens I’m not dwelling on it.41
38 Interview with Paul Evans (18 December 2007).
34 Interview with Bonnie Rycliff (10 October 2007). 
411 Interview with Joan Walker (10 October 2007).
41 Interview with Bonnie Rycliff (10 October 2007).
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Similarly, Alexander Murray had been living with MND for nine years at the time of the 
interview. For the last two years had been fed and toileted by his wife, Beth, who 
commented: ‘I think he still has his dignity. Independence would be the word. He hasn’t got 
his independence.’42
Alexander acknowledged that he was ‘ 100 per cent’ reliant on his wife and other carers even, 
he explained, to scratch his nose.43 Thus it was notable that Alexander did not express 
frustration or grief at this reliance. To the contrary, he declared that it ‘doesn’t bother me one 
little bit.’441 asked him to explain.
AM: When I say it doesn’t bother me, it bothers me that [my wife] has to do it or somebody else has to 
do it, b u t... if you’re disabled and you can’t do it for yourself then you’ve got to be dependent on 
somebody else. Either you accept that or you make life more difficult for yourself by ... letting it 
get to you. I just don’t let it get to me.
KG: So what would you say to people who say, “I’ve lost my sense of self as a person or it’s 
undignified”?
AM: Get over it. I mean that’s hard because I understand that people’s emotions and disabilities are 
different but I just think ... if you’ve got this disability then you are stuck with it and if you want... 
your quality of life to sort of be sustained then get over it, just let it happen. ... I don’t know 
what’s in my psyche ... that’s got me through, but I haven’t let those sorts of things ... bother me.4’
Elsewhere in the interview he gave some insight into that ‘psyche’: ‘by nature I’m not a 
person that lets those sorts of things or any sort of crisis get on top. I deal with it as it comes, 
and I’ve always tried to adopt a very positive outlook on life. That’s been pretty important in 
the process of dealing with MND.'46
Alexander’s comments about his ‘psyche’ and its impact on his outlook resonated in some of 
the interviews with the medical team. A number of doctors observed a correlation between a 
patient’s personality and their attitude towards declining independence and death. Dr Nixon, 
for example, noted that ‘you die the way you live. There are certain people with certain 
personalities who cannot handle the loss of independence.’47 According to Dr Richards, the
42 Interview with Beth Murray (31 October 2007).
43 Interview with Alexander Murray (31 October 2007).
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Interview with Colin Nixon (10 December 2007).
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patients who want euthanasia ‘are usually control freaks. It’s really control freaks who want 
to have this option. People who are willing to just go along with the flow do not want 
euthanasia.'
Dr Evans used the same expression to explain the drive for euthanasia: ‘I think it’s to do with 
the personality before they get sick. Are they a control freak or not?’49 The significance of a 
patient’s personality was also noted in Magnusson’s research with AIDS patients where a 
palliative care specialist remarked: ‘they want to be in control of the situation, and it’s often 
part of their personality, all their life they wanted control' .50
III THE UNDERLYING MOTIVATORS
Some of the MND team thought that the desire for control and independence masked other 
underlying motivators of a patient’s desire for euthanasia. Robyn Kelly referred to the 
boundaries of dependence expressed by many patients, for example, that they wished to die at 
the point when someone else must ‘wipe my bum’. She said:
[i]n my experience, the people that say ‘I am going to go when that happens’ ... have a lot of other 
issues as well. It’s more to do with their houses not being in order ... [they] have a ... lot o f other 
social issues, a lot o f isolation issues, a lot o f anger issues. They have not come to terms with life.51
Dr Nixon highlighted that a patient’s request for euthanasia might actually be an expression 
of other needs: ‘They just want to talk about life, suffering, existential issues. That’s very 
common.’52
I now examine the extensive literature which confirms the underlying motivations of patient 
requests for euthanasia and, in the absence of actual requests, their desire for euthanasia: 
higher levels of depressive symptoms; hopelessness; perceiving oneself as a burden; low 
family functionality; having fewer social supports; anxiety and unrelieved physical 
symptoms. My interviews confirmed that there is a range of psychological, existential, social 
and physical factors that contribute to a patient’s wish for assisted death.
4S Interview with Elizabeth Richards (6 February 2008). 
44 Interview with Paul Evans (18 December 2007).
50 Magnusson, above n 37, 81.
51 Interview with Robyn Kelly (10 December 2007).
52 Interview with Colin Nixon (10 December 2007).
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A Higher Levels o f Depression
A number of studies confirm the significant association of depression with the desire for 
assisted death.53 In a survey of physician specialists who cared for the seriously ill, there were 
495 recent requests for euthanasia. The physicians estimated that 49 per cent were depressed 
at the time of the request.54 In another survey of 256 terminally ill cancer patients, the 
presence of depressive symptoms was the strongest predictor of patient desire for a hastened 
death.55 In research with 92 terminally ill cancer patients, those with major depression were 
four times more likely to have high desire for hastened death/6 Similarly, in Schroepfer’s 
2008 study, terminally ill elders with a high likelihood of clinical depression were four times 
more likely to consider a hastened death than respondents with a low likelihood.57 Earlier
58research also confirms the link between depression and desire for hastened death.
However, this picture is complicated by two studies. A Dutch study published in 2011 
concluded that major depression was not a significant factor in explicit requests for 
euthanasia in end-of-life cancer patients in primary care.59 The Dutch researchers suggested a 
number of reasons for the differences between these studies and the bulk of research. They 
pointed out that the desire for assisted death which was the subject of the other studies does 
not necessarily translate into a request for euthanasia or assisted suicide.60 Another study 
found that three quarters of Oregonians who received a lethal prescription did not have a
53 ‘Clinical depression is a condition marked by persistent, prominent sad mood; loss of interest in almost all 
activities; an overwhelming sense of helplessness, hopelessness and worthlessness; and preoccupation with 
thoughts of death ... people with major depression will also experience a variety of physical symptoms, 
including fatigue, poor concentration, anorexia, weight loss, and insomnia.’ Harvey Chochinov and Leonard 
Schwartz, 'Depression and the Will to Live in the Psychological Landscape of Terminally 111 Patients' in 
Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin (eds), The Case against Assisted Suicide: for the Right to End-of-Life Care 
(John Hopkins University Press, 2002) 261, 262.
54 Diane E Meier et al, 'Characteristics of Patients Requesting and Receiving Physician-Assisted Death' (2003) 
163 Archives o f Internal Medicine 1537, 1538.
55 Brian J Kelly et al, 'Factors Associated with the Wish to Hasten Death: A Study of Patients with Terminal 
Illness' (2003) 33 Psychological Medicine 75, 79.
56 William Breitbart et al, 'Depression, Hopelessness, and Desire for Hastened Death in Terminally 111 Patients 
with Cancer' (2000) 284 Journal o f the American Medical Association 2907, 2909.
57 Tracy A Schroepfer, 'Social Relationships and Their Role in the Consideration to Hasten Death' (2008) 48 
Gerontologist 612, 616-617. See also Elizabeth Mayfield Arnold, 'Factors that Influence Consideration of 
Hastening Death among People with Life-Threatening Illnesses' (2004) 29 Health & Social Work 17, 22.
8 See, eg, H Chochinov et al, 'Desire for Death in the Terminally 111' (1995) 152 American Journal of 
Psychiatry 1185; Ezekiel Emanuel et al, 'Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Attitudes and Experiences 
of Oncology Patients, Oncologists, and the Public' (1996) 347 Lancet 1805.
59 Cees D M Ruijs et al, 'Depression and Explicit Requests for Euthanasia in End-of-Life Cancer Patients in 
Primary Care in the Netherlands: a Longitudinal, Prospective Study' (2011) 28 Family Practice 393.
60 Ibid 398.
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depressive disorder.61 Nevertheless, the Oregon researchers stated that ‘the current practice of 
the Death with Dignity Act in Oregon may not adequately protect all mentally ill patients.’ 
They called for increased vigilance and ultimately concluded that ‘[f]urther study is needed to
63determine the effect of treatment of depression on the choice to hasten death."
Although my interview data are not statistically significant, it is notable that the patients who 
were most strident in their wish for an assisted death also displayed signs which were 
strongly indicative of possible depression. While Isabel Wight, for example, specifically 
denied being depressed and described herself instead as ‘miserable’,64 Dr Blackburn 
confirmed that she had suffered from significant depression since her first presentation, and 
that this, combined with a difficult family situation, drove her desire for death.65
Isabel’s interview was at moments suggestive of depressive symptoms. For example, 
reflecting on her regular testing for breathing capacity, she said: ‘I’ve got perfect breathing ... 
apparently one of the first signs that you’re on your way out is when your respiratory muscles 
start going. Sometimes when they tell me I’m fine now I wish I wasn’t. I feel disappointed.’66
Sophia Jensen displayed other likely indicators of depression. She was a strong supporter of 
euthanasia, who social worker Robyn Kelly described as a ‘very, very sad, troubled, angry, 
bitter woman.’67
1 Doctors Failure to Understand the Significance o f Depression in Hastened Death
A concern identified in the literature is the failure of treating medical practitioners to 
recognise the presence or severity of depression in their patients or to understand its impact
z. o
on the desire for death. Meier et al, for example, noted in their 2003 study that some
61 Linda Ganzini, Elizabeth R Goy and Steven K Dobscha, 'Prevalence of Depression and Anxiety in Patients
Requesting Physicians' Aid in Dying: Cross Sectional Survey' (2008) 337 British Medical Journal 973.
62
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Ibid 975.
Ibid.
Interview with Isabel Wright (26 June 2007).
Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
Interview with Isabel Wright (26 June 2007).
Interview with Robyn Kelly (10 December 2007).
Scott Handsaker, Laura Dempsey and Carole Fabby, 'Identifying and Treating Depression at the End o f Life 
and among the Bereaved' (2012) 18 International Journal o f  Palliative Nursing 91; Sean O'Mahony et al, 
'Desire for Hastened Death, Cancer Pain and Depression: Report of a Longitudinal Observational Study' (2005) 
29 Journal o f Pain and Symptom Management 446; Ronald C Kessler et al, 'Prevalence and Treatment of
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physicians did assist the suicide of patients whom they believed were depressed:
... physicians may reason that it is normal to be depressed or may be unable to distinguish depression 
from sadness under circumstances of terminal illness, may believe that depression in this clinical 
context is unbeatable, or may have tried and failed to treat their patient’s depression/’9
Indeed, the assumption that depression is ‘appropriate’ for a terminally ill patient has been 
identified as a barrier to effective mental health care.70 Some doctors fail to see the distinction 
between emotions like sadness and grief which are normal reactions to stressful events and 
resolve within days or weeks, and, conversely, major depression with its persistent feelings of 
intense hopelessness.71 In a study of 100 MND patients, 36 patients described depressive 
symptoms and 11 met the criteria for major depression, according to the researchers’ 
assessment. However, only six had been prescribed anti-depressants. Doctors also failed to 
follow up on the efficacy of anti-depressants and attempt alternative interventions, such as a
72referral to a mental health professional.
In a study of 131 cancer patients, decrease in depression was significantly predictive of a 
decrease in the desire for hastened death. Yet only 40 per cent of the patients with moderate 
to severe depression were receiving anti-depressants.73
The risk of depression and suicidal ideation was a significant issue at the Chronic Care Unit. 
Studies indicate that MND patients may be at elevated risk of depression. Rates on self- 
reporting scales range from 44 per cent to 75 per cent of MND patients with depression,74 
although one of the few studies to conduct a clinical assessment found 11 per cent of 100
Mental Disorders, 1990 to 2003' (2005) 352 New England Journal o f Medicine 2515; Gregory E Simon et al, 
'Prevalence and Predictors o f Depression Treatment in an International Primary Care Study' (2004) 161 
American Journal o f Psychiatry 1626.
69 Meier et al, above n 54, 1541.
711 Handsaker, Dempsey and Fabby, above n 68, 92; Larry S Goldman et al, 'Awareness, Diagnosis, and 
Treatment o f Depression' (1999) 14 Journal o f General Internal Medicine 569, 576.
71 Anne F Gross, Felicia A Smith and Theodore A Stem, 'Is Depression an Appropriate Response to Having 
Cancer? A Discussion of Diagnostic Criteria and Treatment Decisions' (2007) 9 Primary Care Companion to 
the Journal o f Clinical Psychiatry 382, 384.
72 Linda Ganzini, Wendy S Johnston and William F Hoffman, 'Correlates of Suffering in Amyotrophic Lateral 
Sclerosis' (1999) 52 Neurology 1434. See also Susan D Block, 'Assessing and Managing Depression in the 
Terminally 111 Patient' (2000) 132 Annals o f Internal Medicine 209, 209-210.
77 O’Mahony et al, above n 68, 454.
74 Judith G Rabkin, Glenn J Wagner and Maura Del Bene, 'Resilience and Distress Among Amyotrophic Lateral 
Sclerosis Patients and Caregivers' (2000) 62 Psychosomatic Medicine 271, 271.
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MND patients had major depression.7^  Significantly, while members of the MND team 
referred patients to a psychiatrist or psychologist if they were concerned about the risk of 
depression, there was no qualified specialist to identify at-risk patients in the first place. 
Although researchers have noted that mental health professionals can make a valuable 
contribution to multi-disciplinary teams,76social worker Robyn Kelly pointed out the major
77deficiency of the Chronic Care Unit: the lack of a dedicated psychologist or psychiatrist.
My interviews highlighted the problem of undiagnosed depression and physicians’ failure to 
recognise the significance of depression as an underlying motivator of hastened death. Thus 
in the absence of a mental health specialist, Dr Blackburn stated ‘most of my work is not 
neurology. ... 95 per cent of my work is psychology.’ Dr Blackburn was, he said, making 
major psychiatric evaluations ‘explicitly, every single time.’ When questioned about his 
qualifications in doing so, he stated: ‘I don’t have a psychiatric qualification, no. But most of 
my work is psychology.’ Nor, he added, did he have qualifications in psychology.79
Dr Blackburn’s practice reflects Meier et al’s concerns outlined above about physicians
perceiving depression as normal and their inability to distinguish depression from sadness.
According to Dr Blackburn, ‘[depression is part of MND. If you’re not depressed with MND
there’s something wrong with you.’ Despite the perceived prevalence of depression in his
patients, Dr Blackburn identified just three patients in his experience, including Isabel
Wright, who suffered from major depression such that he would not support their desire for
an assisted death. ‘[I]n MND there is sadness,’ he said, and in Dr Blackburn’s view the
81depression suffered by most of his patients was akin to sadness.
Thus in the case of Joshua (whose euthanasia I described in chapter 3), Dr Blackburn judged 
that he was depressed, but did not require a psychiatrist as he did not have ‘major 
depression’: he was just saddened by the losses associated with his illness. Dr Blackburn
75 Linda Ganzini et al, 'Attitudes o f Patients with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis and their Care Givers toward 
Assisted Suicide' (1998) 339 New England Journal o f Medicine 967. But see Ibid 277.
76 J L Werth Jr, J R Gordon and R R Johnson Jr, 'Psychosocial Issues near the End of Life' (2002) 6 Aging & 
Mental Health 402, 407-408.
77 Interview with Robyn Kelly (10 December 2007).
7S Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
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confirmed he only referred cases he assessed as ‘major depression’ or ‘significant... suicidal
m # O '}  # m
depression’ to a specialist. Highlighting the concerns expressed in the literature, it is 
questionable whether Dr Blackburn, as a neurologist with no mental health qualifications, 
was proficient to make such a judgment.
At a number of points in the interview I confronted Dr Blackburn directly with that question: 
was he the most appropriate person to make psychiatric assessments, given the gravity of the 
end-of-life decisions faced by patients suffering from depression? I asked whether a 
psychiatrist was better placed to ‘consider whether the patient’s decision is maybe motivated 
by depression or even some other psychiatric illness, maybe a personality disorder ...?’ The
or
potential impact of personality disorders on end-of-life decisions has also been noted. 'Apart 
from depression, organic mood and anxiety disorders are prevalent in patients with advanced 
disease.86 Dr Blackburn’s response to my question was: ‘Yes. No, that’s a very good 
question. ’87 At other points in the interview, Dr Blackburn did not directly answer questions 
which challenged his role as a quasi-psychiatrist. His response was always the same: ‘they’re 
going to die irrespective of whether I help them or not. So I have the ability to help them so 
they are comfortable. . . ’88
B Hopelessness
Independently of depression, hopelessness is a strong contributor to the desire for a hastened 
death. Hopelessness is defined as ‘a pessimistic cognitive style’ ,89 ‘a way of thinking in 
which negative expectations about the future are pervasive. ’90 Hope is the capacity to find 
purpose in living,91 regardless of the medical prognosis. Of all the patient interviewees in my 
study, Isabel expressed the most persistent sense of hopelessness, coupled with a strong 
desire for euthanasia. ‘It’s pointless’ was a theme of her interview: ‘I don’t see any meaning 
at all in what I’ve got. Not one iota ... It’s an absolutely pointless disease because you know
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Werth, Gordon and Johnson, above n 76, 405.
86 Ibid, 404; Chochinov and Schwartz, above n 53, 266.
87 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
88 Ibid.
89 Breitbart et al, above n 56.
90 Ganzini et al, 'Attitudes of Patients with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis and Their Care Givers toward 
Assisted Suicide', above n 75, 972.
91 Harvey Chochinov et al, 'Depression, Hopelessness, and Suicidal Ideation in the Terminally 111' (1998) 39 
Psychosomatics 366, 367.
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you’re going to die. I feel really resentful of people with breast cancer because there’s a 
hope.’92
Ganzini et al note that ‘[m]any depressed patients express hopelessness, but patients may be 
hopeless without being depressed.' For example, in a study of 196 terminally ill cancer 
patients, hopelessness was a stronger predictor of suicidal ideation than was depression.94 
Similarly, in a study of 100 patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, although patients who 
would consider assisted suicide did not display higher rates of depression than the patients 
who would not, they did have higher scores for hopelessness.95 Chochinov at al explain the 
association between hopelessness and the desire for death:
When hopelessness becomes a pervasive focal point of one’s psychological response to issues of 
death and dying, then for some patients, suicide may be seen as a compelling alternative over the 
decline toward a natural death.96
A study by Ganzini et al indicates that hopelessness can impact a patient’s end-of-life 
decision making. In that study, after depression treatment, 26 per cent of patients altered their 
preferences in favour of life-sustaining interventions such as ventilatory and feeding 
assistance.97 Thus Ganzini et al comment that ‘in many depressed persons, hopelessness, 
pessimism, and excessive emphasis on the burdens of treatment temporarily alter the person’s 
personal formula for weighing risks and benefits.’98 Other studies confirm that hopelessness 
effects the treatment decisions of patients.99
The combined presence, or absence, of hopelessness and depression is also significant. In 
Breitbart et al’s study, nearly two thirds of patients with both depression and hopelessness 
had a high desire for hastened death, whereas patients who had neither of these conditions
92 Interview with Isabel Wright (26 June 2007).
93 Ganzini et al, 'Attitudes of Patients with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis and Their Care Givers toward 
Assisted Suicide', above n 75, 972.
94 Chochinov et al, above n 91. See also Barry Rosenfeld et al, 'Desire for Hastened Death among Patients with 
Advanced AIDS' (2006) 47 Psychosomatics 504, 508.
95 Ganzini et al, 'Attitudes o f Patients with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis and Their Care Givers toward 
Assisted Suicide', above n 75, 969. See also Mayfield Arnold, above n 57, 22.
96 Chochinov et al, above n 91, 369.
97 Linda Ganzini et al, 'The Effect of Depression Treatment on Elderly Patients' Preferences for Life-Sustaining 
Medical Therapy' (1994) 151 American Journal o f Psychiatry’ 1631, 1634.
98 Ibid 1634-1635.
99 See, eg, A Srikumar Menon et al, 'Depression, Hopelessness, and the Desire for Life-Saving Treatments 
among Elderly Medically 111 Veterans' (2000) 8 American Journal o f Geriatric Psychiatry 333.
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had low levels of desire for hastened death. 100
C Perceiving Oneself as a Burden
The third important motivator for seeking assisted death is self-perceived burden which has 
multiple facets. An extensive literature survey, published in 2007, identified that patients’ 
concerns went beyond the burden of their physical needs and included anxieties about the 
‘social and emotional consequences for others in coping with the illness and impending death 
... and concern about not being able to fulfil important roles and obligations.’101 In a 
qualitative study, terminally ill patients reported that self- perceived burden led to feelings of 
guilt, regret, frustration, and worry.102 The prevalence of self-perceived burden varies across 
studies: a systematic literature review shows that it is a common concern and is reported as a 
significant problem by 19 to 65 per cent of terminally ill patients.103
The literature confirms that the perception of oneself as a burden is a strong motivator of the 
desire for a hastened death. In one study, 38.3 per cent of 155 oncology patients approved of 
physician-assisted suicide and 36.7 per cent approved of euthanasia if the patient’s sickness 
and death would place a burden on the family.104 In a survey of AIDS and cancer patients, 60 
per cent said they would not wish to live for more than 30 days if they were totally dependent 
on others.105 Similarly, 82 per cent of 62 terminally ill cancer patients surveyed believed most 
cancer patients become a burden on their families.106 This perception was matched by their 
acceptance of assisted death, a correlation noted in other studies.107 In the more recent survey
100 Breitbart et al, above n 56, 2909-2910. See also Gary Rodin et al, 'Pathways to Distress: The Multiple 
Determinants of Depression, Hopelessness, and the Desire for Hastened Death in Metastatic Cancer Patients' 
(2009) 68 Social Science and Medicine 562.
1(11 Christine J McPherson, Keith G Wilson and Mary Ann Murray, 'Feeling Like a Burden to Others: A 
Systematic Review Focusing on the End of Life' (2007) 21 Palliative Medicine 115, 117.
102 Christine J McPherson, Keith G Wilson and Mary Ann Murray, 'Feeling Like a Burden: Exploring the 
Perspectives of Patients at the End of Life' (2007) 64 Social Science and Medicine 417.
103 McPherson, Wilson and Murray, above n 101, 115.
1114 Ezekiel Emanuel et al, above n 58,1807.
105 L J Schneiderman et al, 'Attitudes of Seriously 111 Patients toward Treatment That Involves High Costs and 
Burdens on Others' (1994) 5 Journal o f Clinical Ethics 109.
1,16 M E Suarez-Almazor, M Belzile and E Bruera, 'Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Comparative 
Survey of Physicians, Terminally 111 Cancer Patients, and the General Population' (1997) 15 Journal o f Clinical 
Oncology 418.
1(17 Ezekiel Emanuel, Diane Fairclough and Linda Emanuel, 'Attitudes and Desires Related to Euthanasia and 
Physician-Assisted Suicide among Terminally 111 Patients and Their Caregivers' (2000) 284 Journal o f the 
American Medical Association 2460; E J Emanuel et al, 'Predictors and Outcomes of Significant Caregiving 
Needs and Economic Burdens among Terminally 111 Oncology Patients: Results of the Commonwealth- 
Cummings Project' (1998) 17 Journal o f Clinical Oncology 422a; Kelly et al, above n 55.
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by Meier et al, 53 per cent of the patients who requested assisted death were described by 
their physicians as dependent.
In Kelly et al’s 2003 study, a greater perception of oneself as a burden was associated with a 
high level of desire for hastened death.109 In a Japanese study about desire for hastened death, 
self-perceived burden was among the strongest determinants and was a major reason for the 
desire in 42 per cent of cases.110 A 2002 interview study with caregivers of 50 patients who 
died of MND found that of 16 patients who expressed an explicit desire for physician-assisted 
suicide, 38 per cent were ‘somewhat’ and 56 per cent were ‘very’ distressed about being a 
burden.* 111 Other studies demonstrate that the desire not to burden one’s family influences 
patients’ decisions about life-extending treatment.112
The economic burden of illness on families is also significant and is associated with family 
members’ preference for comfort care, rather than life-extending care, an association noted
113also in the preferences of patients themselves.
Consistent with this body of research, the fear of being a burden was a significant theme in 
my interviews. Whilst my data is not statistically significant, it is noteworthy that the two 
patients who were least concerned about being a burden were the two patients explicitly 
opposed to euthanasia. Alexander Murray was highly dependent on his wife for the most 
basic functioning. While this had changed his wife Beth’s life ‘dramatically’, this troubled 
him only ‘occasionally ... I don’t dwell on it.’114 The theme of burden did not arise at all in 
Bonnie Rycliff s interview. She was opposed to euthanasia as was her carer Joan Walker, 
who did remark on the high level of care available in the retirement village in which they 
resided.115
While the majority of patients in my interviews voiced strong concerns about being a burden,
108 Meier et al, above n 54, 1538. See also Ezekiel Emanuel et al, above n 107, 456-457.
109 Kelly et al, above n 55, 75.
110 Morita et al, above n 34, 47.
111 Linda Ganzini, Maria J Silveira and Wendy S Johnston, 'Predictors and Correlates of Interest in Assisted 
Suicide in the Final Month of Life among ALS Patients in Oregon and Washington' (2002) 24 Journal o f Pain 
and Symptom Management 312, 315.
112 W A Knaus et al, 'The SUPPORT Prognostic Model: Objective Estimates of Survival for Seriously 111 
Hospitalized Adults' (1995) 122 Annals o f Internal Medicine 191; Donald Murphy and Leighton Cluff, 
'Introduction: The SUPPORT Study' (1990) 43(Supplement) Journal o f Clinical Epidemiology V.
113 Kenneth Covinsky et al, 'Is Economic Hardship on the Families of the Seriously 111 Associated with Patient 
and Surrogate Preferences?' (1996) 156 Archives o f Internal Medicine 1737, 1740.
114 Interview with Alexander Murray (31 October 2007).
115 Interview with Joan Walker (10 October 2007).
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the link between this fear and the desire for a hastened death was not necessarily explicit. At 
the time of the interview Mary Davis had been without the use of her arms for two and a half 
years and was dependent on her husband for everything, including feeding. While not as 
determined in her desire for euthanasia as some patient interviewees, Mary expressed a desire 
for ‘somebody who would look after me at the end’ and not allow her to suffer. 116 She also 
expressed her grief at the effect of her dependency on her family and husband in particular.
He gets very tired. It’s hard. ... We try to get as much help as we can, but it’s very hard for him to 
take on the role of a housewife virtually and the carer. ... [I] feel quite guilty actually, that I’ve caused 
through my illness a change in everybody’s lives, the children’s, grandchildren’s.117
John Boyd, who was ambivalent about euthanasia but supported it in some circumstances, 
was ‘very much’ concerned at the impact of his decline on his family, especially his wife, 
herself unwell:
I wouldn’t like to see the family sort of stopped in their tracks because there was a guy in a bed over 
there that was hanging on with no prospect of recovery. ... It’s such a family burden that you think it’s 
a bit unfair on the family to have an irreversible thing lasting two or three years.118
Anna MacPherson explained that her husband denied she was a burden. She was convinced to 
the contrary, however. He was, she said, ‘at full stretch’, despite considerable home 
assistance, had relinquished paid employment to care for her and was likely suffering 
depression. 119 Lydia Smith also pointed out that her husband Richard was medicated for 
depression. 120 While Richard denied in his interview that he considered Lydia’s care to be 
burdensome, he expressed being overwhelmed at the thought of her future caring needs, 
notwithstanding extensive assistance and support from the Chronic Care Unit. 121 Similarly, 
Mary Lynch, ‘a firm believer in euthanasia’, described her transition from the paid workforce 
to full time carer of her husband as ‘awful’ . 122
Isabel Wright, a strident supporter of euthanasia, explicitly demonstrated the link between
116
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119
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Interview with Mary Davis (27 April 2007).
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Interview with John Boyd (10 January 2008). 
Interview with Anna MacPherson (25 June 2007). 
Interview with Lydia Smith (28 November 2007). 
Interview with Richard Smith (13 December 2007). 
Interview with Mary Lynch (16 October 2007).
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self-perceived burden and the desire for a hastened death:
IW: I wish in a way I could just know that in three months time I’d be dead. Because ... it’s not fair on
the family. They don’t know how long. I mean I could go on for years and I would hate that. 
Because it’s pointless. I mean imagine sitting in a chair all day. All day.
KG: So you worry about the impact on your family?
IW: I do. Very much so. Yeah.123
Isabel repeated the same concern at a number of points in the interview. For example: ‘I 
sometimes wonder whether any of them wish I was dead. ... I wouldn’t blame them. ... I 
think I’d probably be doing them a favour if I went away.’124
The MND team recognised the significance of patient concerns about being a burden. Dr 
Evans saw this anxiety among his patients ‘all the time’:
They express the fact that they are so reliant on others for personal care, activities of day to day living 
from toileting to dressing, the fact that they are immobile and their partner can’t go out or do things 
they would like to have done. That sort of guilt, regret, remorse ... They perceive that they are in 
effect ruining their partner’s life by being unwell.125
Robyn Kelly agreed that this ‘is a typical concern and pretty well all [patients] feel that, voice
1 9 Athat and ... really push and strive to remain as independent as they can ...’
Although no member of the MND team identified any patient whose anxiety about being a 
burden directly influenced a decision or desire for euthanasia, some were concerned that this 
could be the case, especially if euthanasia was legalised. For example, Dr Richards recalled 
that ‘when there was talk of euthanasia being legalised a few years back, a patient [said] to 
me, “I guess I should go down that path. I should go to the Northern Territory because I’m 
such a burden to my family.”’ Similarly occupational therapist Richard Sallas said ‘I think 
the people would worry that their choice to not have euthanasia would be seen as selfish and 
they would choose it through not wanting to be seen as selfish and not wanting to put their
123
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Interview with Isabel Wright (26 June 2007).
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family in a situation where they had to work hard. ,128
D Low Family Functionality
Another significant factor which influences the desire for assisted death is poor family 
functioning. A number of psychological indices are used to measure family functioning. 
They identify indicators such as family cohesion (the commitment, help and support family 
members provide for one another); family expressiveness (acting openly and expressing 
thoughts and feelings directly); family conflict (the open expression of anger and aggression); 
and depression and anxiety among family members. Poorly functioning families are those 
with moderate to high levels of conflict, low cohesiveness, poor expressiveness and high rates
• 131of depression and anxiety.
A study of cancer patients showed that their own sense of family cohesion had a protective
132effect against distress. “ However, patients with lower levels of family functionality are 
consistently shown to have a higher desire for a hastened death. As Block and Billings 
explain:
Problems in the dying person’s relationships with family and significant others may lead to anger, 
disappointment, depression, and a wish to hasten death. Terminal illness regularly stresses key 
interpersonal relationships, occasionally eliciting enhanced coping behaviours, but also underscoring 
or producing dysfunctional patterns.1 '4
My interviews did not demonstrate an explicit link between low family functionality and the 
desire for euthanasia. However, some of the interviews were illustrative of family conflict, 
poor expressiveness and depression which the literature associates with a higher desire for
128 Interview with Richard Sallas (4 September 2007).
124 For example the Family Relationships Index and the General Functioning scale of the Family 
Assessment Device. Regarding the former, see David W Kissane et al, 'Family Grief Therapy: A Preliminary 
Account of a New Model to Promote Healthy Family Functioning during Palliative Care and Bereavement' 
(1998) 7 Psycho-Oncology 14; Regarding the latter, see Ivan W Miller et al, 'The McMaster Family Assessment 
Device: Reliability and Validity' (1985 ) 11 Journal of Marriage and Family Therapy 345; Nathan B Epstein et 
al, 'The McMaster Model: View of Healthy Family Functioning’ in Froma Walsh (ed), Normal Family 
Processes (Guilford Press, 1993) 138.
130 Ben Edwards and Valerie Clarke, 'The Validity of the Family Relationships Index as a Screening Tool for 
Psychological Risk in Families of Cancer Patients' (2005) 14 Psycho-Oncology 546, 549.
131 Kissane et al, above n 129, 15.
132 See, eg, O’Mahony et al, above n 68, 451.
133 See, eg, Kelly et al, above n 55, 79; Chochinov et al, above n 58.
134 Susan D Block and Andrew Billings, 'Patient Requests to Hasten Death: Evaluation and Management in 
Terminal Care' (1994) 154 Archives o f Internal Medicine 2039, 2041.
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hastened death. Significantly, the patients who were most vocal in their desire for euthanasia 
also disclosed the clearest features of low family functionality.
Sophia Jenson, for example, gave voice to themes of abandonment and rejection. While she 
spoke warmly of her relationship with her three children, the interview was dominated by 
Sophia’s anger and grief over her former husband whom she described as an ‘escapee’ and 
‘love rat’ because of an affair 30 years earlier.1 '5 Sophia explained that her daughters ‘did tell 
him that I was sick. But he won’t want to know that... he doesn’t speak to me at all. Hasn’t 
spoken to me for decades.’136
Isabel Wright revealed poor communication within her marriage of 30 years: ‘we’re not very 
good at talking to each other. ... I don’t know what goes on in his head at all. ... I suppose 
I’m probably a bit like Peter. I’m a bottler.’137 Peter, her husband, also pointed to marriage 
dysfunction: ‘It’s not great. ... it’s been pretty iffy. ... If Isabel hadn’t got [MND] I think 
maybe this year things would have been different and we may have not been living 
together.’138
As Isabel’s primary carer, Peter admitted to possible depression and anxiety. However, he 
would not accept treatment:
At the moment I’m going through quite an ... anger thing. ... It’s been two and a half years and I think 
I’m just hitting that bit when I’m going “Oh my God”... it is difficult... the anger might be some form 
of a depression thing but I don’t want to take medication for it because the problem isn’t mine. It’s 
Isabel’s.119
Anna MacPherson also believed her husband was depressed, ‘but men don’t admit it.’140 She 
was also distressed by family estrangement:
If you want to know the truth, I do not like my son very much because he hasn’t been a good son. He 
was down last week and he barely spoke to me. He didn’t kiss me goodbye or hello or anything. So
135
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he can take a running jump. 141
Whether or to what extent such examples of low family functionality explained these 
patients’ desire for euthanasia is unknown. But the lack of family cohesion expressed by 
these patients correlated with their strongly expressed desire for euthanasia, consistent with 
the literature.
E Having Fewer Social Supports
Lack of social support is also an underlying driver of the desire for assisted death. Social 
support is defined as ‘the existence or availability of people on whom we can rely ... who let 
us know that they care about, value, and love us.’142 Epidemiologic research in the late 1970s 
and 1980s first recognised that social isolation is a predictor of mortality and serious 
morbidity. This is confirmed by numerous studies.143 Social disintegration and lack of social 
support are widely recognised risk factors for suicide.144
The Social Support Scale, the key instrument used to quantify the perceived availability of 
and satisfaction with social support, asks questions such as: on whom the person can rely to 
listen when there is the need to talk; who is dependable; with whom can the person be totally 
their self; who can console them when they are very upset; and who can help in a crisis 
situation.143 Having lower levels of social support is consistently shown to predict higher 
levels of desire for assisted death.146
For example, in a study of 200 terminally ill patients, those with a serious desire for death 
rated the availability of family support significantly lower than other patients. The authors 
argued that supportive family relationships could protect against depression,147 a link noted in
141 Ibid.
142 Irwin G Sarason et al, 'Assessing Social Support: The Social Support Questionnaire' (1983 ) 44 Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 127, 127.
144 James S House, 'Social Isolation Kills, But How and Why?' (2001) 63 Psychosomatic Medicine 273, 273.
144 Unni Bille-Brahe and Borge Jensen, 'The Importance of Social Support' in Diego De Leo et al (eds), Suicidal 
Behaviour: Theories and Research Findings (Hogrefe & Huber Publishers, 2004) 197.
145 Sarason et al, above n 142, 129.
146 See, eg, see Mayfield Arnold, above n 57, 22; Kelly et al, above n 55; Breitbart et al, above n 56.
147 Chochinov et al, above n 58. See also William Breitbart, Barry D Rosenfeld and Steven D Passik, 'Interest in 
Physician-Assisted Suicide among Ambulatory HIV-Infected Patients' (1996) 153 American Journal of 
Psychiatry 238.
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1 48other research. Lack of social support and the experience of loneliness are also 
significantly linked to hopelessness,149 itself a predictor of the desire to hasten death, as 
discussed above.
More recently, in an in-depth interview study with 96 terminally ill elders, those who 
received poor, negative or conflictual social support (usually from a partner or family 
member with whom they had daily contact) were more likely to consider a hastened death 
than those patients who received positive social support.1MI Block and Billings argue that 
‘[ejarly death may seem more tolerable than the frustration of facing a family that fails (or is 
expected to fail) to satisfy the dying person’s basic needs. An early death exit may express 
anger or may serve as an act of punishment.’151
As Isabel’s primary carer, her husband Peter was very attentive to her physical limitations 
and needs, but their dysfunctional relationship, coupled with the strain of caregiving, 
produced obvious tensions. This appeared to undermine the effectiveness of his support. Peter 
explained:
PW: I may decide that I’ve had enough. ... that I’m over caring. ... I know that is an option.
KG: Have you talked about that with Isabel?
PW: Oh w e’ve touched on it but not in any detail. I think she’s aware of it.152
Isabel’s interview suggested she that was ‘aware of it’ and that she could not rely on Peter for 
consolation or support during a crisis, some of the key indicators of poor social support 
identified by the literature. A possible link between this conflictual support and Isabel’s 
strong desire for euthanasia was evident: ‘Sometimes I get a bit hysterical and I say, “Well do 
you think I ought to kill myself?” And one day [Peter] just said to me, “I don’t know”. He’s 
never actually said “Oh no, don’t!”153
Conversely, some of the medical team noted the positive impact of strong social support.
148 Barry Rosenfeld et al, 'Pain in Ambulatory AIDS Patients. II: Impact of Pain on Psychological Functioning 
and Quality of Life' (1996) 68 Pain 323.
149 Janice M Plahuta et al, 'Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis and Hopelessness: Psychosocial Factors' (2002) 55 
Social Science and Medicine 2131,2132.
150 Schroepfer, above n 57, 616.
151 Block and Billings, above n 134, 2041.
152 Interview with Peter Wright (6 October 2007).
153 Interview with Isabel Wright (26 June 2007).
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Occupational Therapists Richard Sallas, for example, observed:
The people who I’ve seen do well are the ones with good social networks surrounding them ... strong 
families who stick by them and challenge them and push them out. They don’t get down into that rut. 
But people who don’t have families, who have strained relationships with their families and don’t 
have a lot o f friends, they’re the ones that become reclusive ...154
F Unrelieved Physical Symptoms
Unrelieved physical symptoms are also a root cause of patient desire for assisted death. The 
Meier et al survey found that patients requesting euthanasia ‘have a substantial burden of 
physical pain and distress’,15^ with 38 per cent suffering extreme pain and 42 per cent severe 
discomfort at the time of the request.156 A longitudinal study of patients with advanced cancer 
revealed that the desire for a hastened death, in association with the experience of despair and 
helplessness, was most profound during periods of severe physical pain, intensified by the
1 c y
perception that healthcare workers were slow or inadequate to respond.
In the Netherlands, a national survey compared the end-of-life medical decisions of 
terminally ill cancer patients who died after euthanasia with the experience of those who did 
not request euthanasia. Patients who died after euthanasia more often suffered severe 
symptoms such as pain, vomiting, nausea and coughing, and more often felt severely 
unwell.158
In Kelly et al’s 2003 study, psychological factors (such as depression) and social factors 
(such as lower social supports and family cohesion) were more significant determinants of 
patient desire than physical symptoms.159 A Japanese study supports these findings.160 
Similarly in another study, while patients with lower levels of pain had less desire for 
hastened death, improvement in pain was not correlated with a decrease in the desire to
154 Interview with Richard Sallas (4 September 2007).
155 Meier et al, above n 54, 1541.
156 Ibid 1538.
187 Rinat Nissim, Lucia Gagliese and Gary Rodin, 'The Desire for Hastened Death in Individuals with Advanced 
Cancer: A Longitudinal Qualitative Study' (2009) 69 Social Science and Medicine 165, 170.
158 Jean-Jacques Georges et al, 'Differences between Terminally 111 Cancer Patients who Died after Euthanasia 
Had Been Performed and Terminally 111 Cancer Patients who Did Not Request Euthanasia' (2005) 19 Palliative 
Medicine 578, 582.
159 Kelly et al, above n 55, 80.
160 Morita et al, above n 34, 49.
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hasten death. 161
Other studies found that pain was not related to interest in assisted death, including among 
patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. In a 2009 survey of 56 patients from Oregon 
who either requested physician-assisted suicide or contacted a physician-assisted suicide 
advocacy organisation, physical symptoms such as pain and fatigue were rated as 
unimportant reasons for their interest in assisted death. However, concerns about future 
physical symptoms were significant motivators.163
IV CONCLUSION
Autonomy and dignity in dying are central to arguments in favour of assisted death. 
However, I argue that a notion of autonomy that upholds self-sufficiency and self-affirmation 
can undermine patients’ sense of self-worth and self-identity when they are struck by physical 
disability and become increasingly reliant on carers. My interview data demonstrates how the 
fear of dependency operated as a driver for euthanasia which some MND patients saw as a 
way to halt the trajectory of decline.
The loss of independence motivated the desire for euthanasia in a second significant way. 
When the MND patients lost control over their life conditions, euthanasia offered them 
control over the manner and timing of their death. Members of the medical team identified 
the desire for control as a significant motivator for euthanasia in their patients.
However, the experience of some patients highlighted how the language of autonomy and 
control can obscure, rather than explain, the underlying motivators of patient desire for 
euthanasia. Both the literature and my interview data identify a range of intersecting 
psychological, existential, social and physical factors that can animate a patient’s wish for 
assisted death and which may go more or less unrecognised by patients, carers and health 
professionals. These factors include depression, hopelessness, low family cohesion, self- 
perceived burden, lack of social support and unrelieved physical symptoms.
161 O’Mahony et al, above n 68, 454.
102 Ganzini, Johnston and Hoffman, above n 72. See also Schroepfer, above n 57, 617; Breitbart et al, above n 
56, 2910; Ezekiel Emanuel et al, above n 58.
163 Ganzini, Goy and Dobscha, 'Oregonians' Reasons for Requesting Physician Aid in Dying', above n 34.
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Only by recognising these underlying motivators can clinicians understand the ‘holistic 
illness and dying experience of patients'164 and deliver appropriate assessments and 
interventions in response to the desire for a hastened death. Moreover, the complex dynamics 
that surround claims about autonomy at the end of life suggest that pro-euthanasia advocacy 
may oversimplify the experience of patients.
The next chapter takes up the theme of vulnerability. It examines whether the availability of 
voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted death could threaten the autonomy of certain 
populations whose social, economic and cultural circumstances might act as controlling 
influences and subvert meaningful choice at the end of life.
164 Pearlman et al, above n 34, 238.
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5Vulnerability
I INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter critically assessed the principle of autonomy as a justification for 
voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide and considered the exercise of autonomy 
among the patients at the Chronic Care Unit. I now examine the counter-point to the 
autonomy argument: that although legalised assisted death might expand the range of choices 
for some patients, its wider availability would pose special risks to the autonomy of the so 
called ‘vulnerable’, who would experience pressure to end their lives. As R J D George et al 
point out:
The cardinal argument against euthanasia... is the insoluble ethical conflict between meeting 
individuals’ demands for therapeutic death and ensuring that incapable, vulnerable, or voiceless 
patients will not have lethal treatment prescribed as their best interest.1
In Part II of this chapter I explore the meaning of vulnerability, a much cited but little 
examined concept. In Part III I identify the legal relevance of vulnerability and consider 
whether existing common law doctrine can adequately safeguard the interests of vulnerable 
people on the death bed. Part IV examines whether there is any quantitative evidence for the 
vulnerability of certain populations to voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide.
In Part V I introduce a case study of a vulnerable population: women. I investigate currently 
available data in order to assess the incidence of assisted death among women. I argue that 
even if there is no greater incidence of women choosing assisted death, the underlying 
reasons for these decisions could nevertheless be indicative of vulnerability and act as 
controlling influences which undermine genuine autonomy. These reasons might include 
structural inequalities and disparities in power -  frequently reflected in women’s experience 
of violence -  as well as social and economic disadvantage and oppressive cultural stereotypes 
that idealise feminine self-sacrifice and reinforce stereotyped gender roles of passivity and
1 R J D George, I G Finlay and David Jeffrey, 'Legalised Euthanasia Will Violate the Rights of Vulnerable 
Patients' (2005) 331 British Medical Journal 684, 684.
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compliance. This is not to assert that women are incapable of deciding freely within such a 
context. However, it does require us to examine the autonomy of women’s decisions for 
death, ‘to question how much real value, worth and power these so-called choices 
have...Choice can be conformity if women have little ability to determine the conditions of 
consent’.2
II THE CONCEPT OF VULNERABILITY3
In broad terms vulnerability is intrinsic to the human condition. Kottow, for example, refers 
to the ‘essential vulnerability of being human’, evidenced in the risks we all face of 
aggression, abuse of rights and in the obstacles to human flourishing.4 However, in the sense 
referred to in this chapter, vulnerability refers to a more substantive deficiency that 
predisposes a person to further frailty and even harm.5
The International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects 
lists the vulnerable as elderly persons with dementia and residents of nursing homes; people 
receiving social security, the unemployed, homeless persons and patients with incurable 
diseases.6 Poor people, minorities and those who are least educated have also been identified 
as vulnerable populations.7 89 Other definitions describe a group of captive individuals, 
including prisoners, the mentally ill, the acutely ill, the terminally ill or dying.
The notion of vulnerability has received some attention in the area of research ethics. The 
chief characteristic of vulnerability identified by ethics guidelines ‘is a limited capacity or 
freedom to consent or to decline...’6 For example:
2 Janice G Raymond, Women as Wombs: Reproductive Technologies and the Battle over Women's Freedom 
(Spinifex Press, 1994) 100, 103. Raymond’s quotation refers to women’s decisions to use reproductive 
technologies such as IVF and surrogacy. I argue that the same questions should be asked about women’s ‘so- 
called choices’ for assisted death.
3 An earlier version o f this part and part III following was published as Katrina George, 'Autonomy and 
Vulnerability at the Death Bed' (2006) 10(1) University o f Western Sydney Law Review 139.
4 Michael Kottow, 'The Vulnerable and the Susceptible' (2003) 17 Bioethics 460, 461-462. See also Onora 
O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue (Cambridge University Press, 1996) 192-193.
5 See Kottow, above n 4, 463.
6 Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical 
Research Involving Human Subjects (2002) 64.
7 Elizabeth Morrow, 'Attitudes of Women from Vulnerable Populations toward Physician-Assisted Death: A 
Qualitative Approach' (1997) 8 Journal o f Clinical Ethics 279, 279.
8 Louis Lasagna, 'Special Subjects in Human Experimentation' in Paul Abraham Freund (ed), Experimentation 
with Human Subjects (George Braziller, 1970) 262, 268.
9 Ruth Macklin, 'Bioethics, Vulnerability, and Protection' (2003) 17 Bioethics 472, 474.
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Vulnerable persons are those who are relatively (or absolutely) incapable of protecting their own 
interests. More formally they may have insufficient power, intelligence, education, resources, strength 
or other needed attributes to protect their own interests.10
This definition of vulnerability highlights the features of the subject’s context that could act 
as ‘controlling influences’, thus limiting the capacity to consent to or decline participation in 
research. These features include structural inequalities and disparities in power, social and 
economic disadvantage and oppressive cultural stereotypes. One issue is whether these 
features of vulnerability could act as controlling influences that undermine the autonomy of 
decisions for death.
Ill VULNERABILITY AND THE LAW
A Voluntariness
In relation to patient decision-making the term ‘vulnerability’ does not find explicit 
expression in the common law. However, the common law does recognise that freedom from 
controlling influences is an essential requirement in patient decision-making. This finds 
expression in the principle of voluntariness, an element of valid consent at law. Thus:
a man cannot be said to be truly “willing” unless he is in a position to choose freely, and freedom of 
choice predicates, not only full knowledge of the circumstances on which the exercise of choice is 
conditional, so that he may be able to choose wisely, but the absence of any feeling of constraint so that 
nothing shall interfere with the freedom of his will.* 11
The voluntariness of the patient’s decision is one of the legal requirements in the Dutch, 
Belgian and Oregon legislation that legalises euthanasia and/or physician-assisted suicide.
It is also a feature of most, if not all, of the Bills which have been introduced to parliaments
• • 1 3in an effort to legalise euthanasia and/or assisted suicide.
10 Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, above n 6, 64.
11 Bowater v Rowley Regis Corpn. [1944] KB 476, 479 (Scott LJ).
12 Wetboek van Strafrecht [Penal Code] (the Netherlands) s 293(2); Wet toetsing levensbeeindiging op verzoek 
en hulp bij zelfdoding [Termination of Life on Request and Assistance with Suicide (Review Procedures) Act] 
(the Netherlands) 1 April 2002, art 2; Loi relative a l'euthanasie 28 Mai 2002 [Act on Euthanasia of May 28th 
2002] (Belgium) 28 May 2002, s 3(1); Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Or Rev Stat 127.800-995 (1994).
13 For example, End of Life Assistance (Scotland) Bill s 11(3). This was defeated 85-16 after a debate in the 
Scottish Parliament in December 2010; Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 (WA) s 9(2)(e)(i). This was defeated 24 
votes to 1 lin September 2010.
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It is entirely appropriate that patients should receive advice from family, friends and doctors 
and be influenced, even persuaded, by that advice. The law will regard such a decision as 
voluntary as long as this influence ‘did not overbear the independence of the patient’s 
decision.’14 From a legal perspective controlling or ‘overbearing’ influences can take a 
number of different forms.
B Controlling Influences
1 Duress
At the extreme is duress, influence that involves force or threats of force to the person, or 
their parent, spouse or child. The duress vitiates what would otherwise be consent. Such 
extremes of influence rarely manifest in healthcare. In Latter v Braddell 15 the plaintiff was a 
domestic servant who complied under protest with her employer’s direction to undress for a 
medical examination. The plaintiff sued for assault. On appeal it was held that she did 
consent. As commentators have noted, the plaintiff today could expect to succeed on the basis 
of duress.16
2 Undue Influence
Controlling influences may take a more subtle form. The contractual doctrine of undue 
influence provides a framework for analysis. Central to this doctrine is the inequality and 
power imbalance that is also characteristic of the concept of vulnerability.
Contract law presumes the presence of undue influence when a dependent party has placed 
confidence in an ascendant party who has the obligation to act in the dependent’s interests. 
Common instances are the relationship of parent-dependent younger child and doctor-patient. 
The law will not allow the ascendant party to benefit from a contract or gift unless that party 
can prove the benefit was conferred freely, unhindered by undue influence. For example, in 
one case, undue influence was held to be present in a relationship of trust and confidence 
between a male employer and a younger female employee which the employer exploited for
14 Re T (Adult: Refusal o f Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, 662 ( Lord Donaldson MR) fR e  T ).
15 Latter v Braddell (1881) 50 LJQB 448.
16 See, eg, Ian Kennedy and Ian Grubb, Medical Law (Butterworths, 2000) 756; Harold Luntz and David 
Hambly, Torts: Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003) 745.
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i • • 17his financial benefit. It is not necessary to prove any actual wrongdoing by the ascendant 
party.18 ‘Rather, the central issue is the plaintiffs lack of capacity for self-management by 
reason of their excessive dependence on the other person in the relationship.’19
Outside of such relationships undue influence may still be present in other relationships of 
trust and confidence that are characterised by, for example, illegitimate pressure, inequality of
90bargaining power or exploitation of weakness and necessity.
a relationship o f influence can be established by showing that it is one which involves ascendancy and 
influence on the part of the dominant party; or dependence, reliance, trust and confidence on the part of 
the weaker party.21
The English Court of Appeal has adopted this approach to the refusal of consent by a patient. 
In Re T the patient’s mother had fervent religious beliefs and was held to have exercised 
undue influence upon the decision of her seriously ill (adult) daughter to refuse a life 
preserving blood transfusion.22 In considering the effect of outside influences on a patient’s 
decision, Lord Donaldson MR considered both the strength of the will of the patient 
(weakened by illness and medication) and the closeness of the relationship with the 
influencer.
The real question in each such case is ‘Does the patient really mean what he says or is he merely saying 
it for a quiet life, to satisfy someone else or because the advice and persuasion to which he has been 
subjected is such that he can no longer think and decide for himself?’23
The potential for the doctrine of undue influence to protect vulnerable patients was also 
evident in Mrs U v Centre for Reproductive Medicine 24 Here the issue was whether Mrs U’s 
husband had withdrawn his consent to the posthumous use of his sperm as a result of the 
undue influence of a nursing sister who impliedly threatened to interrupt or cease fertility 
treatment unless he did so. The Court of Appeal noted Mr and Mrs U’s emotional, mental and
17 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV  v Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144.
18 See, eg, Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113.
19 Fiona R Bums, 'Undue Influence Inter Vivos and the Elderly' (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 
499, 507.
20 Ibid 504.
21 Brown v NSW Trustee & Guardian [2011] NSWSC 1203(23 September 2011) [45],
22 Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649.
23 Ibid 662 (Lord Donaldson MR).
24 [2002] EWCA Civ 565.
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financial commitment to the treatment, ‘a considerable ordeal’, and observed that ‘they were 
both very vulnerable’. Nevertheless it upheld the decision of the President of the Family 
Division who concluded that although the pressure on the husband ‘must have been 
considerable’ it was not sufficient to amount to undue influence. The correct test was whether 
Mr U’s will was overborne, or whether he ‘no longer thought and decided for himself.’26
Undue influence can also arise from the deliberate concealment of material facts.27 Although 
usually relevant in the context of financial transactions, this factor could have relevance in 
healthcare. The withholding or manipulation of information -  by family, doctors or 
supporting healthcare workers - can impact on a patient’s perceptions and beliefs and impair 
the voluntariness of their choices. For example, a patient might not be told about alternatives 
to, or risks of, a recommended course of action; or a health professional’s choice of words 
could present a scenario in a particular light. The disparity in knowledge and power in a 
clinical relationship means that such influence may impact strongly on patients.
3 Uneonscionability
While the focus of undue influence and duress is on the quality of the consent of the weaker 
party, unconscionability challenges voluntariness when the stronger party has obtained a 
benefit by taking unconscientious advantage of the weaker party’s vulnerability. Relief will 
be granted when the weaker party did not act voluntarily. However, unconscionability goes 
further than the doctrine of undue influence by granting relief to a party who, despite acting 
voluntarily, was ‘unable to make a worthwhile judgment as to what is in his best interest.’29 
The party seeking to escape the contract must be ‘placed at a special disadvantage vis-a-vis
25 Mrs U v Centre for Reproductive Medicine [2002] EWCA Civ 565, [21].
26 Centre for Reproductive Medicine v U [2002] EWHC 36, [28] (‘ U’s Case').
27 Bums, above n 19, 504.
2K President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, Making Health Care Decisions: The Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed Consent in the 
Patient-Practitioner Relationship (1982) 67.
20 Commercial Bank o f Australia Limited vAmadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 461 (Mason J) (‘Amadio’). In Amadio 
the High Court held that a mortgage should be set aside on the grounds of the bank’s unconscionable conduct in 
procuring its execution. The mortgagees were at a special disadvantage because of their advanced age, limited 
grasp of English, the circumstances in which the documents were presented to them for signature and their lack 
of understanding of the documents, matters which should have been known to the bank manager. See also 
National Australia Bank v Nobile (1988) 100 ALR 227 where the Federal Court of Australia set aside a 
guarantee and mortgage provided by the Martellis because they had a special disability ie lack of business 
acumen and limited command of English which was known to the bank at the time of the transaction.
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another.’30 The sex of the weaker party has been identified as a factor of special 
disadvantage.31
In the Canadian case of Norberg v Wynrib ‘ a doctor prescribed a drug to an addicted patient 
in return for sexual favours. The patient sued for battery and one issue was the voluntariness 
of her consent. La Forest J adopted an unconscionability approach. He stated that the power 
relationship between the parties was central to the notion of consent. In his view, if the 
‘justice factor’ of unconscionability is relevant to voluntariness in contract, it is also relevant 
to voluntariness in tort when the same ‘power dependency’ relationship and exploitation 
exists. However, on La Forest’s analysis it seems that the mere presence of power by one 
person over another is not sufficient to ground liability, but rather its actual abuse is 
required.34
The patient’s limited education and addiction, the doctor’s knowledge of this and his medical 
expertise created an inequality between the parties that the doctor manipulated for his own 
benefit. This removed the possibility of the patient providing meaningful consent. However, 
La Forest’s application of the unconscionability doctrine in this context has been criticised.
4 Conclusion: Legal Significance o f Vulnerability at the Death Bed
Undue influence and unconscionability demonstrate the legal significance of vulnerability. 
Contract law has long recognised that the features of vulnerability I identified earlier in this 
chapter can act as controlling influences that undermine the voluntariness of a party’s consent 
to a transaction. These features include social and economic disadvantage (such as language 
difficulties, gender, limited education, age, lack of knowledge or understanding) and power 
dependency. In these circumstances the law will assume a protective stance and closely 
scrutinise the validity of the apparent consent. Re T and U’s Case signify the law’s 
recognition that vulnerability may also be relevant to the voluntariness of decisions by 
patients.
30 Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, 462 (Mason J).
31 Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362, 405 (Fullagar J ).
32 Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 SCR 226.
33 Ibid 248 (La Forest, Gonthier and Corry JJ ).
34 Tom Allen, 'Civil Liability for Sexual Exploitation in Professional Relationships' (1996) 59 Modern Law 
Review 56, 65.
35 See, eg, Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 SCR 226, 307(Sopinka J).
36 [1992] 4 All ER 649.’
37 [2002] EWHC 36.
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Unconscionability requires the deliberate abuse of ascendency by a stronger party who takes
1 0
advantage of another’s vulnerability to obtain a personal benefit. Therefore it may be 
applicable in extreme cases of exploitation at the death bed. One example is the unscrupulous 
family member of anti-euthanasia advocacy. Seeking to expedite an inheritance, he or she 
takes advantage of a patient’s weakness to sway a decision in favour of assisted death. In 
these circumstances the doctrine would challenge the validity of the patient’s decision for 
death.
However, controlling influences can be exercised without any deliberate abuse. Family 
members or doctors who influence a patient’s choice in favour of assisted death might have 
nothing to gain, personally, from this decision. When patients are reduced both physically 
and mentally, the power of doctors and family may be exercised in the patient’s ‘best 
interests’, in a well-meaning or unconscious manner. The case of Re T39 suggests that the 
doctrine of undue influence may be particularly relevant in these circumstances because the 
doctrine does not require any intentional wrongdoing by the stronger party. Moreover, even if 
the decision for assisted death is arguably in the patient’s best interests, if the patient did not 
make an independent decision, undue influence may still vitiate consent.
However, an important limitation of these doctrines is that they only respond to pressures 
within certain kinds of relationships. Although the doctrines foresee that the characteristic 
power imbalance can arise from features of the weaker party’s context such as social and 
economic disadvantage, this disparity is ‘played out’ within a particular relationship: there is 
always an ascendant party and a dependent party. The doctrines do not accommodate the 
concern that the voluntariness of a patient’s choice can be undermined by structural factors 
such as their social, cultural and economic circumstances, independently of any relationship. 
This is not to say that such patients should be denied the opportunity to decide for 
themselves, but it does suggest a risk to the voluntariness of their decisions.
38 Such wrongdoing is not a requirement in presumed relationships o f undue influence, although its presence 
will often be determinative of the outcome of any action.
39 [1992] 4 All ER 649.
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IV VULNERABILITY FOR ASSISTED DEATH: WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE?
If certain groups are vulnerable to choosing euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide, this 
would be indicated by a higher incidence of these practices among such groups. In 2007 
Battin et al4<) examined the available data from Oregon and the Netherlands to assess whether 
certain socio-economic groups disproportionately accessed assisted death.41 Their analysis 
revealed no evidence of heightened risk for the elderly,42 women, the uninsured (not relevant 
in the Netherlands where everyone is insured), people with low educational status, the poor, 
the physically disabled or chronically ill, minors, people with psychiatric illnesses including 
depression, or racial or ethnic minorities. The only group with a heightened risk was people 
with AIDS.43 In short, Battin et al concluded that there is ‘no evidence to justify the grave 
and important concern often expressed about the potential for abuse—namely, the fear that 
legalised physician-assisted dying will target the vulnerable or pose the greatest risk to people 
in vulnerable groups.’44
Battin et al’s findings have been disputed, although in a separate article Battin has provided a 
comprehensive rebuttal of the criticisms, some of which involve a mis-reading of the data.4>
40 Margaret P Battin et al, 'Legal Physician-Assisted Dying in Oregon and the Netherlands: Evidence 
Concerning the Impact on Patients in "Vulnerable" Groups' (2007) 33 Journal o f Medical Ethics 591.
41 The Oregon data consisted of all annual and cumulative Department of Human Services reports 1998-2006 
and three independent studies, namely Linda Ganzini et al, 'Physicians' Experiences with the Oregon Death with 
Dignity Act' (2000) 342 New England Journal o f Medicine 557; Linda Ganzini et al, 'Experiences of Oregon 
Nurses and Social Workers with Hospice Patients Who Requested Assistance with Suicide' (2002) 347 New 
England Journal o f Medicine 582; S W Tolle, 'Characteristics and Proportion of Dying Oregonians Who 
Personally Consider Physician-Assisted Suicide' (2004) 15 Journal of Clinical Ethics 111. The data from the 
Netherlands comprised mainly the four nationwide studies of end-of-life decision making, namely P J van der 
Maas, J J M van Delden and L Pijnenborg, 'Euthanasia and other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of 
Life: An Investigation Performed upon Request of the Commission of Inquiry into the Medical Practice 
Concerning Euthanasia' (1992) 22 Health Policy 3; Paul van der Maas et al, 'Euthanasia and Other Medical 
Decisions Concerning the End of Life' (1991) 338 Lancet 669; Paul van der Maas et al, 'Euthanasia, Physician- 
Assisted Suicide, and Other Medical Practices Involving the End of Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995' (1996) 
335 New England Journal o f Medicine 1699; Bregje Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'Euthanasia and Other End-of- 
Life Decisions in the Netherlands in 1990, 1995, and 2001' (2003) 362 Lancet 395; Agnes van der Heide et al, 
'End-of-Life Practices in the Netherlands under the Euthanasia Act' (2007) 356 New England Journal of 
Medicine 1957.
42 This conclusion is supported by an earlier study: see Martien Muller, Gerrit Kimsma and Gerrit van der Wal, 
'Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Facts, Figures and Fancies with Special Regard to Old Age' (1998) 13 Drugs 
and Aging 185, 187.
43 Battin et al, above n 40, 591. The authors offer no explanation for the over-representation of AIDS patients, 
but note that AIDS is sometimes a ‘stigmatised’ illness: at 591.
44 Ibid 597.
45 For an overview of the criticisms and Battin’s response see Margaret P Battin, 'Physician-Assisted Dying and 
the Slippery Slope: the Challenge of Empirical Evidence ' (2008) 45 Willamette Law Review 91. See also I G 
Finlay and R George, 'Legal Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon and The Netherlands: Evidence Concerning
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What is open to challenge is the finding that there is no evidence of increased risk for people 
with depression. As Battin points out, both the Netherlands and Oregon rely on the 
competencies of physicians to screen for depression.46 Critics argue that this is not an 
adequate safeguard because doctors are poorly trained in recognising depression, a claim 
supported by extensive research, as I highlighted in the previous chapter. Indeed, Battin 
acknowledges the conclusion of a study about patients who received a lethal prescription of 
drugs in Oregon that the system does not adequately protect patients whose decisions are 
influenced by depression.47
Other objections to Battin et al’s study relate to the integrity of the reporting and data- 
gathering practices in Oregon and the Netherlands.48 In chapters 7 and 8 I will discuss a 
number of problems with the Dutch system. Battin agrees there are inadequacies in the 
Oregon data,44 but argues that overall the data is useful and criticisms of the Oregon system 
are exaggerated.50
Even if we concede that there are some limitations to the Battin et al study, this does not 
undermine its relatively modest conclusion that there is no current evidence of abuse in 
certain groups identified as vulnerable. Their conclusion should be welcomed by both 
supporters and critics of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide who are concerned about 
risks to the vulnerable, even if, as Battin et al acknowledge, more research is needed.51
However, vulnerability is about more than simply numbers. Both Battin et al and their critics 
overlook what I will argue is a key issue: that even if vulnerable populations do not choose 
euthanasia or assisted suicide in disproportionate numbers, the reasons some members of 
these populations decide for assisted death could be indicative of vulnerability. To examine 
the meaning of this claim I propose women as a case study of a vulnerable population.
the Impact on Patients in Vulnerable Groups - Another Perspective on Oregon's Data' (2011) 37 Journal o f 
Medical Ethics 171.
4(1 Battin, above n 45, 124.
47 Ibid, referring to Linda Ganzini, Elizabeth R Goy and Steven K Dobscha, 'Prevalence o f Depression and 
Anxiety in Patients Requesting Physicians' Aid in Dying: Cross Sectional Survey' (2008) 337 British Medical 
Journal 973.
48 For a discussion o f these criticisms see Battin, above n 45, 109-117.
44 For example, Battin agrees the released publicly Oregon data is ‘skeletal’ and contains no physician or patient 
identifiers: Ibid 114.
50 Ibid 110, 114.
51 Ibid 134.
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V A WOMAN’S CHOICE?52
A Why a Case Study on Women?
Finlay and George assert that women as a group ‘seem to be of questionable relevance’ in the 
context of vulnerability for assisted death.53 However, my interest in women as a case study 
of vulnerability was provoked by a remarkable phenomenon: across the world the most 
prominent assisted death cases have involved women. In the United States there was, for 
example, Diane Trumbull, Janet Adkins, Marjorie Wantz and Sherry Miller; Dianne Pretty, 
Debbie Purdy, Nan Maitland and Kelly Taylor in the United Kingdom; in Ireland, Marie 
Fleming; in New Zealand, Victoria Vincent, and Lesley Martin who assisted her mother Joy’s 
suicide; in Canada, Sue Rodriguez and Gloria Taylor; and in Australia, Nancy Crick, Sandy 
Williamson, Nonna Hall and Lisette Nigot.54
52 An earlier version of this section was published as Katrina George, 'A Woman's Choice? The Gendered Risks 
of Voluntary Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide' (2007) 15 Medical Law Review 1.
53 Finlay and George, above n 45, 171.
54 Diane Trumbull, a 45-year-old leukaemia patient, was assisted to die by Dr Quill who later wrote about this 
experience (Timothy E Quill, 'Death and Dignity-a Case of Individualized Decision Making' ( 1991) 324 New 
England Journal of Medicine 691). Janet Adkins, a 54 year old Oregon woman, suffered from Alzheimer's 
disease and died with the assistance of Dr Kevorkian. Marjorie Wantz, 58 years old, suffered from pelvic pain 
and died with Sherry Miller, with the assistance of Kevorkian. Dianne Pretty died of MND in 2002 after losing 
right to die court challenges in England and the European Court of Human Rights. Debbie Purdy who suffers 
from Multiple Sclerosis sought a declaration from the Director of Public Prosecutions that her husband would 
not be prosecuted if he assisted her suicide. She won a landmark House of Lords case in 2009 which resulted in 
the drafting of a prosecutorial policy regarding assisted suicide: Regina (Pretty) v Director of Public 
Prosecutions [2002] 1 AC 800. Kelly Taylor who suffered from Eisenmenger's syndrome and the spinal 
condition Klippel-Feil syndrome died of heart complications in February 2012 after a six year campaign for her 
doctors to sedate her and withdraw food and fluids with the intention of ending her life. Nan Maitland was not 
terminally ill but suffered from very painful arthritis when she suicided at a Swiss clinic in 2011 with the 
assistance of euthanasia campaigner Dr Michael Irwin. In 2012 Marie Fleming launched a constitutional 
challenge to the Irish prohibition of assisted suicide. She suffers from multiple sclerosis and is cared for full 
time by her husband who leads the Ireland branch of Exit International. In September 2002, former Voluntary 
Euthanasia Society member Victoria Vincent, 83, was found dead with a bag over her head. Lesley Martin, a 
euthanasia campaigner, gave her mother Joy Martin a morphine injection in May 1999 as she was dying of 
cancer, later recording this in a book (Lesley Martin, To Die Like a Dog : a Mother, a Daughter, a Promise Kept 
(M-Press, 2002). Sue Rodriguez suffered from MND and suicided in 2004 after losing a constitutional challenge 
in the Canadian Supreme Court. Her story was recorded in the documentary At the End of the Day: The Sue 
Rodriguez Story. Gloria Taylor also suffers from MND and in June 2012 won a legal challenge to the laws of 
British Columbia that prohibit assisted suicide. Nancy Crick, 69 years old, was not terminally ill when she 
suicided in 2002 in the presence of 21 family, friends, and supporters of voluntary euthanasia with the aim of 
challenging laws against assisting suicide. She had received advice from voluntary euthanasia campaigner, Dr 
Philip Nitschke, as had Sandy Williamson, in her mid-50’s, who suffered from MND and suicided in 2002 after 
significant media interest. Norma Hall, a 72 year old cancer patient, died in 2001 with advice of Dr Nitschke. 
Lisette Nigot, healthy and 79 years old, killed herself in 2002 with the advice of Dr Nitschke, her story recorded 
in the documentary Mademoiselle and the Doctor. Numerous other cases of such women could be cited. 
However, there are some prominent cases involving men. For example. Bob Dent, who died in 1996 with the 
assistance of Dr Nitschke, was the first person to die under the voluntary euthanasia legislation in the Northern 
Territory, Australia before it was overturned. In 2011 the BBC screened a documentary about the last moments 
o f ‘Peter’ who suffered MND and suicided in a Swiss clinic.
123
Autonomy in death may have particular resonance with women who historically have 
struggled to win choice in their lives and control over their bodies.55 But are the deaths of 
such women demonstrations of personal autonomy, expressions of the catch cry ‘my body, 
my choice’?
Contrary to Finlay and George’s assertion, women are a particularly relevant case study of 
vulnerability. As I go on to explain, feminist theory highlights the structural inequalities, 
disparities in power, social and economic disadvantage and oppressive cultural stereotypes 
which still characterise the experience of many women. As I identified earlier in this chapter, 
these are all features of vulnerability that could act as controlling influences and undermine 
the autonomy of choices for death. Even if there is no greater incidence of women choosing 
assisted death than men, the underlying reasons for their decisions could be indicative of 
vulnerability. This does not mean that all women or particular women are vulnerable or 
incapable of autonomous choice.
[T]o observe that patients are members of potentially vulnerable groups is to assert neither that each 
such person or the group as a whole is actually vulnerable nor that people who are seriously or 
terminally ill but not considering physician-assisted dying are not vulnerable. But it is to recognize a 
special and appropriate concern about persons and groups seen as vulnerable . . .56
B The Incidence o f Female Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide
My case study begins with an analysis of the available research that discloses first, the 
incidence of death by voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide; and secondly, the 
sex of patients who make these decisions. When we look beyond the Dutch and Oregon 
data studied by Battin et al, their conclusion that women are not vulnerable to assisted death 
appears less assured. Moreover, a close examination of the quantitative evidence reveals 
women’s preference for certain methods of assisted death. This requires explanation.
55 For example, women's efforts to secure justice in marriage and family life, financial independence, freedom to 
participate in public life and paid employment, respect for bodily integrity and freedom from violence.
56 Battin et al, above n 40, 591.
57 Analysis o f the gender ratios of participants in voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide was 
included in a publication by Kaplan et al in 2002. This thesis has the benefit o f more recent data from the 
Netherlands and Oregon. See Kalman Kaplan, Martin Harrow and Mark Schneiderhan, 'Suicide, Physician- 
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Men Versus Women around the World: The Degree of Physician Control' 
(2002) 18 Ethics and Medicine: a Christian Perspective on Issues in Bioethics 33.
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1 The Netherlands
Quantitative studies of the rates and characteristics of voluntary euthanasia and physician- 
assisted suicide in the Netherlands were conducted in 1990, 1995, 2001, 2005 and 2010.58 
Table 1 shows the proportion of men and women who chose voluntary euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide.
Table 1 -  Incidence of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide According to Sex
in the Netherlands
(expressed as the number of deaths studied (N) and as a percentage of the euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide deaths studied (%))
Deaths by
Euthanasia
and
Physician-
Assisted
Suicide
1990 1995 2001 2005 2010 1990-2010
N % N % N % N % N % N %
Male 109 55 113 44 174 55 199 58 281 57 876 54
Female 88 45 144 56 140 45 149 42 215 43 736 46
Total 197 100 257 100 314 100 348 100 496 100 1612 100
Total
Deaths
Studied 5197 5146 5617 9965 6861 32 786
Note
The deaths studied were from the death certificate survey. The percentages provide some indication of the 
proportion of men and women receiving euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (although the percentages 
have not been weighted to adjust for sampling fractions, for non-response and for random-sampling deviations: 
weighted percentages for each sex were not available in English.) Numbers and percentages are calculated from 
Bregje Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'Euthanasia and Other End-of-Life Decisions in the Netherlands in 1990, 
1995, and 2001' (2003) 362 Lancet 395; Agnes van der Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Practices in the Netherlands 
under the Euthanasia Act' (2007) 356 New England Journal o f Medicine 1957; Bregje Onwuteaka-Philipsen et 
al, 'Trends in End-of-Life Practices before and after the Enactment of the Euthanasia Law in the Netherlands 
from 1990 to 2010: A Repeated Cross-Sectional Survey' (2012) 380 Lancet 908.
58 Chapter 7 of this thesis provides a description and critique of the methodology of these studies.
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Apart from 1995, the proportions have been consistent: on average 54 per cent of euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide deaths were men. This supports Battin et aTs conclusion that 
there is no heightened risk for women in assisted death.59
Yet when the incidence of voluntary euthanasia and the incidence of physician-assisted 
suicide are considered separately, significant gender differences become evident. Overall in 
1990, 1995 and 2001 the rate of voluntary euthanasia was equal between genders: 51 per cent 
of these deaths were men and 49 per cent were women.60 But the rate of physician-assisted 
suicide was higher among men: 57 per cent of physician-assisted suicides across the three 
years were men and 42 per cent were women.61 Unfortunately, the English language reports 
of the 2005 and 2010 findings do not disclose the same gender specific data. While overall 
only a small proportion of all patients decide for physician-assisted suicide, the data that is 
available from the first three Dutch reports may suggest that in the Netherlands, physician-
ZL
assisted suicide appeals less to women than men as the preferred method of assisted death.
2 Oregon, USA
The same pattern is present also in the 596 physician-assisted suicides that have been 
performed in Oregon since it was legalised in November 1997.64 There have been a few years 
where more women than men took the option of physician-assisted suicide, most notably in 
2011 when 63 per cent of such deaths were female.65 Overall, however, of the physician- 
assisted suicides between 1998 and 2011, 51.7 per cent were men and 48.3 per cent were
59 Battin et al, above n 40, 594.
60 Percentages calculated from email from B D Onwuteaka-Philipsen to Katrina George, 8 December 2003.
61 Percentages calculated from ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 This conclusion might be underscored by the data about physician-assisted suicide among psychiatric patients. 
In practice, only physician-assisted suicide (not euthanasia) is offered to psychiatric patients because the 
patient’s self-ingestion of the fatal dose is considered a final guarantee of voluntariness (John Griffiths, 'Assisted 
Suicide in the Netherlands: The Chabot Case' (1995) 58 Modern Law Review 232, 244). One study estimated 
that 63 per cent of requests for physician-assisted suicide among psychiatric patients were by women. This 
might support the observation that when euthanasia is also an option women display a stronger preference for 
euthanasia over physician-assisted suicide than do men. However, this data should be read with caution since 
the same study estimates that only about 2 to 5 physician-assisted suicides occur among psychiatric patients per 
year, out o f approximately 320 requests by men and women: Johanna H Groenewoud et al, 'Physician-Assisted 
Death in Psychiatric Practice in the Netherlands' (1997) 336 New England Journal o f Medicine 1795.
64 Oregon Public Health Division, Table 1. Characteristics and End-of-Life Care o f596 DWDA [Death with 
Dignity Act] Patients who have Died from Ingesting a Lethal Dose o f Medication as o f February 29, 2012, by 
Year, Oregon, 1998-2011 (29 February 2012) Oregon Health Authority
<h:tp://public. health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Documen 
ts/vearl4-tbl-l .pdf>.
65 ibid.
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women.66
The experience of the Netherlands and Oregon suggests that the more proactive method of 
physician-assisted suicide (where the patient is required to self-ingest the fatal prescription of 
drugs) appeals more to men than to women. Women who are seeking a medically assisted 
death display a stronger preference for the more passive, structured method of euthanasia 
where the physician administers the lethal dosage to the patient.
3 Europe
There are limited data available for other European countries. There is no study which 
distinguishes between euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Rather, the data are reported 
collectively. Thus whether men and women display a preference for a method of death cannot 
be assessed. In Flanders, Belgium large scale, replicated surveys were conducted in 1998, 
2001 and 2007. In 1998 58 per cent of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide cases were 
women, although this has since shifted. In 2001 only 33 per cent of such deaths were women 
and 38 per cent in 2007. A separate analysis of all reported euthanasia and physician- 
assisted suicide cases in Belgium 2002 -  2007 revealed the same pattern: 47.3 per cent were 
women.68
A recent Belgian study has for the first time considered why more men than women decide 
for assisted death. Analysing a representative sample of deaths in Flanders in 2007, Smets et 
al conclude that the higher rate of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide among men is 
because of men’s particular clinical profile at the end of life. In Belgium and the Netherlands, 
men are more likely to die of cancer and more often die at home; euthanasia and physician- 
assisted suicide occur most frequently in cancer patients and in patients dying at home.69
Yet other European studies reveal a different gender ratio. A survey of euthanasia and
66 Ibid.
67 Kenneth Chambaere et al, Trends in Medical End-of-Life Decision Making in Flanders, Belgium 1998-2001 - 
2007' (2011) 31 Medical Decision Making 500, 504, table 2.
68 Tinne Smets et al, 'Legal Euthanasia in Belgium: Characteristics of All Reported Euthanasia Cases' (2009) 47 
Medical Care 1, 3, table 2. See also Mette L Rurup et al, 'The First Five Years of Euthanasia Legislation in 
Belgium and the Netherlands: Description and Comparison of Cases' (2012) 26 Palliative Medicine 43, 46, table 
1 .
69 Tinne Smets et al, 'Sex-based Differences in End-of-Life Decision Making in Flanders, Belgium' (2012) 50 
Medical Care 815.
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physician-assisted suicide in the United Kingdom in 2007-2008 found that 76 per cent of 
such deaths were women.70 An investigation in six European countries conducted between 
June 2001 and February 2002 showed that generally women are less likely to choose 
euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide, but there were variations between countries. In 
Belgium, 46 per cent of assisted death cases were women; in Denmark, 54 per cent; in Italy, 
20 per cent; in the Netherlands, 47 per cent; in Sweden, 38 per cent; and in Switzerland, 52 
per cent.71 Assisted suicide, but not euthanasia, is legal in Switzerland. A study about the 
suicides assisted by Swiss right-to-die organisations Exit Deutsche Schweiz and Dignitas 
revealed a significant over-representation of women between 2001 and 2004. Sixty four per 
cent of the suicides assisted by Dignitas were women. Of the suicides assisted by Exit
72Deutsche Schweiz, 65 per cent of were women, an increase from 52 per cent in the 1990s.
4 National United States Survey
In 1996, a national survey of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide was conducted in the 
United States at a time when these practices were illegal across the entire country. Completed 
questionnaires were received from 1902 physicians across a range of medical specialities. 
Eighty-one deaths by euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide were reported. Striking 
gender differences in assisted death preference are evident. Of the 36 patients who died by 
physician-assisted suicide for whom sex was reported, 97 per cent were men. Of those who 
died by euthanasia, 57 per cent were men and 43 per cent were women.74 This confirms that 
the more proactive method of physician-assisted suicide is the preference of men more often 
than women. Although participants of both genders overall preferred euthanasia, this 
preference was more pronounced among women.75
70 Clive Seale, 'End-of-Life Decisions in the UK Involving Medical Practitioners' (2009) 23 Palliative Medicine 
198, 202, table 3. The author makes no comment on this result.
71 Agnes van der Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Decision-Making in Six European Countries: Descriptive Study' 
(2003) 361 Lancet 345, 348, table 3. The authors do not suggest an explanation for the different proportions in 
these countries.
72 S Fischer et al, 'Suicide Assisted by Two Swiss Right-to-Die Organisations' (2008) 34 Journal o f Medical 
Ethics 810, 810. The authors do not offer an explanation for this overrepresentation but suggest it is ‘an 
important phenomenon so far largely overlooked and in need of further study’: at 810.
73 Diane Meier et al, 'A National Survey of Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the United States' 
(1998) 338 New England Journal o f Medicine 1193, 1195.
74 Ibid 1195, table 4.
75 Another small study reports that a combined total o f 60.5 per cent of euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicides were women. Ezekiel Emanuel et al, 'The Practice o f Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the 
United States: Adherence to Proposed Safeguards and Effects on Physicians' (1998) 280 Journal o f the 
American Medical Association 507, 509.
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Despite the small sample, the results of this 1996 United States study are a challenge to the 
autonomy of decisions for assisted death, and decisions for euthanasia in particular. In only 
21 per cent of the euthanasia cases was an explicit request for death received, compared with 
75 per cent of the physician-assisted suicide cases. The patients themselves made the request 
for death in 95 per cent of the physician-assisted suicide cases, but in only 29 per cent of the 
euthanasia cases. The influence of a family member or partner is stronger in the euthanasia 
cases where a family member or partner made the request for death 54 per cent of the time.76
For the women in this United States study, the rhetoric of choice rings a little hollow. 
Compared to men, women died in circumstances where their requests were less likely to be 
explicit, when death was less likely to be at their personal request and more likely to be 
initiated by family members or partners. The euthanasia cases were also characterised by 
weaker doctor-patient relationships: in 12 per cent of cases the physician had known the 
patient for less than 4 weeks. Thus the women considering whether to end their lives were 
also less likely to have the benefit of an established relationship with their physician.
5 Dr Kevorkian
The studies about the suicides assisted by Dr Jack Kevorkian between approximately 1990 
and 1997 reveal a significantly higher incidence of assisted death among women than men: 
depending on the sample size either 72 per cent or 68 per cent of the Dr Kevorkian deaths 
were women, a ratio similar to the Swiss assisted suicides I have previously discussed. 
The authors considered this finding ‘remarkable’ given that in the United States it is men who 
are more likely to kill themselves by a ratio of 1:4.
Dr Kevorkian employed two methods of death. The first method was the inhalation of carbon 
monoxide, triggered by the patient, via a tube and mask over the patient’s face and mouth. 
The second method required considerably more physician involvement and was more
76 Meier et al, above n 73, 1195.
77 Ibid.
78 Silvia Sara Canetto and Janet Hollenshead, 'Gender and Physician-Assisted Suicide: An Analysis of the 
Kevorkian Cases, 1990-1997' (1999) 40 Omega: Journal o f Death and Dying 165, 168 (72 per cent of their 
sample of 75 assisted suicides were women); Kaplan, Harrow and Schneiderhan, above n 57, 36 (68 per cent of 
their sample of 93 assisted suicides were women).
79 This similarity was noted by Fischer et al, above n 72, 813.
8(1 Canetto and Hollenshead, 'Gender and Physician-Assisted Suicide: An Analysis of the Kevorkian Cases, 
1990-1997', above n 78, 182. See also Kaplan, Harrow and Schneiderhan, above n 57, 37.
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structured: in this method the physician established an intravenous line and a saline drip, 
followed by the patient releasing barbiturates into the line.
The authors of one of the Kevorkian studies point out that:
[sjtriking gender differences emerge here: Of the 27 carbon monoxide deaths, 56% were women and 
only 44% were men. Of the 20 lethal injection deaths (the more passive, structured method) 85% were 
women and only 15% were m en...81
The Swiss right-to-die organisations also employed two methods of death, one more ‘passive’ 
and ‘structured’ than the other. Fischer et al explain that most patients self-ingested the fatal
. . . .  . . 89dosage, but for some patients the drugs were administered intravenously via gastric tube, 
possibly because some patients have difficulties swallowing or that staff lack nursing
O l
expertise. It would be interesting to know whether there were gender differences in the 
methods of death used in Switzerland, but the Fischer et al study does not disclose this. 
Certainly the Kevorkian studies strongly indicate women’s preference for a passive death, 
with a significant degree of physician participation.
C Conclusion
My analysis of the available data about the incidence of assisted death by gender is 
inconclusive. However looking beyond Battin et al’s analysis of the Netherlands and Oregon, 
there is evidence that in some countries women do decide for assisted death in 
disproportionate numbers to men. Currently, there is no explanation as to why the gender 
ratios vary across different jurisdictions. Greater scrutiny is needed of this issue in empirical 
research in future. It is important to point out the empirical studies that report an extensive 
range of valuable data but fail to report vital information about the characteristics of patients 
deciding for assisted death, including their gender. Moreover, our understanding of the 
issues would be advanced if empirical studies reported individually the gender break up of 
deaths by voluntary euthanasia and deaths by physician-assisted suicide.
81 This comment was about the first 47 cases of the sample for which both psychological and physical autopsy 
data was available: Kaplan, Harrow and Schneiderhan, above n 57, 33.
82 Fischer et al, above n 72, 812, table 3.
83 Fischer et al suggest this is a possible explanation: ibid 813.
84 For example, Helga Kuhse et al, 'End-of-Life Decisions in Australian Medical Practice' (1997) 166 Medical 
Journal o f Australia 191.
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In the next part of this chapter, I will investigate more closely the evidence that men are more 
likely than women to prefer physician-assisted suicide, and that women demonstrate a 
stronger preference for the more passive method of euthanasia. I argue that even if more men 
overall choose assisted death, the reasons that underlie the decisions of some women are 
gender distinctive and indicative of vulnerability. This poses a challenge to the rhetoric of 
choice which characterises pro-euthanasia advocacy.
VI THE REASONS WOMEN CHOOSE EUTHANASIA 
AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
There are no qualitative studies that explore the reasons why women, as distinct from men, 
choose or, given the opportunity, would choose either euthanasia or physician-assisted
o :
suicide. This is a significant gap in the research. ~ I now critically examine some key 
explanations for women’s decisions for assisted death. I consider the extent to which there is 
empirical evidence to support these explanations. Are the reasons women choose assisted 
death indicative of self-determination, choice and autonomy? My analysis leads me to 
conclude that for some women the decision for death may be a ‘non-choice’, indicative of 
vulnerability and induced by controlling influences that subvert women’s autonomy at the 
end of life.
A Women Are Concerned About Self-Determination
The first possible reason for women’s decisions for assisted death is their particular concern
for self-determination. This may reflect women’s historical struggle for choice and control
0 / 1
over their bodies. There is some evidence that, even at the end of life, courts are less likely 
to affirm women’s preferences for their own treatment, compared to men. An analysis of 
United States appellate cases about the withdrawal of treatment for incompetent patients
85 See generally Felicity Allen, 'Where are the Women in End-of-Life Research?' (2002) 19 Behaviour Change 
39. Gail Tulloch has noted the importance of monitoring the reasons women decide for assisted death where 
empirical data permit (although she does not examine the available data herself): Gail Tulloch, 'A Feminist 
Utilitarian Perspective on Euthanasia: from Nancy Crick to Terri Schiavo' (2005) 12 Nursing Inquiry 155, 159. 
In 1999 Diane Raymond concluded there was not enough data to justify an inference that women are ‘worse off 
with assisted death. This chapter has the benefit of more recent data and draws more widely from a variety of 
interdisciplinary studies to shed light on women’s reasons for deciding for assisted death: Diane Raymond, 
'“Fatal Practices”: A Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia' (1999) 14(2) Hypatia 1,
6.
86 Canetto and Hollenshead, 'Gender and Physician-Assisted Suicide: An Analysis of the Kevorkian Cases, 
1990-1997', above n 78, 184-5.
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revealed gender patterned reasoning in the courts’ decisions:
...a woman’s moral identity is more likely to be discounted as treatment decisions are assigned to 
family...women are disadvantaged in having their moral agency taken less seriously than that of men 
when a controversial medical decision is evaluated...87
In this context, ‘concern about self-determination in death might be particularly relevant to
oo
women.’ Against this explanation, however, are studies which demonstrate less support for
OQ
assisted death by women than men. Thus the explanation that women are particularly 
concerned about self-determination in death is undermined by the evidence of their more 
negative attitudes towards assisted death than men.
B Women Live Longer Than Men
Another explanation for women choosing assisted death is the fact that women tend to live 
longer than men, and so are more likely to suffer from the diseases and disabilities that 
motivate requests for assisted death. Numerous studies in the United States and Britain have 
confirmed that elderly women are significantly more likely to develop disabling conditions 
than elderly men. For example, in Britain ‘above age 80, nearly 20% more women than men 
are functionally disabled’.90
Countering this explanation, however, is data about suicide mortality patterns. It is the male 
suicide rate which rises from about the age of 75 when health deteriorates and there is an 
increase in chronic disease and disability, while the female rate remains relatively stable or 
declines.91
87 Steven Miles and Allison August, 'Courts, Gender and "The Right to Die'" (1990) 18 Law, Medicine and 
Health Care 85, 92. See also Jennifer A Parks, 'Why Gender Matters to the Euthanasia Debate: on Decisional 
Capacity and the Rejection of Women's Death Requests' (2000) 30(1) Hastings Center Report 30.
88 Miles and August, above n 87, 92.
89 See, eg, Joseph Carroll, 'Public Continues to Support Right-to-Die for Terminally 111 Patients' (19 June 2006) 
Gallup, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/23356/public-continues-support-righttodie-terminally-ill-patients.aspx>; 
Morrow, above n 7; Harold Koenig, Diane Wildman-Hanlon and Kenneth Schmader, 'Attitudes of Elderly 
Patients and their Families toward Physician-Assisted Suicide' (1996) 156 Archives o f Internal Medicine 2240; 
B K Singh, 'Correlates of Attitudes Toward Euthanasia' (1979) 26 Biodemography and Social Biology 247; 
David E Jorgenson and Ron C Neubecker, 'Euthanasia: a National Survey of Attitudes toward Voluntary 
Termination of Life' (1980) 11 Omega: Journal o f Death and Dying 281.
911 Sara Arber and Jay Ginn, 'Gender and Inequalities in Health in Later Life' (1993) 36 Social Science and 
Medicine 33, 37.
91 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Gender Indicators, Australia (2012)
<http://www.abs.gov.au/aussta ts/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by+Subject/4125.0~Jan+2012~Main+Features~Suicides~32
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It is striking that, though white female life expectancy is higher and females report more chronic 
diseases and health service use at advanced ages than males, there is no comparable late life rise in 
their suicide rates.92
Data also demonstrate that rates of participation in physician-assisted suicide and voluntary 
euthanasia decrease significantly with age, for both men and women.
Women’s relative longevity also means that they are more likely than men are to experience 
the death of a partner or spouse and to be deprived of this support in older age. For example, 
in the United States
[i]n 1988 there were 6.5 million women age 65 and over living alone, in contrast with fewer than 2 
million men in that situation. Women age 65 and over are almost half as likely as their male age peers to 
be married.94
The pattern is similar elsewhere. For example, in Australia, among people aged 75 and over, 
50 per cent of women and 23 per cent of men live alone.95 The incidence of suicide and 
suicidal ideation increases significantly in people who are lonely or alone.96 It might be 
expected that this isolation could influence some women’s decisions for assisted death.97 
However, this does not appear to be the case for elderly women. Although they are more 
likely to live alone, there is no corresponding increase in the suicide rate of women aged 
around 65 and over, as I noted above. There is also the evidence of the Kevorkian deaths. 
Although women who were divorced or never married were significantly more likely to opt 
for assisted death than those who were married, women who were widowed were less likely
40>; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 'CDC Health Disparities and Inequalities Report - United 
States, 2011' (2011) 60 (Supplement) Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 57.
92 Max Woodbury, Kenneth Manton and Dan Blazer, 'Trends in US Suicide Mortality Rates 1968 to 1982: Race 
and Sex Differences in Age, Period and Cohort Components' (1988) 17 International Journal o f Epidemiology 
356, 360.
93 Oregon Public Health Division, above n 64; Bregje D Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'Trends in End-of-Life 
Practices before and after the Enactment of the Euthanasia Law in the Netherlands from 1990 to 2010: A 
Repeated Cross-Sectional Survey' (2012) 380 Lancet 908.
94 Silvia Sara Canetto, 'Elderly Women and Suicidal Behaviour' in Silvia Sara Canetto and David Lester (eds), 
Women and Suicidal Behavior (Springer Publishing, 1995) 215, 221.
95 David de Vaus, Diversity and Change in Australian Families: Statistical Profiles (Australian Institute of 
Family Studies, 2004) 101.
% Lori Roscoe et al, 'Antecedents of Euthanasia and Suicide among Older Women' (2003) 58 Journal o f the 
American Medical Women's Association 44, 46.
97 See, eg, Lynne Marie Kohm and Britney N Brigner, 'Women and Assisted Suicide: Exposing the Gender 
Vulnerability to Acquiescent Death' (1998) 4 Cardozo Women’s Law Journal 240, 267-268.
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to choose death.98
Overall, the available evidence does not support women’s relative longevity as an 
explanation for their assisted deaths. Elderly women do suffer greater disease and disability 
than men. However, research suggests that this does not influence their requests for assisted 
death. Although women are likely to outlive their spouse or partner and lose this support in 
their old age, the available evidence indicates (somewhat counter-intuitively) that this does 
not impact on their rate of suicide.
C Assisted Death o f Women Reproduces Gendered Patterns o f Violence
Another explanation, not hitherto advanced in the literature, is that the assisted deaths of 
women reproduce gendered patterns of violence. I argue that we must consider women's 
decisions for assisted death within the context of male domination and sexist oppression. I go 
on to identify striking correlations between patterns of male violence against women and the 
mercy killing of women. The possibility that the same dynamics might sometimes underlie 
female voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide is a challenge to an unquestioning 
confidence in the autonomy of these decisions.
1 'The Ubiquitous Phenomenon o f Male Domination and Hierarchy'
While feminist theory is far from homogenous, ‘[t]he insight that women are subject to 
pervasive gender domination remains a driving force of all forms of feminism’.99 Bender 
points out that
[m]uch o f feminist theory begins by describing, defining and exposing...the ubiquitous phenomenon of 
male domination and hierarchy ... men have had the bulk of the power and have used that power to 
subordinate women ... men have clearly been in control ...10°
98 Lori Roscoe et al, 'A Comparison of Characteristics o f Kevorkian Euthanasia Cases and Physician-Assisted 
Suicides in Oregon' (2001) 41 Gerontologist 439, 443.
99 Rosemary Hunter, 'Deconstructing the Subjects Of Feminism: The Essentialism Debate in Feminist Theory 
and Practice' (1996) 6 Australian Feminist Law Journal 135, 138.
IIIU Leslie Bender, 'A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort' (1988) 38 Journal o f Legal Education 3 , 5- 
6. This is a perspective most closely associated with radical feminism which regards the male/female 
relationship as the model o f all power relationships: see, eg, Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (Doubleday, 1970); 
Marilyn French, Beyond Power: On Women, Men and Morals (Summit Books, 1985); Robin Rowland and
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Even in liberal, democratic societies that profess a commitment to justice and self-
determination, women have less access than men to structures of power.101 Correspondingly,
102women are also disadvantaged in their access to material resources.
However, critiques of feminist essentialism reject the view that there are essential, defining 
characteristics of women that unite them as a group distinct from men. Each woman’s 
experience of oppression will be different because of the different conditions of their lives, 
such as race, class and culture. Some theorists also question masculinist essentialism, 
arguing that not all men are part of the dominant masculinity.104 It is not possible here to do 
justice to the complexity and range of this debate. However, to acknowledge the context of 
male domination and female oppression is not to subscribe to determinism, to confine women 
and men to fixed categories, nor to deny the possibility of change:
Existing differences between women and men may have been generated out of the different worlds we 
inhabit as social groups, including our experience of power and powerlessness. But this is not to say 
that these differences are immutable.105
2 Violence against Women: Domination, Control, Possession
I will now examine criminological studies which expose this gender domination in patterns of 
violence. There is compelling evidence of correlations between these patterns of violence 
and women’s experience of mercy killing. I contend that women’s experience of violence 
provides striking insight into the influences that might explain their decisions for assisted 
death and belie the language of autonomy and choice.
The impact of male violence on women as a group is pervasive: in 2005 an estimated 443 000
Renate D Klein, 'Radical Feminism: Critique and Construct' in Sneja Gunew (ed), Feminist Knowledge:
Critique and Construct (Routledge, 1990) 271; Robin Morgan, Going Too Far (Vintage Books, 1978).
101 As of May 2008, the global average for women in parliaments stands at 18.4 per cent: United Nations 
Development Fund for Women, Progress o f the World's Women 2008/2009 - Who Answers to Women? Gender 
and Accountability (2008) 21.
102 For example, internationally, the gender pay gap ranges from 3 per cent to 51 per cent with a global average 
of 17 per cent: ibid 55, citing information supplied by the International Trade Union Confederation, 2008.
103 See, eg, Trina Grillo, 'Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master's House' (1995) 
10 Berkeley Women's Law Journal 16.
104 See, eg, R W Connell, Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics (Polity Press, 1987); 
Fynne Segal, Slow Motion: Changing Masculinities, Changing Men (Virago, 1990).
105 Rowland and Klein, above n 100, 298.’ See also Carol Smart, 'The Woman o f Fegal Discourse' in Ngaire 
Naffine (ed), Gender and Justice (Ashgate, 2002) 29, 40.
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Australian adult women (5.8 per cent of all female adults) had experienced physical or sexual 
violence in the previous 12 months106 and nearly 40 per cent of women had experienced 
violence since the age of 15.107 Women generally suffer lower rates of violence than men.108 
However, women’s experience of violence is more likely to be at the hands of a current or 
previous sexual intimate.109 Although both male and female victims of homicide are most at 
risk from family members, an analysis of homicides in NSW, Australia between 1968-1981 
revealed that '[b]oth as a proportion of their sex, and in absolute numbers females were far 
more likely than males to die in domestic homicides'.110 This is confirmed by more recent 
research.* 111
An undercurrent of male domination and sex stereotyping appears to drive patterns of 
violence against women. For example, in the NSW study above, an ‘overwhelming feature of 
many such killings, particularly those of wives and lovers, was the widespread use of 
violence by men to control their wives’ activities’. The same study revealed that 'men were 
five times more likely than women to kill lovers and/or sexual rivals'. In one Australia­
wide study, over three-quarters of intimate partner killings involved a male offender and 
female victim, the most common trigger being the offender’s jealousy and possessiveness.114 
Another study of homicides in Victoria, Australia between 1985 and 1989 revealed that the 
common feature of male homicide of sexual intimates was the way in which men viewed 
women as possessions. Most of these femicides were the man's attempt to exert control over 
the woman, often as the result of jealousy. There were no cases of a woman killing a partner 
out of jealousy. 115
106 Australian Bureau o f Statistics, Personal Safety Surx’ey Australia (reissue) (2005) 5.
107 Ibid 7.
108 Ibid.
109 Since the age o f 15, o f those men who have been physically assaulted, 65 per cent were assaulted by a 
stranger. Of women who were physically assaulted, 46 per cent were assaulted by a current and/or previous 
partner: ibid 10.
11(1 Alison Wallace, Homicide: the Social Reality (NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 1986) 73.
111 Marie Virueda and Jason Payne, Homicide in Australia: 2007-2008 National Homicide Monitoring Program
Annual Report (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2010) 19.
112
113
Wallace, above n 110. 
Ibid 74.
4 Jenny Mouzos, Homicidal Encounters: A Study o f Homicide in Australia 1989-1999 (Australian Institute of  
Criminology, 2000)115-116. Similarly in Australia in 1999-2000: ‘almost half o f all female victims... were 
killed as a result o f a domestic altercation, jealousy or termination of a relationship’: Jenny Mouzos, Homicide 
in Australia 1999-2000 (Australian Institute o f Criminology, 2001) 5.
115 Kenneth Polk, When Men Kill: Scenarios o f Masculine Violence (Cambridge University Press, 1994) 30. See 
also Kenneth Polk and David Ranson, The Role of Gender in Intimate Homicide' (1991) 24 Australian and New 
Zealand Journal o f Criminology 15, 15.
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An in-depth analysis of 110 adult sexual intimate homicides in NSW and Victoria disclosed 
similar themes. Twenty-one cases out of the 87 cases that involved male offenders were 
characterised by a type of ‘obsessive possessiveness’ and exertion of control or power.116
• • 1 1 7Other international studies confirm these characteristics.
Thus Bean argues that:
control is always the primary warning sign for murder. It is also the number one warning signal for 
violence. Murder is the final irrevocable step, the ultimate expression of men's control over women. 
For some men, the need for control is not satisfied until this irrevocable step is taken.118
Female euthanasia and assisted suicide need to be considered within this context of pervasive 
male violence against women, particularly against intimates. Wolf cautions:
Before we license physicians to kill their patients or to assist patients in killing themselves, we had 
better understand the dynamics at work...We had better understand what distinguishes this from other 
forms of private violence, and other relationships of asymmetrical power that result in the deaths of 
women.119
I would point out, however, that what is remarkable is not what distinguishes female assisted 
death from forms of violence against women. Rather, research points to some striking 
similarities between the broader patterns of male violence against women and at least one 
form of assisted death: mercy killing.
3 Mercy Killing
Mercy killing is typically defined as intentional killing carried out with compassionate 
motives. Frequently, the mercy killers are family or friends of the person killed. A higher
116 Patricia Weiser Easteal, Killing the Beloved: Homicide between Adult Sexual Intimates (Australian Institute 
of Criminology, 1993) 84-85.
117 See, eg, Donald G Dutton and Greg Kerry, 'Modus Operandi and Personality Disorder in Incarcerated 
Spousal Killers' (1999) 22 International Journal o f Law and Psychiatry 287; Jane Koziol-McLain et al, 'Risk 
Factors for Femicide-Suicide in Abusive Relationships: Results From a Multisite Case Control Study' (2006) 21 
Violence and Victims 3; George B Palermo, 'Murder-Suicide - An Extended Suicide' (1994) 38 International 
Journal o f  Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 205.
118 Constance A Bean, Women Murdered by the Men They Love (Haworth Press, 1992) 43.
119 Susan Wolf, 'Gender, Feminism, and Death: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia' in Susan Wolf (ed), 
Feminism and Bioethics: Beyond Reproduction (Oxford University Press, 1996) 282, 284-285.
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incidence of female death is evident in mercy killings. A study of 102 mercy killings in the 
United States between 1960 and 1993 reveals that 65 per cent of the deaths were women.120 
In accordance with the general homicide patterns,121 the majority of those who did the killing
were men, that is 70 per cent. They were most often in a spouse-partner relationship with the
122women they killed.
The gender proportion is consistent with that reported by an Australian study into mercy 
killings123 and by other studies across the world.124 The same pattern is also evident in 
homicide-suicides among the elderly which are commonly regarded as mercy killings 
because the victim, and sometimes the perpetrator, is usually sick and/or disabled. One study 
of four medical examiner districts in Florida uncovered 171 homicide-suicides between 1988 
and 1994. Of these, 58 (34 per cent) were committed by people over 55. Without exception
1 ? 5the perpetrators were men who killed women, most often their wives or female partners.
Similarly, a newspaper surveillance study of homicide-suicides across the United States from 
1997 to 1999 revealed 152 homicide-suicides by older perpetrators, 95.4 per cent of whom 
were men who overwhelmingly killed women, again usually their wives or partners. An 
Australian study of homicide-suicide between sexual intimates discloses a similar incidence
i i l  27pattern among the elderly.
The preponderance of women who die by mercy killing runs contrary to the general homicide 
patterns where men make up the vast majority of homicide victims. Thus while in most
120 Silvia Sara Canetto and Janet Hollenshead, 'Older Women and Mercy Killings' (2001) 42 Omega: Journal o f 
Death and Dying 83, 86.
121 For example, in Australia 2007-2008, 87 per cent of known homicide offenders were men, a consistent 
pattern since data collection began in 1989-1990: Virueda and Payne, above n 111, 25.
122 Canetto and Hollenshead, 'Older Women and Mercy Killings', above n 120, 87.
122 Margaret Otlowski, 'Mercy Killing Cases in the Australian Criminal Justice System' (1993) 17 Criminal Law 
Journal 10, 10.
124 Seena Fazel et al, 'Elderly Homicide in Chicago: a Research Note' (2007) 25 Behavioral Sciences and the 
Law 629; Isabelle M Hunt et al, 'Homicide Convictions in Different Age-Groups: a National Clinical Survey' 
(2010) 21 Journal o f Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology 321.
125 Donna Cohen, Maria Llorente and Carl Eisdorfer, 'Homicide-Suicide in Older Persons' (1998) 155 American 
Journal o f Psychiatry 390, 392.
126 Julie E Malphurs and Donna Cohen, 'A Newspaper Surveillance Study of Homicide-Suicide in the United 
States' (2002) 23 American Journal o f Forensic Medicine and Pathology 142, 147.
127 Weiser Easteal, above n 116, 53.
128 For example, in Australia in 2011, 64 per cent o f murder victims were men: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
Recorded Crime - Victims, Australia, 2011 (2012)
<http://www.abs.gov.aU/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/0FA9FF7C8E9F 17B3CA257A150018FAE0?opendocument
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homicides men are more likely to be the killers and more likely to kill males, when it comes 
to mercy killings, men are significantly more likely to kill a woman than another man.129 Put 
another way, women's experience of mercy killing is overwhelmingly at the hands of men. 
Striking too is the fact that the women killed are almost without exception the spouse or lover 
of the mercy killer. The pattern of mercy killing correlates precisely with the broader pattern 
of women's experience of male violence discussed above: death at the hands of a male 
intimate.
There are other reasons to support my argument that mercy killing is gendered killing. The 
same themes of domination, possessiveness and control that underlie violent crime against 
women are characteristic of mercy killings. Cohen states that about 50 per cent of mercy 
killings among the elderly occur in relationships with a high degree of mutual dependence 
where the man is dominant and fears losing control of his ability to care for his ailing wife. In 
another 20 per cent of cases there is extreme interdependency, one or both are very sick and 
the 'male perpetrator is often the dominant personality and the female victim is often 
submissive.’ The remaining 30 per cent of cases might be characterised as ‘classic’ domestic 
violence. They involve a history of conflict and aggression, commonly precipitated not by 
illness, but by events such as pending or actual separation, or the issuance of a restraining 
order.131
Similarly, the older age perpetrators who killed sick wives or partners in the NSW and 
Victorian study ‘also conformed to a certain extent to the male 'ownership' violence m otif.132 
These men perceived their partner as ‘an integral part’ of themselves.133 Just as the women 
who separated from their partners were no longer willing to play the same role in the 
relationship, the sick women were no longer able to assume their expected role.134
It is important to point out that these homicide-suicides do not necessarily occur with mutual
>; This overrepresentation of men is a consistent finding in the international homicide literature: Virueda and 
Payne, above n 111, 19.
129 Canetto and Hollenshead, 'Older Women and Mercy Killings', above n 120, 88.
130 See, eg, M Rosenbaum, 'Crime and Punishment - the Suicide Pact' (1983) 40 Archives o f General Psychiatry 
979; Martin Brown and Brian Barraclough, 'Partners in Life and in Death: the Suicide Pact in England and 
Wales 1988-1992' (1999) 29 Psychological Medicine 1299; Polk, above n 115.
131 Donna Cohen, 'Homicide-Suicide in Older People' (2000) 17 Psychiatric Times, 49.
132 Weiser Easteal, above n 116,91.
133 Ibid 108.
139
knowledge and consent, as is commonly assumed. In one significant study most of the 
women were shot in their sleep. Almost without exception, these mercy killings were 
involuntary on the part of the woman.135 In the United Kingdom, the Law Reform 
Commission has noted that even in deaths identified as suicide pacts, the man -  usually a 
carer -  takes the initiative and his wife cooperates. In some cases there is an element of 
coercion.136
The research I have presented here defies the very notion of ‘mercy killing’. Rather, it points 
to killings animated by domination, possessiveness and control, redolent of wider cultural 
themes:
Our culture...draws a close connection between men, physical coercion and the legitimate exercise of 
authority, usually in order to exert control over another...Often, this authority is depicted as perfectly 
appropriate...vulnerability to force is nearly always given a female form...Female vulnerability is 
often invoked to strengthen both our sense of male power and the need for its considered use...to 
protect women... Indeed, women seem to play a vital role in the demonstration of male potency...137
The construction of these killings as merciful, the loving deliverance of suffering women -  
against all evidence to the contrary - serves to legitimate the coercive use of male power 
against women.
In sum, mercy killing reflects gendered patterns of violence. First, the incidence and 
demographics of mercy killing match those of masculine violence against women generally. 
Secondly, mercy killings are characterised by the same themes of domination, possessiveness 
and control which animate other killings of women by men. Usually, there is no consent from 
the female victims. There is no research which points to similar correlations with voluntary 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Nonetheless, these insights must challenge the 
theory that women who choose euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are always 
exercising autonomy. We need to ask whether the reasons women decide for assisted death 
are indicative of vulnerability.
135 Donna Cohen, 'An Update on Homicide-Suicide in Older Persons: 1995-2000' (2000) 6 Journal of Mental 
Health and Aging 195, 197.
136 The Law Commission, A New Homicide Act for England and Wales? A Consultation Paper (2005) 213.
137 Ngaire Naffine, Feminism and Criminology (Allen and Unwin, 1997) 146-147.
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D Acquiescence to Gendered Expectations o f Feminine Altruism
Women's decisions for assisted death should also be considered in light of cultural influences 
that idealise femininity in terms of self-effacement and self-sacrifice. Women may choose 
assisted death to spare their loved ones -  especially men -  the burden of care.
1 The Ideal o f Feminine Self-Sacrifice
Canetto and Hollenshead as well as Wolf point to the analysis of Carol Gilligan who
1identified a psychology of self-sacrifice among women.
...while society might affirm publicly the woman’s right to choose for herself, the exercise of such 
choice brings her privately into conflict with the conventions of femininity, particularly the moral 
equation of goodness with self-sacrifice. Although independent assertion in judgment and action is 
considered to be the hallmark of adulthood, it is rather in their care and concern for others that women 
have both judged themselves and been judged.'39
Some critics have claimed that there is little evidence for Gilligan’s theory and have 
questioned her methodology.140 Is the ‘morality of self-abnegation’ distinctively female? 
Some argue that Gilligan has failed ‘to demonstrate a quantitative difference in the proportion 
of the two sexes who show the characteristics in question’.141 However, even some of those 
who question Gilligan’s empirical rigour admit that the stereotype of female self-sacrifice 
resonates strongly:
It is clear that women have a greater reputation for altruism and empathy than do men, and that women 
accept its validity. Whether the reputation is deserved is a more complicated question.142
128 Canetto and Hollenshead, 'Gender and Physician-Assisted Suicide: An Analysis of the Kevorkian Cases, 
1990-1997', above n 78, 187; Wolf, above n 119, 289.
139 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory' and Women’s Development (Harvard University 
Press, 1982) 70.
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Jeanne Larrabee (ed), An Ethic o f Care, Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Routledge 1993) 3, 5; 
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141 Catherine G Greeno and Eleanor E Maccoby, 'How Different Is the "Different Voice?' in Mary Jeanne 
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The qualities of self-effacement and self-sacrifice also characterise the ‘good woman’ of legal 
discourse, according to Naffine:
She is loyal and loving, compliant and altruistic ... good women can be distinguished by their 
abandonment of their own interests and their overriding concern for the interests of family members.143
This ideal of female self-sacrifice finds expression in the Western cultural tradition. An 
analysis of Greek tragedy demonstrates that suicide is portrayed as a uniquely female 
solution, an expression of self-sacrificing devotion to loved ones. According to Loraux, wives 
decide for suicide in these tragedies to join men in death. Very few men die in this way. 144 
Other historical sources confirm this practice in the Greek and Roman worlds. Women -  
inferiors subjected to ‘oppressive social forces’ -  are the only documented cases of spouses 
who suicide after the death of their loved one. 145 Alcestis, who gave her life in place of her 
husband’s to ensure the continuation of his house, became an icon for other women whose 
epitaphs attest to their self-sacrifice at her inspiration. 146 The theme of the self-sacrificing 
loyal wife was so familiar that it was used in the training of young orators. 147Young women
1 4Rwho were virgins were also sacrificed and the person putting them to death had to be male.
The ideal of feminine self-sacrifice also appears in non-Westem cultures. Biggs highlights 
the Inuit and Cheyenne of North America who would abandon elderly or sick women no 
longer able to perform their assigned caregiver roles. 144 Lester points to the Indian practice of 
suttee where a widow was expected to die on her husband’s funeral pyre, 150 thus guaranteeing 
the woman, her husband and seven generations of her family direct access to heaven. 151 In 
Kaliai, New Britain and New Guinea, elderly widows of deceased tribal leaders were killed at
143 Ngaire Naffine, Law and the Sexes: Explorations in Feminist Jurisprudence (Allen & Unwin, 1990) 137. See 
also Pat Carlen and Anne Worrall (eds), Gender, Crime and Justice (Open University Press, 1987) 3.
144 Nicole Loraux, Tragic Ways o f Killing a Woman (Anthony Forster trans, Harvard University Press, 1987) 8. 
See also Anton van Hooff, 'Paetus, It Does Not Hurt: Altruistic Suicide in the Greco-Roman World' (2004) 8 
Archives o f Suicide Research 43; Steven Stack, 'Emile Durkheim and Altruistic Suicide' (2004) 8 Archives o f 
Suicide Research 9, 12.
145 van Hooff, above n 144, 49-50.
146 Ibid 55.
147 Ibid 49.
I4S Loraux, above n 144, 12.
I4g Men might also be abandoned if  they had broken the law, for example: Hazel Biggs, 'I Don’t Want To Be a 
Burden! A Feminist Reflects on Women’s Experiences of Death and Dying' in Sally Sheldon and Michael 
Thomson (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Health Care Law (Cavendish Publishing, 1998) 279, 288-289.
150 David Lester, 'Assisted Suicide and the Elderly' in David Lester and Margot Tallmer (eds), Now I Lay Me
Down: Suicide in the Elderly (Charles Press, 1993) 232, 232-233.
151 Lakshmi Vijayakumar, 'Altruistic Suicide in India' (2004) 8 Archives o f Suicide Research 73, 77.
142
152their own request, often by their son. Lester comments:
...rather than seeing such an act as having been willingly chosen by an autonomous person, it is 
possible to interpret this behaviour as the result o f extreme conformity to sexist oppression...While 
widow-suicide has been a cultural practice, there has been no custom o f widower-suicide.153
There are indications that a psychology of self-sacrifice and the fear of being a burden 
influence some patients in their decisions for assisted death. As outlined in chapter 4, there is 
extensive evidence that concerns about burdening family and carers are a significant 
motivator of the desire for death. However, in my interview study no interviewee agreed that 
the fear of being a burden weighed more heavily on women. Robyn Kelly, a social worker at 
the Chronic Care Unit, observed that women ‘express openly more their fear of being ... The 
men I think are quieter about it and frightened but ... I don't necessarily think they don’t feel 
it. I just don’t think they’re as overt about it.’154
Nor do the empirical studies about being a burden which I referred to in chapter 4 indicate to 
what extent this is a concern of men or a concern of women. But if self-sacrifice is perceived 
as a particularly feminine virtue, we might expect a strong female identification with these 
attitudes. This was evident in one interview study about attitudes towards life-prolonging 
treatment where elderly women were twice as likely as elderly men to oppose using 
technology to extend their lives. The researchers observed that ‘[mjore older women voiced 
‘other-oriented’ reasons for their opposition, particularly not wanting to be a burden on 
others. Older men’s attitudes were primarily ‘self-oriented’, reflecting a concern to stay alive 
for as long as possible, with fewer expressing concern about consequences for others.’155 
Underlying these gender differences was women’s involvement in caregiving.156 After a life 
time of caring for others, women may be unwilling to accept the role reversal that comes with 
their own serious illness.
... those women who feel they have nothing left to offer society once they are no longer required to 
care for others can experience a desire to withdraw from society in order to avoid becoming a burden
152 Lester, above n 150, 232-233.
153 Ibid 233.
154 Interview with Robyn Kelly (10 December 2007).
155 Sara Arber et al, 'Understanding Gender Differences in Older People's Attitudes towards Life-Prolonging 
Medical Technologies' (2008) 22 Journal o f Aging Studies 366, 366.
156 Ibid 373.
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when they need to be cared for themselves. This desire may be satisfied if euthanasia were readily 
available.157
The fear of being a burden was a prominent reason for deciding for death amongst Dr 
Kevorkian’s suicides that were dominated by women. Ten patients (or 13 per cent) 
‘anticipated, did not want to, and/or could not afford to be dependent on others’.158 Of these 
10 patients, eight were women.159 This ethic of self-sacrifice is encapsulated by the 
comments of a friend of one of the suicides: ‘She felt it was a gift to her family, sparing them 
the burden of taking care of her.’160
2 Male Caregivers and Depression
Women’s concerns about the caregiving burden are not unfounded. For some men, caregiving 
responsibilities are so overwhelming that they precipitate the homicide of female patients, 
particularly among the elderly. In one study of homicide-suicide among the over 55’s, 
approximately half of the male perpetrators were caregivers. In comparison, only 13 per cent 
of age-matched married men who committed suicide (and not homicide) fulfilled the 
caregiving role.161 Similarly, a newspaper surveillance study of homicide-suicides across the 
United States from 1997 to 1999 found that 31.6 per cent of older perpetrators were 
caregivers. However, only 2 per cent of younger perpetrators in this study were caregivers, 
impending divorce or separation being the key co-factors. In other studies, physical ill 
health is also an important associative factor among the elderly.163
The burden of caregiving is closely linked to another co-factor: depression. At least half of 
the perpetrators in a Florida study of homicide-suicide had undiagnosed and untreated 
psychiatric problems.164 Another Florida study of 20 spousal homicide-suicides among the 
elderly found that 65 per cent of the perpetrators (all men) were reported to have had
157 Biggs, above n 149, 289. See a similar argument in Kohm and Brigner, above n 97, 260-261.
Canetto and Hollenshead, 'Gender and Physician-Assisted Suicide: An Analysis of the Kevorkian Cases, 
1990-1997', above n 78, 179.
159 Ibid 178, table 4.
160 Ibid 180.
161 Cohen, 'Homicide-Suicide in Older People', above n 131.
162 Malphurs and Cohen, above n 126, 147. A similar pattern is evident in another study, Julie E Malphurs and 
Donna Cohen, 'A Statewide Case-Control Study of Spousal Homicide-Suicide in Older Persons' (2005) 13 
American Journal o f Geriatric Psychiatry 211,213.
107 See, eg, C M Milroy, Magdalene Dratsas and D L Ranson, 'Homicide-Suicide in Victoria, Australia' (1997) 
18 American Journal o f Forensic Medicine and Pathology 369, 369.
164 Cohen, Llorente and Eisdorfer, above n 125,393.
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depressed mood before their death.165 The authors point out:
Elevated risks for depression have long been associated with the care giving role, and husbands who 
care for their wives have shown evidence of increased marital stress, reduced psychological well-being, 
and increased levels o f depression.166
Depression was also a significant factor in the homicide-suicides of older aged sexual 
intimates in the NSW and Victorian study.
... the final tragic act seemed to be generated out of feelings of depression and the inability to accept an 
almost complete role reversal in the marriage: the former nurturer wife requiring full-time care and no 
longer able to take care of the husband.167
The impact of caregiving responsibilities on men is underscored by the fact that ‘there were 
no homicides committed by older women in similar situations’. A United States study of 
homicide-suicides of dependent elderly confirms the role of male caregiver stress in these 
deaths: 83 per cent of victims were women and 70 per cent were killed by spouse or intimate 
partner.160 Many of these homicide-suicides were prompted by the caregiver’s inability to 
continue in the caregiving role due to a recent diagnosis of their own or deterioration of a 
chronic condition. Other motivations included jealousy, job loss, mental health problems and 
threatened separation.170
With this evidence that the caregiving burden and associated depression (often unrecognised 
or untreated) can trigger the homicide of women patients, we must consider whether the same 
forces might influence women’s seemingly autonomous choices of assisted death. For some 
women, their experience of the male caregiver’s stress could reinforce the psychology of self- 
sacrifice identified above and at least partly explain their decisions for assisted death. In this 
context decisions for assisted death might be less about autonomy and more about 
vulnerability, the pressure of caregiving, and acquiescence to gendered expectations of
165 Malphurs and Cohen, ‘A Statewide Case-Control Study of Spousal Homicide-Suicide in Older Persons’, 
above n 162, 213.
166 Ibid 215.
167 Weiser Easteal, above n 116, 101.
168 Ibid 91.
169 Debra Karch and Kelly Cole Nunn, 'Characteristics o f Elderly and Other Vulnerable Adult Victims of 
Homicide by a Caregiver: National Violent Death Reporting System - 17 US States, 2003-2007' (2011) 26 
Journal o f Interpersonal Violence 137, 148.
170 Ibid 150-151.
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feminine altruism.
E Assisted Death Is a ‘Feminine ’ Way to Suicide
Another possible reason for women’s choice of assisted death is that the submissiveness and 
passivity of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide reflect social expectations of 
femininity.
1 Social Acceptability o f ‘Passive, Compliant’ Female Suicides
Suicidologists suggest that the incidence of different types of suicidal acts is influenced by 
their social and cultural acceptability.171 For example, non-fatal suicidal behaviour is most 
acceptable and most common in young women; fatal suicidal behaviour is most permissible
172and most frequent in elderly males.
Overall, fatal (self-inflicted) suicidal behaviour in females is socially less acceptable than 
fatal suicidal behaviour in males and is less common.173 Men are expected to be ‘tough and 
strong’ and tend to choose more violent methods of suicide which can be perceived as an act 
of self-mastery.174 In contrast, self-inflicted suicide subverts cultural stereotypes of 
femininity:
... women who take their own lives ... may be perceived negatively because, by taking ownership of 
their body and control o f their destiny, they challenge the assumption of femininity as passive and 
compliant.175
This is supported by the observations of some feminist theorists that men are typically 
identified with active characteristics and behaviours (tenacity, aggression, competitiveness) 
and women with passive (obedience, responsiveness to approval, kindness, submission,
171 See Canetto, above n 94, 225.
1 2 Ibid 226. See also Herbert Hendin, Suicide in America (W W Norton, 1982) quoted in Howard I Kushner, 
'Women and Suicide in Historical Perspective' in Joyce McCarl Nielsen (ed), Feminist Research Methods 
(Westview Press, 1990) 193, 201.
173 Canetto, above n 94, 226.
174 Sarah Payne, Viren Swami and Debbi L Stanistreet, 'The Social Construction of Gender and its Influence on 
Suicide: A Review o f the Literature' (2008) 5 Journal o f Men's Health 23, 27.
175 Canetto, above n 94, 225.
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1 7  A
willingness to be led), reinforcing male power and female submission. Thus one
explanation of women’s reasons for favouring euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide is 
that these methods make suicidal death appear ‘passive and compliant’ and therefore
177compatible with cultural stereotypes of femininity.
There is some evidence to support this explanation. First, as I discussed earlier, empirical 
data suggests certain gendered patterns in women’s preferences about methods for assisted 
death. Physician-assisted suicide is more likely to be chosen by men than women. Women 
demonstrate a stronger preference for the more passive method of euthanasia. Similarly, in 
the Kevorkian deaths, women strongly preferred the more passive, structured method of death 
by lethal injection.
The incidence of female self-inflicted suicide compared with the incidence of female assisted 
death also supports the explanation. In self-inflicted suicides the people killing themselves 
must assume an active role. The vast majority of these suicides are men. Thus in the United
1 *70
States, for example, women are less likely to kill themselves than men by a ratio of 1:4. 
This ratio has remained constant since 1989 and ‘is consistent with international patterns, 
with the exception of rural China’.174 If this ratio is considered against the data I outlined 
earlier about the incidence of assisted death among women in the Netherlands and Oregon, it 
is apparent that when assisted death is legal, there is a disproportionate increase in the 
number of women who end their lives by this method. Indeed, the incidence of assisted death 
by women in the Netherlands, Oregon and elsewhere is nearly four times that of female self- 
inflicted suicide in the United States. It is clear that increasing numbers of women decide to 
die when offered the more passive options of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide.
There is also the observation which I noted earlier that the assisted deaths that receive 
prominent media exposure are predominantly women. Canetto and Hollenshead point to pro­
euthanasia literature that most often uses women as models or case studies of assisted
176 See, eg, Hester Eisenstein, Contemporary Feminist Thought (G K Hall, 1983) quoted in Rosemarie Putnam 
Tong, Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction (Westview Press, 2nd ed, 1998) 49; Rowland and 
Klein, above n 100, 278.
177 Canetto, above n 94, 227.
178 Canetto and Hollenshead, 'Gender and Physician-Assisted Suicide: An Analysis of the Kevorkian Cases, 
1990-1997’, above n 78, 182. See also Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, above n 91, 56; Australian 
Bureau o f Statistics, above n 91.
I7) L H Chaudron and E D Caine, 'Suicide among Women: A Critical Review' (2004) 59 Journal o f the 
American Medical Women’s Association 125, 126.
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death.180 W olf argues:
...even while we debate physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia rationally, we may be animated by 
unacknowledged images that give the practices a certain gendered logic and felt correctness.181
The studies analysed here challenge the notion that women’s decisions for assisted death are 
unambiguous expressions o f autonomy and choice. The decisions for death of some women 
could reflect the influence of socio-cultural forces that uphold a perception of femininity as 
passive and compliant, a stereotype that reinforces gendered power differentials.
2 Assisted Death ‘Plays Out’ Male Dominance and Female Subjugation
Women’s experience of power imbalance and gender domination could be ‘played out’ in a 
clinical relationship and explain the choice of assisted death. W olf points to the paternalism 
which still pervades the medical profession and has a particular impact on female patients:
When the patient is female and the doctor male, as is true in most medical encounters, the problem is 
likely to be exacerbated by the background realities and history of male dominance and female 
subjugation in the broader society.182
Thus a male physician’s own cooperation with a woman’s request for death might reflect 
entrenched gender roles. His assessment o f the meaninglessness or burden of her life might 
be influenced by the same sexism that could have influenced her request in the first place.
There is evidence that the attitudes of doctors can and do influence their patients’ preferences 
in end-of-life decisions and even their patients’ suicides. Miles refers to several studies 
demonstrating that doctors underestimate the quality of a patient’s life compared with the 
patient’s perception. Largely on this basis doctors wrongly infer that such patients would 
decide to abstain from life- prolonging interventions.183 Miles concludes that there is support 
for concerns that ‘a patient’s suicidal decision can at least partly arise in response to a 
physician’s need for release from a painful clinical relationship, rather than as an independent
180 Canetto and Hollenshead, 'Older Women and Mercy Killings', above n 120, 95-96.
181 Wolf, above n 119, 289. But see Kaplan, Harrow and Schneiderhan, above n 57, 40.
182 Wolf, above n 119, 293.
183 Steven Miles, 'Physicians and Their Patients' Suicides' (1994) 271 Journal o f the American Medical 
Association 1786.
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i * l  84patient’s choice.’ Similarly, an Australian study of 252 doctor-patient relationships found 
that ‘an attitude that conveys endorsement of the wish to hasten death on the part of the 
doctor may facilitate that stance on the part of the patient’.185
Again, women’s preferences for more structured, passive deaths at the hands of their male 
physicians could be evidence of gender dynamics at play. Is there a sense that dying in such a 
way is more ‘feminine’ and deferential, more befitting of a woman’s gender role and the 
gender role of her (more often than not) male physician? One commentator has observed that 
‘[t]he fatal attraction for the women who used the Kevorkian techniques ... is that it offered 
them a passive way to end their life with the approval of a paternalistic figure.’186
F Women Have Limited Access to Health Care
Canetto and Hollenshead argue that women’s decisions for assisted death are influenced by 
their entrenched social and economic disadvantage that limits their options for care.
Women enter mid-to late-adulthood, the time when decisions about hastened death are most likely to 
occur, with vastly different personal, social and economic resources than men...older women are more 
likely than older men to suffer from disabling chronic diseases...older women are more likely to be 
poor, widowed, live alone, and to have limited access to...family care...As a result, they may be more 
likely to see themselves, and/or be seen by others, as appropriate candidates for a hastened death.187
There is evidence that care assistance is less available to women:
Women provide most of the care that is given to dying patients, although women who need care tend to 
receive less assistance from family members than men, and are more likely to have to pay for 
assistance even if married...Wives are only one third as likely as husbands to report their spouses as
. 1 gg
caregivers...
184 Ibid 1786.
185 Brian J Kelly et al, 'Association between Clinician Factors and a Patient's Wish to Hasten Death: Terminally 
111 Cancer Patients and their Doctors' (2004) 45 Psychosomatics 311,317.
18(1 H M Bratt, 'Passive Way to End Life Lures Women', The Detroit Free Press (Detroit), 25 October 1991, 
quoted in Canetto and Hollenshead, 'Gender and Physician-Assisted Suicide: An Analysis of the Kevorkian 
Cases, 1990-1997', above n 78, 193.
187 Canetto and Hollenshead, 'Gender and Physician-Assisted Suicide: An Analysis of the Kevorkian Cases, 
1990-1997’, above n 78, 186.
188 Roscoe et al, ‘A Comparison of Characteristics of Kevorkian Euthanasia Cases and Physician-Assisted 
Suicides in Oregon’, above n 98, 444.
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There are indications that economic disadvantage does influence decisions at the end-of-life, 
with one report stating that in 7.9 per cent of actual cases of euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide in the United States financial burden was a ‘core motive’. Such economic 
disadvantage falls disproportionately upon women. The suggestion is that some ‘choices’ for 
assisted death may be influenced by lack of choice.
There are also indications that women do have less access to health care than men. For 
example, a number of studies show that in the United States women receive fewer cardiac 
treatments and procedures than men and have worse outcomes.190 Women are also more 
likely than men to suffer inadequate pain control.191
However, other studies go against this explanation for female assisted death: ‘[o]n average, 
women visit physicians more frequently, use more preventative and curative drugs, are more 
likely to have a regular doctor and undergo general medical check-ups than men.’ “ In 
Europe, women generally make greater use of health services than men, particularly primary 
care.193 Some studies indicate that low class position and low income are more determinative 
of inequalities in health than gender.194
189 Ezekiel Emanuel et al, above n 75, 510.
190 See, eg, Antonio Reina et al, ‘Gender Differences in Management and Outcomes of Patients with Acute 
Myocardial Infarction’ (2007) 116 International Journal o f Cardiology 389; see also studies cited in Roscoe et 
al, ‘A Comparison of Characteristics o f Kevorkian Euthanasia Cases and Physician-Assisted Suicides in 
Oregon’, above n 98, 444.
191 See, eg, Roger B Fillingim et al, 'Sex, Gender, and Pain: A Review of Recent Clinical and Experimental 
Findings' (2009) 10 Journal o f  Pain 447. See also Kohm and Brigner, above n 97, 259-260.
192 Jamila Bookwala et al, 'Gender Differences In Older Adults' Preferences for Life-Sustaining Medical 
Treatments and End-Of-Life Values' (2001) 25 Death Studies 127, 129.
193 Sarah Payne, How Can Gender Equity Be Addressed through Health Systems? (World Health Organization, 
2009).
194 Emily McFadden et al, 'Social Inequalities in Self-Rated Health by Age: Cross-Sectional Study of 22,457 
Middle-Aged Men and Women' (2008) 8: 230 BMC Public Health, 1.
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VII CONCLUSION
If vulnerability is ‘measured’ simply in quantitative terms, there is currently no strong 
evidence that vulnerable populations including women disproportionately decide for 
euthanasia and assisted suicide. Looking beyond the Netherlands and Oregon, there are a few 
studies that show more women than men choose assisted death. This requires explanation.
However, the incidence of assisted death in vulnerable groups is not the only relevant factor. 
The case study of women as a vulnerable population presented in this chapter highlights the 
risk that features of a patient’s context could operate as ‘controlling influences’ that 
undermine the autonomy of their decision for death. I have examined some of the possible 
reasons for women’s decisions for assisted death. The available evidence for these 
explanations is complex and often conflicting. The explanation that women are particularly 
concerned about self-determination in death is undermined by the evidence of their more 
negative attitudes towards assisted death than men. Nor does the fact that women tend to live 
longer, suffer more disease, disability and isolation than men seem to explain women’s 
motivation for assisted death.
The other explanations for female assisted death are indicative of vulnerability and point to 
oppressive dimensions of women’s socio-cultural context. Criminological studies identify 
themes of male domination, possessiveness, control and female subordination in patterns of 
violence against women. I have suggested a striking correlation with so called ‘mercy 
killings’. This should lead us to question whether the same gender dynamics explain the 
decisions of some women for assisted death.
Another explanation highlights the ideal of feminine self-sacrifice that is strongly embedded 
in Western and some non-Western cultures. The high profile given to female assisted death 
could be a reflection of the same oppressive stereotype. This explanation also finds support in 
the evidence that a psychology of self-sacrifice and the fear of being a burden do influence 
some patients in their decisions for assisted death. Evidence that stress and depression in 
male caregivers precipitates the homicide of female patients suggests that the same influences 
might motivate some women to choose assisted death.
The data consistently show that women demonstrate a preference for more structured, passive
151
methods of suicide. One explanation might be that euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide 
are consonant with cultural stereotypes of women as passive and compliant and play out 
gender expectations of subordination and dominance. And if there is evidence that the gender 
dynamics between a female patient and male physician influence women’s decisions about 
methods of assisted death, then they are likely to have some influence over the decision for 
assisted death in the first place. Finally, there is good evidence that women’s relative social 
and economic disadvantage could influence their decision for death, although some evidence 
also points to the contrary.
However, the review of evidence provided here points to a sizeable gap in the research and 
thus no firmer conclusions can be drawn. There is at least preliminary evidence to challenge 
the theory that these deaths are simply expressions of free choice. For some women assisted 
death might not demonstrate their autonomy, but their vulnerability and acquiescence to 
controlling influences. Similar dynamics could influence the decisions of other populations 
such as the elderly, the poor or racial minorities, even if they do not die in disproportionate 
numbers. However, we need more research.
Given the limitations of the common law highlighted in Part III, one issue raised by this 
chapter is whether autonomy at the end of life -  particularly for vulnerable patients — is more 
effectively protected if voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are legal, rather 
than subject to criminal prohibition. Chapters 8 and 9 will take up this critical question. In the 
next chapter I return to the findings of my qualitative research at the Chronic Care Unit and 
describe the institutional culture that facilitates the practice of illicit euthanasia. What are the 
implications for patient autonomy?
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6Risky Business: The Organisational Culture That 
Facilitates Underground Euthanasia
I INTRODUCTION
In chapters 2 and 3 I argued that certain practices at the Chronic Care Unit may amount to 
euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide: first, the use of pain relieving drugs with the 
intention to cause death; and secondly, the facilitation of a patient’s refusal of treatment, 
knowing the patient’s intent was suicidal. Magnusson points out that ‘the shared nature of 
institutional care, and the need to justify one’s actions to colleagues, creates a significant 
disincentive to euthanasia in hospital.’1 23There are serious legal and professional risks for 
healthcare workers who choose to engage in these criminal activities. How do they ‘get away 
with it?’ This chapter examines the organisational culture that facilitates what may amount to 
the illicit practice of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide within the Chronic Care Unit.
The significance of culture to an organisation’s performance is widely taken for granted and 
there is some evidence to demonstrate its impact on the delivery of health care. 
Organisational culture has been defined as the ‘values, norms, and patterns of action that 
characterize social relationships within a formal organization.’ Others highlight the 
significance of leadership, communication, team work and conflict resolution.4 More broadly, 
Scott et al, referring to organisational culture within health care institutions, state that it 
includes ‘characteristic ideologies, language, dress codes, behaviour patterns, signs of status 
and authority, modes of deference and misbehaviour, rituals, myths and stories, prevailing 
beliefs, values, unspoken assumptions ...’5
1 Roger S Magnusson, Angels o f Death: Exploring the Euthanasia Underground (Melbourne University Press, 
2002)191.
2 Huw T O Davies, Sandra M Nutley and Russell Mannion, 'Organisational Culture and Quality of Health Care' 
(2000) 9 Quality in Health Care 111, 114.
3 John Scott and Gordon Marshall, A Dictionary o f Sociology Oxford Reference Online (Oxford University 
Press, 2009) http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t88.el632.
4 Peter Dodek, Naomi E Cahill and Daren K Heyland, 'The Relationship Between Organizational Culture and 
Implementation o f Clinical Practice Guidelines: A Narrative Review' (2010 ) 34 Journal o f Parenteral and 
Enteral Nutrition 669, 670.
5 Tim Scott et al, Healthcare Performance and Organisational Culture (Radcliffe Medical Press, 2003) 1.
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My interviews disclosed four key features of the organisational culture which facilitated 
practices that may amount to assisted death within the Chronic Care Unit. First, in part II, I 
examine the influential role of Dr Blackburn, a passionate patient advocate and dissident. 
Second, in part III I explain the absence of a shared ethic of care which allowed the co­
existence of seriously divergent values within the Unit. Third, in part IV, I analyse the risk 
management strategies which safeguarded against the ever present threat of exposure. Finally, 
the Unit displayed a culture of silence where colleagues adopted a practice of ‘don’t ask, 
don’t tell’. In part V I argue that some unspoken and unfounded assumptions about patients’ 
desire for an intentionally hastened death suggest the possibility that some of the end-of-life 
practices at the Unit were not always consensual.
II DR BLACKBURN
A Advocate and Dissident
Key to explaining clinical practices that may amount to assisted death within the Chronic 
Care Unit was the person of Dr Blackburn, a senior clinician at the Unit. His active and vocal 
support for assisted death and defiant individualism accords with Magnusson’s profile of the 
so called revisionist practitioners of illicit euthanasia.6 My interviews disclosed a passionate 
patient advocate and a dissident.
Although well respected by colleagues, these characteristics can set Dr Blackburn apart from 
others in the medical profession. He referred to another hospital where the MND patients are 
not given the option of non-invasive ventilation, arguing the doctors ‘come from the 
viewpoint that you’re going to die anyway, why live longer? Better that you die sooner ... I 
think it’s atrocious. It’s atrocious ... It’s outrageous.'7 There was a sense that Dr Blackburn’s 
commitment to MND patients made him a loner within his professional field: ‘My colleagues 
refer patients with MND to me and you don’t see them for dust. They don’t want to know 
anything. They hate the field. They hate the field.’8
Dr Blackburn described in graphic terms how his loyalty and commitment took a toll on him
6 Magnusson, above n 1, 104.
1 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
8 Ibid.
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not so much as a doctor, but as a person:
You know every time you help someone to die it takes something out of you. It’s not something that 
helps you.... you get to know these people intimately and their families over months and years. So it’s a 
sad, sad disease. It’s a sad disease to hold the hand of a 33 year old woman with a 2 year old son dying 
in front of you. It’s a sad thing to watch. ... you’re sad at everyone’s passing because all of these people 
are tremendously courageous ... Seeing young people die. A traumatic field. It’s not a job that many 
people can do for a long time.9
In common with Magnusson’s revisionists, Dr Blackburn was also dismissive of legal norms 
and authority. ‘One could very well describe what I do as murder. But we’re all going to 
die. ’ 10 While on balance he believed that euthanasia should be legalised, it was clear that he 
trusted in his own clinical judgment more than any standards conceived by a parliament: ‘It’s 
very uncommon for law that’s made up by politicians to get it right. ' * 11 When he considered 
the prospect of being prosecuted, Dr Blackburn was equally scornful of the judiciary: ‘I 
shouldn’t say something scurrilous, but needless to say I do not have a very high opinion of 
the quality of the judges that are currently sitting in the state courts. ’ 12
B Criteria for Involvement in Euthanasia
As Magnusson observes, a ‘consequence of revising one’s perceptions of the professional 
role is the need to articulate criteria for involvement in euthanasia.’ Similar to the 
revisionists in Magnusson’s study, Dr Blackburn could ‘do so with only a low level of 
finesse. ’ 14 ‘It’s like fishing,’ he told me. ‘You strike with the bait when you’ve got the right 
combination of circumstances. ’ 15 However, he was unable clearly and consistently to define 
those circumstances.
As Dr Blackburn described it, his professional role was rooted in loyalty to his patients and a 
commitment to their comfort at the end of life. ‘The driver for me is that the person who is in 
a dire situation and is uncomfortable and wants some relief finally gets to die in comfort....
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Magnusson, above n 1, 105.
14 Ibid 105-106.
15 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
155
every single patient knows that if that is what they want us to do, we will do that.’16 But 
despite this emphasis on patient autonomy, a patient’s request was not always a sufficient 
criterion for Dr Blackburn to assist the death of that patient.
I asked Dr Blackburn to consider a hypothetical situation: a patient in the early stage of 
MND, who had no current disability, asks him for a hastened death. Fully informed of her 
prognosis, the hypothetical patient does not want to live a life without control and desires to 
end her life before the inevitable decline. Dr Blackburn said he would refuse the patient 
because in the absence of disability or poor quality of life, such a request was ‘suicidal’. I 
asked him how that hypothetical was different from the case of Joshua, whose death was 
assisted by Dr Blackburn, as I described in chapter 2.
KG: Why’s that [hypothetical] patient suicidal and Joshua wasn’t?
TB: Well they don’t have a disability. Joshua couldn’t talk, he was losing his writing, he was
bed bound, his kids were ... wiping up his shit.
KG: But [the hypothetical patient has] a terminal illness which will inevitably...
TB: [interrupting] We’re all terminal.17
This suggests that Dr Blackburn believes that intentionally hastening death is acceptable if 
the patient’s quality of life is seriously compromised. Yet in some cases of grave disability, 
Dr Blackburn refused to facilitate death. He referred to one patient who had a radical 
tracheotomy performed prior to coming under his care. ‘Now it is a pretty disastrous story,’ 
Dr Blackburn said, ‘but she lived another four years. The last two years of her life she would
# i o
plead with me to let her die.’ Even with her disability and persistent requests to withdraw 
the invasive ventilation, Dr Blackburn refused. This is despite the fact that, as I explained in 
chapter 3, a patient has no ethical or legal duty to continue treatment which the patient 
considers burdensome, even if withdrawal hastens death. Dr Blackburn, however, believed 
that withdrawing the treatment would expose him to criminal liability because the patient’s 
father did not support the withdrawal.
Dr Blackburn’s assessment of depression as a relevant criterion for involvement in euthanasia 
was arbitrary and inconsistent. As I discussed more fully in chapter 4, Dr Blackburn played
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
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down the significance of depression as a motivator for the desire for euthanasia. Despite his 
lack of psychiatric qualifications, he was very confident in his ability to discern patients 
requiring specialist intervention. Joshua, for example, did not have a ‘major depression' but 
was just ‘sad’ and this was no obstacle to a hastened death. Yet, Dr Blackburn assessed Isabel 
as having ‘significant depression’ and refused her request to die.19
Another, unnamed patient, Dr Blackburn assessed as having ‘major depression’ because ‘he 
was getting no pleasure out of anything, could not see the point of doing anything. ... 
everything was useless, futile.’
KG: How do you distinguish an outlook like that from that of say Melanie who also didn’t want to live 
anymore?
TB: Oh, in her last couple o f weeks. Other than that she was, you know, hooked into the art
community ... still ran this amazing community art unit.20
Thus towards the end of her life, Melanie may have exhibited signs of depression but in her 
case this did not preclude an intentionally hastened death. I asked Dr Blackburn, ‘When do 
you decide for a psychiatrist to intervene?’ ‘Judgment,’ was his answer.
Yet even for the most significant of judgments -  would he intentionally cause the death of a 
patient who is no longer competent or conscious? -  there were no stable conditions. Initially, 
Dr Blackburn replied to this question with a firm ‘I wouldn’t do it.’ But then, with a 
wavering confidence in his own intuition, he added, ‘Not unless I knew what was going on in 
their head.’22
C Navigator
Dr Blackburn saw himself as a leader and guide to his patients: ‘I’ve walked down the path of 
MND although the path varies hundreds of times. The person I’m talking to has never seen it 
before. You can’t just give them an audio guide book and say “look after yourself.” You have 
to be a navigator.’“
19
20 
21 
22 
23
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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He described a similar relationship with the families of patients: ‘I [talk] about navigating by 
saying “look, my judgment is [this] and what you want me to do is to tell you what I think is 
the best direction to go and have confidence that I’ll look after your loved one ...”’24 Thus it 
was clear that while as navigator he negotiated consensus in decision making, at the same 
time he steered a firm course through the trajectory of the patient’s illness.
This was a view of leadership shared by respiratory specialist, Dr Evans. Although he 
recognised the patient and the family as central to the decision making process, he was candid 
in identifying where the real authority lay. ‘It’s actually our decision. And we just like them
25to feel like they are making the decision. But they’re not.’^
Dr Blackburn explained how he used this resolute style of leadership to manage potential 
opposition by Unit staff. Again, he used the metaphor of navigator:
Like my sister who lived in Manhattan for many years. She used to go to many places in Manhattan that 
I wouldn’t go and she used to say, “No, you just have to believe and portray that you are dealing from 
strength, not from weakness.” I think that in a similar vein, when you are being a navigator you say, 
“This is [where] we’re heading. This is what we do.”26
D Deference
While Dr Blackburn expressed confidence that ‘[e]veryone knows that if they ever had any 
reservations or weren’t happy, they just have to stick their hand up’,27 there was evidence that 
his decisive, ‘navigator’ leadership style discourages junior medical staff and nurses from 
questioning his clinical judgment. Although the interviews did indicate a level of collegiality 
in Dr Blackburn’s relations with the staff, their dealings were not always frank and open. As I 
will describe in chapter 7, some of the junior medical and nursing staff did mount a challenge 
to Dr Blackburn’s end-of-life practices. However, this was exceptional and they did not 
confront him personally. When someone does question his practices, Dr Blackburn had 
specific risk management techniques to dilute the dissent, as I explain in the next section.
24 Ibid.
2:1 Interview with Paul Evans (18 December 2007).
26 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
27 Ibid.
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Although Dr Blackburn referred to the Unit as a ‘team’, a hierarchy was still evident. The 
subservient position of nurses in health care has long been noted. Nurses describe distress 
at their lack of impact in end-of-life decision making, feelings of inferiority and hospital 
cultures and policies that reinforce their subordinate position.30 They report a lack of power 
relative to physicians in decision making, a lack of professional respect and a ‘silenced voice’ 
which constrains them from equal participation in patient care? 1 An example, as I explain 
below, is Dr Blackburn’s ‘deflection’ of the nurse who challenged his excessive 
administration of pain relief to a patient.
The difficulties of questioning the decisions of senior consultants like Dr Blackburn can also 
be an issue for junior medical staff. One study noted that ‘the influence of their consultants on 
their future career affects good communication in that [junior doctors] feel unable to 
challenge them. ’ 32 Respiratory registrar Dr Simone Sanger, for example, had ‘been in 
situations where doctors ... like consultants have started at a higher dose [of pain relief] 
which I’ve been a little bit uncomfortable with.’ When I asked why she thought these more 
senior physicians began at higher doses than she would judge necessary, her answer 
suggested a degree of deference to their authority: ‘I put it down to experience. ’34 Did she 
think the higher dose was given to hasten death? ‘I’d like to think not.’ While it can be 
entirely appropriate to rely on expert guidance from more experienced colleagues, in some 
circumstances this could mask a form of complicity. I argue that this ‘leading from the 
front’ ,36 as Dr Blackburn describes his ‘navigator’ leadership style, has reinforced a culture of 
deference where questionable practices are less likely to be scrutinised and challenged.
2X See, eg, Helga Kuhse, Caring: Nurses, Women and Ethics (Blackwell Publishers, 1997); Amy M Haddad,
The Nurse/Physician Relationship and Ethical Decision Making' (1991) 53 AORN Journal 151.
29 Ann B Hamric and Leslie J Blackhall, 'Nurse-Physician Perspectives on the Care of Dying Patients in 
Intensive Care Units: Collaboration, Moral Distress, and Ethical Climate' (2007) 35 Critical Care Medicine 422, 
426.
30 Theodora Sirota, 'Nurse/Physician Relationships Survey Report' (2008) 38(7) Nursing 28, 29.
31 David Cruise Malloy et al, 'Culture and Organizational Climate: Nurses' Insights into Their Relationship with 
Physicians' (2009) 16 Nursing Ethics 719. See also Eric J Thomas, J Bryan Sexton and Robert L Helmreich, 
'Discrepant Attitudes about Teamwork among Critical Care Nurses and Physicians' (2003) 31 Critical Care 
Medicine 956, 958.
32 A J Smith and D Preston, 'Communications in an NHS Trust Hospital' (1996) 10 Journal o f Management in 
Medicine 31, 36.
33 Interview with Simone Sanger (12 December 2007).
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
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Ill DIVERGENT ORGANISATIONAL VALUES
Silverman argues that the ‘logic of how culture shapes behavior and performance lies in 
appreciating the centrality of values in grounding human action.’ Values are the underlying 
principles that define what is and is not acceptable within an organisation. The overriding 
value shared by all members of the Chronic Care Unit was a profound dedication to patient 
care. As Dr Blackburn explained: ‘[MND is] a disastrous disease and you need to look after 
these people as well as you can. So part of looking after them is looking after them in death 
as well as in life.’38
Silverman further notes that ‘a set of values that are shared is instrumental in serving as a 
unifying force and creating a sense of commonality among members of a group or an 
organization.’34 Dr Blackburn identified a sense of unity and common purpose within the 
Unit which he thought was a safeguard to ensure appropriate behaviour.
I work in a ... relatively monitored environment. I work with eight other neurologists. We work pretty 
well together as a team. We have a nurse consultant who will speak her mind. ... But the time when 
stuff goes array in medical practice is when there’s people who are unregulated, unwatched, just 
working by themselves.40
However, as I put to him, ‘Being part of the multidisciplinary team is not making you comply 
with [the law].’ His response: ‘Sure. I agree.’41
I argue that the reason for this disjunction is that while there are some common values 
articulated by different members of the Chronic Care team, the practical interpretation of 
those values differed. In short, there was no common understanding of the ethic of care which 
informs end-of-life practice in the Unit. Thus, while Dr Blackburn spoke for the entire team 
when he told me that ‘the two aims are comfort and dignity’, he had his own particular 
philosophy of palliative care where ‘comfort and dignity also come with an appropriately
37 Henry J Silverman, 'Organizational Ethics in Healthcare Organizations: Proactively Managing the Ethical 
Climate to Ensure Organizational Integrity' (2000) 12 HEC Forum 202, 205.
38 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
39 Silverman, above n 37, 207.
4(1 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
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timed death. ,42
A Dr Blackburn ’s Philosophy o f  Palliative Care
Dr Blackburn’s philosophy of palliative was a potent challenge to the medical establishment. 
Again he resembles the revisionists who argue ‘that euthanasia should be seen in appropriate 
cases as an act of care, and as an expression of medical professionalism.’43 Dr Blackburn 
estimated that over the previous ten years he had cared for more than 200 people who died of 
MND.44 His personal experience of their protracted suffering had generated an ethos that 
included euthanasia as an active part of palliation. Dr Blackburn explained: ‘The palliative 
care team looks at palliation first and death as an end point of whatever the biological process 
is. Whereas I think that death is ... an active part of palliation, they see it as a by-product.’45
Dr Blackburn illustrated these different philosophies with the story of Brad, one of his long 
standing patients. Brad was admitted to hospital by the aged-care team which immediately 
engaged the assistance of palliative care specialists who thus had authority over his care. Dr 
Blackburn described Brad’s last weeks:
[A] long, long drawn out death ... Awful. He was comfortable but awful for the family to watch and to 
smell someone ketotic in their death. It’s a smell that will never leave you. Joan, his sister, ... did say 
several times, “Is there anything we can do to make this quicker?” ... Now if the patient is under my 
care alone, then the answer to that is “Yes.” The guy is going to die. So he should die with an
• 46appropriate tempo.
Thus, in Dr Blackburn’s philosophy, ‘comfort and dignity’ in death require more than pain 
management: ‘we use Midazolam-morphine readily to control pain ... but comfort and dignity 
also come through an appropriately timed death.'47 He reiterated this conviction a number of 
times during the interview, referring to the ‘tempo of death’.48 He believed his patients share 
this conviction: they ‘know that part of that ability to provide comfort and dignity is also their
Ibid.
Magnusson, above n 1, 104. Similarly, urologist Rodney Syme, writing about his role in a number of assisted 
deaths, says it is ‘my ultimate aim to see physician-assisted dying become an integral part of palliative care ...’ 
Rodney Syme, A Good Death: An Argument for Voluntary Euthanasia (Melbourne University Press, 2008) 227.
44 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
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quicker death.’44 Dr Blackburn reported that patients who were suffering a protracted demise 
in hospices had been transferred to his hospital so he could expedite their deaths.50 This 
‘tempo of death’ is something of a median between the patient ‘lingering for weeks ... inch, 
by inch, by inch’ and suddenly ‘dying on the end of a needle.’
I think there are better ways to die. Death is not just for the person dying but also for the family. If you 
have someone there one second and they die on the end of a doctor’s needle, that is a very traumatic 
thing to see... there’s tempo to spending time with someone who dies.51
B ‘We ’re Not to Hasten a Death and Not to Kill ’
Sally Donalds, a respiratory nurse, agreed that a functional team requires a shared ethos and a 
common purpose, ‘designed to care until the last breath. We’re not to hasten a death and not 
to kill.’52 This dissonance between Donalds’ view of the Unit’s ethic of care -  ‘we’re not to 
hasten a death’ -  and Dr Blackburn’s philosophy of palliative care and the reality of practices 
that may amount to euthanasia in the Unit was striking.
Donalds was not alone in her view. Of the twelve Unit staff I interviewed, only two other 
team members, in addition to Dr Blackburn, expressed in principle support for deliberately 
hastening death. Six of the staff opposed euthanasia and two were ambivalent, but voiced 
strong reservations.53 The divergence of views on euthanasia demonstrated disjunctions in the 
meaning of care. For palliative care specialist Dr Richards, euthanasia was contrary to the 
social and professional value of caring for the suffering:
... if we think that for our elderly and debilitated and for our terminally [ill], to relieve their suffering, 
we’re just going to kill them ... that doesn’t reflect well on society or what medicine or health or caring 
is all about. ... when they’re actually dying we care for them. We look after them and we make them 
comfortable. But not to get it over and done with, like send them on their way.54
The two respiratory registrars framed their opposition to euthanasia in strongly moral terms. 
Dr Sanger explained that ‘... all life is sacred ... I still see it as ... assisted murder in a way.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Interview with Sally Donalds (10 December 2007).
53 Only one interviewee did not express a view on euthanasia or assisted suicide.
54 Interview with Elizabeth Richards (6 February 2008).
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And so therefore I think it’s wrong. ’ 55 Dr Pitt also saw euthanasia as antithetical to his 
understanding of the ethic of care: ‘the profession ... is supposed to be ... there to alleviate 
suffering ... do no harm has got to be the goal of why the profession is here.’ 56 Similarly, Dr 
Richards had a traditional view which contrasts with Dr Blackburn’s re-framing of the 
professional role: ‘Life is precious and I don’t feel it’s the role of the doctor to go and 
interfere with that. ’57
Likewise, respiratory specialist Dr Evans agreed that ‘ [d]ignity in death is just hugely 
invaluable’ but euthanasia ‘opens a door to a place that me, as a caring physician, wouldn't
C O  #
want to go.’' He rebuffed Dr Blackburn’s notion that comfort and dignity sometimes 
involved hastening a lingering death for the sake of the family: ‘I usually say [to the family], 
“If you’ve got a pressing appointment you’d better get to it.” You don’t mess with death. It 
happens. ... No one ever dies on time. ’ 59 Instead, for Evans, ‘[djignity in death is allowing 
them the time to come to terms with their illness from the very outset, to accept and 
appreciate that their lives are going to change irrevocably. ’60
If leaders have the key role in communicating and demonstrating an organisation’s ethical 
values,61 it is not surprising there was discordance in the understanding of the values of care, 
comfort and dignity among the Unit’s team. For while euthanasia was integral to Dr 
Blackburn’s understanding, the constraints of institutional scrutiny necessitate ambiguity and 
sometimes duplicity, as I describe later in this chapter. The absence of clear leadership in 
defining organisational values thus created a vacuum which allowed divergent meanings of 
end-of-life care to co-exist. This in turn facilitates illicit practices.
C Filters
Some members of the MND team recognised this conflict of values. How did they reconcile 
their complicity in assisted death and how do contradictory meanings of care co-exist within
55 Interview with Simone Sanger (12 December 2007).
56 Interview with Ray Pitt (18 December 2007).
57 Interview with Elizabeth Richards (6 February 2008).
58 Interview with Paul Evans (18 December 2007).
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Michael W Grojean et al, ’Leaders, Values and Organizational Climate: Examining Leadership Strategies for 
Establishing an Organizational Climate Regarding Ethics' (2004) 55 Journal o f Business Ethics 223, 224.
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a single team? My interviews revealed a phenomenon I will call ‘filters’: a mental device 
which staff employed to sift through their experience of assisted death to construct a version 
which was legally or ethically palatable.
When patients were admitted to the hospital in their final days, Dr Blackburn worked very 
closely with respiratory nurse Sally Donalds and nurse coordinator Helen Carlino in 
managing their care. Both nurses were adamant in their interviews that drugs are 
administered purely for pain relief, with no intention of hastening death. Donalds in 
particular emphasised the ethic of ‘care not kill’. One explanation for this dissonance is the 
possibility that Donalds, Carlino and other staff were, as Blackburn suggested, ‘being 
cagey’.63 Indeed, as I explained in chapter 1, truth telling by interview participants is one of 
the challenges of researching illegal practices.
However, Dr Blackburn offered another explanation for their insistence that euthanasia is not 
practised: ‘I think they see what they want to see’.64 Sally Donalds, he argued, has a ‘very 
solid religious background’ and characterising the use of drugs as pain relief, rather than 
intentional hastening of death, ‘could be Sally’s own personal filter’.65 This is an example of 
Williams’ notion o f ‘constructability’ where ‘doctors may ‘construct’ what is really a case of 
euthanasia into something entirely different according to what is allowed.’66 Similarly, 
Davies explains:
When we are in circumstances in which ... there is no possibility of independent verification of what 
our intentions were, and we want very much (not) to do a particular thing ... we may be tempted to 
misrepresent our own mental states in a way that misleads both ourselves and other people into thinking 
that it is permissible for us (not) to do it.67
Filters were a significant characteristic of the practice of euthanasia in the Chronic Care Unit. 
Dr Blackburn described an occasion when a nurse challenged his instructions to increase 
significantly Joshua’s pain relief. From his account it is clear that the nurse knew or at least 
strongly suspected that the intention of the dose was to hasten Joshua’s death. She refused to
02 Interview with Sally Donalds (10 December 2007); Interview with Helen Carlino (28 November 2007).
63 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Glenys Williams, Intention and Causation in Medical Non-Killing (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 20.
67 N Ann Davis, The Right to Refuse Treatment' in Tom L Beauchamp (ed), Intending Death: The Ethics o f 
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia (Prentice Hall, 1996) 109, 118.
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administer the medication because, as Dr Blackburn told me, ‘[h]er own filters were such that 
she thought that by ... doing that she was killing someone...’ She did, however, agree to sign 
the prescription book, and so endorsed the lethal dose administered by Blackburn in her 
presence.69 By not physically administering it herself she ‘filtered out’ her complicity in 
euthanasia.
Dr Blackburn’s confidence that if ‘Sally [Donalds] and Helen [Carlino] ... had major 
problems with what I did, we’ve been working with each other for long enough that they 
would tell me’ is incongruent with his observation that ‘they see what they want to see.’70 If 
members of the Chronic Care Unit, especially those like Donalds and Carlino who were so 
closely involved in end-of-life care, did not ‘see’ possibly illicit practices when they 
occurred, Dr Blackburn could not be challenged.
My interview with Dr Blackburn suggested that he also used filters to rationalise practices 
with which he was not entirely comfortable. This explains how his particular understanding 
of ‘comfort and care’, where death is an ‘active part of palliation’, can operate within a wider 
organisational ethos that rejects such an understanding as unprofessional and unethical. The 
illicit practice of euthanasia within a highly monitored hospital setting requires some level of 
deceit. Dr Blackburn, however, emphasised more than once his commitment to truth telling: 
‘you can’t lie, you never write a falsehood down in notes and you never tell people in a 
clinical situation anything that is incorrect...’71
This attitude is at odds with the way Dr Blackburn managed the nurse who argued that Joshua 
did not need the dose for pain relief. I asked Dr Blackburn to explain how omitting to tell the 
nurse the truth was not the equivalent of lying to her. His answer demonstrates his own use of 
filters:
TB: I wasn’t truthful with her. But I didn’t lie.
KG: Is there a difference?
TB: Absolutely! You know that, you’re a lawyer! ... I said the truth. He was uncomfortable through 
the night. She said, “He is comfortable now.” I said to counter that, “He was uncomfortable
68
69
70
71
Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008). 
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through the night.”
KG: You didn’t say yes or no he is comfortable now.
TB: He was very comfortable. So I didn’t disagree or agree with [the nurse].72
IV RISK MANAGEMENT
Dr Blackburn was conscious of the risk of his end-of-life practices being challenged: ‘if there 
was a complaint about me prematurely hastening the death of someone it could have 
significant consequences. I am extraordinarily mindful of that. Cautious. Not paranoid.’ 
My interviews disclosed a number of risk management techniques and other processes which 
facilitated questionable practices within the Unit.
A Method o f Death
The scrutiny of an institutional setting poses particular challenges. The first risk management 
strategy was the particular method of death used by Dr Blackburn. In hospitals and hospices, 
Magnusson has observed, the fatal drug -  overdoses of therapeutic medication that is 
clinically indicated74 -  tends to be increased gradually over a period of time.75 ‘This,’ he says, 
‘permits the intention to kill to masquerade as routine palliation.’ Ogden has also described 
the euthanasia of patients by morphine overdoses in hospitals. One doctor in this study 
explained: ‘We told the patient that we could not provide euthanasia, but could put up a 
morphine drip which would depress the respiratory system. So, it is like doing it, but saying 
you are not doing it. ... He died within ... hours.’77
Dr Blackburn’s method of death -  increasing the dosage of pain relieving medication -  is not 
just a means of achieving the appropriate ‘tempo’ of death. It is a strategic choice to conceal 
his role in a patient’s hastened death. Morphine and Midazolam are medically indicated for 
relief of terminal symptoms in MND patients,78 including breathlessness and choking. But for
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Magnusson, above n 1, 145.
75 Ibid 133.
76 Ibid 192.
77 Russell D Ogden, Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in Persons with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS) or Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) (Peroglyphics Publishing, 1994) 76 (emphasis in original).
78 Sivakumar Sathasivam, 'Managing Patients with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis' (2009) 20 European Journal 
o f Internal Medicine 355, 357.
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some patients like Jackie79 who are able to breathe normally, the usual Midazolam-morphine 
overdose could attract suspicion. Thus, when Jackie presented to Dr Blackburn and asked to 
die the next day, Dr Blackburn told her that ‘tomorrow would present some difficulties...’ He 
explained to me that the ‘difficulties are that usually we have another excuse to use 
Midazolam-morphine.’ In Jackie’s case therefore, risk management required Dr Blackburn 
altered the usual method of death and withdraw her food and fluids instead.
However, for most MND patients at the end of life, the administration of Midazolam- 
morphine is a routine way to relieve symptoms. According to Dr Blackburn, titrating these 
drugs will depress respiratory function and cause death. Dr Blackburn explained how he 
hastened the death of Melanie.
TB: I did dial it up. ... Not a great deal ‘cause her respiratory function was at a level where ... you get
to just over the cusp, there’s an inflection point where C02 just goes whoosh. I’m not giving her ... 
an industrial dose of morphine and Midazolam.
KG: An industrial dose, what’s that, a huge overdose?
TB: When people die on the end of your needle. You don’t do that. Can't do that.
KG: Why not?
TB: You would be charged.81
B ‘Concordance ’
Another risk management strategy is what Dr Blackburn calls ‘building concordance’. This 
strategy involved Dr Blackburn developing harmonious relationships with the nursing staff 
and with the patient’s family to avert conflict and the danger of exposure.
1 Nurses
Dr Blackburn was aware that many of the nurses who supported his patients in their last days 
got ‘really worked up’ about his practices. Other members of the Unit also reported discord 
amongst the hospital nursing staff. Dr Richards remarked that ‘I’ve had nurses expressing
79
80 
81 
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I described her death in chapter 3.
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distress’ about some of Dr Blackburn’s practices.83 Nurse Coordinator, Helen Carlino, who 
worked closely with Dr Blackburn, but denied knowledge of euthanasia, said ‘we’ve had a 
number of issues with the staff on the ward [who] felt that what we were doing was
84euthanasia.’
Dr Blackburn confirmed that ‘for the nursing staff it is terribly difficult and we’ve had to do 
quite a few sessions with the nursing staff up on [the ward] about the difference between 
alleviating symptoms and hastening people’s death.’851 asked him:
KG: What do you think you are doing then? Which one of those are you doing?
TB: What do I tell them?
KG: What do you think you’re doing?
TB: I’m hastening their death.
KG: You’re hastening their death. But when you have that problem with the nursing staff that you have 
to manage, how do you explain it to them?86
Dr Blackburn answered by emphasising the need to build strong relationships with the nurses. 
Magnusson’s research about illicit euthanasia in hospitals also demonstrated how doctors 
who perform euthanasia depend on good personal relations with nursing staff to avoid 
polarisation, conflict and complaints. Dr Blackburn explained:
I ask [the nurses] what their problem is ... I understand that some people are upset about the 
management o f my patients and ... we just try and get people to talk about why they might be feeling 
upset ... rather than ... say “it’s my patient ... my way or the highway”. You have to accord them the 
respect that they deserve in their role.88
As a respiratory nurse, Sally Donalds was central to the operations of the Chronic Care Unit 
and Dr Blackburn had developed a cooperative relationship with her. Although Donalds 
rejected euthanasia and denied any knowledge of its practice, she managed the other nursing 
staff in an effort to build consensus:
83 Interview with Elizabeth Richards (6 February 2008)
84 Interview with Helen Carlino (28 November 2007).
85 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
86 Ibid.
87 Magnusson, above n 1, 194.
88 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
168
I would view the notes, see the patients and speak to the nurses. Are they happy with what has been 
written in the notes? Are they happy with their involvement in ... delivering the treatment to the 
patient? And if there are any disturbances ... then I would work with the [Nursing Unit Manager] plus 
the consultant to work through any of the [issues] ,...89
The importance of good relationships was highlighted when Dr Blackburn was confronted 
with the potentially explosive situation of the nurse challenging the administration of 
Joshua’s fatal dose. I argued in chapter 2 that this was a case of euthanasia. Dr Blackburn told 
me what happened:
[Joshua] had decided that it was time for him to die and so we exponentially went up with the 
midazolam-morphine every 12 hours. ... And one of the nurses said to me when I wrote up the new 
order: “I can’t do that.” I said, “Why?” She said, “He appears to be comfortable and what you are 
doing is prematurely hastening his death.”90
Dr Blackburn described how he employed the ‘concordance’ strategy to get the nurse on side:
TB: I have to diffuse the nurse and ... with concordance. So I could have dealt with it by saying, “Well,
fuck off and get me another nurse.”... [but] never, ever in that situation...does being inflammatory 
help. ... You always have to step back and say, “Why is this person upset? What are they 
particularly upset about?” She was upset about the dose of narcotic and Midazolam because she 
thought that by doing that she was an instrument of his death.
KG: Would you agree with her?
TB: Yeah.91
The key to ‘diffusing her dissent’ was Dr Blackburn’s realisation that the nurse was 
specifically concerned about physically administering the dose. ‘[Learning how to read 
people’ was critical, he said.92 Dr Blackburn affirmed rather than contradicted the nurse’s 
perspective and personally administered the drugs to the patient. As he explained to me: ‘I 
said, “I can see you are uncomfortable doing this. I am happy to do the syringe. You have to 
sign the book with me. If you don’t want to sign the book, that’s fine, I’ll get someone 
else.”93
89 Interview with Sally Donalds (10 December 2007).
90 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid. ‘Signing the book’ refers to the established protocol whereby the nurse and/or doctor verifies the type of 
medication and dosage by signing the patient’s medication chart.
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This ‘concordance’ strategy was also evident in the death of Jackie. I argued in chapter 2 that 
the withdrawal of her food and fluids could be regarded as a form of physician-assisted 
suicide. A number of the nursing staff agreed. Dr Blackburn described how he met with them 
to explain the process of withdrawal and talk through their concerns: ‘There were several 
nursing staff who were upset ... They said, “She’s got a PEG. She should be fed.” I said ... 
“You can’t actually feed her against her will.” ... And they said, “So you are going to let her 
die?” I said, “Yes, I’m going to let her die.’”94 Indeed, as I explained in chapter 3, the current 
law would accept Jackie’s refusal of treatment, assuming she was competent. To have 
provided Jackie with food and fluids against her will would have amounted to an assault.95
2 Family
Like the rest of the Chronic Care team, Dr Blackburn said that his primary duty was to the 
patient. Thus, when confronted by families who insisted he not tell the patient the terrible 
reality of the diagnosis, ‘I politely but firmly thank them for their advice but tell them that I 
have no contract with them, my responsibility is to my patient.’96 This ‘contract’, however, 
was less clear cut in the case of the woman who requested withdrawal of the tracheotomy, 
mentioned above. Dr Blackburn refused to comply with her constant pleas out of respect for 
her father because ‘having his daughter die against his wishes would destroy him for the rest 
of his life.'97
Thus even in the face of a persistent request for the withdrawal of treatment by a competent 
patient, Blackburn affirmed he would refuse ‘unless the significant others in that person’s life
QO
were on the same page.’ Similarly, when Jackie was adamant she wished to die by the 
withdrawal of her PEG, before he conceded, Dr Blackburn met with her daughters to ensure 
their support.
Clearly the need to have the family ‘on the same page’ was also part of Dr Blackburn’s
94 Ibid.
95 See for example, Secretary o f the Department o f Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB ( ‘Marion’s 
case’)  (1992) 175 CLR 218; Schloendorf v Society o f New York Hospital 195 NE 92 (19 14); Sidaway v Board o f 
Governors o f Bethlehem Royal Hospital and Others [1985] AC 871.
96 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
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strategy of concordance.
The great thing about looking after Australians is that provided they’re given time, an explanation and 
concordance, but it’s concordance not saying “what would you like me to do?”, it’s not concordance by 
saying “you tell me what to do”. It’s concordance by saying “this is the direction to go... and have 
confidence that I’ll look after your loved ones to the goal that we’ve talked about.”100
However, when the family was not ‘on the same page’, risk management and the need to 
maintain concordance militated against intentionally causing the patient’s death. When 
discussing the father of the tracheotomy patient, Dr Blackburn said he ‘was very ingenious. 
Very clever, very smart. But a scary man, very scary man. He had Power of Attorney and he 
would have charged me with murder.’101
C Deflection
Another key practice of Dr Blackburn’s risk management was ‘deflection’: avoiding straight 
answers to incriminating questions. This was evident in the interview, with Dr Blackburn 
seemingly reluctant to answer my direct question about whether his aim in providing drugs to 
Melanie and Joshua (as described in chapter 2) was to hasten death. He answered a number of 
times that his ‘prime goal [is] the person’s comfort and dignity.’102 Only after repeated 
questioning did he concede that his aim in such cases was ‘definitely’ to hasten death.103 
Similarly, he persistently steered the interview away from another difficult question: did he 
lie to the nurse who questioned whether the dose would hasten Joshua’s death?
TB: The nurse wasn’t comfortable with ... putting into a syringe 240mg of morphine and 240 of
Midazolam, a dosage that would kill you or I and was going to kill this guy. She didn’t want to do 
it and that’s OK.
KG: But just so I can understand ... When you wrote that dose, to increase that dose, his symptoms 
were under control, he was comfortable ...
TB: More or less, yeah ...
KG: You increased the dose to hasten his death ...
TB: Yeah
KG: So [the nurse] was correct.
100
101
102
103
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Ibid.
Ibid.
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TB: Yep.
KG: But it seems to me the conversation you had with her ... you led her to believe...
TB: Deflected her a little bit, yeah.
KG: Right, you led her to believe that no, she was incorrect...
TB: No, I didn’t say she was incorrect. I didn’t agree with her. I didn’t disagree with her. I said that he 
had been uncomfortable over night which is true.
KG: You didn’t really answer her.
TB: Absolutely not.104
Dr Blackburn was explicit in confirming that deflection was a deliberate strategy to avoid 
detection: ‘... you could ... say “well why didn’t you just say to her, “I’m doubling the dose 
‘cause I want him to die in the next 12 hours.” Well, there’s ways to get reported and there’s 
ways to not get reported.'105
V SILENCE
A D on’t Ask, Don’t Tell ’
Another characteristic of the organisational culture which facilitated practices that I argue 
may amount to euthanasia at the Chronic Care Unit was silence, a practice of don’t ask, don’t 
tell. Dr Blackburn commented on the nurse’s concerns about Joshua’s death: ‘If she had said 
to me, “are you writing that up to hasten his death?” [I would have said] “Yes”. But you 
know what? People don’t ask ... They don’t want to hear the answer ... there’s sort of this 
complicity.’106
There was evidence that this complicity of silence operated as an unofficial protocol within 
the Unit, facilitating questionable end-of-life practices. Dr Andrea Barron, another 
neurologist, was personally opposed to euthanasia. Without identifying Dr Blackburn, I 
described some of his controversial end-of-life practices and asked her what she thought. 
‘Have they said that? ... It surprises me a little bit,’ she told me, laughing nervously.107 
However, it seems that what surprised her was that someone would disclose such practices. 
‘It surprises me that they’d actually say it in that way ... Usually people would phrase it more
104
105
106 
107
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Ibid.
Interview with Andrea Barron (8 January 2008).
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diplomatically than that I must confess.’108
‘Don’t ask, don’t tell’ was also evident in the use of the medication chart where evidence of 
Dr Blackburn’s excessive drug provision was readily available. Somewhat surprisingly for a 
person cautious about the risk of detection, Dr Blackburn stated he always records the 
accurate dosage of drugs in the medication chart, even when the drugs are administered with 
the intent to hasten death: ‘You can’t lie. You never write a falsehood down in notes’, he told 
me.104 This contrasts with accounts of underground euthanasia in hospitals where the drug 
dosages are either not charted or the record is misrepresented to show deterioration in the 
patient’s condition.110
I asked Dr Blackburn for further clarification:
KG: So from the notes that you write, is it possible for another independent doctor to come in, look at 
those notes and say, “... for what that patient was suffering ... that dose was ... more than medically 
indicated and therefore to hasten death.”?
TB: Yes. Yeah.
KG: Anyone reading the notes could see that?
TB: Take Joshua for example.
KG: There was evidence for anyone who wanted to look?
TB: Absolutely.* 111
B ‘That’s Unspoken Doctor-Patient Silence
In the next section I argue that this complicity of silence characterised at least some of the 
doctor-patient relationships at the Chronic Care Unit. First, however, I consider how this 
‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ approach is incongruent with another feature of the Unit’s culture: its 
emphasis on early and informed decision making.
1 Early and Informed Decision Making
I asked Dr Blackburn what he considered were the ‘ingredients’ of good decision making at
108 Ibid.
109 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
110 Magnusson, above n 1, 133.
111 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
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the end of life.
TB: Time. Honesty.
KG: You mean honesty with the patient?
TB: And the patient being honest with me. ... I think they’re the two most important things. Time: time 
to evaluate, time to assess, time to explain and inform. And you can’t hurry that up.112
When asked the same question, every member of the MND team similarly identified early 
information and early deliberation as the key to sound decision making. Thus, even end of 
life decisions that are unlikely to confront a patient for some time -  such as ventilatory 
support, PEG and pain relief in the final stage -  are discussed at the patient’s initial 
presentation to the Unit, usually not long after diagnosis. Dr Blackburn believes these early 
discussions at the Unit provide a neutral context that facilitates the doctor-patient 
relationship: ‘sitting there and talking like equals about the pros and cons of the person’s care 
is very different to me standing next to the hospital bed and someone sitting there in 
pyjamas. ' 113
Patients were encouraged to consider what Dr Blackburn called a ‘disaster plan’ should they 
suffer a heart attack or stroke: would they wish to be resuscitated or receive life support? ‘I 
actually start talking about that in the first couple of visits ... because while our emphasis is 
on the here and the now ... there is a time when you will die from the disease. ’ 114 According 
to Dr Blackburn, forward thinking ensures that ‘wrong decisions don’t get made’ . 115 
Respiratory nurse Sally Donalds agreed and pointed out that for patients this early 
information is the difference between a ‘crisis decision as opposed to a well-informed, well 
thought out, well discussed [decision] with their carer. ’ 116 Respiratory specialist Dr Evans 
also talks about ventilation when the patient first presents: ‘there is no time like the present... 
there is no use waiting to talk to someone ... [when they are] dying ... and desperate...Whether
117they want to hear it or not is almost irrelevant...’
Social worker Robyn Kelly described this approach to early discussion of end-of-life issues
112
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Interview with Sally Donalds (10 December 2007). 
Interview with Paul Evans (18 December 2007).
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as ‘going for the jugular’, observing that it can be very confronting for the patients who often 
seek her counsel when faced with these decisions. It is an approach with which she had 
personally struggled but had come to accept as appropriate patient care: ‘I think it is being 
cruel to be kind.’ Sound decision making is ‘impossible for people if they haven’t had 
time to think it through, as much as they hate it.’114 Kelly noted that when she sees patients at 
their final admission to hospital, there is a clarity and confidence to their decisions, such that 
many will remark to the effect, “‘Oh I’ve hated hearing that earlier, but thank God I did.’”
2 ‘Dual Complicity Is Silence the Same as Consent?
While members of the Chronic Care Unit stressed the importance of honesty, openness and 
transparency, this did not always extend to the critical decision about pain relief which 
intentionally hastens death. I argued in chapter 2 that this practice may amount to euthanasia.
Dr Blackburn’s own account of how he informed patients about pain relief at the end of life 
demonstrated the ambiguities that surround this practice. ‘I actually tell them, “we’re going to 
give you this medicine, your pain will go away, you’re going to go to sleep, you won’t wake 
up, you’re gonna die.’” According to Dr Blackburn, this information is restated many times 
over the course of the illness: ‘they’re aware that they’re going to die because we’ve talked 
about it many, many times before.’
What he did not talk about, however, was whether their death will be intentionally hastened 
by pain relieving medication. It is likely that the legal prohibition of euthanasia is an 
impediment to doctor-patient communication about this issue. Dr Blackburn perceived an 
informal compact with his patients where the possibility of an intentionally hastened death 
was tacitly understood.
TB: So the patient’s instruction ... is that they want to die. My job is to make sure they do that in the
most comfortable and dignified [manner] and - you can put in brackets - and quick.
KG: Why in brackets? Because that is unspoken?
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TB: That’s unspoken. Yeah. 123
As explained earlier in this chapter, Dr Blackburn’s philosophy of palliative care meant that a 
‘quick’ or ‘appropriately timed’ death in some cases involved an intentionally hastened death. 
Dr Blackburn was self-assured because ‘the great thing about looking after Australians is that 
there is this sort of dual complicity...’124 This ‘dual complicity’ was evident in some 
interviews.
Isabel Wright, for example, stridently expressed her desire for euthanasia in the interview and 
had researched methods of suicide. While she had never had a conversation with Dr 
Blackburn about this, her understanding was that the promised ‘help at the end’ was a 
deliberately hastened death. Isabel explained to me how she thought she would die:
IW: Once your respiratory muscles stop working then you can’t breathe so you choke to death. But I
hope I don’t have to do that.
KG: Why is that?
IW: Well I think that - 1 don’t think I want to talk about this actually with the tape on because I might
get people into trouble. ... W ell... put it this way: both neurologists have told me that they can look 
after me at the end of my life and I think that’s what they would do. ...
KG: So has Thomas [Blackburn] or anyone else explained to you what it means to help you, to give you 
that help at the end?
IW: No not specifically but I would assume it would be an overdose of morphine. But I have no idea.
KG: Right. You haven’t discussed that detail.
IW: No. No.125
The same ambiguity between doctor and patient emerged in other interviews. I asked Mary 
Davis to define euthanasia:
MD: When ... your life’s ending ... an angel or someone is going to kind of help you. ... if somebody
was to just up the morphine drip, that’s the end of pain. And that’s it, fair enough. ... If you know 
you’ve got somebody that’s not going to let you suffer ....
KG: Have you told the doctors that?
MD: Yes.
KG: Which doctor did you talk to?
MD: I have spoken to Thomas Blackburn and Dr Evans and Dr Murphy.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Interview with Isabel Wright (26 June 2007).
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KG: And what did Dr Blackburn say?
MD: His whole attitude is quality of life. And he just wants to not let anybody, you know, suffer
unnecessarily. ... if they can help somebody have a dignified or a peaceful end that’s all they’re 
game for.
KG: OK. And what does that actually mean?
MD: I would imagine that they would kind of just help me, you know, die. Yeah. But I mean when 
everything else has failed virtually. I would hate to be consigned before I died, (laughs)
KG: Did you tell them that?
MD: I think it was taken for granted, (laughs)126
Other interviews, however, clearly indicated Dr Blackburn falsely assumed that a patient’s 
desire for comfort and dignity, coupled with silence about an intentionally hastened death, 
always signal a ‘dual complicity’. My interview with patient Alexander Murray, for example, 
demonstrated that some patients who explicitly communicated to Dr Blackburn their desire 
for adequate pain relief did not also express their personal opposition to euthanasia.
Alexander Murray had been diagnosed more than eight years before the interview. Despite 
regular consultations at the Unit over many years, there was ambiguity surrounding the 
manner and means of his impending death. Alexander understood that his death would be 
precipitated by respiratory failure. I asked him about any discussions he had with medical 
staff about this.
AM: Anytime I’ve really spoken to them about it they’ve said “well, when that time comes we’ve got 
ways and means of managing that without you being in pain or undue discomfort.”
KG: Who are “they”?
AM: Dr Evans and the respiratory people and Thomas [Blackburn].
KG: What does that mean? “We’ve got ways and means”?
AM: I don’t know. I suspect I know but I’m not going to go into it.
KG: You’re not going to go into it?
AM: No.
KG: Can I ask why?
AM: Well I think it’s a doctor-patient issue ... I’ve got to rely on them ... to make my life comfortable. 
... I’ve had some pretty bad experiences in the last couple of years with pain. So I don’t want to 
die in great pain...
KG: Would you envisage that that sort of thing might hasten your death, bring it about more quickly? 
AM: Um yep. Probably.127
126 Interview with Mary Davis (27 April 2007).
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This exchange suggests that Alexander was aware that his death could be deliberately 
hastened. Yet, somewhat inconsistently, he was strongly opposed to euthanasia, telling me 
unequivocally that ‘I don’t want death to be induced ... all I want is to be comfortable...’ 
Whether or not Alexander’s death might be ‘induced’ had not been discussed with the 
medical team and in particular with Dr Blackburn. It is in this silence and ambiguity that Dr 
Blackburn’s assumption about a ‘dual complicity’ operates, and facilitates practices that may 
amount to illicit euthanasia at the Unit.
Bonnie Rycliff was also opposed to euthanasia. I asked her what discussions she had had with 
Dr Blackburn about end-of-life issues.
BR: He’s talked about the terminal stages and seeing that you’re comfortable and that’s fme with me. I 
think it’s important to be comfortable and free from pain.
KG: What in your mind ... [is] the difference between taking pain medication which might hasten 
death? How’s that different to euthanasia?
BR: Well it’s the focus. The focus in euthanasia is terminating your life but the focus of taking
medication is keeping you comfortable and pain free. I recognise that that may hasten things a bit 
but I’m comfortable with that.
KG: Did you talk to Thomas [Blackburn] about that distinction?
BR: No. Not directly...
KG: Did Dr Blackburn say whether or not [pain medication] could hasten death?
BR: I can’t remember...
KG: Okay, so then did you express your opinion against euthanasia to Dr Blackburn?
BR: No I didn’t mention euthanasia.
KG: Didn’t come up?
BR: No ... and there’s no way that I would like to be ‘put to sleep’.129
Alexander and Bonnie’s interviews indicate that while the Unit professed a commitment to 
honest, transparent and proactive end-of-life decision making, in some cases there was a 
‘deafening silence’ between Dr Blackburn and his patients about the most significant of these 
decisions: whether their deaths would be intentionally hastened. Questionable clinical 
practices that may amount to euthanasia were facilitated at the Unit by this ‘unspokenness’ 
and Dr Blackburn’s assumption of ‘dual complicity’. But these interviews demonstrate that a 
patient’s collusion in their intentionally hastened death ought not be taken for granted by Dr
127 Interview with Alexander Murray (31 October 2007).
128 Ibid.
129 Interview with Bonnie Rycliff (10 October 2007).
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Blackburn: silence does not necessarily mean consent. In the absence of unequivocal 
communication about end-of-life decisions, it is possible that some patients were unaware 
that their deaths could be intentionally hastened: such cases could amount to euthanasia 
without consent.
VI CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have analysed the culture which facilitated the possible practice of euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide in the face of institutional scrutiny and the ever present risk of 
exposure. I have highlighted the influence of Dr Blackburn, a classic revisionist practitioner 
who challenged the professional role and conventional concepts of palliative care. Conflicting 
ethics of care co-existed within a culture where healthcare workers use ‘filters’ to ‘see what 
they want to see’. Specific risk management strategies such as the method of death, 
‘concordance’ and ‘deflection’ kept hidden practices hidden.
These findings point to the disturbing aspects of illicit euthanasia revealed by earlier studies: 
hidden decision making, arbitrary clinical judgments, a lack of transparency and 
accountability and - within a culture of pervasive silence - possibly cases of euthanasia 
without consent. In the next chapter I examine whether legalisation would expose euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide to the regulatory Tight of day’ and control such abuses.
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7Legalise and Control?
I INTRODUCTION
In previous chapters, I presented interview data reporting practices which may amount to 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide at the Chronic Care Unit. These practices are not 
isolated examples. This raises the question: are voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide controlled more effectively in jurisdictions where they are legal? In chapter 8 I 
directly answer this question with a comparative analysis of ‘control’ under legalisation and 
prohibition. This chapter lays the groundwork for that analysis. First, in part II, I review 
evidence of euthanasia and assisted suicide in other jurisdictions where such practices are 
also illegal. The reality of extra-legal euthanasia and assisted suicide, and the disturbing 
culture which characterises this underground, suggest a set of practices that are ‘out of 
control’. In part III I examine the concept of legal control. I identify three factors which lie at 
the heart of legal attempts to control assisted death: voluntariness, visibility, and 
accountability. In part IV I argue that Belgium, and particularly the Netherlands, provide 
instructive case studies of control, particularly because extensive data about end-of-life 
practices have been collected over many years. In part V I examine some highly contested 
quantitative studies of end-of-life practices from the Netherlands and Australia and analyse 
their limitations. I conclude this chapter by proposing a survey instrument which may 
overcome these limitations and advance an evidence-based debate.
II EVIDENCE OF EUTHANASIA AND 
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE UNDER PROHIBITION
A Quantitative Studies
Many quantitative studies confirm the practice of underground euthanasia and assisted 
suicide in jurisdictions where they are prohibited. The reliability, methodology and accuracy
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of a number of these studies, particularly the study carried out by Kuhse and colleagues,1 2
have been hotly debated, as have data from the Netherlands. There are also large 
discrepancies in the rates of euthanasia across different jurisdictions. This highlights the 
difficulties of coming to grips with the vast body of data on end-of-life practices, which is a 
challenge to any comparative analysis. I examine these complexities at the end of this 
chapter. In this section I simply canvass a selection of quantitative studies which demonstrate 
that euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are practised even in jurisdictions where these 
practices constitute criminal offences.
A 1988 Australian study by Kuhse and Singer found that 29 per cent of doctors surveyed had, 
somewhat ambiguously, ‘taken steps to bring about death'3 and this prevalence was 
confirmed in a later survey.4 A 1996 national survey in the United States found that 3.3 per 
cent of the 1902 respondents had written a prescription for a lethal dose of medication and 
4.7 per cent had given a patient a lethal injection.5 From a 1997 Australian survey of 1918 
doctors from various medical specialties, Kuhse et al extrapolated that 1.8 per cent of all 
Australian deaths were the result of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide and that 30 per 
cent of all Australian deaths ‘were preceded by an act or omission explicitly intended to end 
the patient’s life ... .’ 6
A 2001 Australian study by Douglas and colleagues, which used more precise wording, 
found that 5.3 per cent of general surgeons surveyed had given a lethal injection in response 
to a patient’s request or had assisted a patient’s suicide, or had done both.7 In addition, 36.2 
per cent of respondents had ‘given drugs in doses greater than those required to relieve
1 Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, 'Doctors' Practices and Attitudes Regarding Voluntary Euthanasia' (1988) 148 
Medical Journal o f Australia 623; Helga Kuhse et al, 'End-of-Life Decisions in Australian Medical Practice'
(1997) 166 Medical Journal o f Australia 191.
2 See, eg, Paul van der Maas et al, 'Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life' (1991) 
338 Lancet 669.
3 Kuhse and Singer, above n 1, 624.
4 Peter Baume and Emma O'Malley, 'Euthanasia: Attitudes and Practices of Medical Practitioners' (1994) 161 
Medical Journal o f Australia 137, 140.
5 Diane Meier et al, 'A National Survey of Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the United States'
(1998) 338 New England Journal o f Medicine 1193, 1195.
6 Kuhse et al, above n 1, 196.
7 Charles D Douglas et al, 'The Intention to Hasten Death: A Survey of Attitudes and Practices of Surgeons in 
Australia ' (2001) 175 Medical Journal o f Australia 511,511.
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symptoms with the intention of hastening death ...,8 Australian research, published in 2007, 
revealed similar results to those in the Douglas study.9
In a 2004 New Zealand study, 3.5 per cent of the 1100 general practitioners who had contact 
with a patient prior to death had caused death by the prescription, supply or administration of 
a drug with the explicit purpose of hastening death.10 A 2008 study which used the same 
questionnaire in seven countries found dramatically different rates of intentionally hastening 
death at the explicit request of a patient: in Australia, 7 per cent of the physicians surveyed; 
in Sweden and Denmark where euthanasia and assisted suicide are also prohibited, 1 per cent 
and 14 per cent respectively; and in Switzerland where only assisted suicide is legal, 9 per 
cent.* 11 In the United Kingdom low rates of voluntary euthanasia have been reported: in 2004 
just 0.16 per cent of all deaths and in 2007-2008, 0.21 per cent. Neither survey identified 
any instance of physician-assisted suicide.14
A United States study of the 75 suicides assisted by Dr Kevorkian between 1990 and 1997 
also exposes the reality of euthanasia and assisted suicide under prohibition. I have already 
examined some of the characteristics of these suicides in chapter 5. Sixty nine per cent of 
Kevorkian’s suicides were not at the terminal stage of their illness.15 There was evidence of 
misdiagnosis by Dr Kevorkian and in a number of cases the coroner found no evidence of 
disease.16 Twenty three per cent of Dr Kevorkian’s patients had current and/or past 
depression, emotional instability, and/or other psychological problems. Dr Kevorkian also 
routinely violated of his own guidelines, such as his requirement that patients seeking death
Ibid 513.
9 David A Neil et al, 'End of Life Decisions in Medical Practice: A Survey of Doctors in Victoria (Australia)' 
(2007) 33 Journal o f Medical Ethics 721, 722.
10 Kay Mitchell and Glynn Owens, 'End of Life Decision-Making by New Zealand General Practitioners: A 
National Survey' (2004) 117 New Zealand Medical Journal 1, 6.
11 Rurik Lofmark et al, 'Physicians' Experiences with End-of-Life Decision-Making: Survey in 6 European 
Countries and Australia' (2008) 6:4 BMC Medicine 1, table 1.
12 Clive Seale, 'National Survey of End-of-Life Decisions Made by UK Medical Practitioners' (2006) 20 
Palliative Medicine 1, 6.
12 Clive Seale, 'End-of-Life Decisions in the UK Involving Medical Practitioners' (2009) 23 Palliative Medicine 
198,201.
14 Ibid.
15 Silvia Sara Canetto and Janet Hollenshead, 'Gender and Physician-Assisted Suicide: An Analysis of the 
Kevorkian Cases, 1990-1997' (1999) 40 Omega: Journal o f Death and Dying 165, 176.
16 Ibid table 1.
17 These figures are based on medical records of the people who died and interviews with their family after their 
deaths: ibid 177.
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be examined by a psychiatrist. The over-representation of female assisted suicides by Dr 
Kevorkian was also remarkable.18
B Qualitative Studies
Qualitative studies confirm the reality of assisted death and highlight a range of disturbing 
practices similar to those emerging from my interviews discussed in the previous chapter.
Ground breaking research by Canadian Russell Ogden investigated the views and experiences 
of people with HIV/AIDS and those involved in assisting their deaths. His interviews 
highlighted the lack of knowledge about euthanasia techniques among underground 
practitioners, the consequence of which, he argues, ‘was that some deaths did not come about 
easily and were fraught with additional agony.’19 Many deaths took several hours, and in one 
case, days to complete. Ogden contrasts this with the two thirds of reported euthanasia deaths 
in the Netherlands that were achieved in no more than one hour. In other cases, drugs could 
not be obtained as the patient suddenly deteriorated and violent methods, including a firearm 
and a razor, were usedC Ogden’s more recent research documents actual cases of ‘do-it- 
yourself suicides in Canada which involve techniques such as self-ingestion of veterinary 
drugs promoted by right-to-die organisations.
In the early 1990’s Jamison interviewed family members, partners and friends involved in 
140 cases of non-physician-assisted death. His research highlighted the ‘fear, uncertainty 
[and] disorder’ when drugs fail and how the role of family and friends ‘gradually escalated 
from observers “merely being present” to actors “doing anything necessary” to ensure the 
death of another.’23
18 Canetto and Hollenshead, above n 15, 165. See also Katrina George, 'A Woman's Choice? The Gendered 
Risks o f Voluntary Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide' (2007) 15 Medical Law Review 1, 6-7.
19 Russell D Ogden, Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in Persons with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS) or Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) (Peroglyphics Publishing, 1994) 71.
20 Ibid 89-90.
21 Ibid 71.
22 Russell D Ogden, 'Suicide, Canadian Law, and Exit International's "Peaceful Pill'" (2010) 31(2) Health Law 
in Canada 37. See also Russel Ogden, 'Non-Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Technological Imperative of the 
Deathing Counterculture' (2001) 25 Death Studies 387.
23 Stephen Jamison, 'When Drugs Fail: Assisted Deaths and Not-So-Lethal Drugs' in Margaret P Battin and 
Arthur G Lipman (eds), Drug Use In Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia (Pharmaceutical Products Press, 1996) 
223,227.
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‘Botched’ attempts were also a disturbing feature of Magnusson’s study of euthanasia and 
assisted suicide in Australia and San Francisco. Seventeen of Magnusson’s 88 first-hand 
accounts involved ‘botches’, although he argues that the real rate may well be higher when 
healthcare workers are not involved.24 His study confirms how ignorance of reliable methods 
forces practitioners to resort to trial and error. Practitioners described their hysteria and 
panicked reactions when the drugs or dosage failed to achieve death, with recourse to
9 Asuffocation and strangulation a common result.
‘Botched’ euthanasia is just one of several troubling characteristics of what Magnusson labels 
the ‘anti-professionalism’ of the euthanasia underground.27 His interviews also disclose 
hidden decision making, secrecy, lack of accountability, rash or hasty involvement by 
doctors, conflicts of interest, euthanasia without consent, coercion2* and ‘euthanasia upon 
able-bodied patients who are not in the terminal stages of illness’.
First person accounts of also describe illicit euthanasia and assisted suicide. Jean’s Way, 
published in 1978, describes how Derek Humphry obtained a lethal drug dose from a 
sympathetic doctor and assisted his terminally ill wife to ingest it. In 1988, an anonymous 
resident gynaecologist wrote about giving an overdose of morphine to patient ‘Debbie’, 
telling her somewhat vaguely that it would ‘let her relax’,31 raising criticisms about whether 
the death was voluntary. Timothy Quill described his provision of barbiturates to terminally 
ill ‘Diane’ and his advice about the dose required to suicide.33 In A Good Death: An 
Argument for Voluntary Euthanasia,34 Australian urologist Rodney Syme offers a personal 
account of assisting people over more than 30 years to end their lives, providing advice, 
information, prescriptions and drugs.
24 Roger S Magnusson, Angels o f Death: Exploring the Euthanasia Underground (Melbourne University Press, 
2002) 202. He provides several accounts o f ‘botched’ attempts: for example, at 167-169 and 206-210.
25 Ibid 202-203.
26 Ibid 205.
27 Ibid 201.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid 202.
30 Derek Humphry, Jean's Way: A Love Story (Fontana Press, 1978).
31 Name withheld, 'It's Over, Debbie' (1988) 259 Journal o f the American Medical Association 272.
32 Frances H Miller and George J Annas, 'It's Over, Debbie ' (1988) 259 Journal o f the American Medical 
Association 2095.
33 Timothy E Quill, 'Death and Dignity-a Case of Individualized Decision Making' ( 1991) 324 New England 
Journal o f Medicine 691.
34 Rodney Syme, A Good Death: An Argument fo r Voluntaty Euthanasia (Melbourne University Press, 2008).
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Given the extensive evidence of the practice of euthanasia and assisted suicide under 
prohibition and the disquieting characteristics of the underground, calls for legal control are 
unsurprising. But what does control involve?
Ill DEFINING ‘CONTROL’
Otlowski points out that the meaning of ‘effective legal control’ of euthanasia is central to 
any evaluation and comparison of differing legal approaches. '5 ‘The word ‘control’ used as a 
noun, refers to the power of directing, or giving command. ... Used as a verb, ‘control’ means 
to hold in check or regulate. The phrase ‘legal control’ conveys the meaning that control is 
achieved through the law...’36
I argue there are three key indicators of effective legal control of voluntary euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide:
First, voluntariness - the intentional tennination of life without explicit patient request is a 
potent expression of failure to control the practice of voluntary euthanasia and physician- 
assisted suicide. A legal system which effectively guards against abuses such as non­
voluntary or involuntary euthanasia would have a low proportion of intentional termination of 
life without explicit patient request.
Second, visibility -  under an effective control system, euthanasia and assisted suicide would 
be practised in the open after consultation with another colleague and would be reported to a 
regulatory authority to allow public oversight and auditing. As Otlowski argues, ‘there is no 
prospect of controlling practices which are performed secretly.’
Third, accountability -  An effective control system would ensure that doctors are answerable 
for the practice of euthanasia and assisted suicide because their conduct is subject to formal 
scrutiny. When doctors fail to comply with safeguards, disciplinary action is taken or, when 
necessary, criminal prosecution.
35 Margaret Otlowski, 'The Effectiveness of Legal Control of Euthanasia: Lessons from Comparative Law' in 
Albert Klijn, Margaret Otlowski and Margo Trappenburg (eds), Regulating Physician-Negotiated Death 
(Elsevier, 2001) 137, 149-150.
36 Ibid 150.
37 See also ibid.
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Voluntariness, visibility and accountability are particularly relevant for a comparative 
analysis because they are recurring themes in the academic literature and policy debate about 
the relative ‘pros and cons’ of prohibition and legalisation. The extent of non-voluntary 
euthanasia is one of the most hotly disputed issues, with critics of the Dutch system painting 
a situation that is out of control. The invisibility of the euthanasia underground is often 
highlighted by assisted death advocates; critics point to the unreported and hence hidden 
cases in the Netherlands.
The nature of accountability is also contested. Where euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide are criminal offences, they are rarely prosecuted. Yet the regulatory systems in 
jurisdictions like the Netherlands are frequently dismissed as the proverbial toothless tiger. 
Cutting through the claims and counter-claims about these three control indicators is essential 
to the goal of evidence based policy.
There may be other factors that could give some indication of the degree of control over 
assisted death. For example, according to Otlowski, control implies that assisted death is 
performed ‘safely in accordance with accepted methods’.39 As discussed above, ‘botched’ 
attempts and ignorance of effective methods of death are features of prohibition. In 
comparison, in the Netherlands there is significant guidance: assisted death must be carried 
out with a drug approved for that purpose by the Royal Dutch Pharmacological Association 
and in most cases the doctor must be present from the administration of the drug to the 
patient’s death.40 The Belgian euthanasia legislation does not have the same requirements.41 
In both the Netherlands and Belgium guidance about methods of death is also available from 
a program of specially trained consultants.42 Therefore, it is clear that on this measure, 
prohibition is a comparative failure.
However, what is not immediately clear is whether voluntariness, visibility and 
accountability are more effectively achieved under prohibition or legalisation. There is 
extensive data relevant to these three indicators which allow some level of evidence-based, 
empirical comparison. Therefore the comparative analysis in my next chapter focuses on
39 Ibid.
40 John Griffiths, Heleen Weyers and Maurice Adams, Euthanasia and Law in Europe (Hart Publishing, 2008) 
100.
41 Ibid 322.
42 Ibid 321.
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these three key indicators as they operate under prohibition and under the legalised regimes in 
the Netherlands and Belgium. I argue that on all three indicators, both prohibition and 
legalisation both fail to achieve effective control of euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide.43
IV WHY THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM?
The regulatory systems in the Netherlands and Belgium are not the only possible models of 
legalisation. Williams outlines a number of reform options for prohibitionist jurisdictions. 
These include: creating a mercy killing defence to take in to account a defendant’s 
compassionate motives; adopting a ‘no prosecution’ policy where there is no evidence of a 
‘victim’; and grading murder into categories that would reflect the severity of the offence, 
including the motives of the defendant.44
Other models include the Rights o f the Terminally III Act 1995 (NT). This statute legalised 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in the Northern Territory, Australia for a brief 
period in 1996 to 1997. The legislation required three doctors to support the patient’s request, 
including a specialist to confirm that the patient was terminally ill and a psychiatrist to certify 
that the patient was not suffering from treatable depression. A nine day cooling-off 
period applied before the death could proceed.
Numerous Bills have been presented to parliaments which have proposed various models. For 
example, the End of Life Assistance (Scotland) Bill 2010 which was defeated. It would have 
allowed a person who was terminally ill or ‘permanently physically incapacited’ to receive 
medical assistance to end their life, after approval by a doctor and psychiatrist and a 15 day 
cooling-off period.4^  Most recently, Brownsword, Lewis and Richardson have proposed a 
regime of prospective legal immunity. Under this model, a person who assists a suicide 
would not be prosecuted if their assistance occurred within the terms of a previously granted
43 The difficulties of comparing evidence from different legal systems, cultures and health systems have been 
noted. See, eg, Penney Lewis, 'The Empirical Slippery Slope from Voluntary to Non-Voluntary Euthanasia' 
(2007) 35 Journal o f Law, Medicine and Ethics 197, 202-203.
44 Glenys Williams, Intention and Causation in Medical Non-Killing (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 181-182.
45 Other examples include: Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 (WA) which was defeated in 2010. In NSW the 
Rights o f the Terminally 111 Bill 2011 (NSW) is currently before the Legislative Council.
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licence.46 In this thesis I do not evaluate these many Bills and proposals because my concern 
is to compare prohibition with currently existing legalised regimes and to examine the 
empirical evidence about their effectiveness.
As noted in chapter 1, a number of jurisdictions have legalised euthanasia and/ or assisted 
suicide. In the United States, Oregon produces annual reports about the incidence and 
characteristics of its physician-assisted suicides. However, for a number of reasons the 
experience of Oregon is of limited comparative value, not least because, as Battin highlights, 
it is ‘a comparatively small, atypical US state, not an entire country.’47 The Netherlands and, 
to a lesser extent, Belgium, offer the most informative comparison for a number of reasons.
A Legal Development over a Long Period
First, the process of legal development in the Netherlands has occurred over a considerable 
period of time: from legalisation by the courts from 1984, to legislation in 2002. Legal 
experimentation and ‘fine tuning’ of the Dutch control system has extended over nearly 30 
years. This is longer than any other jurisdiction including Oregon, where physician-assisted 
suicide has been legal for less than half that time. In Belgium, the experience of regulation is 
even newer, since euthanasia was legalised in 2002.
B Both Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide Are Regulated
In considering legal responses to assisted death, Dutch law offers a useful point of reference 
because it regulates both euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Similarly, although 
physician-assisted suicide is not explicitly referred to in the Belgian legislation, in practice it 
is treated a legal form of euthanasia. The only other jurisdiction to legalise both euthanasia 
and physician-assisted is Luxembourg. However, there is no English language literature
46 Roger Brownsword, Penney Lewis and Genevra Richardson, 'Prospective Legal Immunity and Assistance 
with Dying: Submission to the Commission on Assisted Dying' (2012) 23 King's Law Journal 181.
47 Margaret P Battin, 'The Euthanasia Debate in the United States: Conflicting Claims about the Netherlands' in 
H Krabbendam and H M ten Napel (eds), Regulating Morality: A Comparison o f the Role o f the State in 
Mastering the Mores in the Netherlands and the United States (Maklu, 2000) 151, 160.
48 Mette L Rurup et al, 'The First Five Years of Euthanasia Legislation in Belgium and the Netherlands: 
Description and Comparison of Cases' (2012) 26 Palliative Medicine 43, 47, citing Federale Controle en 
Evaluatie Commissie Euthanasie [Federal Control and Evaluation Committee on Euthanasia], Eerste Verslag 
aan de Wetgevende Kamers 22 September 2002-31 december 2003 [First Report to Parliament September 22, 
2002-December 31, 2003] (2003)
<http://www.leif.be/doc_professioneel/EUTHANASIE%20VERSLAG%202004.PDF>.
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about the Luxembourg experience to allow an analysis. In Oregon, only physician-assisted 
suicide is legal, not euthanasia.
C A Wealth o f  Quantitative Data
1 The Netherlands
Regular, replicated, nationwide studies into end-of-life practices have been conducted in the 
Netherlands over 20 years: in 1990, 1995, 2001, 2005 and 2010.4Q This research looks beyond 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide to examine a range of medical behaviour which 
intentionally or potentially hastens death, including the administration of pain relief, the 
withholding or withdrawing of treatment, and termination of life without explicit request. 
This is important because, as I argued in chapter 2, the intentional termination of life can be 
achieved by a number of different methods. As Griffiths, Weyers and Adams explain, ‘it is 
essential ... not to reify ‘euthanasia’ or any of the rest of [medical behaviours which 
potentially shorten life] as distinct sorts of behaviour and study them in isolation’.50 This is a 
limitation of the Oregon data which is confined to reported cases of physician-assisted 
suicide.
The Dutch research is also distinctive in that the 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2005 replicated 
studies used at least three different sources of information. This triangulation of data 
facilitates the verification of results. The 1990 and 1995 studies used, first, interviews with a 
sample of doctors. Secondly, these studies employed written questionnaires sent to doctors 
who facilitated euthanasia or assisted suicide in a sample of registered deaths (referred to as 
the ‘death-certificate study’). Thirdly, the 1990 and 1995 studies included a prospective 
investigation of doctors who had been interviewed. These doctors completed written 
questionnaires over a six month period for each death where they had been the treating 
physician. In addition, the 2001 study used interviews with doctors and other people involved
van der Maas et al, above n 2; Paul van der Maas et al, 'Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Other 
Medical Practices Involving the End of Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995' (1996) 335 New England Journal of  
Medicine 1699; Bregje Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'Euthanasia and Other End-of-Life Decisions in the 
Netherlands in 1990, 1995, and 2001' (2003) 362 Lancet 395; Agnes van der Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Practices 
in the Netherlands under the Euthanasia Act' (2007) 356 New England Journal o f Medicine 1957; Bregje D 
Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'Trends in End-of-Life Practices before and after the Enactment o f the Euthanasia 
Law in the Netherlands from 1990 to 2010: A Repeated Cross-Sectional Survey' (2012) 380 Lancet 908.
50 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 40, 149.
189
in a sample of reported cases. In the 2005 study, rather than interviews, a questionnaire was 
sent to a sample of more than 1000 doctors.51 Results reported thus far for the 2010 study 
indicate that only a death-certificate study was conducted.52
In addition to the five Dutch studies, useful data on Dutch practice is available in the annual 
reports (published in English since 2005) of the Regional Review Committees which have 
oversight of reported cases of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, and numerous other 
published studies and non-published dissertations about Dutch practice. This extensive body 
of research offers unique insight into the incidence and characteristics of euthanasia, 
physician- assisted suicide and other end-of-life decisions.53 As Griffiths, Weyers and 
Adams state, ‘the results of Dutch research afford a wealth of information ... that is unique in 
the world.04 However, as I will discuss, gaps in the Dutch data militate against a thorough 
evaluation of the Netherlands control system.
2 Belgium
The Belgian research is not as extensive as the Netherlands research and contains similar 
gaps. In Belgium, surveys of end-of-life practices were conducted in 1996, 1998, 2001 and 
2007.55 Unfortunately, unlike the Dutch studies, these were not nationwide studies: the 1996 
report was confined to the city of Hasselt and the other studies were limited to the Dutch 
speaking region of Flanders. This geographical limitation is likely to have impacted the data. 
The first and thus far only nationwide study of the prevalence and types of medical end-of- 
life decisions conducted in 2005-2006 revealed ‘some remarkable differences between the 
Dutch and French-speaking communities in type and prevalence of certain end-of-life
51 Ibid
Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, Trends in End-of-Life Practices before and after the Enactment of the Euthanasia 
Law in the Netherlands from 1990 to 2010: A Repeated Cross-Sectional Survey', above n 49.
53 Unfortunately, some of this research is not readily available, much is published only in Dutch and some is 
published in English only in summary form. Griffiths, Weyers and Adams’ book, above n 40, the successor to 
Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, Euthanasia and Law in the Netherlands (Amsterdam University Press, 1998), 
makes extensive reference to the body of research which has emerged from the Netherlands, and for non-Dutch 
speakers is the only ready reference to a number o f Dutch studies. I draw extensively on these two books and 
primary research sources as far as possible.
54 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 40, 148.
55 Freddy Mortier et al, 'End-of-life Decisions o f Physicians in the City of Hasselt (Flanders, Belgium)' (2000) 
14 Bioethics 254; Luc Deliens et al, 'End-of-Life Decisions in Medical Practice in Flanders, Belgium: A 
Nationwide Study' (2000) 356 Lancet 1806; Agnes van der Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Decision-Making in Six 
European Countries: Descriptive Study' (2003) 361 Lancet 345; Johan Bilsen et al, 'Medical End-of-Life 
Practices under the Euthanasia Law in Belgium' (2009) 361 New England Journal o f Medicine 1119.
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decisions’.56 Moreover, as Griffiths, Weyers and Adams point out, the Belgian studies were 
limited to a death certificate analysis and did not include the interview/questionnaire studies 
with doctors.57
Notwithstanding these limitations, the Belgian studies are an important comparative reference 
because, like the Dutch studies, they explore a range of end-of-life practices, not just 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Other nationwide Belgian studies focus only on 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide but they reveal useful information about the 
characteristics of reported and unreported cases.58 The annual reports of the Federal Control 
and Evaluation Commission are another important source of data, but are not published in 
English.
D Widespread International Interest
Finally, the wealth of data available from the Netherlands over so many years -  as I have 
argued, superior in detail, breadth and methodological integrity to research emanating from 
any other permissive jurisdiction -  means that developments in the Netherlands draw 
widespread international interest. This is particularly so in jurisdictions where there is 
persistent pressure to legalise euthanasia and/or assisted suicide, particularly Britain, the 
United States, Canada, Australia and parts of Europe. Inevitably it is Dutch law that receives 
primary scrutiny as an alternative model. Claims about the merits or the failings of the Dutch 
system are prominent in both academic debate and public discussions about euthanasia and 
assisted suicide.
Both sides of the assisted dying debate regard the Netherlands as ‘the world’s best “test case” 
for disputes ... a kind of laboratory or specimen country, where [assisted death] can be 
observed in full operation.’59 The Netherlands system is frequently held up by advocates of 
legalisation as a model of effective legal control, ‘one that puts the Netherlands in a class by
56 Lieve van den Block et al, 'Euthanasia and Other End-of-Life Decisions: A Mortality Follow-Back Study in 
Belgium' (2009) 9:79 BMC Public Health 1, 4. For example, ‘[e]nd-of-life decisions with possible life­
shortening effect in general were more prevalent in the Dutch-speaking community, while the practice o f  
continuous deep sedation was more prevalent in the French-speaking community’: at 5.
57 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 40, 331-332.
58 See, eg, Rurup et al, above n 48; Tinne Smets et al, 'Legal Euthanasia in Belgium: Characteristics o f All 
Reported Euthanasia Cases' (2009) 47 Medical Care 1.
59 Battin, above n 47, 156.
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itself ...,6U Otlowski argues it provides ‘valuable guidance for the effective control of 
euthanasia and demonstrates that this can be done in a context which supports the integrity 
and professionalism of doctors and respects the rights and interests of patients.’61 Others, 
however, argue that ‘Dutch claims of effective regulation ring hollow’, and see evidence in 
the Netherlands of a slide down the dreaded slippery slope: ‘large scale abuses of patients at
• • • • • . £-5the lowest ebb of their lives is the inevitable consequence of the Dutch legislation.’
V THE NUMBERS GAME
These conflicting claims are indicative of the ‘empirical dilemma’:64 both sides of the 
euthanasia divide insist they have data to support their rival claims.65 Worldwide, there is a 
wealth of quantitative research about end-of-life decisions such as euthanasia, but interpreting 
the results of so many studies over so many years adds to the difficulty and complexity of 
making evidence-based arguments about euthanasia policy.
In this section I analyse two disputes: first, the argument about the ‘real’ incidence of 
euthanasia in the Netherlands which followed the release of the first national survey in 1992; 
and secondly, the controversy surrounding an Australian end-of-life survey by Kuhse et al 
published in 1997. Assessing the accuracy and credibility of the Dutch and Australian 
research will form a foundation for the comparative analysis of my next chapter. Finally, I 
suggest how the relevant research questions might be framed to obtain a reliable estimate of 
different types of end-of-life decisions and to allow a more meaningful assessment of the 
moral and legal significance of these practices.
A The Incidence o f Euthanasia in the Netherlands: ‘Dances with Data ’?
The ‘empirical dilemma’ goes deeper than an argument about the numbers. It reveals an 
underlying dispute about fundamental principles, in particular, the significance of intention in
60 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 40, 199.
61 Otlowski, above n 35, 155.
62 Henk Jochemsen and John Keown, 'Voluntary Euthanasia under Control? Further Empirical Evidence from 
the Netherlands' (1999) 25 Journal o f Medical Ethics 16, 21.
63 Kumar Amarasekara and Mirko Bagaric, 'The Legalisation o f Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Lessons to be 
Learnt' (2001) 27(2) Monash University Law Review 179, 196.
64 Battin, above n 47, 151.
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moral evaluation. This lies at the heart of the disagreement about the true incidence of 
euthanasia in the Netherlands.
The results of the first survey in 1991 by van der Maas, van Delden and Pijnenborg were 
widely greeted with a ‘collective sigh of relief that there was apparently no real problem.’66 
According to the Dutch researchers, around 1.8 per cent of all deaths (2318 cases) per year 
were attributable to euthanasia and 0.3 per cent of all deaths (386 cases) were due to 
physician-assisted suicide. The media concluded that the practice of euthanasia was not as 
frequent as commonly assumed. However, this conclusion and the interpretation of the data 
by the Dutch researchers were immediately challenged. The real rate of euthanasia, it was 
argued, was significantly higher:64 by Keown’s analysis, 26 350 cases, representing over 20 
per cent of all deaths in the Netherlands.70 This was ‘dances with data’, the Dutch researchers 
countered, which misleadingly inflated the incidence of euthanasia.71
1 The ‘Narrow ’ Dutch Definition o f Euthanasia
At the centre of the wrangle is the definition of euthanasia. The Dutch studies narrowly 
define euthanasia as ‘the administration of drugs with the explicit intention of ending the 
patient’s life on his or her explicit request’.72 Thus the method of death, namely the act of 
administering drugs, is central to the definition. Life ending omissions, such as withholding 
treatment, are excluded, as are practices involving incompetent patients because the patient’s 
request is essential to the definition.
66 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 40, 79.
67 van der Maas et al, ‘Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life’, above n 2, 670, 
table 1. Note that the percentages I quote elsewhere in Table 2 to this chapter are slightly different as they are 
from van der Heide et al who quote only the results of the death certificate study: van der Heide et al, 'End-of- 
Life Practices in the Netherlands under the Euthanasia Act', above n 49, 1958. van der Maas et al, however, 
quote the ‘best estimate’ figure which is based on all three parts of the study and is slightly higher: van der 
Maas et al, ‘Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life’, above n 2, 670, table 1.
68 Henk A M J ten Have and Jos V M Welie, 'Euthanasia: Normal Medical Practice?' (1992) 22(2) Hastings 
Center Report 34.
69 For example, the data were ‘meaningless’: ibid 39 and indicative o f ‘political bias’: at 35. See also K F 
Gunning et al, 'Euthanasia' (1991) 338 Lancet 1010; Richard Fenigsen, 'The Report of the Dutch Governmental 
Committee on Euthanasia' (1991) 7 Issues in Law and Medicine 339.
70 John Keown, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?' in John Keown (ed), 
Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 261, 271.
71 Johannes J M van Delden, Loes Pijnenborg and Paul J van der Maas, 'Dances with Data' (1993) 7 Bioethics 
323.
72 Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'Euthanasia and Other End-of-Life Decisions in the Netherlands in 1990, 1995, 
and 2001', above n 49, 396.
193
2 A Wider Definition?
Confining the meaning of euthanasia within the Dutch parameters narrows the debate: it 
suggests that the administration of drugs with the purpose of terminating a patient’s life upon 
request is the only end-of-life practice that might be considered ‘problematic’. In what 
follows I argue the Dutch definition is too restrictive and that all acts or omissions that 
intentionally terminate life are morally and legally relevant.
(a) Patient Request
As Keown points out, a ‘request from the patient to be killed is not an ingredient of standard 
definitions of 'euthanasia'. ... [rather] it is ... conventional to subclassify 'euthanasia' 
according to the presence or absence of a request.’73 Hence, the commonly accepted terms 
‘voluntary’ euthanasia to signify the presence of a request; ‘involuntary’ euthanasia to signify 
when a patient is capable of requesting death but is either not asked or when asked, refuses 
consent; and ‘non-voluntary’ euthanasia to signify when a patient lacks capacity to request 
death. Regardless of the presence or absence of a request, these sub-classifications all amount 
to conduct that intentionally terminates life.
(b) The Significance o f Intention
It is the intention to cause death which ought to be central to the meaning of euthanasia. In 
chapter 2 I defended the philosophical tradition which emphasises the significance of 
intention and which supports the notion that human conduct is morally specified by the 
intention of the actor; that is, by the plan, purpose or choice adopted by a particular act or 
omission.74 As Finnis explains, ‘[w]hatever ... is included within one’s chosen plan or 
proposal, whether as its end or as a means to that end, is intended ...,75 This tradition
73 John Keown, "Dances with Data': A Riposte' (1994) 6(1) Bioethics Research Notes,
<http://www.bioethics.org.au/Resources/Online%20Articles/Opinion%20Pieces/0601%20Dances%20with%20d 
ata.pdf> 1.
74 John Finnis, Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision and Truth (Catholic University of America Press, 1991) 66, 
citing Thomas Aquinas, In sent. 2 d.40 a.2.
75 John Finnis, 'Intention and Side-Effects' in R G Frey and Christopher W Morris (eds), Liability and 
Responsibility: Essays in Law and Morals (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 32. See also John Finnis, 
'Intention in Tort Law' in David G Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations o f Tort Law (Oxford University Press, 
1997) 229 (emphasis in original).
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repudiates acts and omissions which intentionally impede the realisation of one or more of 
the basic human goods - including life - which are integral to human fulfilment.76
The definition of euthanasia adopted by the Dutch research requires the ‘explicit intention of 
ending the patient’s life’ and therefore recognises that intentional killing is a hallmark of 
euthanasia.77 The relevance of intention was also recognised by the Dutch researchers when 
they asked physicians to identify whether their underlying state of mind when performing or 
omitting an intervention which hastened death was:
(acting with) the explicit purpose of hastening the end of life;
(acting) partly with the purpose of hastening the end of life;
(acting while) taking into account the probability that the end of life will be
7 0
hastened.
The Dutch researchers acknowledge that both an act and an omission can be intentionally 
employed to cause death. As they explain in relation to the first category: ‘[i]f a physician 
administers a drug, withdraws a treatment or withholds one with the explicit purpose of 
hastening the end of life, the intended outcome of that action is the end of the life of the 
patient.’ This is consistent with the common law meaning of intention, namely the aim or 
purpose of causing a particular result, in this context the patient’s death.
Therefore I contend that the method of death is not significant in defining euthanasia: what 
matters is the underlying intention -  or ‘explicit purpose’ - to cause death. The commonly 
accepted understanding of euthanasia supports this, hence the terms ‘active’ and ‘passive’
0 1
euthanasia. And, as I explained in chapter 2, in common law jurisdictions, it matters not 
whether death was caused by an act or culpable omission: provided there is an accompanying 
mental element, the offence of murder is constituted.
76 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 1980) 118.
77 John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument against Legalisation (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 97.
78 Paul van der Maas, Johannes J M van Delden and L Pijnenborg, Euthanasia and other Medical Decisions 
Concerning the End o f Life: An Investigation Performed Upon Request o f the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Medical Practice Concerning Euthanasia (Elsevier, 1992) 21.
79 Ibid.
80 R v Mohan [1976] QB 1 at 8; see also LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws o f Australia (at 19 June 2009) 130 
Criminal Law, ‘1 Principles of Criminal Liability’ [130-80].
81 Keown, "Dances with Data': A Riposte', above n 73.
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(c) Other States o f Mind That Are Not Relevant to the Definition of Euthanasia
It follows that the other two states of mind identified by van der Maas, van Delden and 
Pijnenborg are not relevant to the definition of euthanasia.
(i) ‘Taking into Account the Probability that the End o f Life Will Be Hastened’
As the researchers acknowledge, physicians with the third state of mind, ‘taking into account 
the probability that the end of life will be hastened’, may not intend the subsequent death. 
Indeed, as I argued in chapter 2, there is a morally and legally significant distinction between 
intended and foreseen consequences. For example, it is appropriate for a doctor to provide 
reasonable analgesic to relieve a patient’s grievous pain, even if he or she foresees it may 
hasten death.
(ii) ‘Partly with the Purpose o f Hastening the End o f Life ’
van der Maas, van Delden and Pijnenborg define the second state of mind, conduct done 
‘partly with the purpose of hastening the end of life’, as an intervention
performed to achieve one particular effect (e.g., pain relief) but the side-effect (e.g., death) is not 
unwelcome. ... In order to be considered unintentional, this side-effect should in fact not have been 
desired. ... This description relates to a situation in which the death of the patient was not foremost in the 
physician’s mind but neither was death unwelcome.83
This, however, confuses intention with desire (in the sense of feeling or emotion). Although 
a desire for death can lead to an intention to hasten death, it need not. Finnis explains:
The distinctions between what is intended as means or end and what is accepted as a side-effect do not 
depend upon whether the side-effect is desired or undesired, welcomed or accepted with reluctance. 
Provided that one in no way adjusts one’s plan so as to make them more likely, side-effects may be 
welcomed as a ‘bonus’ without being intended.85
82 van der Maas, van Delden and Pijnenborg, above n 78, 21.
83 Ibid.
84 Finnis, ‘Intention and Side-Effects’, above n 75, 35.
85 John Finnis, 'A Philosophical Case against Euthanasia1 in John Keown (ed), Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, 
Clinical and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 23, 27. See also Andrew McGee, 'Double 
Effect in the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld): A Critical Appraisal' (2005) 4 Law and Justice Journal 46, 53, n 25.
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Therefore, what the Dutch researchers characterise as the ‘partial intention of hastening 
death’ is likely to be in many cases instead the foresight of the side effect of death. No doctor 
is happy about their patient’s prolonged suffering and thus the death of a patient might come 
as a welcome relief, but not necessarily the intended outcome of the analgesic. Moreover, the 
common law is clear that desire and intention are not the same things.
3 All Acts or Omissions Done with the Explicit Purpose o f Hastening Death Are Relevant
A meaningful calculation of morally and legally relevant end-of-life practices must therefore 
go beyond the narrow Dutch meaning of ‘euthanasia’ and adopt a wider definition which 
includes all categories of acts or omissions done with the explicit purpose (or intention) of 
hastening death identified in the Dutch studies. These include:
euthanasia as narrowly defined
physician-assisted suicide
ending of life without an explicit request
withdrawal or withholding of treatment with the explicit intention to hasten death.
alleviation of symptoms with the explicit intention to hasten death
the rejection of food and fluids by the patient, with the explicit intention to hasten
death88
continuously and deeply sedating the patient or keeping them in a coma before death 
with the explicit intention of hastening their death.
4 ‘Lumping Together ’ Disparate Practices?
van Delden, Pijnenborg and van der Maas have criticised this broader definition of euthanasia 
as Tumping together’ the different types of end-of-life practices. This is primarily because 
they reject the centrality of intention, considering it as ‘weak’ and ‘fragile’ and essentially a
S6 See, eg, Hyam v Director o f  Public Prosecutions [1975] AC 55; R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025; R v 
Moloney [1985] AC 905.
87 Defined as ‘the administration o f drugs with the explicit intention of ending the patient’s life without a 
concurrent, explicit request by the patient’: van der Maas et al, 'Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and 
Other Medical Practices Involving the End o f Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995', above n 49, 1700.
88 This category appeared for the first time in the 2010 survey: Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'Trends in End-of- 
Life Practices before and after the Enactment of the Euthanasia Law in the Netherlands from 1990 to 2010: A 
Repeated Cross-Sectional Survey', above n 49, supplementary web appendix, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140- 
6736(12)61034-4.
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‘private matter’.89 As I argued at length in chapter 2, discerning a person’s state of mind is 
not a problem unique to end-of-life care. The criminal law routinely infers a person’s state of 
mind from the surrounding circumstances. A physician’s state of mind could be inferred 
from, for example, whether the drugs used had pain relieving properties and whether the 
dosage was medically indicated for pain relief.
As I also argued in chapter 2, a critique like that of the Dutch researchers conflates intention 
with motive. They argue that ‘no physician who performs euthanasia does so with the sole 
intent to kill his or her patient. His or her intention can always be described as trying to 
relieve the suffering of his or her patient.’90 However, the death of the patient is still the 
immediate objective of the act, the intended means to an end. As Keown argues, ‘while the 
doctor's motive may well be to relieve suffering, he intends to do so by shortening the 
patient's life. And that is precisely why, in most jurisdictions, the doctor who performs 
euthanasia is liable for murder.’91
(a) Continuous and Deep Sedation
The category of deaths by continuous and deep sedation was first identified in the Dutch 
survey of 2001. In this practice patients are deeply and continuously sedated at the same time 
as other practices that possibly hasten death are employed, such as the withdrawal of nutrition 
and hydration. This practice, sometimes referred to as ‘terminal sedation,’92 has steadily 
increased in the Netherlands: from 5.6 per cent of all deaths in 2001 to 7.1 per cent of all 
deaths in 2005, to eleven per cent of all deaths in 2010.93 The 2005 Dutch survey revealed 
that ‘euthanasia and assisted suicide were to some extent replaced by continuous deep 
sedation.'94 The practice is not limited to patients for whom death is imminent.95
89 van Delden, Pijnenborg and van der Maas, above n 71, 325.
90 Ibid.
91 Keown, "Dances with Data': A Riposte', above n 73, 3 (emphasis in original).
92 It is distinguished from ‘palliative sedation’ where the patient is deeply and continuously sedated until death. 
In palliative sedation, if hydration and nutrition are withheld, they are only withheld for a limited period at the 
very end of life and this withholding is unlikely to have hastened death: see Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above 
n 40, 164-165.
93 Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'Trends in End-of-Life Practices before and after the Enactment of the Euthanasia 
Law in the Netherlands from 1990 to 2010: A Repeated Cross-Sectional Survey', above n 49, 9, note to table 1. 
See also Judith Rietjens et al, 'Continuous Deep Sedation for Patients Nearing Death in the Netherlands: 
Descriptive Study' (2008) 336 British Medical Journal 810.
94 van der Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Practices in the Netherlands under the Euthanasia Act', above n 49, 1962.
95 Judith A C Rietjens et al, 'Physician Reports of Terminal Sedation without Hydration or Nutrition for Patients 
Nearing Death in the Netherlands' (2004) 141 Annals o f Internal Medicine 178, 183.
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In a significant omission, the 2001, 2005 and 2010 English version reports fail to disclose 
whether in these cases it was the doctor’s explicit intent to cause death, although the 2010 
survey did ask this question.96 However, the researchers note that ‘[p]hysicians ... sometimes 
administer sedatives when they have the explicit intention of hastening death, such that 
sedation and euthanasia are not mutually exclusive in all cases.’97
In a 2002 Dutch survey, 17 per cent of physicians who practised continuous deep sedation 
reported that they did so with the explicit intention to hasten death.98 The increase in the use 
of continuous deep sedation between 2001 and 2005 occurred mostly in patient populations 
in which euthanasia is most common: ie those attended by general practitioners and those 
with cancer. Moreover, in nine per cent of the cases in 2005 continuous deep sedation 
followed an ungranted euthanasia request.99 This again suggests that continuous deep 
sedation is increasingly used as a means of intentionally hastening death.
(b) ‘ Withdrawal or Withholding o f Treatment with the Explicit Intention to Hasten Death ’
As I have argued, an accurate assessment of the rate of euthanasia must include the Dutch 
category of ‘withdrawal or withholding of treatment with the explicit intention to hasten 
death’, which is commonly referred to as ‘passive’ euthanasia, van Delden, Pijnenborg and 
van der Maas disagree because in their view this would blur the distinction between illicit 
practices (‘killing’) and acceptable practices (‘letting die’).100
However, van Delden, Pijnenborg and van der Maas are incorrect, because the Dutch 
category of ‘withdrawal or withholding of treatment with the explicit intention to hasten 
death’ excludes what I argued in chapter 3 were morally and legally acceptable omissions of 
treatment: ie withdrawal of treatment where treatment is futile (because it cannot achieve its 
medically indicated purpose) or when it is excessively burdensome. To repeat, the Dutch
96 Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, Trends in End-of-Life Practices before and after the Enactment of the Euthanasia 
Law in the Netherlands from 1990 to 2010: A Repeated Cross-Sectional Survey', above n 49, supplementary 
web appendix, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/SO 140-6736( 12)61034-4.
97 van der Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Practices in the Netherlands under the Euthanasia Act', above n 49, 1963. 
Kuhse would agree: see Helga Kuhse, 'Why Terminal Sedation Is No Solution to the Voluntary Euthanasia 
Debate' in Torbjom Tannsjo (ed), Terminal Sedation: Euthanasia in Disguise? (Kluwer, 2004) 63.
98 Rietjens et al, 'Physician Reports of Terminal Sedation without Hydration or Nutrition for Patients Nearing 
Death in the Netherlands', above n 95, 181.
99 J A C Rietjens et al, 'Two Decades of Research on Euthanasia from the Netherlands. What Have We Learnt 
and What Questions Remain?' (2009) 6 Journal o f Bioethical Inquiry 271, 281.
100 van Delden, Pijnenborg and van der Maas, above n 71, 324.
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category of withdrawal or withholding of treatment with the explicit intention to hasten death 
should be included in the assessment of the Dutch rate of euthanasia. This is so for two 
reasons.
First, the Dutch interview questionnaires clarified that this category does not include ‘day-to- 
day’ decisions by physicians to omit treatment that would be unsuccessful in prolonging life. 
101 I argued in chapter 3 that this is correctly described as futile treatment. Secondly, this 
category does not refer to the other ‘day-to-day’ omission of treatment, that is, on the basis 
that it is burdensome to the patient. As I argued in chapter 3, a patient does not have a duty to 
accept burdensome treatment and an omission of such treatment is unlikely to infer an 
‘explicit intention’ to hasten death. Rather, when treatment is omitted on the basis of burden, 
it is more likely that the patient and doctor accept death as a foreseen (and perhaps welcome, 
but not intended) side effect. This is a state of mind more akin to the second or third of the 
states of mind identified by the Dutch researchers which I discussed above.
Smith argues that to include the withdrawal or withholding of treatment with the explicit 
intention to hasten death within a wider definition of euthanasia ‘would include medical 
practices that are accepted in most Western countries.’1112 He points to cases such as Blandn)3 
in the United Kingdom and Cruzann)4 in the United States where, he says, the (explicit) 
intention underlying the withdrawal of treatment was that the patient should die.
However, the acceptability of such deaths is highly contested.105 In chapter 3 I argued that 
some decisions to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment are based on an erroneous 
concept of futility which conflates the concept of futility of treatment with the futility of the 
patient’s life. While such non-treatment decisions are accepted in some judicial decisions as 
being in the patient’s best interests,106 this is arguably improper. I contend that a decision to 
withdraw treatment from a patient who is viewed as having ‘a life not worth living’, coupled
van der Maas, van Delden and Pijnenborg, above n 78, 84-85.
1112 Stephen W Smith, 'Evidence for the Practical Slippery Slope in the Debate on Physician-Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia' (2005) 13 Medical Law Review 17, 35.
103 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789.
104 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department o f Health 497 US 261 (1990).
105 See, eg, John Keown, 'Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law After Bland (1997) 113 Law 
Quarterly Review 481; John Finnis, 'Bland: Crossing the Rubicon?' (1993) 109 Law Quarterly Review 329; 
Christopher Tollefsen, 'Ten Errors Regarding End of Life Issues and Especially Artificial Nutrition and 
Hydration' in Christopher Tollefsen (ed), Artificial Nutrition and Hydration: The New Catholic Debate 
(Springer, 2008) 213.
106 See, eg, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789.
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with an intention on the part of a healthcare worker to cause the patient’s death, should be 
understood as a form of euthanasia.
For these reasons I argue that since the Dutch category of withdrawing or withholding 
treatment excludes cases of ‘letting die’ (where there is not an explicit intent to cause death, 
but rather where treatment is omitted as clinically futile or burdensome), there is no ‘lumping 
together’ of lawful and unlawful practices. The ‘real’ rate of euthanasia in the Netherlands 
should include consideration of the Dutch category of ‘withdrawal or withholding of 
treatment with the explicit intention to hasten death’.
4 Conclusion
The ‘empirical dilemma’ about the incidence of euthanasia in the Netherlands is foremost a 
dispute about foundational principles of moral evaluation. The Dutch researchers contend that 
in defining euthanasia, more is to be taken into account than just intention, such as the 
presence of the patient’s request. However, I have argued that intention is central to moral 
evaluation. While this principle is contested, especially by consequentialists, it is supported 
by a rich philosophical tradition and record of scholarship, as discussed in chapter 2.
Because I argue that intention to cause death is central to the definition of euthanasia, a 
calculation of the incidence of euthanasia must include all categories of acts or omissions 
done with the explicit purpose (or intention) of hastening death. As table 2, below, illustrates, 
according to this wider definition, I calculate there were 16 523 cases in 1990, significantly 
higher than the figure of 2318 calculated by the Dutch researchers in their narrow definition. 
My calculation is also lower than Keown’s calculation of over 26 000 cases because he 
factored in acts and omissions done with the partial intention to hasten death which I have 
argued is not a relevant category.109
1117 van Delden, Pijnenborg and van der Maas, above n 71, 326.
I(IS Keown, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?', above n 70, 270, table 1, citing 
Paul van der Maas, J J M van Delden and L Pijnenborg, Medische beslissingen rond het levenseinde 
(Euthanasia and other Medical Decisions Concerning the End o f Life: an Investigation) (SDU Uitgeverij 
Plantijnstraat, 1991).
109 Although note that Keown did calculate the subtotal o f ‘explicit intention’ of 10,558: Keown, 'Euthanasia in 
the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?', above n 70, 270, table 1. He has subsequently disregarded 
the ‘partial intent’ category in his calculation because the definition is ‘arguably unclear’: Keown, "Dances with 
Data': A Riposte', above n 73, 2.
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In the next chapter I examine the incidence of non-voluntary euthanasia in an effort to assess 
voluntariness as an indicator of control under conditions of both prohibition and legalisation. 
The definition of euthanasia I have laid out here will form the foundation of that examination 
because in my calculation I will factor in all categories of acts or omissions that intentionally 
cause death without explicit request. Following table 2 below, I analyse the debate regarding 
the Australian study by Kuhse and colleagues.
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Table 2
The Incidence of All Acts or Omissions Done 
with the Explicit Intention of Hastening Death in the Netherlands
(expressed as percentages of all deaths (%) and number of deaths (N))
Category of 
Explicit Intention 
of Hastening 
Death
1990 1995 2001 2005 2010
% N % N % N % N % N
Euthanasia 
‘narrowly’ defined 
as ‘the
administration of 
drugs with the 
explicit intention 
of ending the 
patient’s life on his 
or her explicit 
request’.a)
1.7b) 2190 2.4 3256 2.6 3650 1.7 2319 2.8 3809
Termination of life 
without requestc) 0.8 1031 0.7 950 0.7 983 0.4 546 0.2 272
Physician-assisted
suicide11 0.2b) 258 0.2 271 0.2 281 0.1 136 0.1 136
Withdrawal or 
withholding of 
treatment with 
explicit intention 
to hasten deathe>
9 11 694 13 17 638 13 18 249 8 10912 ?j) ?
Alleviation of 
symptoms with 
explicit intention 
to hasten deathn
1.0 1350 1.5 2000 <?g) ? ? ? ? ?
Patient deciding to 
end life by 
stopping eating 
and drinking10
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.4 544
Totalh) 12.7 16 523 17.8 24 115 ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total deaths in the 
Netherlands by 
any cause1
128 824 135 675 140 377 136 402 136 056
Notes
a) Bregje Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'Euthanasia and Other End-of-Life Decisions in the Netherlands in 1990, 
1995, and 2001' (2003) 362 The Lancet 395, 396. Percentages in this category are reported in Agnes van der 
Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Practices in the Netherlands under the Euthanasia Act' (2007) 356 The New England 
Journal o f Medicine 1957, 1961, table 1. The 2010 data is from Onwuteaka-Philipsen, Bregje D et al, 'Trends in
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End-of-Life Practices before and after the Enactment of the Euthanasia Law in the Netherlands from 1990 to 
2010: A Repeated Cross-Sectional Survey' (2012) 380 The Lancet 908.
b) This is a slightly higher figure than I quoted in the body of this chapter because van der Heide et al cite the 
results of the death certificate study, not the best estimate of all three studies combined which would result in a 
slightly higher percentage. See Agnes van der Heide et al, above n a), 1958.
c) Percentages in this category are reported in ibid 1961, table 1.
d) Percentages in this category are reported in ibid 1961, table 1. The 2010 data is from Onwuteaka-Philipsen et 
al, Trends in End-of-Life Practices before and after the Enactment of the Euthanasia Law in the Netherlands 
from 1990 to 2010: A Repeated Cross-Sectional Survey', above n a).
e) Percentages in this category are reported in John Griffiths, Heleen Weyers and Maurice Adams, Euthanasia 
and Law in Europe (Hart Publishing, 2008) 154, table 5.1, citing Bregje D Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, Evaluatie 
Van De Wet Toetsing Levensbeèindiging Op Verzoek En Hulp Bij Zelfdoding: Praktijk, Melding En Toetsing 
[Evaluation of the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedure) Act o f 2002] 
(ZonMw, 2007). Note the figures reported here include all cases of withdrawal/ withholding with the explicit 
intention to hasten death ie cases both with explicit patient request and without explicit request. For 1990 
Keown only reports cases in this category without explicit patient request, a figure of 4000 such deaths and 
therefore underestimates the total incidence of deaths with the explicit intention of hastening death in 1990: he 
states there were 10 558 such deaths whereas my estimate is there were 16 523: John Keown, 'Euthanasia in the 
Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?' in John Keown (ed), Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical 
and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 261,270, table 1.
f) Percentages in this category are reported in John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument 
against Legalisation (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 126, table 2.
g) There is no data available in English for this category for the years 2001, 2005 and 2010.
h) These total percentage estimates do not correspond to the total number of deaths (eg, 12.7 per cent of 128 824 
is 16 361). Griffiths, Weyers and Adams highlight the same problem and note ‘[n]o explanation for the 
difference is given in the reports of the national studies’: above n e), 154, table 5.1.
i) The total number of deaths in the Netherlands for each year is reported in Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'Trends 
in End-of-Life Practices before and after the Enactment of the Euthanasia Law in the Netherlands from 1990 to 
2010: A Repeated Cross-Sectional Survey', above n a).
j) There is no data available in English for this category in 2010.
k) This question was asked for the first time in 2010.
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B Kuhse et al ‘End o f Life Decisions in Australian Medical Practice ’
Australia had its own ‘numbers game’ in 1997 following the publication of a study by Kuhse 
et al about end-of-life practices by Australian physicians.110 The publication in the Medical 
Journal o f Australia occurred at a time of national debate about the recent legalisation of 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in the Northern Territory, and during a Senate 
Committee enquiry* 111 into proposed Commonwealth legislation to override the Territory 
legislation. The most controversial finding was that ‘[i]n 30% of all Australian deaths, a 
medical end-of-life decision was made with the explicit intention of ending the patient's life,
• » 1 1 9of which 4% were in response to a direct request from the patient.’ “ This indicated a rate of 
non-voluntary termination of life higher than in the Netherlands.
The figures were disputed, with accusations of a Tack of objectivity and balance in the 
composition of the research team and the seemingly political nature of the project.’113 Three 
of the authors, Kuhse, Singer and Baume, were active public advocates of legalisation of 
voluntary euthanasia. Kuhse in reply argued that criticism of the study was a ‘contrived and 
unconvincing attempt by well-known opponents of voluntary euthanasia’.114
The reliability of the Kuhse et al survey is important because the findings are frequently cited 
in comparative studies and as evidence of the failure of prohibition to curtail euthanasia.113 I 
examine the findings in my next chapter about indicators of control. Therefore I now analyse 
the key criticisms116 of the Kuhse et al study and assess the credibility of the findings.
110 Kuhse et al, above n 1.
111 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Enquiry into the Euthanasia Laws Bill 1996.
112 Kuhse et al, above n 1, 191.
113 Nicholas Tonti-Filippini et al, Joint Supplementary Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Euthanasia Laws Bill 1996, 22 February 1997, 
4 (‘Joint Submission’).
114 Helga Kuhse, Supplementary Submission No. 2 to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Euthanasia Laws Bill 1996, 27 February 1997, 11 ( ‘Supplementary 
Submission 2’).
115 See, eg, Deliens et al, above n 55; Patrik S Florencio and Robert H Keller, 'End-of-Life Decision Making: 
Rethinking the Principles of Fundamental Justice in the Context o f Emerging Empirical Data' (1999) 7 Health 
Law Journal 233.
11(1 The criticisms are outlined in Tonti-Filippini et al, Joint Submission, above n 113 and Nicholas Tonti- 
Filippini et al, Joint Supplementary Submission (No. 2) to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Euthanasia Laws Bill 1996, 2 March 1997 ( ‘Joint 
Submission 2’). For a response see Helga Kuhse, Supplementary Submission 2, above n 114.
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1 Sample Size
The first criticism relates to sample size. In their submission to the Senate Committee 
Enquiry, Tonti-Filippini and colleagues argue that the ‘Kuhse et al study is not comparable to 
the Paul J van der Maas et al study ... in size, scope and design and does not provide a basis 
for the comparative conclusions that the authors make between Australia and the 
Netherlands.’117 They highlight the smaller sample size of the Kuhse et al study: 3000 doctors 
with a 64 per cent response rate. This compares with 6942 questionnaires mailed in the 
original Dutch 1990 study, with a response rate of 76 per cent114 and 6060 questionnaires 
mailed in 1995, with a response rate of 77 per cent.1211 While some studies do have larger 
sample sizes than the Kuhse et al research,121 a number have similarly smaller sample 
sizes. For example, in a study of end-of-life practices in six European countries and 
Australia, the number of questionnaires sent out varied from 1870 in Denmark to 3873 in 
Italy, with response rates varying from a low of 39 per cent in Italy to a high of 64 per cent in 
Switzerland. The smaller sample size in the Kuhse et al study, like these other studies, 
may call for some degree of caution in drawing comparisons with larger scale research such 
as the Dutch study. However, this can be an issue for all comparative research.
2 No Triangulation o f Data
A second criticism of the Kuhse et al study is that it was confined to a postal survey which 
relied on doctors’ recollections of their past behaviour. Unlike the Dutch research, the 
Australian study did not include a death certificate study. 124 For this reason, Otlowski points
1 9 S
out that the results of the Australian study are not ‘directly comparable’ to the Dutch data. "
117 Tonti-Filippini et al, Joint Submission, above n 113, 3.
118 Kuhse et al, above n 1, 192.
1 14 van der Maas et al, ‘Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life’, above n 2, 670.
1211 van der Maas et al, 'Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Other Medical Practices Involving the End 
of Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995', above n 49, 1700.
121 See, eg, Seale, ‘End-of-Life Decisions in the UK Involving Medical Practitioners’, above 13; Bilsen et al, 
above n 55.
122 See, eg, Kay Mitchell and Glynn Owens, 'National Survey of Medical Decisions at End o f Life Made by 
New Zealand General Practitioners' (2003) 327 British Medical Journal 202; Douglas et al, above n 7.
123 Bregje D Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'End-of-Life Decision Making in Europe and Australia: A Physician 
Survey' (2006) 166 Archives o f  Internal Medicine 921, 922.
124 See, eg, Robert Manne, 'Research and Ye Shall Find' (1997) 41(3) Quadrant 2, 2; Anthony Fisher et al, 
'Matters Arising: End-of-life Decisions in Australian Medical Practice' (1997) 166 Medical Journal o f Australia 
506, 506.
125 Otlowksi, above n 35, 141 n 14.
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Moreover, the Australian study lacked triangulation of data used in the Dutch study because 
it did not include the interview and prospective studies.
The absence of the interview study is significant because the interviews were designed to 
check the doctors’ interpretation of the questions and the concepts used in the survey: if a 
doctor had incorrectly categorised a practice in the written questionnaire, this could be probed 
and corrected during the interview. The Dutch researchers regarded the interviews as an 
important ‘quality control’ " mechanism and ‘contributed greatly to quantification as well as 
to gaining an insight into the background(s) of [medical decisions concerning the end of 
life].’129
The lack of triangulation, and omission of the interview study in particular is a 
methodological weakness of the Kuhse et al study. However, the same can be said of every 
other quantitative study into end-of-life practices, none of which, to my knowledge, have 
replicated all three parts of the Dutch studies. This does not mean that we should jettison any 
attempt at comparative analysis. However, it does suggest caution in comparing data across 
different studies.
3 ‘Lumping’?
The most vehement criticism of the Australian survey relates to Kuhse et al’s wording of the 
question regarding the withdrawal or withholding of treatment. The dispute is reminiscent of 
the ‘numbers game’ analysed earlier where the Dutch researchers rejected what they 
perceived as the Tumping together’ of disparate practices under the Dutch category of 
‘withdrawal or withholding of treatment with the explicit intention to hasten death’. I argued 
then that there was no ‘lumping’ because the Dutch category excluded morally and legally 
acceptable omissions of treatment. However, the wording of the Australian questionnaire 
does Tump together’ certain practices. This inappropriately inflates the incidence of
126 Kuhse et al’s explanation for omitting the interview component of the study is that anonymity was essential 
‘because we were seeking information about conduct for which doctors would be liable for prosecution’: Kuhse 
et al, above n 1, 192. This is not entirely convincing. There are relatively straightforward strategies to protect 
interview data and ensure confidentiality, including those employed by van der Maas, van Delden and 
Pijnenborg, above n 78, 34.
127 van der Maas, van Delden and Pijnenborg, above n 78, 34-35, 118.
128 Ibid 35.
129 ti • j  i n i
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intentional termination of life in Australia, an important observation for the comparative 
analysis in my next chapter.
Question 5 of the Kuhse et al survey purports to reproduce question 6 of the 1995 Dutch 
survey. According to Kuhse et al, their questionnaire was ‘based on an authoritative 
translation provided by the Dutch researchers’ in the 1995 study and was therefore 
comparable.1"’0 Critics argued that the Australian wording was significantly different and this 
criticism was warranted.131
Box 1
1995 Dutch survey question 6132
‘Was death as a result of one or more of the following courses of action, upon which was decided by you or a 
colleague for the express purpose of expediting the end of life*:
(answer 6a as well as 6b)
6a. Not starting treatment** yes/ no
6b. Stopping treatment** yes/no
* Expediting the end of life may also meanyy ‘not prolonging life’
** In this investigation no treatment also includes no feeding’
Kuhse et al survey question 5134
‘Was death caused by one or more of the following actions or omissions which you or a colleague decided to 
take with the explicit intention o/135 not prolonging life or hastening death? (Please answer both 5a and 5b)
a) withholding treatment* yes/no
b) withdrawing treatment* yes/no
* In this study ‘treatment’ includes tube feeding’
130 Kuhse et al, above n 1, 192.
131 Tonti-Filippini et al, Joint Submission, above n 113, 11-12.
132 Translated in ibid 11. The Dutch researchers do not provide an English translation of the 1995 questionnaire. 
The equivalent question in the 1990 survey made no reference to ‘not prolonging life’ and only referred to 
‘hastening the end of life’: van der Maas, van Delden and Pijnenborg, above n 78, 213.
133 Emphasis added.
134 Quoted in Tonti-Filippini et al, Joint Submission, above n 113, 12.1 was unable to obtain an original copy of 
the Kuhse et al questionnaire from any source, including from Kuhse.
135 Emphasis in original.
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Question 6 of the 1995 Dutch survey asked whether death was the result of withdrawal or 
withholding of treatment ‘which was decided by you or a colleague for the express purpose 
of expediting the end of life*’. It noted with an asterisk that ‘[expediting the end of life may 
also mean ‘not prolonging life'.’
The phrase ‘may also mean’ indicates that the Dutch questionnaire gave a respondent the 
option of including a decision not to prolong life in this category by answering ‘yes’, but did 
not require a respondent to include it. As Tonti-Filippini et al argue, ‘[i]t would thus be open 
to a conscientious doctor to answer negatively if he felt that while withholding or 
withdrawing overly burdensome treatment and thus not prolonging life, he had not acted to 
expedite the end of life.’ As I argued in chapter 3, in this situation, a doctor’s intent (or 
express purpose) might instead be to relieve the patient of the burdens of treatment. In other 
words, the Dutch question acknowledges the crucial distinction between treatment omissions 
for the purpose of avoiding unreasonable burdens on the one hand, and omissions for the 
purpose of causing death on the other.
The wording of the equivalent Kuhse et al question blurs this distinction. It asks whether 
death was caused by withholding or withdrawing treatment ‘which you or a colleague 
decided to take with the explicit intention o f not prolonging life or hastening death?’137 Tonti- 
Filippini et al argue that this phrasing conflates decisions to omit burdensome or 
unreasonable treatment with decisions to omit treatment in order to hasten the end of life: ‘a 
doctor who decided to withhold an aggressive treatment, such as ... invasive surgery ...
• « 1  *38would be required to answer “yes” to the Kuhse question.’
Is this a fair criticism? The answer is yes and no. Tonti-Filippini et al over-state their 
critique. They do not acknowledge that this question is confined to decisions with a specific 
state of mind: ‘with the explicit intention of not prolonging life or hastening death’, as Kuhse 
et al point out in response to this criticism.139 Omissions of treatment with different states of 
mind would not fall within this category. Strictly speaking, a doctor who lacked the explicit 
intention when omitting treatment could answer ‘no’ to this question.
136 Tonti-Filippini et al, Joint Submission, above n 113, 12.
137 Quoted in Tonti-Filippini et al, Joint Submission, above n 113, 12 (emphasis in original).
138 Ibid.
139 H Kuhse et al, 'Matters Arising: End of Life Decisions in Australian Medical Practice' (1997) 166 Medical 
Journal o f Australia 507, 507.
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The real problem with the Kuhse et al question is the uncertain meaning of the vague phrase 
‘not prolonging life’. Unlike the Dutch wording, the Kuhse et al question puts ‘not 
prolonging life’ decisions in the same category as ‘hastening death’ decisions. Yet in 
common understanding, ‘not prolonging life’ is associated with appropriate ‘letting die’ 
decisions where there is not an intent to kill and is distinct from ‘hastening death’ decisions 
which are commonly regarded as decisions to kill. The Kuhse et al wording Tumps together’ 
these disparate practices.
For example, a doctor who omitted burdensome treatment with the intention of sparing the 
patient the continued burden could characterise this state of mind as the ‘explicit intention of 
not prolonging life’. The doctor would thus be required to answer yes to this question in the 
Kuhse et al survey, even though the decision was not accompanied by what I have argued 
earlier in this chapter is the morally and legally relevant intention to hasten death. The 
phrasing of the Australian question inaccurately inflates the incidence of intentional 
termination of life.
Moreover, the Kuhse et al survey did not have the benefit of the Dutch interview study to 
verify the meaning of concepts such as ‘not prolonging life’ and to ensure that practices were 
correctly categorised by doctors. The Dutch interviews specifically clarified that the 
‘withdrawal/ withholding’ category does not include decisions by physicians to omit 
treatment on the basis that the treatment would be unsuccessful in prolonging life. 140 There 
was no such opportunity for clarification in the Australian study.
3 Questionable Findings
For these reasons, the accuracy of the Kuhse et al conclusions can be questioned. Their most 
startling conclusion -  that ‘30% of all Australian deaths were preceded by a medical decision 
explicitly intended to hasten the patient’s death’141 -  is almost certainly overstated because of 
the Tumping together’ I described above: 24.7 per cent of such deaths include decisions to 
withhold or withdraw treatment with the explicit intention to hasten death and decisions with 
the explicit intention of not prolonging life.142 The Tumping together’ in the withdrawal/
140 van der Maas, van Delden and Pijnenborg, above n 78, 84-85.
141 Kuhse et al, ‘End-of-Life Decisions in Australian Medical Practice’, above n 1, 195.
142 Ibid.
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withholding category undermines other important conclusions, including the finding that 
‘Australia had a significantly higher rate of intentional ending of life without the patient’s 
consent ... than the Netherlands.’143 This is a key issue for the following chapter.
C Asking the Right Questions
My analysis of the ‘dances with data’ controversy and the arguments about the Kuhse et al 
research demonstrates that part of the ‘empirical dilemma’ is that the Dutch researchers, and 
those who have attempted to replicate their surveys, have not collected data in ways that 
permit accurate quantification and debate by those who frame the terms differently.
I have argued that what is of particular moral and legal significance are acts and omissions 
done with the explicit intent to hasten death. In Box 2 below I propose a questionnaire which 
would allow for a more accurate quantification of these relevant practices. However, the way 
my questions are worded allows other researchers to categorise and sub-categorise these 
practices differently from the way I do. This is important in a field where there is no single 
acknowledged conceptual framework to facilitate discussion among researchers with 
divergent moral, and even conflicting legal, views about the significance of various end-of- 
life practices.
While there are many other relevant questions that might be asked, for example, the age of 
the patient, the role of the family in the decision, the personal characteristics of the 
respondent, I have only indicated questions I consider essential to ascertaining the nature and 
incidence of end-of-life decisions and to avoid Tumping together’ disparate practices.
I have not used terms such as ‘euthanasia’ because, as the original Dutch researchers noted, 
their interpretation varies.144 1 have endeavoured to use wording which is clinically and 
legally relevant. Conciseness is important in encouraging doctors to complete the survey: my 
questionnaire is about the same length, or a little shorter, than the original Dutch survey.14^ 
Following Box 2 I explain key aspects related to these proposed questions.
143 Ibid.
144 P J van der Maas, J J M van Delden and L Pijnenborg, 'Euthanasia and other Medical Decisions Concerning 
the End of Life: An Investigation Performed upon Request of the Commission of Inquiry into the Medical 
Practice Concerning Euthanasia' (1992) 22 Health Policy 3, 115.
145 Ibid 213-216.
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Box 2
Proposed Questionnaire
1) In relation to the most recent non-acute death for which you acted as the treating doctor did you:
a) withhold a treatment* (or ensure that it was withheld)?
b) withdraw a treatment* (or ensure that it was withdrawn)?
c) use any drug to alleviate pain and/or symptoms?
d) continuously and deeply sedate the patient or keep them in a coma before death?
(tick one or more answers)
* ‘Treatment’ includes cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR), ventilation and artificial feeding and/or hydration.
2) Was the patient male or female?
- male
- female
3a) Was the decision to withhold treatment made in response to an explicit request by the patient?
- yes
- no
- not applicable as I did not withhold a treatment
3b) Was the decision to withdraw treatment made in response to an explicit request by the patient?
- yes
- no
- not applicable as I did not withdraw a treatment
3c) Was the decision to use a drug to alleviate pain and/or symptoms made in response to an explicit request by 
the patient?
- yes
- no
- not applicable as I did not use a drug to alleviate pain and/or symptoms
3d) Was the decision to continuously and deeply sedate the patient or keep them in a coma before death made in 
response to an explicit request by the patient?
- yes
- no
- not applicable as I did not continuously and deeply sedate the patient or keep them in a coma before death
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4a) In withholding a treatment, did you consider it probable or certain that this would hasten the end of the 
patient’s life?
- yes
- no
- not applicable as I did not withhold a treatment
4b) In withdrawing a treatment, did you consider it probable or certain that this would hasten the end of the 
patient’s life?
- yes
- no
- not applicable as I did not withdraw a treatment
4c) In administering the drugs to alleviate pain and/or symptoms, did you consider it probable or certain that this 
would hasten the end of the patient’s life?
- yes
- no
- not applicable as I did not administer drugs to alleviate pain and/or symptoms
4d) In continuously and deeply sedating the patient or keeping them in a coma, did you consider it probable or 
certain that this would hasten the end of the patient’s life?
- yes
- no
- not applicable as I did not continuously and deeply sedate the patient or keep them in a coma before death
5a) In withholding a treatment, did you have the explicit intention* to hasten the end of life?
- yes
- no
- not applicable as I did not withhold a treatment
* In this study, ‘intention’ means purpose, aim or objective.
5b) In withdrawing a treatment, did you have the explicit intention to hasten the end of life?
- yes
- no
- not applicable as I did not withdraw a treatment
5c) In continuously and deeply sedating the patient or keeping them in a coma, did you have the explicit 
intention to hasten the end of life?
- yes
- no
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- not applicable as I did not continuously and deeply sedate the patient or keep them in a coma before death
6a) In withholding a treatment, was it the patient’s explicit intention to hasten the end of their life?
- yes
- no
- 1 don’t know
- not applicable as I did not withhold a treatment
6b) In withdrawing a treatment, was it the patient’s explicit intention to hasten the end of their life?
- yes
- no
- 1 don’t know
- not applicable as I did not withdraw a treatment or the patient.
6c) In continuously and deeply sedating the patient or keeping them in a coma, was it the patient’s explicit 
intention to hasten the end of their life?
- yes
- no
- 1 don’t know
- not applicable as I did not continuously and deeply sedate the patient or keep them in a coma before death
7a) In withholding a treatment, was it your assessment that the treatment would be unduly burdensome to the 
patient or that the treatment could not achieve its clinical purpose?
- yes
- no
- not applicable as I did not withhold a treatment
7b) In withdrawing a treatment, was it your assessment that the treatment would be unduly burdensome to the 
patient or that the treatment could not achieve its clinical purpose?
- yes
- no
- not applicable as I did not withdraw a treatment
8a) In withholding a treatment, was it the patient’s assessment that the treatment would be unduly burdensome 
or, on medical advice, that the treatment could not achieve its clinical purpose?
- yes
- no
- 1 don’t know
- not applicable as I did not withhold a treatment
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8b) In withdrawing a treatment, was it the patient’s assessment that the treatment was unduly burdensome or, 
on medical advice, that the treatment could not achieve its clinical purpose?
- yes
- no
- 1 don’t know
- not applicable as I did not withdraw a treatment
9a) Was death caused by the use of a drug prescribed, supplied or administered by you with the intention of 
hastening the end of life (or with the intention of enabling the patient to end his or her own life)?146
- yes
- no
9b) If yes, who administered the drug?
- the patient in your presence
- the patient without you being present
- you or another doctor
- a nurse
- another person in your presence
- another person without you being present
9c) Was the decision to administer the drug at the explicit request of the patient?
- yes
- no
10) In your estimation, by how much was the patient’s life shortened due to the act or omission?
- more than 6 months
- 1 -  6 months
- 1 — 4 weeks
- up to one week
- less than 24 hours
- life probably was not shortened at all
Unlike the Dutch surveys and the Kuhse et al questionnaire, my questions ask about types of 
treatment (questions la - Id )  before they ask separately about expectations or intentions 
associated with these treatments (questions 4a -  5c).147 This makes it clear to respondents that 
a particular treatment decision need not necessarily be accompanied by an expectation of or 
an intention to hastened death. In contrast, the Dutch and Kuhse et al wording conflates these
146 Cf Seale, ‘End-of-Life Decisions in the UK Involving Medical Practitioners’, above n 13, 199.
147 Cf Ibid.
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issues because in the same question, an inquiry about the type of treatment is wrapped up 
with an inquiry about the respondent’s state of mind. Seale argues this can potentially 
overestimate the number of treatment decisions made with the expectation or intention of
148hastening death.
My proposed questions ask whether withdrawal and withholding decisions are made with the 
explicit intention to hasten death, in keeping with my argument in chapter 3 that both acts and 
omissions can be intentionally employed to cause death. Questions 8a and 8b attempt to 
identify non-treatment decisions made because of the burden or futility of the treatment 
which, as I argued in chapter 3, a patient does not have a duty to accept. This information 
assists to distinguish legitimate refusals of treatment from suicidal refusals of treatment. No 
other surveys have asked these questions. However, as I have noted, the 2010 Dutch survey 
for the first time asked whether a patient stopped eating or drinking with the purpose of 
ending his or her life.
Questions 7a and 7b ask whether the doctor considered the patient’s treatment burdensome or 
clinically futile. The answers to these questions may help clarify the ‘real’ reason for the 
doctor’s non-treatment decision. For example, in questions 5a and 5b, a doctor might identify 
the non-treatment decision as an intentional effort to end the life of the patient, whereas an 
affirmative answer to question 7a or 7b would suggest this might not be the case.
Questions 4a-4d relate to treatment decisions which the respondent reports would probably or 
certainly hasten death, in other words, ‘double effect’ decisions. This reflects my argument in 
chapter 2 that there is a morally and legally relevant distinction between conduct which 
intentionally causes death and conduct where death is the unintended but foreseen -  even 
certain -  consequence.
Some of my proposed questions attempt to fill gaps in the Netherlands data which I identify 
in the following chapter. For example, as I will highlight, the Dutch surveys of 2001 and 
2005 fail to ask whether or not patients requested the withdrawals and withholdings that were 
performed with the explicit intention of causing death. Questions 3a-3d attempt to obtain
148 Ibid 202-203.
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clear information about whether there was an explicit request underlying such treatment 
decisions.
Question 2 asks about the sex of the patient. As I highlighted in chapter 5, there is evidence 
that sex and gender play a role in decisions about euthanasia and assisted suicide, but this 
important data about patient sex is not always reported.
My questions avoid the ambiguous concept of ‘not prolonging life’ which appears in the 
Dutch and Kuhse et al questionnaires. As I have explained, the particular wording of the 
Kuhse et al question, in the minds of some respondents, could potentially conflate legitimate 
‘letting die’ decisions such as omitting burdensome treatment with decisions to intentionally 
hasten death.
Question Id asks whether the respondent continuously and deeply sedated the patient or kept 
them in a coma before death, the same wording that has been used in other surveys.149 
Importantly, my proposed questionnaire asks whether this practice was done with the explicit 
intent to hasten death and whether it was at the request of the patient, information which has 
not been published in English.
Question 10 (which also appears in the Dutch questionnaires and replicated studies) 
recognises the legal and clinical relevance of causation: the act or omission must be a cause 
of the patient’s death. A respondent might assess that although he or she did intend to hasten 
death, in reality their treatment decision did not affect life expectancy.
In relation to the use of drugs to relieve symptoms, unlike the Dutch research150 and other 
surveys,151 I have not asked whether hastening death was the partial intention underlying this 
decision. As I argued earlier in this chapter, this question confuses intention with desire and 
what respondents identify as the ‘partial intention of hastening death’ is likely to be in most 
cases instead the knowledge of probable or certain death, in other words, a ‘double effect’ 
decision.
144 van der Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Practices in the Netherlands under the Euthanasia Act', above n 49; Johan 
Bilsen et al, 'Changes in Medical End-of-Life Practices during the Legalization Process of Euthanasia in 
Belgium' (2007) 65 Social Science and Medicine 803; Seale, ‘End-of-Life Decisions in the UK Involving 
Medical Practitioners’, above n 13.
150 See, eg, the first 1992 survey: van der Maas, van Delden and Pijnenborg, above n 144, 213.
151 Seale, ‘End-of-Life Decisions in the UK Involving Medical Practitioners’, above n 13, 199.
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In addition to my proposed questionnaire, cross verification of results could be achieved if 
retrospective and prospective interviews were conducted with doctors, which is the Dutch 
gold standard methodology, described earlier. However, I have attempted to word the 
questionnaire so respondents can complete it without further explanation since, apart from the 
Dutch triangulated methodology, most quantitative research in this field relies solely on a 
postal survey.
VI CONCLUSION
Quantitative and qualitative studies demonstrate both the practice of euthanasia and assisted 
suicide under prohibition and the disquieting characteristics of the ‘underground’. In the next 
chapter I examine whether these practices are more effectively controlled where they are 
legal, focussing on the Netherlands and Belgium. In this chapter I have established the 
foundations for that analysis.
I have identified three key indicators of control: voluntariness, visibility, and accountability. 
Interpreting the data can be a highly charged ‘numbers game’, sometimes driven by 
competing understandings of moral evaluation. I have developed a survey instrument which 
can be used by researchers who approach these issues from differing moral perspectives so 
that studies can be comparable and generate a more accurate picture of end-of-life practices. 
My critique of some pivotal Dutch and Australian studies also informs my comparative 
analysis of the capacity for legalisation to ‘control’ euthanasia, in the next chapter.
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8Indicators Of Control: A Comparative Analysis
I INTRODUCTION
The empirical reality of euthanasia and assisted suicide surveyed in the previous chapter 
confirms that under prohibition ‘[t]here is ... a wide gulf between the strict legal position ... 
and the position in practice ...’’ While ‘it is a fallacy to equate prohibition with effective 
control’,1 2 3in this chapter I challenge the argument that legalisation more effectively controls 
assisted death. I conduct a comparative analysis o f ‘control’ in jurisdictions such as Australia, 
the United Kingdom and other parts of Europe where assisted death is prohibited and in the 
Netherlands and Belgium where it is permitted under certain legal conditions.
Griffiths, Weyers and Adams point to the increased ‘quantity’ of euthanasia law in the 
Netherlands since legalisation broke the ‘taboo’ and the greater quantity of law than in places 
where assisted death is prohibited. They describe the Dutch system of legal control as an
avalanche of “juridification” ... The Dutch have not freed the doctors from constraints that bind their 
colleagues in other countries, on the contrary, they have subjected the behaviour of doctors to much more 
law than used to be the case, and to much more than it attracts elsewhere.4
However, the ‘quantity’ of law does not necessarily equate to legal control. What really 
matters is effectiveness in practice. It is easy for critics of the Dutch system to ‘focus on the 
mote in another’s eye and ignore the beam in their own...’5 While the failures of prohibition 
must be faced squarely, it is also easy to over-state the effectiveness of control in the 
Netherlands.
1 Margaret Otlowski, 'The Effectiveness of Legal Control o f Euthanasia: Lessons from Comparative Law' in 
Albert Klijn, Margaret Otlowski and Margo Trappenburg (eds), Regulating Physician-Negotiated Death 
(Elsevier, 2001) 137, 139.
2 Ibid 138.
3 John Griffiths, Heleen Weyers and Maurice Adams, Euthanasia and Law in Europe (Hart Publishing, 2008) 
510-511.
4 Ibid 511.
5 Ibid 517.
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In the previous chapter I identified three key indicators of legal control of euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide: voluntariness of request, visibility and accountability. In parts II, 
III and IV of this chapter I use these indicators to evaluate the effectiveness of the Dutch and 
Belgian legalised systems and compare this with my analysis of prohibitionist jurisdictions.
I argue that after nearly 30 years of legal development, the Dutch system fails to control 
assisted death satisfactorily. The concerns I identify in this chapter are more than merely 
‘manageable imperfections'6 and should give pause for caution in considering legalisation as 
a response to the problems of the euthanasia underground. Ten years after legalisation in 
Belgium, there is evidence of some of the same systemic failings as in the Netherlands: non­
reporting; mis-classification of life terminating behaviour; the problematic characteristics of 
cases that remain underground; and lack of scrutiny by the authorities. Prohibition doesn’t 
‘work’ but neither does legalisation. This points to a hard reality: assisted death may well be 
beyond legal control.
II VOLUNTARINESS
As I explained in the previous chapter, a system which effectively controls euthanasia and 
physician-assisted suicide would safeguard that these practices are conducted upon the 
voluntary request of a patient. Such a system would have a low proportion of intentional 
termination of life without explicit request.
A Prohibition
There is evidence that termination of life without explicit request does occur under 
prohibition. The Australian study by Kuhse et al estimated that the proportion of all 
Australian deaths that involved ending a patient’s life without the patient’s concurrent explicit 
request by the use of drugs was 3.5 per cent.7 Decisions not to treat with the explicit intention 
of not prolonging life or of hastening death without explicit patient request amounted to an
6 Ibid.
7 Helga Kuhse et al, 'End-of-Life Decisions in Australian Medical Practice' (1997) 166 Medical Journal o f 
Australia 191, 193.
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Oestimated 22.5 per cent of all Australian deaths. In chapter 7 I argued that the wording of the 
withdrawal/ withholding question inflated the incidence of intentional termination of life.
Douglas et al’s 2001 study showed that at least 20.4 per cent of their sample of 683 Australia 
doctors had given drugs in doses greater than those required to relieve symptoms, with the 
intention of hastening death, but without explicit patient request.9 Thus it is clear that 
intentional ending of life without the patient’s request does occur in Australia. However, as I 
argued in chapter 7, it is questionable whether ‘[ojverall, Australia [has] a higher rate of 
intentional ending of life without the patient’s request than the Netherlands,’10 as Kuhse et al 
conclude.
Research since Kuhse et al’s study raises further doubts about their conclusion that 3.5 per 
cent of all Australian deaths were intentional terminations without explicit request. Research 
in Europe discloses rates very much lower than in Australia. The intentional termination of 
life through the supply, administration or prescription of drugs without request represents 
0.67 per cent of all deaths in Denmark; in Belgium (where euthanasia was at the time 
prohibited), 1.5 per cent; in Switzerland (where euthanasia is still illegal), 0.42 per cent; in 
Sweden, 0.23 per cent and in Italy, 0.06 per cent.* 11 The Dutch rate at 0.60 per cent over the 
same period of 2001-2002 was higher than everywhere except Belgium and virtually the 
same as Denmark. “ In the United Kingdom intentional termination of life by the use of drugs 
without request is estimated to account for 0.33 per cent of all deaths. It is questionable 
whether Australia’s end of life practices could be so radically out of step with other Western 
nations such that its proportion of non-voluntary terminations is triple or quadruple that of 
these other countries, as Kuhse et al’s study indicates.
These European studies do not provide data about other end of life decisions (such as 
decisions not to treat) which were done with the intention to cause death but without explicit
8 Ibid 195.
9 Chades D Douglas et al, The Intention to Hasten Death: A Survey of Attitudes and Practices of Surgeons in 
Australia ' (2001) 175 Medical Journal o f Australia 511,513.
10 Kuhse et al, above n 7, 191.
11 Agnes van der Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Decision-Making in Six European Countries: Descriptive Study' 
(2003) 361 Lancet 345, 347.
12 Ibid.
13 Clive Seale, 'National Survey of End-of-Life Decisions Made by UK Medical Practitioners' (2006) 20 
Palliative Medicine 1,1.
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request.14 Therefore, it is not possible to ‘measure’ accurately voluntariness as an indicator of 
control under prohibition. However, this brief overview demonstrates that intentional 
termination of life without explicit patient request occurs throughout the world under 
prohibition. With the exception of Belgium and the Kuhse et al Australian study, the accuracy 
of which I have questioned, the evidence is that the rate of intentional termination of life 
without request is mostly lower under prohibition than it is in the Netherlands.
B The Netherlands
1 ‘Administration o f Drugs with the Explicit Intention o f Ending the Patient’s Life without an 
Explicit Request’
The Dutch studies into end-of-life practices have a very specific definition of ending of life 
without explicit request: ‘the administration of drugs with the explicit intention of ending the 
patient’s life without an explicit request from the patient.’15 Thus the method of death -  the 
administration of drugs - is central to the definition.
Using this definition, the incidence of taking life without explicit request has remained fairly 
constant. As table 3 below indicates, in 1990, 0.8 per cent of all deaths in the Netherlands fell 
within this category, representing 1031 deaths.16 By 2010, there had been a steady decrease to 
0.2 per cent of all deaths in the Netherlands, which as a percentage is low, but it is still 272 
patients who had their lives intentionally terminated by this method without explicit request 
in 2010.
14 van der Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Decision-Making in Six European Countries: Descriptive Study', above n
11. See also Georg Bosshard et al, 'Forgoing Treatment at the End o f Life in 6 European Countries ' (2005) 165 
Archives o f Internal Medicine 401.
15 Bregje Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'Euthanasia and Other End-of-Life Decisions in the Netherlands in 1990, 
1995, and 2001' (2003) 362 Lancet 395, 396.
16 Agnes van der Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Practices in the Netherlands under the Euthanasia Act' (2007) 356 
New England Journal o f Medicine 1957, 1960.
17 Bregje D Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'Trends in End-of-Life Practices before and after the Enactment of the 
Euthanasia Law in the Netherlands from 1990 to 2010: A Repeated Cross-Sectional Survey' (2012) 380 Lancet 
908 (‘Trends’).
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Table 3
Frequency of Intentional Termination of Life without Explicit Request by all Methods in
the Netherlands
(expressed as percentages of all deaths (%) and number of deaths (N))
Method of Intentional 
Termination of Life without 
Explicit Request
1990 1995 2001 2005 2010
% N % N % N % N % N
Termination of life without 
explicit request31 0.8b) 1031 0.7 950 0.7 983 0.4 546 0.2 272
Withdrawal or withholding of 
treatment with explicit intent 
to cause death without explicit 
request.
3.1 4000c) 10.5 14 200d) oe) ? ? ? ? ?
Alleviation of symptoms with 
explicit intent to cause death 
without explicit request.
0.35 450° ?g> ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Total 4.3 5481
11.2
(at least)
15 150 
(at least)
Total deaths in the Netherlands 
by any cause1” 128 824 135 675 140 377 136 402 136 056
Notes
a) Defined as ‘the administration of drugs with the explicit intention of ending the patient’s life without an explicit 
request from the patient.’ Bregje Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'Euthanasia and Other End-of-Life Decisions in the 
Netherlands in 1990, 1995, and 2001' (2003) 362 The Lancet 395, 396.
b) Percentages in the category of termination of life without request are reported in Agnes van der Heide et al, 'End- 
of-Life Practices in the Netherlands under the Euthanasia Act' (2007) 356 The New England Journal o f Medicine 
1957, 1961, table 1.
c) This figure is taken from John Keown, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?' in John
Keown (ed), Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 
261, 270, table 1, citing Paul van der Maas, Johannes J M van Delden and L Pijnenborg, Euthanasia and Other 
Medical Decisions Concerning the End o f Life (Elsevier, 1992). From my reading, Keown’s calculation of 4000 
deaths by withdrawal or withholding of treatment with explicit intent to cause death without the patient’s explicit 
request is correct and is based on data on pages 185-186 and page 90, table 8.15 of Paul van der Maas, Johannes J 
M van Delden and L Pijnenborg. For some reason, the figure of 4000 is different from a figure of 2670 deaths in 
1990 by the same method published subsequently by Henk Jochemsen, and John Keown, 'Voluntary Euthanasia 
under Control? Further Empirical Evidence from the Netherlands' (1999) 25 Journal o f Medical Ethics 16, 17, table
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1. Jochemsen and Keown do not provide an explanation for this lower figure and my close reading of Paul van der 
Maas, Johannes J M van Delden and L Pijnenborg provides no basis for the figure of 2670 deaths. Therefore I have 
quoted the figure of 4000 deaths which I consider more reliable. Moreover, Keown later reiterates the figure of 
4000 deaths in this category: John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: An Argument against 
Legalisation (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 96, table 1.
d) Jochemsen, and Keown, above n c), 17, table 1, citing Gerrit van der Wal and Paul van der Maas, Euthanasie En 
Andere Medische Beslissingen Rond Het Levenseinde. De Praktijk En De Meldingsprocedure. (Euthanasia and 
Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life. Practice and Reporting Procedure) (SDU uitgevers, 1996). I 
am unable to verify Jochemsen and Keown’s calculation of the figure of 14,200 deaths by this method because only 
summaries of this Dutch report are published in English.
e) In 2001 and 2005, no data was published regarding the withdrawal or withholding of treatment with explicit 
intent to cause death without patient request.
f) John Keown, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?', above n c), 270, table 1, citing 
Paul van der Maas, Johannes J M van Delden and L Pijnenborg, above, n c). Keown’s calculation of deaths by this 
method appears to be correct and on my analysis is based on data on page 76, table 7.8 and pages 77 and 183 of 
Paul van der Maas, Johannes J M van Delden and L Pijnenborg, above, n c).
g) In 1995, 2001 and 2005 no data was published about the alleviation of symptoms by the use of opioids with the 
explicit intention of hastening death.
h) The total number of deaths in the Netherlands is reported in Bregje D Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'Trends in End- 
of-Life Practices before and after the Enactment of the Euthanasia Law in the Netherlands from 1990 to 2010: A 
Repeated Cross-Sectional Survey' (2012) 380 The Lancet 908, 909, table 1.
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2 Other Methods o f Intentionally Causing Death without Explicit Request
In chapter 7 I challenged the narrow Dutch definition of euthanasia. I argued that because an 
act or an omission of whatever description can be intentionally employed to cause death, the 
method of death is not legally or morally relevant, but the underlying intention - or ‘explicit 
purpose’ - to cause death is. Similarly, all methods of intentionally causing death must be 
considered when calculating the incidence of termination of life without explicit request.
When all methods of intentionally causing death are considered, the real rate of death without 
explicit request in the Netherlands increases. As table 3 demonstrates, in 1990 there were 
5481 such deaths, representing 4.3 per cent of all deaths in the Netherlands. This is more than 
five times the rate of 1031 non-voluntary deaths calculated by the Dutch researchers. This 
means that one third of all intentionally hastened deaths in 1990 were without explicit patient 
request.18
As Smith points out, an increase in non-voluntary termination of life ‘would provide some 
evidence ... that the Dutch were finding it increasingly difficult to abide by the [legal] 
guidelines’;19 in other words over time there has been a breakdown of legal control. We 
cannot know whether the rate of these practices increased in the Netherlands after euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide were effectively legalised by the courts in 1984 because we 
know nothing of the incidence of these practices before legal change. Lewis correctly points 
out that in the absence of any evidence of the rate of non-voluntary termination of life prior to 
legal change, it is not possible to conclude that any increase was caused by legal change. 
Even if there was such evidence, this would not necessarily infer a causal link: the increase 
could be caused by a change in social norms that might have predated legalisation.
IX See my table 2, chapter 7: by my calculations in 1990 there were 16 523 intentionally hastened deaths by all 
methods with or without explicit request. Keown states that 52 per cent o f intentionally hastened deaths were 
without explicit request: John Keown, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?' in 
John Keown (ed), Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 
1995) 261, 2 7 8 .1 argue Keown’s calculation is incorrect because he underestimates the incidence of 
intentionally hastened deaths by all methods in 1990, as I explained in note e) to my table 2, chapter 7.
19 Stephen W Smith, 'Evidence for the Practical Slippery Slope in the Debate on Physician-Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia' (2005) 13 Medical Law Review 17, 35.
20 See, eg, Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 515.
21 Penney Lewis, 'The Empirical Slippery Slope from Voluntary to Non-Voluntary Euthanasia' (2007) 35 
Journal o f Law, Medicine and Ethics 197, 200.
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However, as Lewis argues ‘a significant increase in the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia 
within a short time during which legalization has taken place would strongly suggest that 
legalization has had an influence on the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia.’ Lewis concludes 
that there is no such evidence because she limits her analysis to the restrictive Dutch 
definition of ending of life without explicit request, a practice which, as I noted above, has 
declined slightly over the years. However, when all methods of intentionally causing death 
are included in the analysis, there has been a significant rise in the Dutch rate of non­
voluntary termination of life, at least between 1990 and 1995, and possibly beyond.
3 An Increase in the Rate o f Non-Voluntary Termination o f Life
As table 2 in chapter 7 shows, there were an estimated 24 115 deaths in 1995 (compared with 
16 523 in 1990) where the explicit intention was to hasten death, with or without request. The 
total number of these deaths in 1995 without explicit request is not certain because there are 
no data about how many of the 2000 cases24 in which life shortening opioids were used with
c
the explicit intent to shorten life, without explicit patient request."
However, the data shows that in only 43 per cent of all cases in which life shortening opioids 
were used in 1995, was the decision to administer large doses discussed with the patient. 
Some of these decisions were accompanied by the foresight of the probability of death but 
some did involve the explicit intention to hasten death. From this insight it seems reasonable 
to extrapolate that in 1995 there were a number of deaths without explicit request through the 
use of opioids with probable life shortening effects.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid 199. Other studies that confine their analysis to the same restrictive definition come to the same 
conclusion: See, eg, Smith, above n 19, 36.
24 This figure is calculated by Jochemsen and Keown: Henk Jochemsen and John Keown, 'Voluntary Euthanasia 
under Control? Further Empirical Evidence from the Netherlands' (1999) 25 Journal o f Medical Ethics 16, 17, 
citing Gerrit van der Wal and Paul van der Maas, Euthanasie en andere medische beslissingen rond het 
levenseinde. Depraktijk en de meldingsprocedure. (Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the 
End o f Life. Practice and Reporting Procedure) (SDU uitgevers, 1996) table 7.2.
25 For 2001,2005 and 2010, there is no data available about the alleviation of symptoms by the use of opioids 
with the explicit intention of hastening death.
26 Whether with the explicit intention to hasten death or with that partial intention or taking into account the 
probability that life will be shortened.
27 Paul van der Maas et al, 'Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Other Medical Practices Involving the 
End o f Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995' (1996) 335 New England Journal o f Medicine 1699, 1702.
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As table 3 above demonstrates, the rate of withdrawal or withholding of treatment with the 
explicit intention to cause death without explicit request increased from 4000 deaths in 1990, 
to 14 200 deaths in 1995.28 In 1995 the number of deaths without explicit request according 
to the strict Dutch classification was 950.“ Therefore, as table 3 indicates, the approximate 
number of intentional deaths without explicit request in 1995 is at least 15 150. This is a 
significant increase from the 5481 cases in 1990.
As I demonstrated in table 2 in the previous chapter, in 1995 there were 24 115 intentionally 
hastened deaths by all methods, including those with and without explicit request. As table 4 
below shows, this means that in 1995 over 62 per cent of all intentionally hastened deaths 
occurred without the patient’s explicit request. This is a significant increase from the 33 per 
cent in 1990. As table 3 highlights, intentional deaths without explicit patient request 
represented over 11 per cent of all deaths that occurred in the Netherlands in 1995, up from 
4.3 per cent in 1990. If Lewis’ reasoning is accepted, this significant increase in the rate of 
non-voluntary termination of life over just five years ‘would strongly suggest that legalization 
has had an influence on the rate of non-voluntary euthanasia.’30
Table 4
Comparison of the Incidence of Intentional Termination of Life 
without Explicit Request 1990 and 1995
1990 1995
Intentional termination of life 
by all methods3’
Number of deaths Number of deaths
16 523 24 115
Intentional termination of life 
by all methods without 
explicit requestb)
Number of 
deaths
As a percentage 
of intentional 
termination of life 
by all methods
Number of 
deaths
As a percentage of 
intentional 
termination of life 
by all methods
5481 33% 15 150 62%
Notes
a) This includes deaths with and without explicit request. Refer to table 2 for the calculation of these 
figures.
h) Refer to table 3 for the calculation of these figures.
2S This represented 3.1 per cent and 10.5 per cent of all deaths in the Netherlands respectively. See table 3 in this 
chapter, citing Keown, above n 18, 270, table 1; Jochemsen and Keown, above n 24, 17, table 1.
24 See table 3 in this chapter, citing van der Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Practices in the Netherlands under the 
Euthanasia Act', above n 16, 1961, table 1.
30 Lewis, above n 21, 200.
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4 A Causal Link?
I argue that the legal and political climate around 1990 to 1995 influenced the rate of 
intentional non-voluntary termination of life. According to Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, 
this was a time ‘when euthanasia practice had become fairly well normalized...’31 In 1990, 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide had been effectively legalised by the courts for six 
years. In January 1990 the Remmelink Commission was appointed by the Dutch government 
to conduct research into euthanasia practice. In November 1990, after consultation with the 
Dutch Medical Association, a reporting procedure for euthanasia was announced by the 
Minister of Justice. At the same time, the prosecutorial authority issued instructions to police 
about the investigation of reported cases: discretion was the guiding principle. In September 
1991, the Remmelink Commission delivered its report, based on the first national research by 
Van der Maas et al.
Griffiths, Bood and Weyers note that
[although the results o f the research can support a variety of interpretations and conclusions, the 
Commission’s report consistently chooses the politically unproblematic interpretation and draws the 
politically reassuring conclusion ... the current situation in the Netherlands gives no occasion for political 
concern.34
The Government published its formal response to the Report in November 1991. It concluded 
that ‘medical practice in connection with the end of life is characterized by great
T C
conscientiousness and responsibility’. In 1993 the reporting procedure and requirements of
36
careful practice which had been developed by the courts were enshrined in statutory form.
3 7
This came into force in June 1994.
This demonstrates that between 1990 and 1995 there was a period of growing legal and 
political permissiveness and normalisation of euthanasia practice. There is a strong
31 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 128.
32 John Griffiths, Alex Bood and Heleen Weyers, Euthanasia and Law in The Netherlands (Amsterdam 
University Press, 1998) 76.
33 Ibid 77.
34 Ibid 78-79.
35 Ibid 79, citing Second Chamber o f Parliament 1991-1992, 20 383, no 14 2.
36 Wetboek van Strafrecht [Penal Code] (the Netherlands) art 293.
37 Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, above n 32, 79-80.
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correlation between this increasing liberalisation and the significant increase in non-voluntary 
intentional termination of life over the same period.
An increase over a five year interval is not evidence of a trend or a sustained inability to 
control non-voluntary termination of life. Unfortunately, it is not possible to calculate the 
incidence of non-voluntary termination of life in more recent years because as table 3 shows, 
there are no published data about two significant categories: the use of opioids with probable
t o
life shortening affect and the omission of life-sustaining treatment.
5 Terminal Sedation
The recent increase in the Netherlands of the use of ‘continuous deep sedation’ which is often 
combined with the omission of hydration and nutrition, must also be considered when 
ascertaining the rate of intentional hastening of death without explicit request. As I explained 
in chapter 7, a significant number of these cases occur with the explicit intention of hastening 
death.
The Dutch surveys do not ask whether continuous deep sedation occurred with the patient’s 
explicit request." However, other research has found that continuous deep sedation 
frequently occurs without explicit request. In one nationwide study conducted in 2010, 
around half the sample of 482 physicians reported having used terminal sedation but they 
discussed this with the patient in 59 per cent of cases.40 In just 33 per cent of cases had the 
patient actually requested sedation.41 There was even less consultation about the decision to 
omit artificial hydration or nutrition: this was discussed in 34 per cent of cases but there was 
an explicit patient request in just 9 per cent of cases.4/
Therefore, while precise figures are not reported, it is likely that a significant number of 
terminal sedations done with the explicit intention of hastening death occurred without the 
explicit request of the patient. The practice of terminal sedation is further confirmation that 
the actual rate of non-voluntary termination of life is higher than the official Dutch rate.
38 This was confirmed by an email from Agnes van der Heide to Katrina George, 28 July 2011.
39 Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, ‘Trends’, above n 17.
411 Judith A C Rietjens et al, 'Physician Reports o f Terminal Sedation without Hydration or Nutrition for Patients 
Nearing Death in the Netherlands' (2004) 141 Annals o f Internal Medicine 178, 180.
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C Belgium after Legalisation
Belgian research sheds little light on the question of voluntariness. There has been one 
quantitative study about the incidence of various end-of-life practices in Flanders, Belgium 
and one national study since euthanasia was legalised in 2002.43 The rate of termination of 
life without explicit request (narrowly defined) was 1.6 per cent of all Belgian deaths in 
2005-2006.44 This is a slight increase from 1.5 per cent in 2001, prior to legalisation.45 In a 
2007 survey of Flanders, the rate had increased to 1.8 per cent of all deaths. These rates are 
significantly higher than the 2001-2002 rates in European countries where euthanasia and/or 
assisted suicide are illegal, noted in part II A above. For example, in Switzerland cases of 
termination of life without explicit request comprised 0.42 per cent of all deaths; in Sweden, 
0.23 per cent and in Italy, 0.06 per cent of all deaths.46
D Conclusion
The exact incidence of non-voluntary termination of life in the Netherlands and Belgium is 
unknown. Belgian research since legalisation does not report data about all methods of 
intentional termination of life without explicit request, including withdrawal or withholding 
of treatment and the use of pain relieving drugs. While data ‘overload’ is sometimes a feature 
of the Dutch research, some critical data are missing, as table 3 highlights. Certainly in the 
Netherlands the rate of non-voluntary termination of life must be much higher than the 
official 272 cases which fell within the strict Dutch definition in 2010. Non-voluntary 
termination of life occurs under prohibition. While it might be expected that legalisation 
would ensure the voluntariness of patient request, the available evidence discussed here 
demonstrates that this does not always occur in practice.
43 Lieve van den Block et al, 'Euthanasia and Other End-of-Life Decisions: A Mortality Follow-Back Study in 
Belgium' (2009) 9:79 BMC Public Health 1; Kenneth Chambaere et al, 'Trends in Medical End-of-Life Decision 
Making in Flanders, Belgium 1998-2001-2007' (2011) 31 Medical Decision Making 500.
44 van den Block et al, above n 43, 3.
45 van der Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Decision-Making in Six European Countries: Descriptive Study', above n i l ,  
347.
46 Ibid.
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Ill VISIBILITY
A Prohibition
A second indicator of legal control is visibility, by which I mean that assisted death is 
practised in the open to allow formal scrutiny. One criticism of prohibition is that it creates a 
‘conspiracy of silence’ where ‘euthanasia is concealed and protected by an all-pervasive 
culture of deception’, marked by hidden decision making.47 As discussed in chapter 6, this 
was certainly a feature of the culture which facilitates euthanasia at the Chronic Care Unit.
Not only is there no official oversight of assisted death under prohibition, but consultation 
with colleagues, another marker of visibility, is less likely to occur under prohibition than 
legalisation, van der Heide et al found that doctors in jurisdictions where assisted death is 
illegal were less likely to discuss an end-of-life decision (including euthanasia, physician- 
assisted suicide and omission of treatment with the explicit intention of hastening death) with 
another doctor than doctors in countries where assisted death is legal (18 per cent and 40 per 
cent respectively). Similarly, consultation with a nurse was more likely to occur in countries 
where assisted dying is legal than in countries where it is prohibited.44 Against this, however, 
is the finding that in the United Kingdom doctors discuss end-of-life decisions with 
colleagues even more frequently than do doctors in countries where assisted death is legal (52 
per cent and 40 per cent respectively) and just as often with nurses (47 per cent).50
B Legalisation in the Netherlands and Belgium
It is frequently argued that legalisation drags euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide into 
the regulatory light of day. However, the visibility of these practices presupposes their 
accurate reporting. In this section I critique the reporting systems in the Netherlands and
47 Roger S Magnusson, Angels o f Death: Exploring the Euthanasia Underground (Melbourne University Press, 
2002) 254-255.
4X van der Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Decision-Making in Six European Countries: Descriptive Study', above n i l ,  
348, table 4. See also Clive Seale, 'Characteristics of End-of-Life Decisions: Survey of UK Medical 
Practitioners' (2006) 20 Palliative Medicine 653, 656, table 4.
49 van der Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Decision-Making in Six European Countries: Descriptive Study', above n i l ,  
348, table 4.
511 Seale, 'Characteristics of End-of-Life Decisions: Survey of UK Medical Practitioners', above n 48, 656, table 
4. Seale calls these results ‘surprising’ and suggests they could reflect ‘a long-standing commitment in UK 
medical culture to shared decision-making’: at 658
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Belgium. I demonstrate that many of the most problematic assisted death cases remain hidden 
under legalisation
1 The ‘Due Care ’ and Reporting Requirements
In the Netherlands, doctors who facilitate euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide and 
termination of life without request must report the death as ‘non-natural’ to the municipal 
pathologist.51 Since 2002, reported cases are then reviewed by one of five Regional Review 
Committees comprising a physician, a lawyer and an ethicist. The committees decide 
whether the physician has complied with the ‘due care’ requirements which are: (1) that the 
patient's request was voluntary and well-considered; (2) the patient's suffering was 
unbearable and hopeless, with no reasonable alternative; (3) the patient was informed about 
his or her situation and prospects of improvement; (4) the doctor concluded the patient’s 
suffering was hopeless; (5) another, independent physician had been consulted and (6) the 
termination of life was performed with due medical care and attention/ The case will be 
referred to the prosecutorial authority only if the physician fails to convince the committee 
that he or she has complied with these requirements.
Since legalisation in 2002, Belgium has had a similar system. A doctor who performs 
euthanasia is required to notify the Federal Control and Evaluation Committee. There is no 
offence if the doctor complies with the due care requirements set out in the legislation.54 
Smets et al summarise the Belgian requirements:
To make a legitimate euthanasia request, the patient must be an adult, must be conscious and legally 
competent at the moment of making the request, and must be in a condition of constant and unbearable 
physical or psychological suffering resulting from a serious and incurable disorder caused by illness or 
accident, for which medical treatment is futile and there is no possibility of improvement. The physician
51 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 126-127.
52 Cases of termination of life without request are reviewed directly by the prosecutorial authorities, and not the 
review committees (except for the termination o f neonates which are reviewed by a government established 
Expert Committee): ibid 130.
3 Jurriaan de Haan, The New Dutch Law on Euthanasia' (2002) 10 Medical Law Review 57, 62, citing Wet 
toetsing levensbeeindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding [Termination of Life on Request and Assistance 
with Suicide (ReviewProcedures) Act] (The Netherlands) 1 April 2002, s 2(1).
54 Maurice Adams and Herman Nys, 'Comparative Reflections on the Belgian Euthanasia Act 2002' (2003) 11 
Medical Law Review 353, 358, citing Loi relative a l'euthanasie 28 Mai 2002 [Act on Euthanasia of May 28th 
2002] (Belgium) 28 May 2002, sections 3J 1 and 4 /2 .
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decides whether the disorder is incurable based on the actual state of medicine, and the patient alone 
determines whether suffering is constant and unbearable.55
Based on the information provided by the doctor, if the committee finds the requirements 
have been met, the case is closed. However, when the committee determines that one or more 
of the due care requirements have not been followed it must refer the case to the public 
prosecutors.56
1 now go on to argue that the Dutch and Belgian reporting systems exert inadequate control 
which undermines the visibility of assisted death. First, a significant number of euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide cases remain unreported. Secondly, the problematic cases 
which flout the procedural requirements of due care -  precisely the cases that most need legal 
control - are much less likely to be reported.
2 Unreported Cases
Griffiths, Weyers and Adams point out that:
[t]he system of legal control over euthanasia in the Netherlands ... is crucially dependent on the 
willingness of those whose behaviour is to be controlled (doctors) to report what they have done. ... it is 
almost exclusively reported cases that are subjected to legal review and if necessary sanction.57
The same observation could be made of Belgium whose control system is also based on self- 
reporting by physicians. In Belgium ‘[t]he number of reported euthanasia cases increased 
every year from 0.23% of all deaths in 2002 to 0.49% in 2007.’58 There is no data yet 
available for subsequent years. As a proportion of actual estimated euthanasia cases, just
55 Tinne Smets et al, 'Legal Euthanasia in Belgium: Characteristics of All Reported Euthanasia Cases' (2009) 47 
Medical Care 1,1. Smets et al clarify that a ‘euthanasia request from a nonterminal patient... may also be 
granted under the same requirements of careful practice. Etowever, a third physician, a psychiatrist, or specialist 
in the illness from which the patient suffers, must be consulted, and there must be at least 1 month between 
request and performance of euthanasia’: at 1.
56 Mette L Rurup et al, 'The First Five Years of Euthanasia Legislation in Belgium and the Netherlands: 
Description and Comparison of Cases' (2012) 26 Palliative Medicine 43, 44.
57 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 196-197.
"s Smets et al, 'Legal Euthanasia in Belgium: Characteristics of All Reported Euthanasia Cases” , above n 55, 1.
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under 53 per cent of all euthanasia cases in Flanders were reported in 2007.59 The experience 
of the Netherlands suggests this rate might have since increased.
As a ratio of cases actually reported to the total number of estimated cases, the reporting rate 
of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands has risen steadily over the 
years, from 18 per cent in 1990, to 41 per cent in 1995, 54 per cent in 2001, to a high of 80 
per cent in 2005611 and 77 per cent in 2010.61 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams assert that ‘such 
data are nothing short of spectacular.' Certainly the Dutch reporting rate is higher than the 
reporting rate under prohibition: zero per cent. However, in a system which prides itself on 
transparency, 23 per cent is still a significant number of cases that remain hidden from 
scrutiny.
(a) Terminal Sedation
Moreover, if, as I argue and as the Dutch researchers would agree,63 many cases of ‘terminal 
sedation’ (continuous deep sedation used in conjunction with practices that intentionally 
hasten death) are the equivalent of euthanasia, the real reporting rate is even lower: ‘[t]he 
number of cases of terminal sedation ... that are reported and reach the Regional Review 
Committees seem to be miniscule.’64 According to Griffiths, Weyers, and Adams, in the 
Netherlands there are a ‘plainly substantial number’ of terminal sedations that would amount 
to ‘termination of life’ and should therefore be reported.65 Instead, most cases of terminal 
sedation are mis-reported as ‘natural deaths’.66
59 Tinne Smets et al, 'Reporting of Euthanasia in Medical Practice in Flanders, Belgium: Cross Sectional 
Analysis of Reported and Unreported Cases' (2010) 341 British Medical Journal, 
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2950259/> 1 (‘Cross Sectional Analysis’).
60 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 199, citing Bregje D Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, Evaluatie van de 
Wet toetsing levensbeeindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding: Praktijk, melding en toetsing [Evaluation o f  
the Termination o f Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedure) Act o f2002] (ZonMw, 2007) 
(‘Evaluation’).See also Gerrit Van der Wal et al, 'Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide. II. Do Dutch Family Doctors 
Act Prudently?' (1992) 9 Family Practice 135.
61 Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, ‘Trends’, above n 17, 908.
62 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 199.
63 van der Heide et al, 'End-of-Life Practices in the Netherlands under the Euthanasia A ct', above n 16, 1963.
64 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 177, citing Regionale Toetsingscommissies Euthanasie [Regional 
Review Committees Euthanasia], Annual Report (Ministry of Health, 2005) 8; Regionale Toetsingscommissies 
Euthanasie [Regional Review Committees Euthanasia], Annual Report (Ministry of Health, 2002) 17.
65 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 200.
66 Ibid.
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(b) Withdrawal and Withholding o f Treatment
In chapter 7 I argued that withholding or withdrawing treatment is, in some circumstances, 
the equivalent to intentional termination of life. However, such cases are not reportable in 
Belgium and the Netherlands and thus escape the control system altogether. Griffiths, Weyers 
and Adams comment that ‘ [f]rom the standpoint of adequate legal control, it is unnerving to 
see how casually all forms of withholding or withdrawing treatment are relegated to ‘normal 
medical behaviour’ that can be reported as a ‘natural death’.’
As Kuhse points out, the assumption that doctors who
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment and administer life-shortening palliative care do not 
[practise euthanasia] offers neither transparency nor regulatory protection. It does not encourage honesty 
and openness in the doctor/patient relationship and may encourage doctors to act patemalistically, rather 
than with their patient’s consent.68
(c) Termination o f Life without Explicit Request
Despite the legal requirement to report cases that fall in the Dutch category of ‘termination of 
life without explicit request’, ‘hardly any of them have been reported’.69 In Belgium, such 
deaths are not legally reportable and are thus ‘essentially unregulated in Belgium.’70
(d) The Problem of Classification
The problem of non-reporting appears to be partly one of classification. There are ‘major, 
systemic differences’71 in the way that doctors, prosecutors and researchers of Dutch 
euthanasia practice interpret and apply the official legal classifications. This has a major 
impact on reporting rates, van Tol’s research reveals three possible reporting rates for 2001,
67 Ibid 74, n 92.
68 Helga Kuhse, 'Why Terminal Sedation Is No Solution to the Voluntary Euthanasia Debate' in Torbjom 
Tannsjo (ed), Terminal Sedation: Euthanasia in Disguise? (Kluwer, 2004) 68.
69 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 127, citing Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, ‘Evaluation’, above n 60, 68- 
69 and Esther Pans, De normatieve grondslagen van het Nederlandse euthanasierecht [The Normative 
Foundations o f Dutch Euthanasia Law] (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006) 125-126.
7(1 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 344.
71 Ibid 203.
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depending on whose classification is used: according to prosecutors, just over 30 per cent; 
according to researchers, just over 50 per cent; and according to doctors, over 90 per cent.72
In the Netherlands in 2010 most doctors who indicated they had performed euthanasia or 
physician-assisted suicide did classify these practices accurately. However, 18.1 per cent 
mis-classified them as palliative or terminal sedation which are not reportable. This is 
comparable to findings from 2005.73 Moreover, in 2010, intentional termination of life 
without explicit request was never labelled as such by physicians. Rather, it was mis- 
classified as palliative or terminal sedation or alleviation of symptoms.74
Griffiths, Weyers and Adams state that breakdowns in the Dutch control system are mainly 
attributable to doctors’ failure to classify their behaviour as the law requires. ' Doctors almost 
always classify as euthanasia the obvious cases where an immediately lethal substance (other 
than morphine) is injected in a patient upon request at an agreed time.76 If other drugs are 
used with the same intention of hastening death, doctors -  contrary to the legal requirements 
-  will overwhelmingly classify their behaviour differently. When benzodiazepines are used 
to cause death, the cases are usually classified as ‘palliative/ terminal sedation’; when 
morphine is used, ‘pain relief is the usual classification.
In Belgium, a 2007 study indicates that mis-classification is the major reason for non­
reporting of euthanasia: in 76.7 per cent of non-reported cases, physicians said they did not 
perceive their act as euthanasia. Reported cases of euthanasia are nearly always performed 
with recommended drugs such as barbiturates and/or neuromuscular relaxants. However, 
most unreported cases are performed with non-recommended drugs, mainly opioids,
72 Ibid, citing Donald van Tol, Grensgeschillen; een rechtssociologisch onderzoek naar het classificeren van 
euthanasie en ander medisch handelen rond het levenseinde (Boundary Disputes: a Legal-Sociological Study of 
the Classification o f Euthanasia and other Medical Behaviour at the End o f Life) (PhD Thesis, University of 
Groningen, 2005) 292.
7 Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, ‘Trends’, above n 17, 911, table 3. There is no relevant data for other years.
74 In 2005 only 17.2 per cent of such cases were correctly classified. There is no data for other years: ibid.
75 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 211.
7(1 Ibid 203, citing van Tol, above n 72.
77 Only one per cent of such cases are accurately classified and hence reported as ‘termination of life’: Griffiths, 
Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 203, citing Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, ‘Evaluation’, above n 60, 107-108. 
s Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 204, citing Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, ‘Evaluation’,above n 60, 122- 
124. Rurup et al’s research confirms the problem of (mis)classification and that euthanasia with non- 
recommended drugs (such as opioids) is almost never reported by doctors: Mette L Rurup et al, 'The Reporting 
Rate of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Study of the Trends' (2008) 46 Medical Care 1198, 1198. 
7i> Smets et al, ‘Cross Sectional Analysis’, above n 59, 3-4.
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sedatives, or both. Exactly the same observation was made about the Netherlands data in 
2010. Smets et al hypothesise that one reason for non-reporting of euthanasia is that if, in 
response to a request for death, a doctor ‘disproportionally increases the opioid or sedative 
dose instead of administering neuromuscular relaxants, the distinction between euthanasia 
and normal compassionate intensification of symptom treatment is blurred.’82
(e) The Problem of Revisionist Practitioners
Another explanation for non-reporting or deliberate mis-classification of behaviour is that 
some so called ‘revisionist’ practitioners object on principle to reporting which they view as 
state intrusion on the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship. In 1990, about 20 per cent of 
Dutch doctors had conscientious objections like this, although this had declined to about 10 
per cent by 1995. More recently, there appears to be just under 10 per cent of doctors who 
would not report under any circumstances because euthanasia is a ‘matter between doctor and 
patient’. The same reason was given by 8.7 per cent of physicians who failed to report in 
Smet et al’s 2007 Belgian study.86
Magnusson’s research in Australia and San Francisco also identified revisionist practitioners 
who reject the idea of legalised guidelines as a bureaucratic intrusion into their clinical 
discretion. ‘The underlying assumption ... was that the doctor’s values, and experience, are 
a sufficient protection for patients...’ Revisionists see mandated safeguards as an imposition 
and resist the scrutiny involved in reporting to a regulatory authority.
Whatever the reasons for non-reporting -  rejection of state intrusion or honest differences in 
interpreting and applying the legal classifications -  it is clear that significant numbers of 
intentional terminations of life go unreported in the Netherlands and Belgium and escape the 
scrutiny of the control system altogether.
80 Ibid 4.
81 Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, ‘Trends’, above n 17, 914.
82 Smets et al, ‘Cross Sectional Analysis’, above n 59, 5.
82 This was the term used by Magnusson and which I discussed in chapter 6: Magnusson, above n 47, 104.
84 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 197, citing van der Wal and van der Maas, above n 24, 120-121.
85 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 197, n 152, citing Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, ‘Evaluation’, above n 
60, 177.
86 Smets et al, ‘Cross Sectional Analysis’, above n 59, 4.
87 Magnusson, above n 47, 107.
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3 Problematic Cases Remain Hidden
Also of significant concern are the characteristics of the cases which doctors do not report. 
Griffiths, Weyers and Adams comment about the Netherlands:
Much of what is currently classified as ‘pain relief -  and hence protected from public scrutiny by the 
mantra ‘normal medical behaviour’ -  is ethically and legally problematic: without a medical indication, 
without a request from the patient, without consultation with a colleague or other procedural
. go
protections.
van der Wal’s 1992 survey of general practitioners in the Netherlands revealed that the cases 
which failed to comply with the due care requirements such as consultation, written requests 
and proper record keeping, were more likely to be misreported as ‘natural death’.90 When 
cases were reported, the facts were stated in such a way that the likelihood of criminal 
investigation was minimised. For example, doctors stated that the suffering was worse than it 
really was; that the assisted death was more often at the patient’s initiative; and that the 
procedural requirements were followed more carefully than they really were.91
Follow up research confirms the concerning characteristics of the cases that remain hidden 
from scrutiny. While there was written record keeping in 97 per cent of reported cases, this 
occurred in only 57 per cent of the unreported cases. A written request for assisted death was 
provided by the patient in 73 per cent of the reported cases, but in 44 per cent of the 
unreported cases.92
Smet el al’s 2007 study in Flanders, Belgium disclosed the same pattern. The legally required 
written request from the patient was lacking in 87.7 per cent of unreported cases, whereas
q i
both a verbal and written request were present in 73.1 per cent of all reported cases.
s9 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 204.
90 Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, above n 32, 205, citing Gerrit van der Wal, Euthanasie en hulp bij zelfdoding 
door huisartsen [Euthanasia and Assistance with Suicide by Family Doctors] (WYT Uitgeefgroep, 1992).
91 Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, above n 32, 205, citing Gerrit van der Wal, Euthanasie en hulp bij zelfdoding 
door huisartsen [Euthanasia and Assistance with Suicide by Family Doctors] (WYT Uitgeefgroep, 1992).
92 Gerrit van der Wal et al, 'Evaluation of the Notification Procedure for Physician-Assisted Death in the 
Netherlands' (1996) 335 New England Journal o f Medicine 1706, 1708.
93 Smets et al, ‘Cross Sectional Analysis’, above n 59, 4.
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(a) Lack o f Consultation
Consultation with colleagues is an essential requirement for visibility and a form of proactive 
control. Thus the very low consultation rate in the unreported cases is particularly concerning. 
In a Dutch study, formal consultation with another physician occurred in the unreported cases 
only 11 per cent of the time, but 94 per cent of the time in the reported cases.94 Similarly in 
Belgium, other physicians were consulted in 97.5 per cent of reported cases, but in only 54.6 
per cent of unreported cases. Care-givers with expertise in palliative care were consulted in 
63.9 per cent of reported cases but in 33 per cent of unreported cases."
In the Dutch study, informal discussions with colleagues only occurred in 58 per cent of 
unreported cases, compared with 100 per cent of reported cases.96 In Flanders, Belgium the 
decision to perform euthanasia was discussed in 100 per cent of the reported cases, but in 
85.2 per cent of unreported cases.97
The SCEN programme in the Netherlands is a form of ‘before-the-fact’ supervision and 
control which has operated nationally since 1999. Under this program, specially trained 
consultants are available to assist doctors who are considering a request for assisted death. 
SCEN has reportedly improved the quality of consultation. One national study indicated 
that a SCEN consultant was involved in nearly 90 per cent of reported euthanasia cases.99 
Similar consultation services operate in Belgium. In the Dutch speaking region of Flanders, 
so called ‘LEIF’ consultants were involved in 54 per cent of reported cases.100 However, the
94 van der Wal et al, 'Evaluation c f  the Notification Procedure for Physician-Assisted Death in the Netherlands', 
above n 92, 1708.
95 Smets et al, ‘Cross Sectional Analysis’, above n 59, 4.
96 van der Wal et al, 'Evaluation of the Notification Procedure for Physician-Assisted Death in the Netherlands', 
above n 92, 1709.
97 Smets et al, ‘Cross Sectional Analysis’, above n 59, 4.
98 Marijke Catharina Jansen-van der Weide, Bregje Dorien Onwuteaka-Philipsen and Gerrit van der Wal, 
'Implementation of the Project ‘Support and Consultation on Euthanasia in The Netherlands’ (SCEN)' (2004) 69 
Health Policy 365; Marijke Catharina Jansen-van der Weide, Bregje Dorien Onwuteaka-Philipsen and Gerrit 
van der Wal, 'Quality of Consultation and the Project ‘Support and Consultation on Euthanasia in the 
Netherlands’ (SCEN)' (2007) 80 Health Policy 97. See also Maurice Adams and Heleen Weyers, 'Supervision 
and Control in Euthanasia Law: Going Dutch?' (2012) 23 King's Law Journal 121, 131-132; Ron L P 
Berghmans and Guy A M Widdershoven, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Consultation and Review' (2012) 23 
King's Law Journal 109, 114.
99 Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, ‘Evaluation’,above n 60, cited in Adams and Weyers, above n 98, 132.
100 Yanna Van Wesemael et al, 'Role and Involvement of Life End Information Forum Physicians in Euthanasia 
and Other End-of-Life Care Decisions in Flanders, Belgium' (2009) 44(6) Health Services Research 2180, 2180. 
‘LEIF’ stands for ‘Forum for End of Life Information’. A similar organisation, Médecins EOL, operates in the
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problem persists that non-reporting is associated with a lack of consultation with another 
doctor.101
Even with the legal guidelines of the Dutch and Belgian systems and an improving reporting 
rate, my analysis questions the visibility of assisted death. The most problematic cases of 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide remain hidden, immune from scrutiny, and hence 
uncontrolled.
IV ACCOUNTABILITY
An effective control system would also ensure that doctors are formally accountable for the 
practice of assisted death. If doctors fail to observe the legal requirements, disciplinary action 
is taken or, when necessary, criminal prosecution.
A Prohibition
There is no formal scrutiny of euthanasia and assisted suicide where these practices are 
prohibited because they remain hidden from official scrutiny. Despite being criminal 
offences, prosecutions for assisted death are infrequent, convictions even less so.
Otlowski documents a number of prosecutions of doctors for murder or attempted murder in 
the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada due to their alleged involvement in 
euthanasia or assisted suicide. In some of the United States cases the doctors were acquitted 
on the basis that the prosecution could not prove the doctor caused the death, despite what 
Otlowski says was evidence to the contrary. In 1999 Dr Jack Kevorkian was convicted of 
second-degree murder in the United States for giving a man a lethal injection upon request. 
He was sentenced to between 10 and 25 years imprisonment. He was reported to have 
assisted the deaths of around 130 people since 1990.103
French speaking region of Wallonia but there is little reliable information about this organisation: Adams and 
Weyers, above n 98, 136.
101 Bregje D Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'Dutch Experience o f Monitoring Euthanasia' (2005) 331 British 
Medical Journal 691, 693.
102 Margaret Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (Oxford University Press, 2000) 140-141, 
citing, for example, People v Sander (unreported) NY Times, 10 March 1950; People v Montemarano 
(unreported) (1974) Nassau County Court (NY).
103 'Kevorkian jailed for 10-25 years', guardian.co.uk (online), 14 April 1999 
<http://www.guardian.co.Uk/world/1999/apr/14/3>.
240
In the United Kingdom, despite the weight of evidence against him, Dr Carr was found not 
guilty of attempted murder after administering a large dose of barbiturate to a patient.104 In 
1992 Dr Cox was convicted of the attempted murder of one of his terminally ill patients upon 
her request and received a 12 month suspended prison sentence.105 In Canada, Dr Pedley 
pleaded guilty to the attempted murder of his terminally ill wife and was sentenced to six 
months imprisonment.106
Otlowski also points to a number of non-prosecutions of doctors in Canada.107 In Australia, 
when seven Victorian doctors declared publicly that they had assisted terminally ill patients 
to end their lives, no charges were laid.108 Among them was Dr Rodney Syme who has 
continued to speak openly about his involvement in assisted death.109 He has been questioned 
by police six times, but thus far has not been charged with an offence.110
There have been some successful prosecutions in Australia. In February 2012 Merin Nielsen 
was sentenced to three years gaol with a non-parole period of six months for assisting the 
suicide of 76 year old Frank Ward. Nielsen had travelled to Mexico and obtained Nembutol 
and Ward died the day after his return.111 However, as I pointed out in chapter 3, the 2008 
conviction of Shirley Justins for manslaughter was overturned on appeal. She had allegedly 
supplied her partner with Nembutol. Justins’ long-time friend, Caren Jenning, obtained the 
Nembutol and was found guilty of being an accessory to manslaughter. She committed
104 Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law, above, n 102, 143, citing R v Carr (unreported) The 
Sunday Times, 30 November 1986. In other cases in the United Kingdom, doctors have been acquitted after 
arguing the drugs were administered for pain relief: see R v Adams (unreported, 1957) and R vLodwig  
(unreported, 1990), cited in Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law , above n 102, 145.
105 Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law, above, n 102, 144, citing R v Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 
38 (Winchester CC).
106 Unreported (1973) cited in Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law, above n 102, 145. See 
also the case of Dr De La Rocha in Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law, above, n 102, 145- 
146.
107 Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law, above, n 102, 146.
108 Ibid 147.
109 See, eg, Rodney Syme, A Good Death: An Argument fo r  Voluntary Euthanasia (Melbourne University Press, 
2008).
11(1 Julie-Anne Davies, Terminal Answer', The Bulletin (Sydney), 6 November 2007, 28, 33. One possible 
explanation for the non-prosecution of Syme is that at least some of these deaths were not unlawful. For 
example, the Victorian Coroner ruled that one case where Syme sedated the patient into a coma after she chose 
to forego intravenous hydration was a natural death and not reportable: see Rodney Syme, A Good Death: An 
Argument for Voluntary Euthanasia (Melbourne University Press, 2008) 141, 169, 181-2.
111 Rosanne Barrett, 'Queensland Teacher Merin Nielsen Jailed for Aiding Suicide of Man, 76 ', The Australian 
(online), 16 February 2012 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/queensland-teacher-jailed-for- 
helping-suicide-of-man-76/story-e6frg6nf-1226272723498>.
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1 1 2 * • • • suicide before sentencing. “ Despite these few exceptions, under prohibition, ‘the picture is
largely one of non-enforcement of the law.’113
B Legalisation in the Netherlands and Belgium
The system of self-reporting means that there is no proactive identification of cases of 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands and Belgium. The reality is that 
‘a doctor who wants to conceal what he has done would have to be extraordinarily careless to 
give [authorities] reason to doubt his report of a ‘natural death’...’114 The Dutch control 
system has been compared to ‘a highway system. In this system, drivers are responsible for 
monitoring their own speed. As long as they tell officials how fast they’re driving, the 
authorities generally won’t issue tickets for speeding.’117 The following examination of the 
role of the Dutch prosecutorial authorities and the operation of the review committees will 
bear out this analogy.
1 Belgium
The same analogy could be made with the Belgian control system which also relies on self- 
reporting. However, very little is known about the operation of the Federal Control and 
Evaluation Committee which has oversight of reported cases in Belgium. Griffiths, Weyers 
and Adams comment that the committee’s biennial reports (which are not translated into 
English) do not provide adequate information to assess its functioning, including the basis for 
its judgments.116 Nor is there information provided about the range of sanctions open to the 
Committee or whether it has attempted to influence medical practice.117 ‘In short, a 
commission whose raison d’être is to produce transparency and thereby maintain confidence 
in euthanasia practice, itself suffers from a regrettable absence of transparency.’118
112 Lauren Wilson, 'Shirley Justins Given 22-Month Sentence for Assisting Death of Graeme Wylie The 
Australian (online), 12 November, 2008 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/weekend-detention-for- 
euthanasia/story-e6frg6o6-l 111118014740>.
113 Otlowski, The Effectiveness of Legal Control o f Euthanasia: Lessons from Comparative Law', above n 1, 
144.
114 Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, above n 32, 236.
115 Stephen Drake, 'Euthanasia Is Out o f Control in the Netherlands' (2005) 35(3) Hastings Center Report 3, 3.
116 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 343.
117 Ibid. See also Adams and Weyers, above n 98, 137.
118 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 343.
242
Therefore an assessment of ‘accountability’ as a control indicator in Belgium is not possible. 
What we do know is that, at least in the first five years of legalisation, the committee assessed 
every one of the 1917 reported cases as ‘careful’; that is, in full compliance with the legal due 
care requirements. No cases were referred to the prosecutorial authorities for further 
investigation.114 The logical inference might be that the Belgian control system is an 
overwhelming success. The reality in the Netherlands -  which ‘on paper’ has nearly as 
impressive a record as Belgium - cautions against this conclusion. I now go on to demonstrate 
that the Dutch system fails to ensure the accountability of doctors and scrutiny over end of 
life practices.
2 Decline o f Prosecutorial Authority in the Netherlands
Prior to the Dutch euthanasia legislation in 2002, the Dutch prosecutorial authority was 
central in assessing reported cases. Its role and influence, however, has been reduced ‘to the
• ,  i i npoint of marginality.’ Originally, in 1994, doctors were required to report directly to the 
prosecutorial authorities. In 1998 the review committees were introduced to act as a ‘buffer’ 
between the doctor and the prosecution. The committees advised the prosecution on
whether the doctor had met the due care requirements, but all cases were ultimately 
considered by the prosecutors who retained the final decision. It was widely believed that this 
more robust role of the prosecutors up until 2002 was the main explanation for the low
reporting rate. Doctors disliked the ‘bureaucratic hassle’ and perceived the risk of
• 122prosecution. Many would not run the risk of reporting.
Indeed, Griffiths, Weyers and Adams identify a correlation between highly publicised 
prosecutions in the Netherlands and a decline in the willingness of doctors to report. 
Evidence suggests that the more closely reported cases are scrutinised, the more negative are
119 Rurup et al, The First Five Years of Euthanasia Legislation in Belgium and the Netherlands: Description and 
Comparison of Cases', above n 56, 45. In 2006 the public prosecutors investigated a case o f physician-assisted 
suicide of a dementia patient after the doctor revealed details to the media but failed to formally report it. The 
prosecutors found that all statutory requirements had been met: Penney Lewis, 'Euthanasia in Belgium Five 
Years after Legalisation' (2009) 16(2) European Journal o f Health Law 125, 129.
120 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 208.
121 de Haan, above n 53, 62.
122 Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, above n 32, 279.
123 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 200-201.
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the experiences and responses of doctors.124 Concerns about the perceived costs of reporting 
and the corresponding low reporting rate led to the changes in 1998 and again in the 2002 
legislation. Only the cases judged ‘not careful’ by the review committees are now examined 
by the prosecutors.
The likelihood of prosecution in the Netherlands has declined sharply. In the four years 
between 1991 and 1995 when the prosecutorial role was central to the control system, 6324 
cases were dealt with by the prosecutors. Of these cases, 120 were given full consideration by 
the highest prosecutorial authority and resulted in 13 indictments.125
In the eight years between 1998 and 2006, as the role of the review committees overtook that 
of the prosecutors, the number of reported cases nearly tripled to 18 042.126 Despite this huge 
increase in cases coming to official attention, just 25 ‘not careful’ cases were dealt with by 
the prosecutors after referral from the committees. No prosecutions resulted. There were 
medical disciplinary proceedings in just two cases, one resulting in a warning, the other, a 
reprimand.125 Between 2007 and 2010 there were 10 223 notifications and 31 ‘not careful’ 
determinations which were referred to the prosecutors. ~ There is no information available in 
English about the outcome of these cases.
At first glance, the lack of prosecutions in the Netherlands might indicate excellent 
compliance with the due care requirements and a high degree of control exerted by the legal
124 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 201, n 166, citing B Crul, 'Melding en toetsing vooraf, daar had ik 
wat aan gehad [Reporting and Review in Advance, That Would Have Been Useful]' (1999) 54 Medisch Contact 
1038 and Gerrit van der Wal et al, Medische besluit\’ormir.g aan het einde van het ¡even: De praktijk en de 
toetsingprocedure euthanasiae en het Verslag van de begeleidingscommissie van het evaluatieonderzoek naar 
de medische besluit\’orming aan het einde van het ¡even [Medical Decision Making at the End o f Life: Medical 
Practice and the Assessment Procedure for Euthanasia] (de Tijdstroom, 2003).
125 Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, above n 32, 241, table 5.17.
126 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3,198.
127 Ibid 208. The last prosecution resulting from a reported case, known as Brongersma, stemmed from a 
physician- assisted suicide in 1998 which occurred before the introduction of the Regional Review Committees: 
Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 128.
128 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 215.
I2g Regional Euthanasia Review Committees, Annual Report (Ministry of Health, 2010)
<http://www.euthanasiecommissie.nl/overdetoetsingscommissies/jaarverslag/> 34; Regional Euthanasia Review 
Committees, Annual Report (Ministry of Health, 2009)
<http://www.euthanasiecommissie.nl/overdetoetsingscommissies/jaarverslag/> 29; Regional Euthanasia Review 
Committees, Annual Report (Ministry of Health, 2008)
<http://www.euthanasiecommissie.nl/overdetoetsingscommissies/jaarverslag/> 35; Email from Angelique C M 
van der Arend to Katrina George, 7 December 2011, attaching Regional Euthanasia Review Committees, 
Annual Report (Ministry o f Health, 2007).
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guidelines.130 However, I now go on to argue that the low number of ‘not careful’ cases and 
the zero prosecutions is at least in part due to the eclipse of prosecutorial authority by the 
review committees and the committees’ failure to scrutinise reported cases adequately. In 
other words, while the decreasing burden of reporting since 1998 has resulted in a rising 
reporting rate in the Netherlands, this has corresponded with not more, but less, 
accountability and control.
3 Lack o f Scrutiny by the Review Committees o f Reported Cases
A study of 243 files of assisted death cases lodged with the Dutch Regional Review 
Committees in 2005 found that, although in virtually all cases doctors reported that the 
patient’s request was voluntary and well informed, this criterion was ‘hardly substantiated’ by 
the doctors. Yet the review committees rarely asked for more information about this 
criterion.131 This is despite physicians reporting frequent difficulties with assessing whether a 
patient’s request was well considered and voluntary. “ Doctors also report difficulties 
assessing the criterion of absence of reasonable alternatives in particular cases.133 However,
despite the fact that the Dutch euthanasia policy is based on the principle that euthanasia and physician- 
assisted suicide are only acceptable when the patient's suffering cannot otherwise be relieved, review 
committees virtually never ask the reporting physician to substantiate the lack of alternatives.134
Thus, according to the Dutch researchers, review committees ‘basically trust the reporting 
physicians’.135 But trust is not the same as scrutiny. It is true that ‘a certain level of trust is a 
prerequisite for an adequate reporting procedure.’ However, I argue that the review 
committees’ failure to scrutinise adherence to fundamental due care criteria -  despite 
indications that doctors themselves struggle to apply these same criteria -  indicates a
130 This is the conclusion of Otlowski, The Effectiveness of Legal Control o f Euthanasia: Lessons from 
Comparative Law', above n 1, 151.
131 Hilde Buiting et al, 'Reporting of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands: Descriptive 
Study’ (2009) 10:18(1) BMC Medical Ethics, 6-7.
132 Hilde Buiting et al, 'Dutch Criteria of Due Care for Physician-Assisted Dying in Medical Practice: A 
Physician Perspective' (2008) 34(9) Journal o f Medical Ethics, e l2  <http://jme.bmj.eom/content/34/9/el2> 2.
133 Ibid.
134 Buiting et al, 'Reporting of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands: Descriptive Study', 
above n 131,8.
135 Ibid 9.
136 Ibid.
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misplaced level of trust. This undermines claims that the control system achieves 
accountability.
The lack of scrutiny by the review committees also, at least in part, accounts for the low 
prosecution rate. Prosecutorial guidelines issued in 2003 and marginally revised in 20071,7 
state that prosecution is ‘in principle’ only warranted in two situations. First, if the Review 
Committee found the doctor was ‘not careful’ because the suffering was not unbearable and 
not without the possibility of improvement. In some cases this would imply that the doctor 
did not demonstrate the absence of reasonable alternatives. Secondly, if the Review 
Committee found that the doctor was ‘not careful’ because the patient’s request was not 
voluntary and well considered.
As I have already noted, the review committees rarely ask for more information about the 
voluntariness of the request, despite the inadequate substantiation of doctors. And they 
seldom request substantiation of doctors’ assertions that there were no reasonable alternatives 
to euthanasia. Therefore the type of cases which could, in principle, warrant prosecution, 
are unlikely to make it to the attention of the prosecutorial authorities because the review 
committees do not adequately scrutinise those types of cases.140
4 Unreported Cases
Apart from the inadequate scrutiny of reported cases, the Netherlands control system, like 
that in Belgium, is unable to ensure the accountability of doctors in the non-reported cases. 
The few prosecutions that have occurred in the Netherlands are of non-reported cases ‘that 
happen accidentally to come to the attention of the prosecutors.’141 There is no evidence that
137 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 128, n 353.
138 Ibid, 129.
139 While the review committees do not scrutinise the issue of reasonable alternatives, in 32 per cent of cases in 
Buiting et al’s study, they did ask reporting doctors about the related question of whether the patient’s suffering 
was unbearable: Buiting et al, 'Reporting of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands: 
Descriptive Study', above n 131,6.
140 The review committees are most likely to ask for additional information about the consultation with another 
doctor, particularly his or her independence: ibid. The inadequacy of the consultation is also the most common 
reason for a finding of ‘not careful’ by the review committees: Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 206. 
However, the prosecutorial guidelines state that prosecution is not usually warranted in such cases: Griffiths, 
Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 129.
141 Ibid 128.
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prosecutorial authorities actively look for non-reported cases.142 As Rurup et al note in their 
study of the Dutch reporting trends between 1990 and 2005, ‘[t]he odds are ... that ... an 
unreported case will not come to the attention of the authorities, and the physician will go 
undisciplined/143
V CONCLUSION
Measured against the indicators of voluntariness, visibility and accountability, the 
effectiveness of legal control under both prohibition and legalisation leaves much to be 
desired.
It would be expected that the legal requirement of voluntariness of the patient’s request in the 
Netherlands and Belgium would influence the behaviour of doctors and reduce the incidence 
of non-voluntary termination of life. There is no evidence that this has occurred. The weight 
of evidence indicates that intentional termination of life by the use of drugs without explicit 
request is higher in the Netherlands and in Belgium since legalisation, compared to most 
places where assisted death is prohibited. Certainly the data does not demonstrate that the risk 
of abuse is generally greater under prohibition.
I have argued that other methods of intentional non-voluntary termination of life without 
request (such as treatment withdrawal) are also relevant in measuring whether the law 
controls voluntariness. In the Netherlands the real rate of intentional non-voluntary 
termination of life by all methods is significantly higher than the restrictive Dutch definition 
would indicate. As I demonstrated, in 1990 the actual rate was 4.3 per cent of all Dutch 
deaths, compared with 0.8 per cent as the restrictive definition would have it. Similarly, in 
1995, the real rate of intentional non-voluntary termination of life was 11.2 per cent by all 
methods, compared with 0.7 per cent as indicated by the restrictive definition.
While a causal link cannot be established, 1 contend that there is an association between the 
significant increase in non-voluntary termination of life between 1990 and 1995 and the 
increasingly permissive legal and political climate over the same period. This is reason for
142 Ibid.
143 Rurup et al, 'The Reporting Rate of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Study of the Trends', 
above n 78, 1199.
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caution when considering legalisation as an effective control of voluntariness. Certainly, 
non-voluntary termination of life occurs under prohibition. But while it might be expected 
that legalisation would bring a certain transparency which safeguards the voluntariness of 
patient request, the available evidence does not bear this out.
Visibility is another key indicator of control. Prohibition necessarily drives assisted death 
underground, hidden from official oversight and the scrutiny of colleagues. In contrast, most 
cases of assisted death in the Netherlands and Belgium are now visible in the sense that they 
are formally reported. They are also more likely to be subject to professional consultation 
than is the case under prohibition.
However, assessing visibility is more complex than simply pointing to the high reporting rate 
of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. The reality of non- reporting; mis-classification 
of life tenninating behaviour; the resistance of revisionist practitioners; and the problematic 
characteristics of cases that remain underground, exposes the hyperbole of claims that the 
Dutch reporting system is an ‘impressive success’, an ‘enormous success’, Tittle short of 
spectacular’.144 Non-voluntary intentional termination of life by drug administration is rarely 
reported in the Netherlands, despite the legal requirement to do so. In Belgium, the practice is 
completely unregulated. The fact remains that many cases of intentional termination of life 
are still hidden and the very cases that ‘cry out’ for legal sanction escape the Dutch and 
Belgian control systems altogether.
Accountability of doctors for their practice of assisted death is another control indicator. The 
underground nature of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide under prohibition means that 
few cases ever come to the attention of the authorities. Prosecution is unlikely and conviction 
even less so. Clearly there is a gulf between the Taw on the books’ and the law in practice.
In the Netherlands, somewhat counter-intuitively, the increasing reporting rate has resulted in 
less, not more accountability. As the role of the prosecutorial authority has been reduced to 
encourage reporting, there has been a corresponding decline in scrutiny of the reported cases 
by the review committees. This is particularly so when doctors fail to substantiate the
144 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 3, 199.
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voluntariness of the patient’s request and absence of reasonable alternatives. Yet these are 
exactly the two situations that warrant prosecution, according to prosecutorial guidelines.
Therefore it is simplistic to conclude that the zero prosecutions of the few ‘not careful’ cases 
indicates the success of the Dutch control system: at least in part it highlights the failure to 
ensure accountability in cases where compliance with the due care requirements is 
questionable. The Dutch experience is a warning for those who would point to the lack of 
prosecutions in Belgium as evidence of the success of that control regime.
Moreover, I argue that the failures of the Dutch and Belgian control systems suggest that 
there are problems inherent to any control system based on self-reporting: non-reporting due 
to disagreements and confusion about classification of end-of-life practices; the resistance of 
revisionist practitioners; and the concealment of problematic cases that flout legal safeguards.
The experience of the Netherlands also demonstrates the irreconcilable tension of a policy 
that encourages compliance by reducing the costs of reporting to doctors and simultaneously 
aims for scrutiny and accountability. But what is the alternative to self-reporting: national 
corps of forensically trained coroners who independently certify the cause of every death, not 
just those that are reported? This was the suggestion of a former chief prosecutor.145 Needless 
to say, the costs to the state, the families of the deceased and the health system would be 
prohibitive.
My analysis indicates that neither prohibition nor legalisation exerts satisfactory control over 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Under prohibition, criminal enforcement is rarely 
anything more than a symbolic threat. However, symbols matter, particularly when it is the 
termination of life that is at issue. In the next chapter I argue that despite the very real 
limitations of prohibition, it does have one advantage over legalisation: a symbolic function 
that ‘controls’ the liberalisation of behaviours that intentionally terminate life. I will argue 
that this should caution policy makers to consider alternatives to legalisation: ‘non-law’ 
strategies which address the underlying motivators of physician and patient involvement in 
euthanasia and assisted suicide.
145 Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, above n 32, 276, n 28.
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9An Argument For The Criminal Prohibition Of 
Voluntary Euthanasia And Physician-Assisted Suicide
I INTRODUCTION
In this chapter I present an argument in support of the criminal prohibition of voluntary 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. In Part II I argue that notwithstanding the serious 
shortcomings of prohibition, it does have one advantage over legalisation: it serves a 
symbolic function that influences attitudes concerning the intentional termination of life. In 
Part III I present evidence that the removal of this symbolism risks a permissive shift in 
attitudes and behaviour that would be difficult -  if not impossible -  to control. This is 
reflected in the experience of the Netherlands, in particular, a trend from euthanasia as a last 
resort to its normalisation and a growing acceptance of non-voluntary euthanasia. In Part IV I 
argue that because of this shift, policy makers should be cautious when considering whether 
or not to abandon prohibition. In Part V I acknowledge that prosecuting cases of assisted 
death can only be a marginal response to underground practice. Therefore, in Part VI, I 
propose a ‘non-law’ strategy that addresses the underlying drivers of doctor and patient 
involvement in assisted death. I argue that underground euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide can be minimised with clinical-based strategies and the expansion of professional 
education about palliative care.
II THE SYMBOLIC FUNCTION OF PROHIBITION
The evidence discussed in chapter 7 demonstrated that prosecutions for assisted death are 
infrequent under prohibition, convictions even less so and sentences are usually lenient. Thus 
criminal enforcement is rarely anything more than a symbolic threat. But symbols matter.
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Theorists of law and social norms argue that the law has an ‘expressive’ or symbolic function 
in shaping and reinforcing social norms which in turn influence behaviour. Melton and 
Saks, for example, refer to ‘the enduring role of law in transmitting core social values across 
generations.’ The criminal law can be particularly significant in this process as Bussmann 
argues:
Penal law and its sanctions are used as a script that enables actors to interpret different social actions. ... 
It is undeniable that our social reality is structured through symbolism. Modem societies are 
characterized by new uncertainties, doubts and confusions. After church and religion lost their dominant 
role in forming and expressing social norms, alternative institutions took on this function. Criminal law 
has now achieved a position of central importance ...1 234
As Griffiths, Bood and Weyers point out, ‘people tend to hold to their faith in the criminal 
law as the only form of control that is ‘good enough’ if a really fundamental value is at 
stake’.5 This is particularly true when considering the value of human life. The criminal 
prohibition of intentional killing, except in circumstances of self-defence or defence of 
others, expresses the social norm which forbids deliberate killing. It is widely accepted that 
this criminal prohibition ‘is the cornerstone of law and of social relationships. It protects each 
one of us impartially, embodying the belief that all are equal.’6
However, the legalisation of assisted death changes the symbolism: intentional killing is 
expressed to be a legitimate response to suffering, illness and disability. This change is 
associated with a liberalisation of attitudes towards the intentional termination of life and a
1 The precise definition of social norms has been contested. Broadly, however, the literature refers to norms as 
‘informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, 
because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both.’ Richard H McAdams, The Origin, Development, and 
Regulation of Norms' (1997) 96 Michigan Law Review 338, 340.
2 The study of law and social norms ‘has an established pedigree in criminal law theory’: Tarunabh Khaitan, 
'Dignity as an Expressive Norm: Neither Vacuous nor a Panacea' (2011) 32 Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies 1,
5. For criticism o f ‘expressionism’ see Robert Weisberg, 'Norms and Criminal Law, and the Norms of Criminal 
Law Scholarship' (2003) 93 Journal o f Criminal Law and Criminology 467.
3 Gary B Melton and Michael J Saks, 'The Law as an Instrument of Socialization and Social Structure' in Gary B 
Melton (ed), The Law as a Behavioural Instrument (University of Nebraska Press, 1986) 235, 236.
4 Kai-D Bussmann, 'Morality, Symbolism, and Criminal Law: Chances and Limits of Mediation Programs' in 
Heinz Messmer and Hans-Uwe Otto (eds), Restorative Justice on Trial: Pitfalls and Potentials o f Victim- 
Offender Mediation - International Research Perspectives (Kluwer, 1992) 317, 321. Robinson and Darley 
express a similar view: Paul H Robinson and John M Darley, 'The Utility of Desert' (1997) 91 Northwestern 
University Law Review 453, 474.
5 John Griffiths, Alex Bood and Heleen Weyers, Euthanasia and Law in The Netherlands (Amsterdam 
University Press, 1998) 264.
6 Select Committee on Medical Ethics, House of Lords, Report (1994) [237], See also Margaret Somerville, 'The 
Song Of Death: The Lyrics Of Euthanasia' (1993) 9 Journal o f Contemporary Health Law and Policy 1,44.
251
gradual extension of the persons considered permissible candidates for assisted death. In Part 
III I argue the experience of the Netherlands bears this out. As Pool has observed:
The Dutch euthanasia debate ... is an ongoing and complex socio-cultural, medical, legal and ethical 
process which has been characterised by increasing tolerance of physician assisted death, creeping 
jurisprudence culminating in the legalisation of euthanasia ... and a gradually shifting limit to what is 
considered ethically acceptable.7 8
Ill ‘GRADUALLY SHIFTING LIMITS’: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE
NETHERLANDS
The two justificatory boundaries of physician-assisted death in Dutch jurisprudence -  
necessity and autonomy -  have been under increasing stress, almost from the beginning of 
legal change in the Netherlands more than thirty years ago. In the medical context, this has 
coincided with a dilution of the social norm against intentional killing. Below, I examine the 
evidence of a gradual attitudinal shift: a movement from euthanasia as a last resort to its 
increasing normalisation for ever-expanding categories of patients. This shift is also evident 
in the practice of non-voluntary termination of life, including in the case of long-term 
comatose patients and disabled newborns.
In table 5 below I summarise the key developments in Dutch euthanasia law and social policy 
which represent this shift and then explain these developments in detail. It cannot be 
definitively established whether the legalisation of assisted death led the attitudinal change in 
the Netherlands, or whether legal change merely reflected attitudinal change. However, there 
are other examples of the role the criminal law plays in nurturing or weakening an existing 
social norm as Robinson and Darley observe:
7 In jurisdictions such as Belgium, Washington State and Luxembourg, assisted death has only relatively 
recently been brought under legal regulation. Thus it is too early to discern any shift. In Oregon, where legalised 
physician-assisted suicide has been in effect since 1997, the official government reports show no evidence o f a 
shift, for example, towards a liberalisation of the criteria for qualifying for an assisted death: see most recently 
Office of Disease Prevention and Epidemiology, Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act 2011 (Oregon Health 
Authority, 2012)
<http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Documen
ts/yearl4.pdf>.
8 Robert Pool, '“You’re Not Going to Dehydrate Mom, Are You?”: Euthanasia, Versterving, and Good Death in 
the Netherlands' (2004) 58 Social Science and Medicine 955, 955.
252
The criminal law is not an independent player in [the] process [of changing social norms], but it is a 
contributing mechanism ...We have seen the process at work recently in enhancing prohibitory norms 
against sexual harassment, hate speech, drunk driving, and domestic violence. It has also been at work in 
diluting existing norms against homosexual conduct, fornication, and adultery. While it is difficult to 
untangle how much the criminal law reform followed and how much it led these shifts, it seems difficult 
to imagine that these changes could have occurred without the recognition and confirmation that comes 
through changes in criminal law legislation, enforcement, and adjudication.9
9 Robinson and Darley, above n 4, 473-474. Tyler has made an extensive review of the empirical evidence that 
demonstrates the power of the law as an educative and moral authority: Tom R Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 
(Yale University Press, 1990); Tom R Tyler, 'Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation'
(2006) 57 Annual Review o f Psychology 375.
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Table 5
‘Gradually Shifting Limits’: Landmarks in the Development of Dutch Euthanasia Law
and Social Policy
Date Landmark
D ecem b er 1981 T he W ertheim  case. T he D istric t C ourt held  that assisted  su ic ide  can be  
ju stified  u n d er ce rta in  cond itions. T he vo lu n ta rin ess  o f  the  d ec ision  to d ie 
w as held  to be  essen tia l. T he  national C o m m ittee  o f  P ro cu ra to rs-G en era l 
es tab lished  p ro secu to ria l g u idelines based  on  the  W ertheim  cond itions, 
in clu d in g  the  req u irem en t o f  v o lu n ta rin ess .20
1982 T he D u tch  H ealth  C ouncil defined  eu th an asia  for the  first tim e. T he 
v o lu n tariness o f  the  p a tie n t’s req u est w as essen tia l to th is d e fin itio n .b)
27 N o v em b er 
1984
T he Sch oonheim  case. T he  S uprem e C ourt h e ld  that the  defen ce  o f  
necessity  cou ld  be  av a ilab le  to a d o cto r w ho had  p erfo rm ed  eu thanasia , in 
c ircum stances in c lu d in g  w here  a patien t w as sub jec t to ‘u nb earab le  
su ffe rin g ’ and  Toss o f  pe rso n a l d ig n ity ’. T he dec is io n  w as a ffirm ed  by the 
C ourt o f  A ppeals, the  H ague. T his w as the first tim e a d o c to r w ho had 
p erfo rm ed  eu th an asia  w as acq u itted .20
1984 T he R oyal D utch  M ed ica l A sso c ia tio n  adop ted  a p o licy  w h ich  stated  that 
eu th an asia  w as accep tab le  w hen  conducted  in acco rd an ce  w ith  the five 
‘req u irem en ts  o f  carefu l p rac tic e ’, w hich  included  that the  req u est be 
vo lun tary , w ell co n sidered  and  p ers is ten t.d)
1985 T he S tate  C o m m issio n  on  E u thanasia  repo rted  on p ro posed  national po licy  
and leg isla tion . T he  vo lu n ta rin ess  req u irem en t w as affirm ed . It p roposed  
leg isla tion  to c rim in a lise  the  in ten tional term in a tio n  o f  life  o f  a person  
unab le  to express h is o r h e r w ill, b u t specified  an ex cep tio n  fo r pa tien ts  
w ho are  irrev ers ib ly  co m ato se  and w hose  trea tm en t has b een  w ithd raw n  as 
fu tile .6'
1989 D utch  eu th an asia  advocates pu b lic ly  affirm ed  that vo lu n ta rin ess  is an 
essen tia l e lem en t o f  eu th an as ia .0
1990 T he R oyal D u tch  M edical A sso cia tio n  issued  a rep o rt abou t the  trea tm en t 
o f  severe ly  d isab led  new borns. It s ta ted  that in ten tio n a l te rm in a tio n  o f  
such  n ew borns cou ld  be  ju s tif ied  in som e c ircu m stan ces.8'
1991 A  C o m m issio n  appo in ted  by  the  R oyal D utch  M edical A sso c ia tio n  stated  
that the  in ten tional te rm in a tio n  o f  the  life o f  a pa tien t in a persisten t 
veg e ta tiv e  sta te  cou ld  b e  ju s tified  i f  ex isting  trea tm en t w as d isco n tin u ed .10
1992 T he D utch  A sso c ia tio n  fo r P aed ia trics  issued  a rep o rt abou t the  trea tm en t 
o f  severe ly  defec tiv e  new b o rn s w h ich  stated  that the  in ten tional 
term in a tio n  o f  new b o rn s can  b e  ju stified  in som e c ircu m stan ces .0
1992 P rosecu to rs an n o u n ced  th at they  w ould  not p ro secu te  a d o c to r w ho had  
te rm inated  the  life  o f  an irrev ers ib ly  com atose  p a tien t w ith  severe  b rain  
dam age, on  the g ro u n d s that the  defence  o f  n ecessity  w ou ld  likely  h ave  
succeeded .0
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1993 T he M in is te r fo r Ju stice  sta ted  that eu th an asia  shou ld  b e  co n fined  to 
term in a lly  ill pa tien ts. A s a resu lt there  w as a s ig n ifican t in crease  in  the  
p ro secu tio n s o f  p e rsons resp o n sib le  fo r eu th an asin g  pa tien ts  no t in the 
term inal p h ase .kl
1994 T he C h a b o t  case. T he S uprem e C ourt accep ted  that eu th an asia  co u ld  b e  
p rov ided  to peo p le  w ith  m ental o r p sy ch ia tric  su ffe rin g  w ho w ere  
o th erw ise  p h y sica lly  h ea lth y  and that a p a tie n t’s refusa l o f  p sy ch ia tric  
trea tm en t need  not b e  a b a rrie r  to eu th an asia .0
1995 T he P r in s  case  and the K a d i jk  case . T w o docto rs w ere  acq u itted  o f  m u rd e r 
afte r adm in is te rin g  lethal in jec tions to n ew born  b ab ies w ith  serious 
d isab ilities . T he p rosecu to ria l au tho rities , w ho had  reco m m en d ed  ag a in st 
the  p ro secu tio n s, d id  no t ap p ea l.m>
1997 T he D istrict C ourt acqu ited  a d o c to r o f  m an slau g h te r on the  g ro u n d s o f  
necessity  a fter he term in a ted  the life  o f  an u n co n sc io u s p a tien t.11’
1997 A  C on su lta tiv e  C o m m ittee  appo in ted  by  the M in is te r o f  Ju stice  and  the  
M in is te r o f  H ealth  reco m m en d ed  req u irem en ts  o f  due care  to b e  observ ed  
in cases o f  the in ten tional term in a tio n  o f  n ew b o rn s.0’
1995 - 1998 T he C o m m ittee  o f  P ro cu ra to rs-G en era l, the R oyal D utch  M edical 
A sso c ia tio n  and the  R eg ional R ev iew  C o m m ittees ag reed  th at w h e th e r 
there are p ro sp ec ts  o f  im p ro v em en t in the p a tie n t’s co n d itio n  is o b jec tiv e ly  
de term ined  on  a m ed ical b a s is .1”
2000 F rom  2000 there  w as a trend  to w ards the p a tie n t’s sub jec tive  a ssessm en t 
o f  w h e th er there  are  p ro sp ec ts  o f  im p ro v e m e n t^ ’
2000 T he R egional R ev iew  C o m m ittee  de term ined  that the  eu th an asia  o f  
com atose  p a tien ts  w as p erm issib le  w here  there  w ere  signs such  as 
g roan ing , b lin k in g  and d ifficu lty  in b rea th in g  w h ich  m igh t ind ica te  
unbearab le  su ffe rin g .”
2001 T he T e rm in a tio n  o f  L ife  on  R e q u e s t  a n d  A s s is te d  S u ic id e  (R e v ie w  
P r o c e d u re s )  A c t  2001 w as passed . T erm in atin g  a p e rso n ’s life at th e ir  
request rem ain ed  a crim inal o ffence, bu t a d o c to r w ho p erfo rm ed  
eu th an asia  or assisted  su ic ide  in acco rdance  w ith  the  due care  
req u irem en ts and rep o rted  th is to the co roner w o u ld  no t b e  p rosecu ted .
D ecem ber 2001 T he S u to r iu s  case. T he S uprem e C ourt ru led  th at ‘life fa tig u e ’ su ffe rin g  
had  no m ed ical basis  and cou ld  no t g ive rise  to the  defen ce  o f  n ecessity . 
T he S uprem e C ourt re jected  a subsequen t appeal in  D ecem b er 2002 , b u t 
on  n e ith er occasio n  did it exc lude  life fatigue as a fo rm  o f  ‘u n b earab le  
su ffe rin g ’.”
2002 T he R egional R ev iew  C o m m ittee  determ ined  that the  eu th an asia  o f  
com atose  p a tien ts  w as p erm issib le  w here  it w ou ld  be  in h u m an e  to a llow  
an un co n sc io u s pa tien t to w ak e  from  a com a.”
N o v em b er 2002 T he van  O ijen  case. T he D u tch  S uprem e C ourt ru led  that in ex trao rd in a ry  
c ircum stances necessity  cou ld  ju s tify  the  in ten tional te rm in a tio n  o f  life  
w ithou t req u es t.11’
2004 W ith  the  assis tan ce  o f  a local p rosecu to r, doc to rs at the  U n iv ersity
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Medical Centre in Groningen produced a protocol to guide the behavior of 
doctors in cases of intentional termination on newborns.v)
2005 The Dutch Association for Paediatrics adopted the Groningen Protocol for 
use across the country.w)
2006 The Dutch government established a national Committee of Experts to 
whom doctors reported cases of intentional termination of newborns. The 
Committee was to assess whether the requirements of due care had been 
followed and advise the prosecutorial authorities.x)
February 2010 The ‘Accomplished Life’ citizen’s initiative proposal was presented to the 
Dutch parliament. It proposed that people over 70 years of age who are 
tired of life should have the right to assisted death /’
February 2010 The ‘Completed Life’ campaign was launched. It aimed to have 
‘completed life’ suffering recognised as grounds for legal euthanasia or 
physician assisted suicide/’
2011 A Royal Dutch Medical Association Position Paper endorsed an extended 
definition of unbearable suffering. It stated that psychosocial or existential 
suffering was medical in nature, including ‘meaning in life problems’.aa)
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A The Increasing Normalisation o f Euthanasia
When a doctor is confronted with the conflicting ‘duty to preserve life and the duty ... to do 
everything possible to relieve the unbearable and hopeless suffering of a patient’,10 the Dutch 
defence of necessity states that the doctor can terminate the life of the patient if there is no 
alternative means of ending the suffering. According to van Delden, ‘[f]rom an official and 
legal point of view, therefore, euthanasia is only tolerated as a last resort.'* 11 However, in this 
section I argue the evolution of what ‘suffering’ means in Dutch law reflects an attitudinal 
shift: euthanasia is increasingly viewed as a choice, not a last resort.
1 Unbearable Suffering
The Regional Review Committees have specified the patient’s suffering must be both 
unbearable and with no prospect of improvement. From the outset, Dutch law has taken a 
wide view of the concept of suffering, recognising that it need not be physical. Beginning in 
1984, the Schoonheim case13 effectively legalised euthanasia by a doctor, subject to 
compliance with due care requirements. The court held that non-physical suffering can 
include the prospect of personal deterioration and an ‘undignified’ death.14 The Regional 
Review Committees have endorsed this view and highlighted conditions where the 
anticipation of suffering might be particularly unbearable. These conditions include 
Parkinson’s disease, stroke and early dementia.15 Prosecutorial guidelines also note that 
suffering can include immobility, increasing dependency and the fear of suffocation, all of 
which are often experienced by Motor Neurone Disease patients.16
1(1 Schoonheim, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1985, no 6, translated by John Griffiths in John Griffiths, Heleen 
Weyers and Maurice Adams, Euthanasia and Law in Europe (Hart Publishing, 2008) 326; see also Margaret 
Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (Oxford University Press, 2000) 333.
11 Johannes J M van Delden, 'Slippery Slopes in Flat Countries - a Response' (1999) 25 Journal o f Medical 
Ethics 22, 23.
12 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 89, citing Regionale Toetsingscommissies Euthanasie [Regional 
Review Committees Euthanasia], Annual Report (Ministry of Health, 2002).
13 Schoonheim, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1985, no 106.
14 Ibid. The Court of Appeals, the Hague, subsequently ruled that Schoonheim’s defence of necessity was 
established and acquitted him: Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1987, no 608.
15 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 89.
16 Ibid 89, n 168.
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Suffering has always been considered subjectively, from the perspective of the patient, with 
the objective limitation that it needs to be ‘understandable’. Because of the subjective 
requirement, suffering must be conscious. However, the Review Committees have interpreted 
this criterion somewhat liberally: groaning, blinking and breathing difficulties have been 
accepted as sufficient indicators of suffering in unconscious patients. Since 2009 the 
Review Committees have drawn a distinction between a ‘full coma’ (when a patient cannot 
be suffering unbearably and euthanasia is not permitted) and a ‘reduced state of 
consciousness’ where ‘outward symptoms of suffering’ may justify euthanasia.19 In 2002 the 
Review Committees determined that the requirement of unbearable suffering can be satisfied 
if it would be inhumane to allow an unconscious patient to wake from a coma, again adopting 
a wide definition of suffering. A guideline published in 2010 by the Royal Dutch Medical 
Association adopts a similar position.21
(a) ‘Life Fatigue ’ as Suffering
The Sutorius case also illustrates how the boundaries of the concept of suffering have 
expanded. Edward Brongersma, an 86 year old ex-senator, had neither a physical nor 
psychiatric condition when he suicided in 1998, assisted by Dr Philip Sutorius. Brongersma 
was motivated by so called ‘life fatigue’ or ‘existential suffering’. As Griffiths, Weyers and 
Adams explain, he ‘had had a very active, politically and socially engaged life. But in recent 
years his physical condition had begun to deteriorate and among other things he had problems 
of incontinence and balance. The consequence was increasing social isolation.’ “^
17 Ibid 79, nl 10; 89-90.
18 For example, Régionale Toetsingscommissies Euthanasie [Regional Review Committees Euthanasia], Annual 
Report (Ministry of Health, 2000) 17, cited in ibid 90, n 170.
19 Regional Euthanasia Review Committees, Annual Report (Ministry of Health, 2009) 
<http://www.euthanasiecommissie.nL/overdetoetsingscommissies/jaarverslag/> 15. See also Regional 
Euthanasia Review Committees, Annual Report (Ministry of Health, 2010) 
<http://www.euthanasiecommissie.nl/overdetoetsingscommissies/jaarverslag/> 23.
2(1 Régionale Toetsingscommissies Euthanasie, above n 12, cited in Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 
90, n 171.
21 KNMG [Royal Dutch Medical Association], Euthanasie bij een verlaagd bewustzijn [Euthanasia and 
Lowered Consciousness] (KNMG [Royal Dutch Medical Association], 2010), cited in Maurice Adams and 
Heleen Weyers, 'Supervision and Control in Euthanasia Law: Going Dutch?' (2012) 23 King's Law Journal 121, 
128.
22 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 35.
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Dr Sutorius was prosecuted and acquitted in the District Court which accepted suffering in 
the form of ‘life fatigue’ as a basis for legal euthanasia. The Committee of Procurators- 
General was concerned that the decision would result in an unlimited right to patient self- 
determination.24 It appealed, seeking a ruling that would ‘set a principled boundary.'2" In 
December 2001 the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment. It ruled that relieving suffering 
that has no medical basis is not part of a doctor’s professional duty; therefore there could be 
no conflict of duties which would give rise to the defence of necessity. Sutorius appealed 
and in December 2002 the Supreme Court again rejected the necessity defence and endorsed 
the Court of Appeals’ reasoning.27 Dr Sutorius’ conviction was upheld, although he was not 
punished.
While the Supreme Court confirmed that life fatigue is not medical in nature, it did not 
decisively rule out life fatigue as a form of unbearable suffering. Thus the ‘principled 
boundary’ sought by the prosecution was not provided. Indeed, popular pressure for a wide 
definition of unbearable suffering intensified, culminating in February 2010 in the 
presentation of the ‘Accomplished Life’ citizen’s initiative to the Dutch parliament. 
Supported by 116,871 signatures, this would give people over 70 years who are ‘tired of life’ 
the right to assisted death.
At the same time the largest Dutch voluntary euthanasia society launched a campaign to 
recognise ‘completed life’ as a ground for elderly people to access legal assisted suicide. 
‘Completed life’ suffering encompasses many of the commonly experienced physical, 
psychological, personal and social impacts of old age:
Frequently it refers to a combination of: 
non-threatening ailments;
bodily decline (poorer mobility, vision and/or hearing, tiredness, listlessness, 
incontinence) ... loss of independence and personal dignity;
23 District Court Haarlem, 30 October 2001, no 15/035127-99; Tidjdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht 2001/21.
24 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 36, n 34. This Committee then, as now, made the final decision 
about whether to prosecute cases of euthanasia and termination of life without explicit request: at 129.
25 Richard Huxtable and Maaike Moller, "Setting a Principled Boundary'? Euthanasia as a Response to 'Life 
Fatigue" (2007) 21 Bioethics 117, 117.
26 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 37.
27 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2003, no 167.
28 Huxtable and Moller, above n 25, 126.
29 Suzanne Ost and Alexandra Mullock, 'Pushing the Boundaries of Lawful Assisted Dying in the Netherlands? 
Existential Suffering and Lay Assistance' (2011) 18 European Journal o f  Health Law 163, 164.
260
dependency on care (... and becoming a burden ...)  
loss of status and the direction of one’s own life; 
declining social network ... 
loss of future and purpose;
detachment from the community (the bond with people, the material aspect and the 
‘world of now’ is no longer); 
fear for the future; 
absence of prospects.30
The inclusion of these factors in the definition of ‘unbearable suffering’ was supported by a 
2011 position paper by the Royal Dutch Medical Association which rejected the courts’ view 
that existential suffering is not medical in nature. The Association stated that ‘[pjsychosocial 
or existential suffering ... also fall within the medical domain,’31 including ‘ailments of a 
spiritual nature’ such as ‘Meaning in Life problems, emptiness, meaninglessness or 
preventing humiliation.’ To date the Dutch Government has not responded to this position 
paper. The Association acknowledged the widening definition of suffering:
the current statutory framework and the concept of suffering have already become broader than their 
interpretation and application by many physicians ... This makes patently clear not only that physicians’ 
practice and the professional standard are not set in stone, but also that the legal assessment framework is 
attuned to such advancing insights.33
2 No Prospect o f Improvement
It has never been a requirement of Dutch euthanasia law that the patient’s condition be 
terminal. From at least 1973, the lower courts rejected this as a requirement.34 However, in 
1993, when the Minister for Justice expressed the view that voluntary euthanasia should be 
confined to terminally ill patients, there was a significant increase in the number of 
prosecutions for euthanasia relating to non-terminal patients.35 In 1994 the Supreme Court
30 Marleen Peters, Completed Life: What Are We Talking About? (February 2010) N W E , Nederlandse 
Vereniging voor een Vrijwillig Levenseinde [Right to Die Netherlands] <http://www.nwe.nl/assets/nvve- 
english/publications/CompletedLife.pdf> 12.
31 KNMG [Royal Dutch Medical Association], The Role o f the Physician in the Voluntary Termination o f Life 
(KNMG [Royal Dutch Medical Association], 2011) 22.
32 Ibid 21, ng.
33 Ibid 26.
34 Potsma, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1973, no 183.
35 Otlowski, above n 10, 408.
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ruled in the Chabot case that euthanasia could be provided to people with mental or 
psychiatric suffering who are otherwise physically healthy. I discuss Chabot further below.
The question of whether there is any opportunity to improve the suffering of the patient has 
always been an assessment involving both medical expertise and the perceptions of the 
patient. The Regional Review Committees explained this requirement as follows:
The suffering of the patient is considered to be lacking any prospect of improvement if there is no 
realistic treatment possibility. The disease or condition that causes the suffering cannot be cured and there 
is also no realistic prospect that the symptoms can be relieved. One can only speak of a ‘realistic 
prospect’ if there is a reasonable balance between the improvement that can be accomplished with a 
(palliative) treatment and the burden that such (palliative) treatment entails for the patient.37
At times patients refuse treatment even when such treatment could improve their condition or 
relieve their suffering, for example, because they do not want to experience the ‘diminished
T O
awareness’ that may accompany palliative care. Griffiths, Bood and Weyers provide 
examples of early cases from the 1980s where a patient’s refusal of treatment was not an 
obstacle to euthanasia. By 1995 the Committee of Procurators-General was concerned that 
doctors increasingly regarded ‘unbearable and hopeless’ as a subjective assessment for the 
patient.40 However, the Minister of Justice rejected the Committee’s proposal to establish 
more objective criteria.41 In 1997 the Royal Dutch Medical Association also defined ‘real 
possibility of treatment’ in objective terms: ‘medically speaking there is a prospect of 
improvement, within a reasonable time, and with a reasonable relationship between the 
expected results and the burden for the patient.’42 Likewise, according to Griffiths, Weyers 
and Adams, the first Annual Report of the Regional Review Committees viewed prospect of
36 Chabot, Nederlandse Jurisprudence 1994, no 656.
37 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 91, quoting Regionale Toetsingscommissies Euthanasie [Regional 
Review Committees Euthanasia], Annual Report (Ministry of Health, 2005) 19.
38 Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, above n 5, 102, n 38.
39 Supreme Court, 27 November 1984, Nederlandse Jurisprudence 1985, no. 106; Court of Appeals, The 
Hague, 10 June and 11 September 1986, Nederlandse Jurisprudence 1987, no. 608, cited in ibid.
40 Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, above n 5, 242.
41 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 242.
42 Commissie Aanvaardbaarheid Levensbeeindigend Handelen [Commission on the Acceptability of 
Termination of Life of the Royal Dutch Medical Association], Medisch Handelen Rond Het Levenseinde Bij 
Wilsonbekwamepatienten [Medical Behavour in Connection with the End o f Life o f Non-Competent Patients] 
(Bohn Stafleu Van Loghum, 1997) 164, cited in Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 91, n 177.
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improvement as essentially a question of whether a medically indicated and proportionate 
treatment was available.43
However, from 2000 the Annual Reports took a more accommodating approach: if a refusal 
was ‘understandable’, assisted death could still be provided.44 This applied to refusals of both 
palliative treatment and curative treatment.45 In the 2001 legislation, the relevant due care 
requirement stated that the doctor and the patient must be convinced there was ‘no reasonable 
alternative in light of the patient’s situation.'46
Overall, there appears to be a trend away from objective medical criteria when judging the 
prospects of improvement towards a patient’s subjective response to alternatives to assisted 
death. In 2010, this subjective approach was highlighted by the Regional Review 
Committee’s definition o f ‘no prospect of improvement’. This, it said, ‘refers to the disease or 
condition and its symptoms, for which there are no realistic curative or palliative treatment 
options that may -  from the patient’s point o f view -  be considered reasonable.’47 It seems 
clear, therefore, that a patient who refuses an available treatment may nevertheless satisfy the 
‘no prospect of improvement’ criterion.
(a) The Chabot Case
The same evolution when assessing prospects of improvement - from objective medical 
criteria towards a patient’s subjective view of alternatives - is evident in relation to non­
physical suffering. This is illustrated by the case of Chabot,4S Hilly Boscher, a 50 year old 
woman with a history of marital difficulties, had lost two sons, one to suicide the other to 
cancer. After an unsuccessful suicide attempt, the Dutch Voluntary Euthanasia Society put 
her in contact with psychiatrist Dr Chabot. He diagnosed ‘an adjustment disorder consisting 
of depressed mood, without psychotic signs, in the context of a complicated bereavement
43 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 91, citing Regionale Toetsingscommissies Euthanasie [Regional 
Review Committees Euthanasia], Annual Report (Ministry of Health, 1998) 11.
44 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 91, citing, for example, Regionale Toetsingscommissies 
Euthanasie, above n 18. Griffiths, Weyers and Adams also refer to Annual Reports in subsequent years which 
disclose the same reasoning: at 91-92, n 178.
45 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 92, n 178.
46 Wet toetsing levensbeeindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding [Termination of Life on Request and 
Assistance with Suicide (ReviewProcedures) Act] (the Netherlands) 1 April 2002, article 2 (l)(d), quoted in ibid 
84.
47 Regional Euthanasia Review Committees, above n 19, 17 (emphasis added).
48 Chabot, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1994, no 656.
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process. ’49 Mrs Boscher repeatedly asked for assistance with suicide and refused 
antidepressants and bereavement therapy. Dr Chabot formed the view that the patient was 
‘experiencing intense, long-term psychic suffering that, for her, was unbearable and without 
prospect of improvement. ’ 50 Dr Chabot supplied her with a lethal dose of medication which 
she consumed in his presence.
The District Court' and the Court of Appeals found that the defence of necessity was 
established and acquitted Dr Chabot. The Supreme Court, however, found him guilty of 
assisted suicide because he failed to arrange an independent expert examination to confirm 
the patient’s suffering was unbearable and hopeless.53 It held that in relation to non-somatic 
suffering ‘there can in principle be no question of hopelessness if there is a realistic 
alternative to relieve the suffering which the patient has in complete freedom rejected. 0 4
However, it appears the Supreme Court took the view there was no ‘realistic alternative’ to 
Mrs Boscher’s suffering. It highlighted the findings of the Court of Appeals that ‘[although 
her condition was in principle treatable, treatment would probably have been long and the 
chance of success was small’, particularly given her ‘well-established refusal of treatment’ .55 
In subsequent proceedings, the Medical Disciplinary Tribunal questioned the Supreme 
Court’s somewhat accommodating position towards Mrs Boscher’s refusal.56 According to 
the Tribunal, determining whether her condition was treatable depended on the treatment 
being attempted.57 By sanctioning a patient’s refusal of any attempt to alleviate suffering as 
an alternative to assisted death, the Supreme Court’s decision indicated a shift away from 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide being viewed as the last resort towards their 
increasing normalisation.
49 Ibid, translated by John Griffiths in Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, above n 5, 332.
50 Ibid.
51 Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht 1993, no 42.
52 Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht 1993, no 62.
53 Chabot, Nederlandse Jurisprudence 1994, no 656, translated by John Griffiths in Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, 
above n 5, 337.
54 Ibid 336-337.
55 Ibid 332.
56 As Griffiths, Bood and Weyers explain, ‘the Tribunal seems to have taken a more restrictive view than the 
Supreme Court on one crucial aspect of the case: the extent to which a doctor must insist on treatment as an 
alternative to assistance with suicide.’ Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, above n 5, 339-340.
57 ‘The patient’s refusal o f treatment should have been a reason for [Chabot] to refuse the requested assistance 
with suicide, at least for the time being.’ Gerritsen v Chabot, Medical Disciplinary Tribunal, Amsterdam, no. 
93/185; Medisch Contact 50: 668-674 (1995), quoted in Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, above n 5, 340.
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B Growing Acceptance o f Non-Voluntary Euthanasia
The second shift in Dutch attitudes towards assisted death is the growing acceptance of non­
voluntary euthanasia. In chapter 7 I demonstrated how the incidence of non-voluntary 
termination of life by all methods increased significantly in the Netherlands between 1990 
and 1995. I noted the correlation between this increase and the increasingly permissive legal 
and political culture over the same period. I now look at this phenomenon from a different 
angle: not as a quantitative shift, but as an attitudinal shift. Put simply, there has been a 
creeping liberalisation of attitudes towards the intentional non-voluntary termination of life, 
despite early protestations from legal and medical authorities that this (nearly always) was 
unacceptable. A brief sketch of legal, political and social developments in the Netherlands 
over the last 30 years bears this out. These developments are summarised in table 5 above.
1 Early Affirmations o f the Need for Voluntariness
In December 1981, the District court decided that physician-assisted suicide was justifiable in
CO
certain circumstances. The voluntariness of the decision to die was considered essential. 
Shortly after, Dutch prosecutors stated that the conditions set out in the Wertheim case -  
including voluntariness -  would act as prosecutorial guidelines in an effort to achieve 
national consistency/4 In 1982 the Health Council defined euthanasia for the first time and 
the patient’s request was an essential element.60 In 1984, the Supreme Court held that 
euthanasia can be legally justified under conditions of necessity, affirming that the patient 
must voluntarily request death.61 Also in 1984, the Royal Dutch Medical Association adopted 
a policy which stated that euthanasia was acceptable when conducted in accordance with the
five ‘requirements of careful practice’, which included the request must be voluntary, well
62considered and persistent.
58 Wertheim, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1982, no 63.
54 Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, above n 5, 60.
60 Ibid 68.
61 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 219, citing Schoonheim, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1985, no 106. 
Some commentators point to a 1973 case, Postma, as the first precedent for the legal performance of voluntary 
euthanasia: see, eg, Otlowski, above n 10, 395. However, the decision was limited: it permitted, under certain 
conditions, the hastening of death as a foreseen side effect of pain relief. It did not rule on the permissibility of 
intentionally causing death, the hallmark of euthanasia. See Postma, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1973, no 183; 
Verbatim, 'Euthanasia Case Leeuwarden - 1973' (1988) 3 Issues in Law and Medicine 439, 439-440.
62 Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, above n 5, 66.
265
The State Commission on Euthanasia released its report on national policy and legislation in 
1985 and the voluntariness requirement was again affirmed.63 The Commission’s proposed 
legislation explicitly criminalised the intentional termination of the life of a person who was 
unable to express his or her will due to ‘severe physical or mental illness or disorder’.64 For 
the first time an exception was defined: patients who were irreversibly comatose and whose 
treatment had been withdrawn as futile. The intentional termination of such a patient would 
not be punishable.65 Legislation along these lines ‘was supported by a substantial majority in 
Parliament.’66 An explicit and voluntary patient request was still a requirement under a 
revised Bill submitted to Parliament at the end of 1987.67
In 1989 the Vice Chairman of the State Commission, a supporter of legalisation, affirmed that 
a request was ‘central’ to the Dutch definition: ‘[wjithout it the termination of a life is 
murder. ... People who have become incompetent are no longer eligible for euthanasia . . . ,68 
Other supporters of euthanasia expressed similar sentiments around this time. For example, 
according to the executive director of the Health Council of the Netherlands, ‘[i]n the absence 
of a patient request the perpetrator renders him or herself guilty of manslaughter or murder.'69 
As Keown notes, a number of leading Dutch advocates of voluntary euthanasia at that time 
endorsed this assessment and asserted that voluntariness was indispensable. Griffiths, 
Weyers and Adams summarise legal developments at this stage:
by the time -  toward the end of the 1980s -  that the legalisation of euthanasia had been more or less 
accomplished, the key role of a voluntary request in the solution ultimately arrived at seemed a 
formidable barrier to any acceptance of termination of life in the case o f non-competent patients . . .71
63 Ibid 70.
64 Proposed Article 292b(l), cited in ibid 314.
65 Proposed Article 292b(2), cited in ibid.
66 Ibid 73.
67 Ibid 75.
(’8 H J J Leenan, 'Dying with Dignity: Developments in the Field of Euthanasia in the Netherlands' (1989) 
Medicine and Law 517, 520.
(,L> Henk Rigter, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Distinguishing Fact from Fiction' (1989) 19(1) Hastings Center 
Report 31,31.
70 John Keown, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?' in John Keown (ed), 
Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 261, 286, 
citing 'Letters' (1989) 19(6) Hastings Center Report 47, 47-48.
71 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 220.
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2 The Shift
However, from the 1990s a shift in attitudes was discernible. The Remmelink Commission 
was established in January 1990 to investigate the extent and characteristics of euthanasia 
practice.72 Its response to the 1000 intentional terminations without explicit request 
uncovered by the study demonstrates a shift towards a growing acceptance of non-voluntary 
termination of life in some circumstances. The Commission defended the intentional 
termination of incompetent patients, describing it as usually ‘inevitable’ because of the 
patient’s ‘death agony’. 73 However, as Keown points out, none of the doctors surveyed stated 
that ‘agony’ was a reason for terminating these patients without request and only 30 per cent 
identified pain or suffering as a reason.74 When lethal drugs were administered to accelerate 
the death of patients whose bodily functions were successively and irreversibly failing, these 
cases were described as ‘help in dying’, and the Commission stated they should be reported 
as ‘natural’ deaths.75 The government at the time made clear its opposition to this view, 
reaffirming that such deaths are ‘termination of life’ and should be reported as ‘non- 
natural’.76
3 Patients in a ‘Persistent Vegetative State ’
The growing acceptance of non-voluntary euthanasia was also evident in a 1991 report by a 
Commission appointed by the Royal Dutch Medical Association. The Commission 
considered the situation of incompetent patients in long-term comas or so called persistent 
vegetative states, which it defined as ‘a severe and irreversible form of loss of consciousness 
in which all communication and normal movement are impossible.’77 The intentional 
termination of such a patient by lethal injection could be appropriate if existing treatment was
12 Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, above n 5, 76-77.
73 Keown, above n 70, 276, citing Ministry of Justice, Outlines Report Commission Inquiry into Medical 
Practice with regard to Euthanasia (1991)3.
74 Keown, above n 70’ 277.
7:1 Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, above n 5, 132, citing Commissie Remmelink, Medische beslissingen rond het 
levenseinde [Medical Decisions Concerning the End o f Life] (SDU Publishers, 1991) 15, 32, 37.
76 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 132, citing Second Chamber o f Parliament 1991-1992, 20 383, no 
14:7.
77 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 254, citing Commissie Aanvaardbaarheid Levensbeeindigend 
Handelen [Commission on the Acceptability o f Termination of Life of the Royal Dutch Medical Association], 
(1991) Landurig Comateuze Patienten [Long Term Comatose Patients] 5-7.
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• 78discontinued, including artificial feeding. This approach affirmed the exception to the 
voluntariness principle identified in 1985 by the State Commission, as noted above.
Throughout the 1990s the early emphasis on voluntariness continued to wane. In 1992 the 
prosecutorial authority announced it would not prosecute the case of a doctor who had 
terminated the life of an irreversibly comatose patient with severe brain damage, on the 
grounds that the defence of necessity would likely have succeeded.79 In 1997 a doctor was 
acquitted of manslaughter in the District Court on the grounds of necessity after terminating
on
the life of an unconscious patient. Another non-voluntary termination of life came to 
official attention in 1997 after Dr van Oijen injected an elderly coma patient with muscle 
relaxant. He was found guilty of murder in 2001. The Dutch Supreme Court upheld the 
conviction on appeal in November 2002. However, it ruled that the justification of necessity 
could be available when a doctor, forced to choose between conflicting duties and interests, 
terminated a patient’s life without request.81
4 Newborns with Disabilities
The liberalisation of attitudes towards non-voluntary termination of life is also evident in 
neonatology. Notwithstanding the initial insistence on voluntariness, in the early 1990s a 
series of reports by the Royal Dutch Medical Association and the Dutch Association for 
Paediatrics began to define situations in which the life of a newborn baby could be 
intentionally terminated. “ There has been no subsequent Supreme Court ruling on this issue 
and no legislative initiative by the Dutch Parliament. However, based on some test cases, 
prosecutorial policy, the establishment of due care requirements by a government appointed
78 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 254. The authors note that a report by the Health Council in 1994 
came to essentially the same position: at 254, n 125.
79 Artificial respiration had been withdrawn as futile, but the patient did not die: Griffiths, Bood and Weyers, 
above n 5, 130-131.
8(1 District Court, Almelo, 28 January 1997, cited in ibid 132-133. I have been unable to identify the name of this
case.
81 van Oijen, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2005 no 217. See also Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 41.
82 The Royal Dutch Medical Association appointed the Commission on the Acceptability of Medical Behaviour 
that Shortens Life and it issued a report about severely defective newborns in 1990. In 1992 the Dutch 
Association for Paediatrics issued a report on the same subject: see Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 
220-221.
87 In both the Prins case (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1995, no 602; 1996, no 13) and the Kadijk case (Tijdschrift 
voor Gezondheidsrecht 1996, no 35) a doctor administered a lethal injection at the parents’ request to a newborn 
with serious disabilities after life-sustaining treatment had been withdrawn. The courts found the doctors had 
followed the requirements o f due care. Both doctors were acquitted at trial and there was no appeal by the 
prosecution. See Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 227-228.
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committee and the so called ‘Groningen Protocol’ which has been adopted for national use to 
guide the behaviour of doctors in these cases, Griffiths, Weyers and Adams argue it is 
possible to discern the current legal position regarding the intentional termination of 
neonates.84
In summary, that position is that although the termination of newborns is in principle murder, 
it can be justified if, inter alia, life-sustaining treatment has been withdrawn or withheld, the 
baby’s suffering is unbearable and cannot be alleviated and the due care requirements (such 
as independent consultation and record keeping) have been met. The deaths must be reported
85as non-natural and are subject to review.
IV THE NEED FOR POLICY CAUTION
My analysis demonstrates that over nearly thirty years, beginning in 1984 when the courts 
effectively legalised assisted death, the limiting boundaries of necessity and autonomy have 
been under stress. These legal changes have played a role in weakening the social norm 
against intentional killing in two respects. First, euthanasia is no longer viewed as an 
exceptional procedure of last resort, and, secondly, there has been increasing legal acceptance 
of the non-voluntary termination of life.
0/1
This shift is widely acknowledged although the ethical implications are disputed. Some 
commentators view the shift in positive terms and identify a growing emphasis on patient 
autonomy87 or an evolving concept of ‘death consistent with human dignity’.88 Others view 
the shift negatively, as evidence of a decline in palliative alternatives and an emerging 
concept o f ‘lives not worth living’.90
84 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 239.
85 Ibid 240.
86 See, for example, Henk Jochemsen and John Keown, 'Voluntary Euthanasia under Control? Further Empirical 
Evidence from the Netherlands' (1999) 25 Journal o f Medical Ethics 16; van Delden, above n i l ;  ibid 520; 
Herbert Hendin, 'The Politics Of Euthanasia' in Seduced By Death: Doctors, Patients, and Assisted Suicide (W 
W Norton, 1998) 111; Stephen W Smith, 'Evidence for the Practical Slippery Slope in the Debate on Physician- 
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia' (2005) 13 Medical Law Review 17, 44; Ost and Mullock, above n 29, 185; 
Huxtable and Moller, above n 25, 126.
87 For example, van Delden, above n 11, 23; John Griffiths, 'Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands: The Chabot 
Case' (1995) 58 Modern Law Review 232, 246.
88 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 142.
84 Jochemsen and Keown, above n 86, 20.
90 Keown, above n 70, 262.
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The full ethical implications of the shift will continue to be contested. However, the policy 
response should focus on what is plainly evident: there has been a liberalisation of attitudes 
towards the intentional termination of life, and a widening of the patients considered suitable 
candidates for an assisted death. These include the long-term comatose, disabled newborns, 
patients who refuse alternatives to assisted death and increasingly, pressure to permit 
euthanasia of those suffering ‘life fatigue’. The Dutch experience suggests that the removal of 
the criminal prohibition of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide is associated 
with a dilution of the social norm which proscribes intentional killing. Beauchamp and 
Childress express the concern:
Rules in our moral code against passively or actively causing the death of another person are not isolated 
fragments. They are threads in a fabric of rules that support respect for human life. The more threads we 
remove, the weaker the fabric may become. If we focus on the modification of attitudes, not only on 
rules, shifts in public policy may also erode the general attitude of respect for life. Prohibitions are often 
both instrumentally and symbolically important, and their removal could weaken a set of attitudes, as 
well as practices and restraints that we cannot replace.91
At the very least these developments should caution policy makers to pause and consider 
whether and how prohibition could be a workable alternative to legalisation when considering 
a response to the euthanasia underground.
V PROSECUTE THE OFFENDERS?
It must be acknowledged that the symbolic authority of prohibition is challenged by the gap 
between the law and practice: doctors and others who facilitate assisted death under 
prohibition do not face a high risk of detection, prosecution, conviction or incarceration. 
Otlowski, for example, labels this a ‘hypocrisy’ which ‘threatens to bring the law into 
disrepute.’ Indeed, in order to preserve the authority of the law and nurture the social norm 
which proscribes intentional killing, a policy of prohibition does require the prosecution of 
people who facilitate assisted death. As Somerville argues:
91 Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 
2001) 146.
92 Otlowski, above n 10, 149-150.
270
If hidden cases were to become known ... they would have to be prosecuted if the general effectiveness 
and symbolism of the law is to be maintained. The law allows discretion and, in some rare cases 
involving euthanasia, this discretion might be exercised best by deciding not to prosecute. These cases 
must be clearly exceptional and very rare, however, if they are not to become a message to health-care 
professionals that they may carry out euthanasia with impunity. Suspended or light sentences could have 
the same effect.93
The criminal justice system contains mechanisms which allow appropriate flexibility in 
response to suspected euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. The use of discretion by 
police and prosecutors should be exercised in accordance with standard guidelines and 
protocols. Not every suspicion, allegation or confession of a criminal offence results in a 
prosecution.94 Like all allegations, the prosecution of suspected euthanasia or assisted suicide 
depends on the weight of evidence and the prospects of a conviction.95 Public interest 
considerations are also be relevant. This has been explicitly recognised in the United 
Kingdom where the Director of Public Prosecutions in 2010 issued a policy for prosecutors 
regarding cases of encouraging or assisting suicide. It sets out the public interest factors to 
take into account in deciding whether to prosecute.96
There is also opportunity for discretion at the sentencing stage where mitigating factors (such 
as the doctor’s compassionate motive or the patient’s voluntary request) are considered, in 
accordance with standard sentencing principles.97
Prosecutions are exceptional because of the hidden nature of assisted death under prohibition. 
This does not mean that prohibition is devoid of expressive influence in shaping social norms 
about intentional killing. Social norms theorists contend that the ‘attitude-shaping influence’ 
of law (and criminal law in particular) operates independently of the fear of sanctions.
93 Margaret Somerville, Death Talk: The Case against Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide (McGill- 
Queen's University Press, 2001) 55.
94 NSW Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Prosecution Guidelines of the Office of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (1 June 2007)
<http://www.odpp.nsw.gov.au/guidelines/DPP%20Guidelines_whole_document_current%20to%2031_dec_201 
0.pdf> 8.
95 Ibid.
% Public interest considerations include whether the person assisted had capacity and whether their decision to 
die was voluntary and informed: The Director of Public Prosecutions, Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of 
Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide (The Crown Prosecution Service, 2010) 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.html>.
97 For example, Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A which states the aggravating and 
mitigating factors a court is to take into account in determining an appropriate sentence.
Johannes Andenaes, 'The Moral or Educative Influence of Criminal Law' (1971) 27 Journal of Social Issues 
17, 19.
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Andenaes goes so far as to argue that the law’s influence on attitudes and behaviour ‘is of 
greater value than mere deterrence because the former may work even in cases where a 
person need not fear detection and punishment.*" Similarly, McAdams rejects
the simple claim that law directs behavior only because the state inflicts a cost on violators. Of course, 
law alters behavior when the state threatens to enforce its rules, at least ultimately, by force. But law also 
expresses normative principles and symbolizes societal values, and these moralizing features may affect 
behavior.100
McAdams refers to the example of the anti-smoking norm that has developed relatively 
recently. Laws which prohibit smoking in public places are seldom enforced by authorities, 
but these laws operate informally to influence attitudes and deter smokers.101
Therefore even if prosecutions for assisted death are rare, and even if sanctions are relatively 
lenient because of mitigating circumstances, the criminal law still signifies that the 
intentional termination of life is an aberrant -  not normal - part of medical practice. 
However, prosecution will never be more than a limited response to assisted death. A policy 
of prohibition cannot aim to ‘purge the health professions of those who participate in assisted 
death’ “ because illicit practices will remain largely concealed. Ultimately, we must look 
beyond the law for a strategy to address the euthanasia underground.
VI A ‘NON-LAW’ RESPONSE TO THE EUTHANASIA UNDERGROUND
The culture of the Chronic Care Unit which I described in chapter 6 highlights two key 
problems of prohibition: hidden decision making and a pervasive culture of silence. In my 
interviews with the Unit’s medical staff I discovered what happened when Dr Blackburn’s 
euthanasia practice was exposed. The reaction of his colleagues both highlights the 
limitations of prohibition and suggests a ‘non-law’ response that can inform policy efforts in 
this area. In this section I argue that the practice of assisted death can be minimised with 
clinically-based strategies to address, first, the underlying causes of physician involvement in
99 Ibid.
100 McAdams, above n 1, 398. See also, eg, Carl E Schneider, 'Bioethics in the Language of the Law' (1994) 
24(4) Hastings Center Report 16, 20.
101 McAdams, above n 1,404-405.
1112 As Magnusson characterises the policy of prosecution: Roger S Magnusson, Angels of Death: Exploring the 
Euthanasia Underground (Melbourne University Press, 2002) 267.
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assisted death; and secondly, the root causes of patient requests for assisted death. This 
requires the expansion and improvement of professional education about palliative care.
A Reaction to Dr Blackburn’s Practices
Palliative care specialist Dr Elizabeth Richards told me about an incident which occurred not 
long before our interview ‘where the nursing staff and the junior medical staff felt completely 
compromised by the situation.’103 Junior medical staff informed Dr Richards that palliative 
medication had been administered to an MND patient ‘[at] doses which [were] totally 
disproportionate to the level required with the aim of influencing the timing [of death] 
specifically.’104 For Dr Richards, this was ‘a very uncomfortable situation ... probably the 
thing that I found the most distressing so far in my two years being at [the] hospital.’105
During the interview Dr Richards was very concerned to preserve the anonymity of the 
doctor who had directed the administration of the drugs, although it was clear that he or she 
was a senior physician. The context of the interview suggests that Dr Richards was referring 
to the episode described in chapter 2, when Dr Blackburn intentionally caused Melanie’s 
death by administering a large dosage of Midazolam-morphine. Dr Richards described how 
she confronted the doctor by asking directly whether the doctor administered the drugs with 
the intention of hastening death. She explained to me that the doctor began to admit 
involvement, but quickly back tracked and ‘kind of twisted [it] around as if it wasn’t really 
happening.’106 This reaction is consistent with Dr Blackburn’s risk management strategy of 
‘deflection’ which I described in chapter 6. The doctor ‘sort of claimed that they didn’t ask 
for that dose’, Dr Richards said in her interview, Tike “What? That dose?! No I never asked 
for that!” But I heard something different from the junior medical staff,’ she told me.107
It is significant that Dr Richards’ response to this revelation of what may have been illicit 
euthanasia was a non-legal response. Neither she nor the junior medical staff, nor the nursing 
staff reported this matter to the police, or to the local medical complaints authority108 or even
103
104
105
106
107
Interview with Elizabeth Richards (6 February 2008). 
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Illh At the approximate time this incident took place, Dr Blackburn’s conduct would have amounted to 
‘reportable misconduct’ pursuant to medical disciplinary legislation in Australia. See, eg, Medical Practice Act
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the hospital’s management. Dr Richards decided, she said, not to ‘insist on the law’ because 
this would result in ‘a great loss’ of a ‘highly functioning, very good practitioner’ of ‘great 
compassion’, as well as adverse media attention for the hospital.109
The culture of silence which characterised the Unit ensured, on this occasion, that the hidden 
practices of Dr Blackburn remained hidden. The decision of Dr Richards and her colleagues 
not to report his conduct demonstrates that prosecution can only ever be a marginal strategy 
in addressing the euthanasia underground. However, Dr Richards’ response to the incident 
was shaped by a question which policy makers should also ask: why did the doctor facilitate 
euthanasia? This suggests the first ‘non-law’ strategy for dealing with the euthanasia 
underground: address the underlying motivators of physician involvement.
B Address the Underlying Causes o f Physician Involvement
In Dr Richards’ assessment, part of the ‘why’ for the doctor’s involvement in that particular 
incident was the doctor’s desire to control the timing of patients’ deaths: ‘he felt out of his 
depth as to how to cope with that person’s suffering. And he’s usually a real control person 
... a person who likes to have high levels of control ... he ... likes to be the doctor who has all 
the answers ...,no
As I explained in chapter 6, controlling what he called ‘an appropriately timed death’ -  a 
‘quicker death’ -  was central to Dr Blackburn’s philosophy of end of life care.111 Dr 
Blackburn is unlikely to be alone in this. According to Somerville:
It is possible to see euthanasia as a way for physicians to feel like “winners,” as opposed to “failures,” in 
the face of their patients’ deaths. Instead of accepting what they cannot and should not try to change -  
namely, that patients die despite all o f their best efforts -  they take control through euthanasia. It is the 
ultimate example of the “do something” syndrome.112
1992 (NSW) s 71A. Under sections 36 (1) (b) and 37 the failure of a doctor to report a colleague’s misconduct 
amounted to either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. As of 1 July 2010, the 
concept o f ‘notifiable conduct’ applies in uniform legislation across Australia. A practitioner’s failure to report a 
reasonable belief that a colleague has engaged in notifiable conduct can amount to notifiable conduct: see, eg, 
Health Practitioner Regulation Act 2009 (NSW), ssl40  and 141; Health Practitioner Regulation National Law 
Act 2009 {QLD) ss 140 and 141.
109 Interview with Elizabeth Richards (6 February 2008).
110 Ibid.
111 I analysed this philosophy of Dr Blackburn’s more fully in chapter 6.
112 Somerville, above n 93, 282.
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Similarly, Kelly et al note that certain attributes of doctors can directly impact on the care 
they provide and the response to a patient’s expressed desire for death:
These include a heightened sense of responsibility, a tendency to experience guilt, high self-criticism and 
perfectionism, and need for control. ... [these attributes] can create vulnerability to loss of self-esteem 
and to a sense of failure and guilt when the rewards of [the] clinical encounter (a sense of effectiveness 
and value) are not forthcoming. The doctor's excessive sense of responsibility can create a tendency 
toward omnipotent expectations to achieve a degree o f control o f illness and even death that is not 
realistically possible.113
This is the phenomenon of ‘countertransference’114 where clinicians bring an unrecognised 
bias in assessing patients’ requests for a hastened death, especially when patients articulate 
their desire in terms of control. In chapter 4 I recounted the experience of some of my patient 
interviewees who expressed an aversion to dependence and a loss of autonomy in day to day 
activities. When so much of their lives are ‘out of control’, euthanasia is a means for these 
patients to assert control over the manner and timing of their death. In this context, a 
patient’s request for assisted death can
provide an avenue for the clinician's own overvaluing of control and autonomy such as to override other 
concerns, leading to a reluctance to challenge or carefully explore the basis of the patient's request for 
assisted suicide. The behavior or wishes are considered to be “rational” by the clinician because they 
conform to the values and common concerns o f the clinician— the fear of death, wish for control, and 
accentuation of individual autonomy.115
As I noted in chapter 4, Dr Blackburn himself expressed it thus: ‘there is an impotence to 
Motor Neurone Disease. ... you have to try and give patients a sense of control ... The last 
and ultimate sense of control is whether they live or die.’
Miles argues that a patient’s desire for assisted death can arise partly in response to a doctor’s 
need for relief from a painful clinical relationship.116 A doctor’s attitude of hopelessness 
towards a dying patient and the doctor’s own anxieties about disability or dependency can
113 Brian J Kelly, Francis T Varghese and Dan Pelusi, 'Countertransference and Ethics: A Perspective on 
Clinical Dilemmas in End-of-Life Decisions' (2003) 1 Palliative and Supportive Care 367, 371.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid 371.
116 Steven Miles, 'Physicians and Their Patients' Suicides' (1994) 271 Journal o f the American Medical 
Association 1786, 1786.
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lead to a ‘therapeutic nihilism’.117 This can prompt a premature willingness to confirm the 
patient’s despair and their desire for a hastened death.1 ls This attitude itself impacts on the 
patient’s outlook. An understanding of the interaction between doctor and patient is therefore 
essential in addressing the drivers for euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.
C Address the Root Causes o f the Patient’s Request
As I described in chapter 6, Dr Blackburn had a range of motivations for facilitating practices 
that may amount to euthanasia. When one of those motivations is the desire for control, 
doctors like Blackburn may not challenge a patient’s request for death and are more likely to 
take their patient’s desire for control at face value. However, the language of control can 
disguise, rather than explain, the underlying drivers of a patient’s desire for euthanasia. In 
chapter 4 I reviewed the extensive literature and drew on my own interviews to illustrate how 
a range of intersecting factors can animate a patient’s wish for assisted death: higher levels of 
depressive symptoms; hopelessness; perceiving oneself as a burden; low family functionality; 
having fewer social supports; anxiety and unrelieved physical symptoms. Therefore, I argue 
that a second ‘non-law’ strategy for dealing with the euthanasia underground is to address 
these underlying motivators of patients’ desire for assisted death.
1 How Many Patients Want Assisted Death?
A foundational question, however, is the prevalence of patient desire for assisted death. If the 
demand for euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide is relatively small, then the significant 
risks of removing the symbolism of criminal prohibition would weigh against legalisation and 
underline the need for a ‘non-law’ response to patient requests.
While the evidence is that a significant majority of terminally ill patients and caregivers 
support euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in principle, only a small minority actually 
consider assisted death for themselves.119 In a 2000 study of 988 terminally ill patients across
117 For example, R N Butler, 'Psychiatry and the Elderly: an Overview' (1975) 132 American Journal o f  
Psychiatty 893, cited by ibid 1786.
118 Susan D Block and Andrew Billings, 'Patient Requests to Hasten Death: Evaluation and Management in 
Terminal Care' (1994) 154 Archives o f Internal Medicine 2039, 2044.
119 Ezekiel Emanuel, Diane Fairclough and Linda Emanuel, 'Attitudes and Desires Related to Euthanasia and 
Physician-Assisted Suicide among Terminally 111 Patients and Their Caregivers' (2000) 284 Journal o f the 
American Medical Association 2460, 2468.
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the United States, a total of 60.2 per cent supported euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide 
in a hypothetical situation, but only 10.6 per cent said they had seriously considered 
euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide for themselves.
In a smaller study, 73 per cent of the 70 palliative care patients interviewed said they 
supported the legalisation of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide.121 However, only 12 
per cent would have made such a request by the time of the interview, if these practices were 
legal.122 Similarly, in a study of 379 cancer patients receiving palliative care, 62.8 per cent 
believed that euthanasia and/or physician-assisted suicide should be legal. If these practices 
were legal, 9.5 per cent thought they would already have chosen a hastened death and 39.8 
per cent thought they could consider a hastened death at some time in the future.124 Only 5.8 
per cent said they would definitely and immediately request a hastened death in their current
125condition if euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide were legal.
In another study of 200 terminally ill patients, 44.5 per cent of respondents reported the 
occasional desire that death would come soon, although only 8.5 per cent acknowledged ‘a 
serious and pervasive desire to die.’126 Kelly et al found a high level of desire for a hastened 
death in 14 per cent of 256 terminally ill patients studied. The highest prevalence of a 
desire for assisted death was found in Breitbart et al’s study where 17 per cent of 92 
terminally ill cancer patients surveyed had a high desire for assisted death.
120 Ibid 2465.
121 Keith G Wilson et al, 'Attitudes of Terminally 111 Patients toward Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide' 
(2000) 160 Archives o f Internal Medicine 2454, 2454.
122 Ibid.
123 Keith G Wilson et al, 'Desire for Euthanasia or Physician-Assisted Suicide in Palliative Cancer Care’ (2007) 
26 Health Psychology 314, 316.
124
125
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Ibid 318. 
Ibid.
H Chochinov et al, 'Desire for Death in the Terminally 111' (1995) 152 American Journal o f Psychiatry 1185, 
1185.
127 Brian J Kelly et al, 'Factors Associated with the Wish to Hasten Death: A Study of Patients with Terminal 
Illness' (2003) 33 Psychological Medicine 75, 79.
128 William Breitbart et al, 'Depression, Hopelessness, and Desire for Hastened Death in Terminally 111 Patients 
with Cancer' (2000) 284 Journal o f the American Medical Association 2907, 2909.
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(a) Very Few Patients Actually Request Assisted Death
Emanuel, Fairclough and Emanuel’s United States study involved the follow up of 
participants until their death. The results demonstrate that while a small minority of 
terminally ill patients express a personal desire for assisted death, even fewer actually take 
specific action. In their sub-sample of 249 patients, 5.6 per cent had discussions with their 
caregiver about requesting assisted death.129 Only 1.6 per cent were known to have actually 
discussed assisted death with their physician.Ll() Among the caregivers of these patients, 2.4
per cent had thought of asking the physician to perform assisted death and 1.6 per cent
• • » 1^1 actually had this discussion with the physician.
Therefore, it is important to consider patient requests for euthanasia or physician-assisted 
suicide in an accurate perspective: these studies show that overall, a small minority of dying 
patients want assisted death for themselves and even fewer go a step further and articulate a 
request. Significantly, the patients in these studies who did express a current wish for 
assisted death confirm the significance of the key drivers for the desire which I identified in 
chapter 2. Compared to the patients who did not have a current desire for hastened death, 
these patients had a higher frequency of depression and hopelessness; a higher prevalence 
of social concerns such as being a burden; more caregiving needs; low family support and 
isolation;133 unresolved existential issues such as loss of control;134 and unrelieved physical 
symptoms.135
129 Emanuel, Fairclough and Emanuel, above n 119, 2465.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 Wilson et al, 'Attitudes of Terminally 111 Patients toward Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide', above n 
121, 2454; Emanuel, Fairclough and Emanuel, above n 119, 2464; Wilson et al, 'Desire for Euthanasia or 
Physician-Assisted Suicide in Palliative Cancer Care', above n 123, 320, table 3; Chochinov et al, above n 126,
1185; Breitbart et al, above n 128, 2909; Kelly et al, 'Factors Associated with the Wish to Hasten Death: A 
Study of Patients with Terminal Illness', above n 127, 79.
133 Emanuel, Fairclough and Emanuel, above n 119, 2464; Wilson et al, 'Desire for Euthanasia or Physician- 
Assisted Suicide in Palliative Cancer Care', above n 123, 320, table 3; Chochinov et al, above n 126, 1185.
134 Wilson et al, 'Desire for Euthanasia or Physician-Assisted Suicide in Palliative Cancer Care', above n 123, 
320, table 3; Wilson et al, 'Attitudes of Terminally 111 Patients toward Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted 
Suicide', above n 121, 2458, table 3.
135 Wilson et al, 'Attitudes of Terminally 111 Patients toward Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide', above n 
121, 2458, table 3; Wilson et al, 'Desire for Euthanasia or Physician-Assisted Suicide in Palliative Cancer Care', 
above n 123, 320, table 3; Emanuel, Fairclough and Emanuel, above n 119, 2464; Chochinov et al, above n 126, 
1185.
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2 Patient Demand for Assisted Death Can Be Minimised with Comprehensive Palliative Care
The ‘non-law’ strategy I propose is to more effectively educate doctors and other medical 
professionals about palliative care and support them to develop clinical skills to address the 
underlying motivators of patient requests for assisted death. The World Health Organisation 
defines palliative care as
an approach that improves the quality of life o f patients and their families facing the problem associated 
with life-threatening illness, through the prevention and relief of suffering by means o f early 
identification and impeccable assessment and treatment o f pain and other problems, physical, 
psychosocial and spiritual.130
As Block and Billings point out, when patients do receive comprehensive palliative care 
which targets the root causes of the request for death, the few requests for assisted death that 
do occur tend to abate. Similarly, Bascom and Tolle observe that ‘most patients’ desires for 
[assisted death] diminish as their underlying concerns are identified and addressed 
directly.’1’8 According to Muskin, ‘[t]he availability of reliable and effective palliative care 
may reduce dramatically the requests for physician-assisted suicide.’ Similarly, in a study 
of dying patients in Oregon, Tolle et al conclude that ‘[cjoncems about suffering or a lack of 
understanding about end-of-life care options may be the catalyst for considering [physician- 
assisted suicide], with the desire for [physician-assisted suicide] diminishing as these issues 
are resolved.’140
Ganzini et al’s study of assisted suicides in Oregon shows that substantive palliative 
interventions will lead some patients to change their minds about assisted death. For other 
patients, however, the desire for assisted death will persist.141 Studies confirm that palliative 
care may only do a little to alleviate anxieties about control - one of the key drivers of the
130 World Health Organization, WHO Definition o f Palliative Care (2012) .
137 Block and Billings, above n 118, 2046.
138 Paul Bascom and Susan Tolle, 'Responding to Requests for Physician-Assisted Suicide: "These Are 
Unchartered Waters for Both of Us. ..."' (2002) 288 Journal o f the American Medical Association 91,91.
I3g Philip R Muskin, The Request to Die: Role for a Psychodynamic Perspective on Physician-Assisted Suicide' 
(1998) 279 Journal o f the American Medical Association 323, 325.
140 S W Tolle, 'Characteristics and Proportion of Dying Oregonians Who Personally Consider Physician- 
Assisted Suicide' (2004) 15 Journal o f Clinical Ethics 111, 116.
141 Linda Ganzini et al, 'Physicians' Experiences with the Oregon Death with Dignity Act' (2000) 342 New 
England Journal o f Medicine 557, 557.
279
desire for assisted death - or it may actually increase feelings of loss of control in some
142patients.
Australian urologist and vice-president of Dying with Dignity Victoria, Dr Rodney Syme, 
warns that patients ‘may feel they are being treated as an intellectual or moral pygmy as the 
multi-disciplinary team descends upon them ... [this will not] appeal to those who prefer to 
control their own medical care ...,143A number of the doctors I interviewed said the same: that 
regardless of palliative intervention and clinical strategies, there will always be a small 
number of patients whose desire for control and independence cannot be relieved.144 For 
these patients, as Dr Blackburn commented, ‘The last and ultimate sense of control is whether 
they live or die.’145 I argue, however, that because palliative care is able to minimise the 
demand for assisted death and because of the wider social risks of diluting the taboo against 
intentional killing, legalisation to benefit this small minority of patients cannot be justified.
D Educate the Medical and Health Professions about End-of-Life Care
In a divisive policy debate, highly charged with the claims and counter-claims of euthanasia 
advocates and opponents of legalisation, ‘educate the profession' may seem a naïve proposal. 
However, it is clear that the two key strategies for tackling the problem of underground 
euthanasia -  addressing first, the reasons for a doctor’s involvement and secondly, the 
underlying causes of a patient’s desire -  must be supported by improved education of the 
profession.
Palliative care is an interdisciplinary project, drawing on expertise from medicine, nursing, 
social work, occupational therapy, psychology, nutrition, and rehabilitation. However, it is 
the doctor-patient relationship which is the primary context for discussion about treatment 
and the assessment of requests for assisted death. It is critically important that doctors
142 Clive Seale and Julia Addington-Hall, 'Euthanasia: The Role of Good Care' (1995) 40 Social Science and 
Medicine 581, 581; Linda Ganzini and Anthony Back, 'From the USA: Understanding Requests for Physician- 
Assisted Death' (2003) 17 Palliative Medicine 113,113; Marijke C Jansen-van der Weide, Bregje D 
Onwuteaka-Philipsen and Gerrit Van Der Wal, 'Requests for Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide and the 
Availability and Application of Palliative Options' (2006) 4 Palliative and Supportive Care 399.
142 Rodney Syme, A Good Death: An Argument for Voluntary Euthanasia (Melbourne University Press, 2008) 
90-91.
144 For example, interview with Elizabeth Richards (6 February 2008); interview with Colin Nixon (10 
December 2007).
145 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
280
understand the multiple factors which influence the desire for assisted death and are equipped 
with the therapeutic skills to intervene appropriately Without such skills, doctors are unlikely 
to address the root causes of a patient’s request for death and are more likely to view a 
hastened death as the appropriate, or only, response to a patient’s suffering.
1 The Need for Improved Education
The need for doctors to receive more training in palliative care is supported by studies 
showing that physicians with less training are more likely to endorse assisted death.146 
Doctors who receive support from palliative care services are less likely to have patients with 
a high level of desire for assisted death.147 Conversely, doctors whose patients express a high 
desire are less likely to access palliative support. As Dr Richards told me:
I think that [doctors who perform euthanasia] lack knowledge ... it’s kind of just like a knee jerk reaction. 
Someone’s suffering. Oh this is what we have to do. But they don’t know that there’s ... lots o f other 
ways. And I think it comes from education and knowing that there's support. You don’t have to handle 
it all yourself.149
A survey in Australia and Europe found that in most countries, only around half of 
respondent physicians had any formal training in palliative medicine, whether undergraduate 
or postgraduate.150 Regardless of their level of training, a large majority of respondents -  
between 87 and 98 per cent -  expressed the need for extended palliative education.1^ 1 A 
number of studies also highlight inadequate education among other healthcare professionals 
who work in palliative care.
146 Ezekiel J Emanuel et al, 'Attitudes and Practices of U S Oncologists Regarding Euthanasia and Physician- 
Assisted Suicide' (2000) 133 Annals o f Internal Medicine 527; R K Portenoy et al, ’Determinants of the 
Willingness to Endorse Assisted Suicide. A Survey of Physicians, Nurses, and Social Workers' (1997) 38
Psychosomatics 277.
147 Brian Kelly et al, 'Doctors and Their Patients: A Context for Understanding the Wish to Hasten Death' (2003) 
12 Psycho-Oncology 375, 381.
148 Ibid.
149 Interview with Elizabeth Richards (6 February 2008).
150 Rurik Lofmark et al, 'Palliative Care Training: A Survey among Physicians in Australia and Europe' (2006) 
22 Journal o f Palliative Care 105, 106.
151 Ibid 107.
152 See, eg, Elizabeth Mayfield Arnold et al, 'Unmet Needs at the End of Life: Perceptions of Hospice Social 
Wokers' (2006) 2(4) Journal o f Social Work in End-of-Life and Palliative Care 61, 78; Nancy A Contro et al, 
'Hospital Staff and Family Perspectives Regarding Quality of Pediatric Palliative Care' (2004) 114 Pediatrics 
1248. See also Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Palliative Care in 
Australia (2012) 93.
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2 Education about Physical Distress
First, because physical pain and distress are strongly associated with requests for assisted 
death, there is a need for physician education in effective palliation of physical symptoms and 
non-pain sources of physical distress.153 Many doctors have an ‘inappropriate fear’ of 
prescribing pain relieving medication, including opioids and are ignorant of basic methods of 
symptom relief.1^4 Training should include guidance about the clinical, legal and ethical 
distinction between palliative sedation for the purpose of relieving suffering and the use of 
pain relief which incidentally might hasten death and, on the other hand, the use of drugs 
intentionally to cause death.155 This was Dr Richards’ approach when she learned of Dr 
Blackburn’s excessive use of Midazolam-morphine. She told me she provided Dr Blackburn 
with literature and advice about dosage levels ‘that would be considered within the law’ and 
information about palliative sedation to manage pain and anxiety, without the need to 
intentionally hasten death.156
3 Education about Psychosocial Factors
As discussed in chapter 4, psychosocial factors are generally stronger influences on the desire 
for assisted death than physical suffering. This is not well recognised by doctors. For 
example, a survey of United States physicians examined recent requests for death and 
concluded that therapeutic responses could be improved if doctors better understood the non­
physical drivers for the desire for death such as depression, social isolation and
157hopelessness.
Doctors report feelings of inadequacy in dealing with their patients’ emotional needs and this 
is most prominent when patients express a high desire for assisted death. ~ Diminished 
empathy on the part of physicians has also been associated with an increased willingness to
153 Diane E Meier et al, 'Characteristics o f Patients Requesting and Receiving Physician-Assisted Death' (2003)
163 Archives o f Internal Medicine 1537, 1541.
154 Ilora G Finlay and Simon I R Noble, 'Graduate Education' in Eduardo Bruera et al (eds), Textbook o f 
Palliative Medicine (Hodder Arnold, 2009) 136, 136. See also Katya Robinson et al, 'Assessment of the 
Education for Physicians on End-of-Life Care (EPEC™) Project' (2004) 7 Journal o f Palliative Medicine 637, 
638.
155 Cf Meier et al, above n 153, 1541.
156 Interview with Elizabeth Richards (6 February 2008).
157 Meier et al, above n 153, 1541.
158 Kelly et al, 'Doctors and Their Patients: A Context for Understanding the Wish to Hasten Death', above n 
147,381.
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approve assisted death.159 Similarly, Kelly and colleagues found that doctors with less 
training in psychology and counselling were ‘significantly associated with a high reported 
wish to hasten death’ among their patients.160 They conclude that:
[I]n a setting where there is a greater perception of a patient’s emotional distress and hopelessness, 
combined with a doctor’s limited psychological training and his or her own difficulty in caring for the 
patient, the doctor may be more inclined to hasten the death of the patient. ... A doctor overwhelmed by 
the patient’s unaddressed emotional distress, with limited training in these areas, may be more inclined to 
favor hastening death for the patient.161
The Meier et al study identified education about depression as a particular need. “ Indeed, as 
I explained in chapter 4, both my interview data and other research indicates that depression 
in the terminally ill is often undiagnosed and untreated by doctors, considered ‘normal’ or 
indistinguishable from sadness. Its significance as a driver for the desire for assisted death is 
frequently unrecognised.
Other researchers urge an approach to palliative care that looks beyond physical
1 £ 1
symptoms. This increased focus on psychosocial causes of suffering could be 
recommended particularly in the Netherlands: the Regional Review Committees rarely 
examine whether there were non-medical or social alternatives to euthanasia or suggest that 
the doctor should have explored these.164
According to Cherny and colleagues, there are therapeutic approaches and cognitive 
techniques to address existential distress including disappointment, remorse, and a sense of 
futility and meaninglessness.165 Physicians also need to recognise that family dysfunction can 
be a barrier to effective palliative interventions and therefore a focus on family needs, not just
159 Portenoy et al, above n 146.
160 Brian J Kelly et al, 'Association between Clinician Factors and a Patient's Wish to Hasten Death: Terminally 
111 Cancer Patients and their Doctors' (2004) 45 Psychosomatics 311,316.
161 Ibid 317.
162 Meier et al, above n 153, 1541.
163 See, eg, Kelly et al, 'Factors Associated with the Wish to Hasten Death: A Study of Patients with Terminal 
Illness', above n 127, 75; J L Werth Jr, J R Gordon and R R Johnson Jr, 'Psychosocial Issues near the End of 
Life' (2002) 6 Aging & Mental Health 402, 404.
164 Griffiths, Weyers and Adams, above n 10, 91, n 175.
165 Nathan I Cherny, Nessa Cherny and Kathleen M Foley, 'The Treatment of Suffering When Patients Request 
Elective Death' (1994) 10 Journal o f Palliative Care 71, 75. See also D W Kissane, O Spruyt and S Aranda, 
'Palliative Care - New Approaches to the Problem o f Suffering' (2000) 30 Internal Medicine Journal 377, 380.
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patient needs, is warranted.166 The lack of education contributes to other short comings in 
end-of-life care, including ‘discomfort communicating bad news, limited skills estimating 
prognosis, poor skills assisting patients and families to establish clear goals of care and 
treatment priorities, and a lack of understanding about options to decline or withdraw 
treatment.’167
4 Strategies to Improve Education about End-of-Life Care 
(a) Increase the Availability o f Specialist Palliative Care Support
Not every doctor will have the specialist skills required to address the complex physical, 
emotional, psychological and existential requirements of their patients. Access to specialist 
palliative care services is therefore critical. It is significant that, in responding to Di- 
Blackburn’s questionable practices, Dr Richards emphasised the importance of the palliative 
care service maintaining a good working relationship with the doctor. In this way the 
channels of support, advice and communication between Dr Blackburn and the palliative care 
specialists would be preserved, for the benefit of the patients.
However, there is a wide gap between the need for specialist palliative services and their 
availability. Industry benchmarks for the palliative medicine workforce suggest a ratio of 
about 1 full time equivalent palliative medicine specialist per 100 000 population.164 It is 
estimated that Australia and New Zealand currently have only half of the palliative medicine 
specialists needed, and the shortfall is likely to increase in coming years. The gap is widest 
outside the capital cities.171 In Australia, admission rates to palliative care services are 30 to
166 Mayfield Arnold et al, above n 152, 76. See also Kissane, Spruyt and Aranda, above n 165, 381.
167 Robinson et al, above n 154, 638, citing J T Ptacek and T L Eberhardt, 'Breaking Bad News. A Review of the 
Literature.' (1996) 276 Journal o f the American Medical Association 496; N A Christakis, Death Foretold 
(University of Chicago Press, 1999); The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, 'A Controlled Trial to Improve 
Care for Seriously 111 Hospitalized Patients' (1995) 274 Journal o f the American Medical Association 1591.
168 Interview with Elizabeth Richards (6 February 2008).
169 Australian and New Zealand Society of Palliative Medicine, Position Statement: Benchmark Number o f 
Specialists in Palliative Medicine (29 June 2010), 2.
170 Ibid 2, 3. See also Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Palliative Care Services in Australia 2012 
(2012) 66-67. See also Senate Community Affairs References Committee, above n 152, 85-87.
171 Australian and New Zealand Society of Palliative Medicine, above n 169, 2. See also Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare, above n 170, 67; Senate Community Affairs References Committee, above n 152, 90-91.
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50 per cent lower in rural and remote areas than in cities. Nearly two-thirds of people who 
die an expected death in Australia do not receive specialist palliative care services.
Similarly in the United States, a 2011 ‘report card’ on access to palliative care found that, 
despite improvements, there was a shortage of palliative care specialists174 and wide 
geographic variation in availability. The 47 million Americans living in remote communities 
or lacking health care coverage had the lowest rates of access.17:1 The consequence is that in 
the United States ‘most people living with a serious illness experience inadequately treated 
symptoms, fragmented care, poor communication with their doctors and enormous strains on 
their family caregivers.’176
This deficit in palliative medicine specialists and the need to attract and train a specialist 
palliative care workforce was recently identified as a priority by the Australian and New 
Zealand Society of Palliative Medicine. 177 The Society also identified a need to increase 
training opportunities in rural and remote areas to improve access to palliative care in those 
communities. This is a challenge for training providers, professional associations and 
governments who may need to increase funding to support additional training places.174
(b) Increase Education for Non-Specialist Palliative Care Providers
While Dr Richards necessarily adopted an informal approach to the education of Dr 
Blackburn, there are models available for increasing physician knowledge of palliative care in 
a more structured way.
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174 Sean R Morrison and Diane E Meier, America's Care o f Serious Illness: A State-by-State Report Card on 
Access to Palliative Care in Our Nation's Hospitals (Center to Advance Palliative Care, 2011) 6.
175 Ibid 20.
176 Ibid 1-2.
177 Australia and New Zealand Society of Palliative Medicine, (2011) Workforce Strategy: Meeting the 
Palliative Medical Needs of Patients in Australia 2011-2015 and Beyond , 4.
178 The Royal Australasian College of Physicians, Submission to Senate Community Affairs References 
Committee, Parliament of Australia, Palliative Care in Australia, February 2012, 8.
179 See, eg, Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Palliative Care in 
Australia (2012) 59, 95, 96.
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(i) Education for Physicians in End-of-life Care (EPEC) Project
One of the most successful and most widely disseminated programs is the Education for 
Physicians in End-of-life Care (EPEC) Project. EPEC aims to educate all United States 
physicians in the core competencies of end-of-life care. An independent evaluation 
concluded that the EPEC Project lias set a standard of knowledge in the field and is an 
example of disseminating new information to physicians in practice.’
The success of EPEC and similar models lies in the recognition that traditional methods of 
continuing education in medicine, with their reliance on didactic lectures and conference 
presentations, do not result in significant changes to medical practice. Studies confirm that
1 o i
a multifaceted educational approach is most effective for adult learners. EPEC adopts a 
‘train-the-trainer’ strategy where a corps of physicians who have been trained in the EPEC 
curriculum return to their workplace and teach a second tier of physicians. The aim is to 
change the behavioural norms of practicing clinicians: much of the knowledge required to 
improve end-of-life care is readily available, but unsupportive attitudes mean that often it is 
not applied in practice. EPEC uses specific strategies designed to facilitate attitudinal 
change, including ‘trigger’ audio recordings that describe a case and provide an ‘emotionally 
and intellectually engaging context for learning’. A number of studies have noted that 
knowledge by itself is insufficient to improve palliative care practice and that changing
• 187attitudes is critical.
180 See EPEC, EPEC: Education in Palliative and End-of-Life Care (20 February 2012) < http://epec.net/>: 
Linda L Emanuel, 'Changing the Norms of Palliative Care Practice by Changing the Norms of Education' in 
Eduardo Bruera et al (eds), Textbook o f Palliative Medicine (Hodder Arnold, 2009) 146, 149.
181 Robinson et al, above n 154.
182 Linda L Emanuel, 'Crossing the Classroom-Clinical Practice Divide in Palliative Care by Using Quality 
Improvement Methods' (2008) United Health Foundation Commentary,
<http://www.facesofhopecampaign.com/uhfassets/docs/2008/ebm-emanuel-crossing-the-classroom.pdft> 3.
183 Ellen Bugge and Irene J Higginson, 'Palliative Care and the Need for Education - Do We Know what Makes 
a Difference? A Limited Systematic Review' (2006) 65(2) Health Education Journal 101, 109.
184 Robinson et al, above n 154, 638.
185 Linda Emanuel, 'Changing the Norms of Palliative Care Practice by Changing the Norms of Education', 
above n 180, 147.
186 Ibid 148.
187 See, eg, Yoram Singer and Sara Carmel, 'Teaching End-of-Life Care to Family Medicine Residents - What 
Do They Learn?' (2009) 31(2) Medical Teacher e47. Frank D Ferris and Charles F von Gunten, 'North America' 
in Bee Wee and Nic Hughes (eds), Education in Palliative Care: Building a Culture o f Learning (Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 85, 89.
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(ii) Focus on Clinical Skills
The EPEC module on physician-assisted suicide demonstrates that when physicians have a 
working knowledge of all aspects of palliative care, requests for physician-assisted suicide or 
euthanasia can be effectively addressed not with philosophical or legal arguments, but with 
practical clinical skills. According to the module, ‘[t]he vast majority of requests for 
[physician-assisted suicide] or euthanasia should abate’ when physicians follow a six step 
protocol which can be summarised as follows:
Clarify the request: physicians should listen carefully to determine the type of request 
that is being made and be alert to personal bias and countertransference which could 
influence their perception of the patient’s request.
Assess the root causes of the specific request: depression, psychosocial factors, 
anticipated distress, unrelieved physical suffering and fears of being a burden, 
abandonment, loss of control, indignity and future pain are common causes.
Make a commitment to the patient’s care: physicians should allay the patient’s fears 
by committing to the patient, and his or her caregivers and family, assuring them that 
there are ways to address their concerns.
Address the root causes of the patient’s request: the module provides a detailed 
framework and specific clinical skills to address each dimension of the patient’s 
suffering.
Educate the patient about legal alternatives: this includes the right to refuse or 
withdraw treatment and palliative sedation.
188 Linda L Emanuel, Charles F von Gunten and Frank D Ferris, 'Module 5: Physician-Assisted Suicide' in 
EPEC: Education for Physicians on End-of-Life Care Participant's Handbook (EPEC Project, The Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation, 1999) 1.
189 Ibid.
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Seek counsel from colleagues: because of the significant ethical, personal and legal 
ramifications of dealing with a request, physicians should seek support from at least 
one medical colleague or member of the interdisciplinary care team. 190
(Hi) Program o f Experience in the Palliative Approach (PEPA)
As well as EPEC, there are other projects that both disseminate information and seek to 
change attitudes about palliative care within the health profession, including nurses. 191 In 
Australia the Program of Experience in the Palliative Approach (PEPA) emphasises active 
engagement in self-directed learning. It provides clinical placements with experienced 
mentors who use various teaching methods including case discussions, problem solving and 
interaction with patients and staff. “ Surveys of allied health participants who participated in 
PEPA report an increase in knowledge of palliative care, greater confidence in identifying
. 1  0 7interventions and referring patients to specialist palliative care when required. Similar 
success has been reported amongst medical practitioners. 194 The program has also had a 
demonstrable effect on organisational practices: a large majority of employers report that 
participants effectively disseminate their experiences among other staff and that PEPA has 
increased the institutional capacity to provide a palliative care approach. 195
190 Ibid 4-15; see also Linda L Emanuel, 'Facing Requests for Physician-Assisted Suicide: Toward a Practical 
and Principled Clinical Skill Set' (1998) 280 Journal o f the American Medical Association 643.
191 For example, in the United States, the End-of-Life Nursing Education Consortium (ELNEC) Project: 
American Association of Colleges of Nursing, End-of-Life-Care (ELNEC) (2012)
<http://www.aacn.nche.edu/elnec>; The Medical College of Wisconsin Palliative Care Program: David E 
Weissman et al, 'Improving Pain Management in Long-Term Care Facilities' (2001) 4 Journal o f Palliative 
Medicine 567, 567; The End-of-Life Graduate Education Curriculum Project: David E Weissman et al, 'End-of- 
Life Graduate Education Curriculum Project' (2001) 4 Journal o f Palliative Medicine 525; The Stanford 
Faculty Development Center’s End-of-Life Care Program: Georgette A Stratos et al, 'Faculty Development in 
End-of-Life Care: Evaluation of a National Train-tne-Trainer Program' (2006) 81 Academic Medicine 1000, 
1005; Growthhouse.org and Stanford Faculty Development Center, End-of-Life Care Curriculum for Medical 
Teachers < http://www.growthhouse.org/stanford/index.html> ; The Harvard Medical School Program in 
Palliative Care Education and Practice: Harvard Medical School Center for Palliative Care, Program in 
Palliative Care Education and Practice (3 March 2012) <http://www.hms.harvard.edu/pallcare/PCEP.htm>; 
Amy M Sullivan et al, 'Creating Enduring Change: Demonstrating the Long-Term Impact of a Faculty 
Development Program in Palliative Care ' (2006) 21 Journal o f General Internal Medicine 907, 907.
192 Shirley E. Connell, Patsy Yates and Linda Barrett, 'Understanding the Optimal Learning Environment in 
Palliative Care' (2011) 31 Nurse Education Today 472, 473.
193 Vinesh G Oommen, Natasha Myers and Patsy Yates, ‘PEPA Workshops for Allied Health Professionals : 
Outcomes and Directions for the Future’ (Paper presented at Palliative Care Conference: Together!, Perth, 24-27 
September 2009).
194 Vinesh G Oommen, Natasha Myers and Nhu T Tran, ‘The Role of a Palliative Care Educational Program in 
Improving the Skills of Medical Practitioners’ (Paper presented at RACGP 51st Annual Scientific Convention 
WONCA Asia Pacific Regional Conference, Melbourne, 2008).
195 Vinesh G Oommen, Natasha Myers and Patsy Yates, ‘How has PEPA Changed Practice? Views of 
Employers of PEPA Participants’ (Paper presented at Palliative Care Conference: Together!, Perth, 24-27 
September 2009).
288
(c) Improve Undergraduate Education in Palliative Care
Almost all doctors will be required to care for dying patients at some point and in most 
developed countries the majority of deaths occur in hospital after a period of chronic or 
terminal illness.146 However, as noted above, most dying patients will not be treated by a 
specialist palliative care physician, but by a generalist physician.197 Therefore it is essential 
that all doctors are equipped with the knowledge, skills and attitudes to care for dying 
patients. This requires focus in undergraduate medical education. Given the 
interdisciplinary nature of palliative care, undergraduate nursing and allied health curricula 
also require instruction about palliative care. Moreover, it is usually junior doctors and nurses 
who spend most time with terminally ill patients and their families.199 Many of them believe 
they are unprepared for this role, with medical school focussed on curing patients, rather than 
supporting patients in dying.200
Undergraduate education in palliative care is inadequate worldwide and highly variable. In 
one survey, a minority of physicians received palliative care training in undergraduate 
studies, ranging from a low of two per cent in Italy to a high of 23 per cent in Sweden. In 
Australia the rate was 20 per cent. Other studies in the United Kingdom, United States and 
Canada confirm the inconsistency in undergraduate education in palliative care: some 
medical schools teach it extensively but others offer very little.
196 Barbara Gomes and Irene J Higginson, 'Where People Die (1974-2030): Past Trends, Future Projections and 
Implications for Care' (2008) 22 Palliative Medicine 33, 33.
197 See also John E Wennberg et al, 'Use of Hospitals, Physician Visits, and Hospice Care During Last Six 
Months of Life among Cohorts Loyal to Highly Respected Hospitals in the United States' (2004) 328 British 
Medical Journal 607.
198 Jane Gibbins, Rachel McCoubrie and Karen Forbes, 'Why Are Newly Qualified Doctors Unprepared to Care 
for Patients at the End of Life?' (2011) 45 Medical Education 389, 390. See also Senate Community Affairs 
References Committee, above n 152, 99-102.
199 Gibbins, McCoubrie and Forbes, above n 198, 390.
200 Ibid 393.
2(11 Rodger Charlton and Andy Currie, 'A UK Perspective on Worldwide Inadequacies in Palliative Care 
Training: A Short Postgraduate Course Is Proposed' (2008) 25 American Journal o f Hospice and Palliative 
Medicine 63, 63.
Lofmark et al, above n 150, 107, table 1.202
203 David Field and Bee Wee, 'Preparation for Palliative Care:Teaching about Death, Dying and Bereavement in 
UK Medical Schools 2000-2001' (2002) 36 Medical Education 561; E S van Aalst-Cohen, R Riggs and I R 
Byock, 'Palliative Care in Medical School Curricula: A Survey of United States Medical Schools' (2008) 11 
Journal o f Palliative Medicine 1200; Doreen Oneschuk et al, 'The Status of Undergraduate Palliative Medicine 
in Canada: a 2001 Survey' (2004) 20 Journal o f Palliative Care 32.
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In Australia, a 2010 survey of undergraduate medicine, nursing and allied health curricula 
also found variation in learning strategies and in the number of hours dedicated to palliative 
care teaching.204 The survey indicated that allied health professionals have the least exposure 
to palliative care in their curricula.205 According to Hegarty et al, there has been only limited
investigation to date about the most effective methods for developing graduate knowledge
206and skills in palliative care, including curriculum design.“
Strategies have been identified to improve undergraduate medical education. For example, 
increasing required coursework and clinical experience in palliative care; increasing the 
number of palliative medicine specialists and role models to support the expansion of 
undergraduate palliative care education; further developing palliative care as an academic 
discipline;207 and evaluating student competency in palliative care using ‘state of the art’ 
assessment.208
In Australia, the Federal Department of Health and Ageing has prioritised improvement in
undergraduate palliative care education by initiating the Palliative Care Curriculum for
Undergraduates Project (PCC4U) which aims to ‘ensure that all health undergraduate
curricula develop graduates with capabilities in a palliative approach.’200 The project provides
learning modules, a resource compendium, as well as professional development workshops
for clinicians and academics about teaching undergraduate palliative care. There is
sustained uptake with the project, with 125 courses across all disciplines (or 59 per cent of all
211courses) in 38 universities actively engaged.
204 M Hegarty et al, 'Palliative Care in Undergraduate Curricula: Results of a National Scoping Study' (2010) 
12(2) Focus on Health Professional Education: A Multi-Disciplinary Journal 97, 97.
205 Ibid 105.
206 Ibid 98.
2117 James F Hammel et al, 'End-of-Life and Palliative Care Education for Final-Year Medical Students: A 
Comparison of Britain and the United States' (2007) 10 Journal of Palliative Medicine 1356, 1364. See also 
Gibbins. McCoubrie and Forbes, above n 198, 395.
208 Doreen Oneschuk, 'Undergraduate Education' in Eduardo Bruera et al (eds), Textbook o f Palliative Medicine 
(Hodder Arnold, 2009) 129, 130.
209 Hegarty et al, above n 204, 104.
210 PCC4U, PCC4U Fact Sheet (2012)
<http://www.pcc4u.org/images/pdf/About%20PCC4U%20June%20201 l/PCC4U%20Factsheet.pdf>.
211 PCC4U, Palliative Care Curriculum for Undergraduates (PCC4U): Final Report (2011) 
<http://www.pcc4u.org/images/pdf/About%20PCC4U%20June%20201 l/Synopsis%20PCC4U%20May%20201 
l%20Final%20report.pdf> 3. See also John M Ramjan et al, 'Integrating Palliative Care Content into a New 
Undergraduate Nursing Curriculum: The University of Notre Dame, Australia - Sydney Experience' (2010)
17(2) Collegian 85.
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VII CONCLUSION
In this chapter I described an attitudinal shift in the Netherlands since the legalisation of 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide: a movement from assisted death as a last resort to 
its increasing normalisation, as well as a growing acceptance of non-voluntary termination of 
life. This strongly suggests caution in abandoning a policy of prohibition, especially since 
only a small minority of patients persist in their request for assisted death. The risk of 
legalisation is an erosion of the expressive influence of the criminal law and a dilution of the 
‘cornerstone’ social norm which proscribes intentional killing. Although many -  or perhaps 
most -  cases of assisted death will inevitably occur beyond the practical reach of the criminal 
law, the iconology of prohibition is still significant.
Nevertheless, prosecutions will never ‘stamp out’ the euthanasia underground. Therefore in 
this chapter I proposed a non-law strategy to address, first, the underlying reasons for a 
doctor’s involvement in assisted death; and secondly, the drivers for a patient’s request for 
assisted death. Increased access to specialist palliative care services is essential, as is 
improved education in palliative care. This approach will not satisfy those who have a 
philosophical commitment to voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. However, 
it is a practical and compassionate clinical strategy which will minimise the demand for 
assisted death.
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Conclusion
10
‘Oh it’s a lovely way to die. You suffocate to death. Eventually you drown in your own 
fluids. You lose all abilities. It’s the most degrading disease known.’1 2 Patient Anna 
MacPherson’s matter-of-fact description of her anticipated death highlights why MND is 
such a powerful reference point in the assisted death debate: it is a hard case which really puts 
to the proof the claims of euthanasia advocates and opponents. Anna reminds us what is at 
stake in the debate: real people with harrowing stories to tell. However, even more is at stake. 
My thesis shows that assisted death is never just a private decision by one individual in tragic 
circumstances: it is a public phenomenon with profound social consequences.
I have argued against the legalisation of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide and in 
favour of a policy of criminal prohibition. In this chapter I summarise the findings of my 
research; identify their significance for social policy, law and the assisted death debate; note 
the limits of my research; and suggest opportunities for future research.
I THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION
What are euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide? Respiratory registrar Simone Sanger’s 
answer was simple and revealing: ‘that’s a hard question.’ Indeed, my thesis demonstrates 
that scholarship, the common law, empirical research and even clinical practice, are 
bedeviled by conceptual confusion and definitional disputes about the meaning of assisted 
death.
A What is Euthanasia?
1 The Primacy o f Intention
One of the themes of my thesis is the centrality of intention to moral and legal deliberation. I 
argued the intention to cause death ought to be fundamental to the definition of euthanasia. I 
defended the philosophical tradition which grounds personal responsibility in the subject’s
1 Interview with Anna MacPherson (25 June 2007).
2 Interview with Simone Sanger (12 December 2007).
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intention, understood as the aim or purpose of causing a particular result or state of events. It 
is a tradition that takes human well-being as a touchstone of ethical behaviour and thus 
disclaims conduct which intentionally impedes or destroys the attainment of any of the basic 
goods that are essential to human well-being, including life.3 This is the origin of the social 
norm which proscribes intentional killing and, as I noted in chapter 9, is widely regarded as 
the foundation of social equity and just relationships.
The significance of intention is reflected in established legal principles. Commonly envisaged 
as the deliberate hastening of a patient’s death for compassionate motives, euthanasia satisfies 
the elements of murder: an act or culpable omission which is a substantial or significant cause 
of death, with the accompanying intent to cause death.
One of the unique contributions of my thesis is its interrogation of clinical practice and its 
analysis of how the elements of murder may apply to specific case examples which emerged 
from my interviews. As I argued in chapter 2, Dr Blackburn’s use of Midazolam-morphine 
may have been a substantial cause of the deaths of Melanie and Joshua and an accompanying 
intention to cause death by suppressing their breathing may have been present. These deaths 
may have been cases of euthanasia which could satisfy the elements of murder.
In grappling with the problem of definition, my thesis sheds light on a question which has 
long troubled patients, their doctors and policy makers: if pain relieving drugs hasten death, is 
this the same as euthanasia?4 My interviews revealed cases where the use of Midazolam- 
morphine may have been a substantial cause of death, although I referred to research which 
shows that the life-shortening effect of such opioids is overstated.5 Clinical staff explained 
that in many cases the purpose of the Midazolam-morphine was to palliate, and while death 
may have been foreseen, it was not intended. My interviews thus brought to life a contentious 
philosophical, ethical and legal debate: whether there is a valid distinction between intended 
and foreseen consequences. I argued there is. As Lyons explains:
3 See, eg, John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 1980) ch 5.
4 See, eg, Roger Magnusson, 'The Devil's Choice: Re-Thinking Law, Ethics and Symptom Relief in Palliative 
Care' (2006) 34 Journal o f Law, Medicine and Ethics 559.
5 See, eg, P D Good, P J Ravenscroft and J Cavenagh, 'Effects of Opioids and Sedatives on Survival in an 
Australian Inpatient Palliative Care Population' (2005) 35 Internal Medicine Journal 512.
293
Direct introspection validates the experience of a uniquely powerful form o f causality under personal 
control - the experience of successfully effecting states of affairs in the world as a direct result o f one's 
affirmative belief-desire state. "Intent," taken strictly, is the name reserved for that particular causal 
phenomenon.6
As I argued in chapter 2, foresight is a different state of mind because the agent lacks the 
same commitment to bring about the particular result or state of affairs. The common law 
recognises the distinction between intent and foresight and the different degrees of culpability 
that can be ascribed to these mental states.7 *This distinction is central to double effect 
reasoning: while intentional damage to one of the basic goods such as life can never be 
justified, sometimes it may be permissible to accept such damage as a foreseen consequence 
if there is a proportionate reason and the agent’s intended purpose is morally good or neutral.
2 In Defence o f Double Effect
My thesis provides a robust defence of double effect which I argued provides the bright line 
to define the difference between the use of drugs for lawful palliation and their use for 
unlawful killing. This is one of the most significant contributions of my thesis. In chapter 2 I 
demonstrated that double effect reasoning finds expression in case law regarding end-of-life 
care across the common law world, including the United Kingdom, Australia and the United 
States. Its exact status in law has been unclear, but my analysis of Crabbe9 demonstrated that 
it is a justificatory defence: in the context of end-of-life care, double effect reasoning 
vindicates the use of palliative drugs even if death is foreseen as the probable or certain 
result, because pain relief is an important social objective. Contrary to some accounts, I 
explained that double effect is not the same as the defence of necessity. My analysis of the 
Conjoined Twins case10 shows that necessity could excuse the deliberate infliction of morally 
bad consequences, which is fundamentally inconsistent with double effect reasoning and its 
embrace of moral absolutes.
6 Edward C Lyons, 'In Incognito: The Principle of Double Effect in American Constitutional Law' (2005) 57 
Florida Law Review 469, 499.
7 See, eg, R v Adams (Bodkin) [1957] Crim Law Rev 365; R v Arthur (1981) 12 BMLR 1.
s D P Sulmasy and Edmund Pellegrino, 'The Rule of Double Effect: Clearing up the Double Talk' (1999) 159 
Archives o f Internal Medicine 545.
9 (1985) 156 CLR464
10 [2001] Fam 147.
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It is almost orthodoxy to deride the ‘hypocrisy’, ‘manipulation’ and ‘inconsistency’ of the 
common law in its application of double effect reasoning to euthanasia, pain relief and other 
end-of-life practices. One of the important findings of my research is that these criticisms are 
largely unfounded and are based on a significant misreading of the common law and a 
misunderstanding of clinical practice.
A widespread argument is that double effect conflicts with established principles because, it 
is said, the law treats foresight of virtually certain consequences as the equivalent of 
intending those consequences.11 This is incorrect, but the confusion is not surprising, given 
the influence of consequentialism in contemporary ethical theory. After all, if only 
consequences matter, then the distinction between intention and foresight can have little or no 
significance. Thus according to nineteenth century consequentialist philosopher, Henry 
Sidgwick: ‘[f]or purposes of exact moral or jural discussion, it is best to include under the 
term “intention'’ all the consequences of an act that are foreseen as certain or probable.’ In 
contrast to the ethic of personal responsibility which is central to my argument, this is an 
ethic of causal responsibility where a person is accountable for all the consequences he or she 
brings about, regardless of his or her subjective mental state.
My analysis shows that such a concept of ‘oblique’13 or constructive intention has no place in 
a jury’s deliberations about the existence or otherwise of an intent to kill and that the 
confusion stems from a misdirection in Woollinu English case law upholds the jury’s 
discretion in determining, on the evidence, a defendant’s subjective state of mind: if death is 
the virtually certain consequence of a defendant’s conduct, the jury is entitled to infer the 
defendant intended to kill, but it is not compelled to do so.15 My research shows that double 
effect’s distinction between intended and foreseen -  even certain -  consequences is entirely 
in step with existing criminal law principles. Moreover, the courts’ rejection of ‘oblique’ 
intention is consistent with the ethic of personal responsibility I adopted in this thesis and the 
subjective meaning of intention as the choice of a proposal or plan, preferred before all 
alternatives.
11 See, eg, Magnusson, above n 4, 562.
12 Henry Sidgwick, The Method o f Ethics (Hackett Publishing, first published 1874, 7th ed) 202.
12 To borrow the phrase suggested by Glanville Williams (although he did not use the phrase to cover probable 
consequences as Sidgwick suggests): Glanville Williams, 'Oblique Intention' (1987) 46(3) Cambridge Law 
Journal 417, 420.
14 R v Woollin [1998]4 All ER 103.
15 See, eg, R v Moloney [1985] AC 905; R vNedrick[\9S6\ 1 WLR. 1025.
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My thesis also finds that, contrary to much commentary,16 double effect reasoning does not 
unfairly discriminate in favour of doctors by manipulating intention. Rather, the application 
of double effect reasoning reflects the fact that unlike many other people, doctors are often 
justified in accepting foreseen death, because of the need for palliation at the end of life. 
However, I argued that because of the misconceived critique of double effect and the 
widespread ‘opiophobia’ that impacts palliative care, the double effect defence should be 
codified in statute.
My thesis also rebuts the criticism that double effect reasoning can have no practical 
application to medical care. The criminal law is faced routinely with the challenge of 
determining an agent’s subjective mental state. I referred to case law which shows that this 
challenge is not unique to end-of-life care. The intention underlying a doctor’s use of drugs is 
evidenced by the choice of drugs that have established pain relieving qualities and by their 
administration at a dosage necessary for symptom control.
Double effect is also criticised because, it is said, clinical intentions are ‘ambiguous’ and 
‘multilayered’. Although my interviews confirmed that doctors can be confused about the 
intention underlying their conduct, they also confirmed the finding in the literature that an 
explicit line of questioning can identify whether the prohibited intent is present and
i  o
distinguish it from motive. Moreover, my interviews showed that medical staff recognise 
the relevance of double effect reasoning to clinical practice.
Defining the difference between euthanasia and palliative care is not always straightforward, 
but, in sum, I conclude that double effect reasoning provides the essential line of 
demarcation. Its criteria are ethically sound, consistent with established criminal law 
principles and workable in clinical practice.
1(1 See, eg, Richard Huxtable, 'Get Out of Jail Free? The Doctrine of Double Effect in English Law' (2004) 18 
Palliative Medicine 62, 64.
17 See, eg, Timothy E Quill, 'The Ambiguity of Clinical Intentions' (1993) 329 New England Journal o f 
Medicine 1039.
IS Charles D Douglas et al, 'The Intention to Hasten Death: A Survey of Attitudes and Practices o f Surgeons in 
Australia ' (2001) 175 Medical Journal o f Australia 511.
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B What is Physician-Assisted Suicide?
A patient self-ingesting a lethal dose of drugs with the intention of causing his or her own 
death is a paradigm case of suicide. If the drugs are provided by a doctor with the knowledge 
they will be used for that purpose, this is non-controversially a case of physician-assisted 
suicide. However, my interviews suggested a more complex reality. At least one patient, 
Jackie, refused treatment in an effort to end her life. My analysis disclosed the common law’s 
almost unquestioning assumption that a refusal of life-sustaining treatment is always a 
legitimate expression of self-determination, even if the patient has the specific intent to die.19 
An important contribution of my thesis is to challenge this assumption and to define the 
‘bright line’ between a legitimate refusal of treatment and a suicidal refusal.
1 Specific Intent to Die
The first ‘bright line’ is the presence of a specific intent to die. This must be distinguished 
from the intention to avoid the burden or futility of the treatment. Even if the patient foresees 
the hastening of death as a side effect, such a refusal would be supported by double effect 
reasoning. There is some dispute as to whether an omission such as treatment refusal can 
constitute suicide. I argued the dispute is irrelevant because of the centrality of intention to 
moral deliberation. Whether the patient causes his or her own death by the ‘active’ ingestion 
of a drug, or the ‘passive’ refusal of a treatment or by any other method, if the intended result 
of that conduct is death, then the mental element of suicide is present.
I referred to cases which highlight the criticism that judges often manipulate the concept of 
intention in treatment refusal cases. This certainly aggravates the problem of definition. In 
two Australian judgments the courts have even ignored clear evidence that a specific intent to 
cause death animated the refusal, perhaps in an effort to avoid the apparent endorsement of
• . . . . 9 1  . . . . .
suicide and the risks of a doctor facing criminal liability. Rather than jettisoning intention 
altogether, I argued that a second bright line can define the difference between a legitimate
19 See, eg, Brightwater [2009] WASC 229 (14 August 2009); H  Ltd v J  [2010] SASC 176 (15 June 2010).
2(1 See, eg, Heston (John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital) v Heston 279 A 2d 670 (1971); Erickson v Dilgard 252 
NYS 2d 705 (1962); Georgetown College (Application o f the President and Directors o f Georgetown College) 
331 F 2d 1000(1964).
21 Brightwater [2009] WASC 229 (14 August 2009); H Ltd v J  [2010] SASC 176 (15 June 2010).
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refusal of treatment and a suicidal refusal: whether the patient has a moral duty to accept 
treatment.
2 Burdensome or Futile: Does the Patient Have a Moral Duty to Accept Treatment?
I argued that the patient always has a moral duty to accept treatment, unless the treatment is 
burdensome or futile. When a patient does have such a duty to accept treatment, I suggested 
that the common law should recognise a corresponding legal duty, although a thorough 
analysis of this issue was outside the scope of my thesis. Currently the common law does not 
recognise any such duty. My thesis drew an analogy with the law’s treatment of homicidal 
omissions: I proposed that if a patient does have a moral and thus legal duty to accept 
treatment but refuses, the refusal should be regarded as not just a factual cause of death, but 
also a legal cause of death. Assuming the specific intent to die is present, such a refusal 
would amount to suicide.
Central to my proposal are the concepts of burdensome and futile treatment. Whether an 
intervention is burdensome is assessed largely subjectively, from the patient’s perspective. 
The patient might consider the pain, discomfort, inconvenience or expense of the intervention 
disproportionate to the likely benefits. A number of MND patients told me that the burdens of 
invasive ventilation and PEG feeding were unacceptable. Other treatments might be untested 
or risky. Sometimes a patient will have conscientious or moral objections to the treatment. In 
these circumstances, I argued there is no moral duty to accept the treatment, nor should there 
be any legal duty.
The meaning of futility, however, is more complex. I argued that an intervention is futile 
when it cannot achieve the therapeutic purpose it is designed to achieve. A mistaken view of 
futility arises when the intervention is judged against criteria not relevant to its purpose. 
Therefore if artificial fluid and food are successfully hydrating and nourishing a patient, it is 
incorrect to describe them as ‘futile’ just because they cannot restore a patient to 
consciousness.
My analysis of case law exposed how the prevailing view of futility and burden conflates the 
futility or burden of treatment with the futility or burden of the patient’s life. Underlying
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decisions such as Bland22 in the United Kingdom, Cruzan22 in the United States and 
Gardner24 in Australia is the concept o f ‘the worthless life’ which rationalises the intentional 
termination of the sick and disabled via the omission of life-sustaining treatment. Value 
judgments of this sort are avoided and intrinsic human dignity is respected when the benefits 
or futility of the intervention are assessed correctly against the medically indicated purpose of 
the treatment.
My thesis makes a significant contribution to the literature by demonstrating how the 
concepts of burdensome and futile treatment, correctly understood, can be applied in clinical 
practice. My interviews illuminated the problem of delineating legitimate refusals of 
treatment from suicidal refusals. I referred to the deaths of Max and Sam after they refused 
further mechanical ventilation, most likely due to its invasiveness and its diminishing 
effectiveness as their respiratory function irreversibly declined. These were therefore valid 
refusals of treatment, quite distinct from suicide.
Jackie’s refusal of artificial food and hydration, however, was unambiguously suicide. On my 
analysis she had a moral duty to continue with the PEG: it was neither burdensome nor futile 
because it was providing effective sustenance. In these circumstances I suggested that the law 
should recognise a legal duty to accept this treatment. The withdrawal should therefore be 
regarded as a legal cause of death. Dr Blackburn was explicit in his interview that Jackie’s 
underlying intention was to cause death and thus all the elements of suicide were present.
3 Physician-Assisted Suicide by Omission
Moreover, Jackie’s death, while not the ‘classic’ case of a suicidal patient self-ingesting fatal 
drugs provided by a doctor, may have been a case of physician-assisted suicide. There is a 
distinction between a doctor’s cooperation with a patient’s valid refusal of treatment and 
cooperation with a suicidal refusal and this is recognised by legislation in some 
jurisdictions. It is a criminal offence to assist suicide in all Australian jurisdictions and there 
are, broadly, three separate offences: aiding or abetting suicide; inciting suicide; and 
counselling suicide.
22 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789.
23 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Health Department (1990) 111 LEd 2d 224.
24 Gardner; Re BW V[2003] VSC 173.
25 See, eg, Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) ss 4(3)(a), 5, 6.
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I argued it is possible to aid and abet a suicide by omission, for example, by a doctor omitting 
life-sustaining treatment at a patient’s request. When a patient like Jackie refuses to cooperate 
in the provision of treatment, even with the intent to die, case law, including the Australian 
authority of HLtd v J, suggests that a doctor’s duty to provide the treatment is negated, thus 
relieving the doctor from any liability for aiding and abetting suicide.
However, Dr Blackburn’s advice to Jackie that her death could be achieved by withdrawing 
the PEG indicates he may have committed the offence of inciting suicide: he knew her 
intention was to end her life and his answer -  ‘it’s easy’ -  encouraged her to do so and 
arguably was a cause of her suicide. His response to her request for advice about how to end 
her life suggests the offence of counselling suicide. His proposal of the means of death 
suggests that his intent was to assist her suicide.
4 Guidance for Clinical Practice
My thesis extends the existing debate not only by illustrating how physician-assisted suicide 
can pose as ordinary treatment refusal, but for clinicians who are faced with a patient’s 
rejection of life-sustaining treatment, it provides practical guidance about the legal 
requirements. First, my findings provide clarity for medical professionals about the meaning 
of burdensome and futile interventions and reassure them that they behave within the bounds 
of the law when they cooperate with a patient’s refusal on that basis, even if they foresee that 
their assistance will hasten death.
Secondly, if a doctor knows that a patient refuses treatment with the intent to suicide, my 
thesis explains there is no legal requirement for mandatory treatment, which in any event 
would be practically difficult or impossible. However, the doctor should not simply accept a 
patient’s suicidal refusal at face value, as Dr Blackburn did. Rather, as H Ltd v J2 held, the 
doctor’s duty requires his or her best efforts to secure the patient’s cooperation. This could 
include exploring any underlying psychosocial, physical, existential or other influences on 
the suicidal refusal and addressing those influences as far as possible. If the patient persists in 
the refusal, the doctor would be free to provide reasonable palliation and other care including 
hospital admission: this would not imply the intent to assist the suicide.
26 [2010] SASC 176 (15 June 2010).
27 TUi^l
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I admit that the difference between a valid refusal of treatment and a suicidal refusal is not 
always easy to discern. In clinical practice the presumption should be that a patient’s refusal 
is legitimate, unless there are indications of suicidal ideation. The circumstances of the 
refusal, particularly whether the intervention is burdensome or futile in the correct meaning 
of these concepts, are important indicators. The findings of my thesis suggest that the 
common law, as well as clinical practice, must grapple with this ‘problem of definition’ and 
face the reality that sometimes a doctor’s cooperation with a patient’s refusal of treatment is 
actually physician-assisted suicide masquerading as ordinary medical care.
C The Policy Debate ‘Tower o f Babel ’
The ‘problem of definition’ is a particular challenge for policy makers. My examination in 
chapter 7 of the disputes about significant Dutch and Australian studies revealed a veritable 
Tower of Babel, with researchers and their critics arguing at cross-purposes about the 
incidence and significance of end-of-life practices, while disputing their legal and ethical 
meaning/ One of the contributions of my thesis is to unravel these tangled disputes and 
analyse the points of contention. This is important because both the Dutch research and the 
Kuhse et al study in Australia10 are frequently cited by all sides of the debate and continue to 
be replicated across the world. My analysis revealed that more than semantics is at stake. At 
the heart of these empirical contests is heated disagreement about the fundamentals of moral 
deliberation, in particular, the significance of intention. In the absence of an agreed language, 
an evidence-based debate about euthanasia policy is extremely difficult.
In chapter 7 I highlighted the wealth of data gathered over the years by the Dutch studies, 
unique in the world and the attendant deficiencies. I criticised the wording of some Dutch 
questions and their conceptual confusion, for example, the conflation of intention with motive 
and the ambiguous mental state of ‘partial intention’ which is more akin to foresight than
28 Paul van der Maas et al, 'Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life' (1991) 338 
Lancet 669; Helga Kuhse et al, 'End-of-Life Decisions in Australian Medical Practice' (1997) 166 Medical 
Journal o f Australia 191; John Keown, 'Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?' in 
John Keown (ed), Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 
1995) 261; Johannes J M van Delden, Loes Pijnenborg and Paul J van der Maas, 'Dances with Data' (1993) 7 
Bioethics 323.
29 van der Maas at al, above n 28.
30 Kuhse et al, above n 28.
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intent. I argued that the Kuhse et al study was compromised by ‘lumping together’ disparate 
practices due to its use of the vague phrase ‘not prolonging life’.
My suggested survey instrument in chapter 7 builds on these important studies by 
overcoming their terminological confusion. It asks questions about all acts and omissions that 
intentionally terminate life, to ensure the collection of data essential to an informed debate. 
My questionnaire would generate data so researchers with divergent moral views could 
quantify end-of-life practices within their own terms of reference. This is a significant 
advance in the empirical literature which could facilitate more meaningful exchange in a 
debate where the protagonists define the issues so differently.
II MOTIVATIONS
Understanding the motivations for assisted death is essential for evidence-based social policy. 
An aim of my research was to explore the influence of interpersonal relationships and social, 
economic, and other factors in decisions faced by patients with a terminal illness, in this 
instance MND. My in-depth interviews with patients allowed them to speak for themselves 
about end-of-life decisions such as the omission of ventilation or artificial feeding and 
hydration. The richest data to emerge was about their desire -  or otherwise -  for euthanasia. 
In most instances I also interviewed the patient’s carer, usually the spouse, and their insights 
sometimes confirmed, but sometimes challenged, the perspective of the patient and threw 
light on the dynamics of their relationship at a time of acute stress. What was unexpected, but 
illuminating, was the vibrancy of the data from the interviews with the medical staff. There 
were multiple perspectives which exposed the motivations of Dr Blackburn in facilitating 
what may have been euthanasia.
A Control
One of the pervasive themes of this thesis, ‘control’, emerged from my interviews as a 
motivator of both patient and doctor involvement in euthanasia. In chapter 9 I referred to the 
literature which suggests a doctor’s emphasis on autonomy and the need to assert control over
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illness can affirm a patient’s own desire for euthanasia.31 My interviews lend weight to this 
insight. Dr Richards believed that the desire for control was the key motivator for Dr 
Blackburn’s involvement in what may have amounted to euthanasia.32 As I recounted in 
chapter 6, control over ‘an appropriately timed death’ was a feature of Dr Blackburn’s 
philosophy of palliative care.33
The desire of patients for control is perhaps unsurprising given that the principle of autonomy 
is one of the most common justifications for voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide in both 
scholarly and popular debates. I argued that in a culture which privileges the value of 
independence, patients who are dependent due to disease or disability may experience a 
profound sense of indignity and degradation. This was confirmed by my interviews. In 
chapter 4 I documented the grief of patients like John, Mary, Anna and Isabel as they 
described their increasing dependence and loss of their sense of personal dignity. Anna’s 
sentiment encapsulated what others saw as the very worst aspect of MND: ‘it’s just losing 
every bit of independence. That’s why it’s such a degrading thing because you become like a 
baby.’34
These interviews provided a graphic illustration of how the fear of losing control and 
independence acts as a motivator for euthanasia: first, because a hastened death is a means to 
halt further decline; and secondly, when patients have lost all control over their life, 
euthanasia at least offers them control over the manner and timing of their death. This was 
recognised by the medical staff and was confirmed by those patients who rejected euthanasia: 
they did not need to assert control but reported they had come to terms with their limitations. 
These findings confirm the observation in the literature that the desire for control is 
significantly associated with requests for euthanasia and assisted suicide.35
31 See, eg, Brian J Kelly, Francis T Varghese and Dan Pelusi, 'Countertransference and Ethics: A Perspective on 
Clinical Dilemmas in End-of-Life Decisions' (2003) 1 Palliative and Supportive Care 367.
32 Interview with Elizabeth Richards (6 February 2008).
33 Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).
34 Interview with Anna MacPherson (25 June 2007).
35 See, eg, Robert A Pearlman et al, 'Motivations for Physician-Assisted Suicide: Patient and Family Voices' 
(2005) 20 Jounal o f General Internal Medicine 234.
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B Underlying Motivators
Some members of the Chronic Care team observed that patients’ anxieties about control 
actually disguise other motivators for euthanasia. In chapter 4 I critically examined the 
literature about the underlying drivers of the desire for euthanasia and assisted suicide. The 
upsetting accounts from the patients, carers and doctors in my research gave very personal 
voice to these drivers and confirmed the key findings in the literature.
Many studies reveal that one of the key motivators for euthanasia is higher levels of 
depressive symptoms in patients.36 Like these studies, my interview with Dr Blackburn 
indicated that doctors frequently fail to diagnose depression in the terminally ill and do not 
recognise that the desire for a hastened death can be influenced by depression. It was 
particularly concerning that Dr Blackburn, who had no qualifications in psychology or 
psychiatry, was making psychiatric assessments of patients who requested euthanasia, 
without any specialist assistance. Independently of depression, hopelessness -  a persistently
• • i c  - •pessimistic mindset -  is also linked with the desire for euthanasia, expressed in Isabel’s 
mournful cry, ‘It’s pointless’.39
The literature identifies self-perceived burden as another impetus for a hastened death. This 
includes not just the economic burden of illness and disability, but also the social and 
emotional strain on relationships. Patient Mary Davis, who euphemistically expressed the 
hope that there ‘would be somebody who would look after me at the end’,40 was distressed by 
the change in her relationship with her husband and family:
We’ve always loved each other but the relationship does change because I can’t give him a hug ... And 
we were very tactile people ... That actually is the worst part, the fact that I can’t hug the grandchildren. 
They’ve got used to it now and they fling my arms around their necks. As regards the relationship you 
feel quite guilty actually. I’ve caused through my illness, a change in everybody’s lives, the children’s, 
grandchildren’s.41
36 See, eg, Brian J Kelly et al, 'Factors Associated with the Wish to Hasten Death: A Study of Patients with 
Terminal Illness' (2003) 33 Psychological Medicine 75.
Interview with Thomas Blackburn (7 January 2008).37
38 See, eg, Harvey Chochinov et al, 'Depression, Hopelessness, and Suicidal Ideation in the Terminally 1111 
(1998) 39 Psychosomatics 366.
39 Interview with Isabel Wright (26 June 2007).
40 Interview with Mary Davis (27 April 2007).
41 Ibid.
304
My interviews confirmed other influences on the desire for euthanasia identified in the 
literature: family dysfunction, including conflict, poor communication and estrangement;42 
having fewer social supports, including unsupportive family relationships and lack of 
emotional assistance;43 and, finally, unrelieved pain and physical distress.44
C Vulnerability as a Motivator
In chapter 5 I considered the motivations for euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide from a 
different angle. I asked whether the social, economic and cultural features of a patient’s 
context could act as ‘controlling influences’ that subvert genuine autonomy and explain some 
decisions for assisted death. Pressure on so called ‘vulnerable’ populations is an oft-cited 
argument against the legalisation of assisted death. There has been very little scholarly 
consideration of this issue and the legal significance of vulnerability has been overlooked. 
One of the contributions of my thesis was to demonstrate the relevance of vulnerability to the 
common law principle of voluntariness. Controlling influences are recognised in law as 
undermining the voluntariness of decision-making in the doctrines of duress, undue influence 
and unconscionability.45
What is the evidence that dimensions of vulnerability can motivate the desire for euthanasia 
and assisted suicide? I examined one significant study of the Dutch and Oregon data by 
Battin et al which indicates that populations commonly identified as vulnerable, including 
women, do not disproportionately access assisted death.46 However, adopting women as a 
case study of a vulnerable group, I examined data beyond Oregon and the Netherlands. A 
more complex picture than that drawn by Battin et al emerged. Although many studies 
indicate there is no heightened risk for women in assisted death, I argued there is evidence in 
some European countries, notably Switzerland and in the United States, that women are 
significantly more likely to choose euthanasia or assisted suicide.
42 See, eg, Kelly et al, 'Factors Associated with the Wish to Hasten Death: A Study of Patients with Terminal 
Illness', above n 36.
43 Elizabeth Mayfield Arnold, 'Factors that Influence Consideration of Hastening Death among People with 
Life-Threatening Illnesses' (2004) 29 Health & Social Work 17.
44 Diane E Meier et al, 'Characteristics of Patients Requesting and Receiving Physician-Assisted Death' (2003) 
163 Archives o f Internal Medicine 1537.
45 See, eg, Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649; Mrs U v Centre fo r Reproductive Medicine [2002] EWCA Civ 565; 
Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 SCR 226
4(1 Margaret P Battin et al, 'Legal Physician-Assisted Dying in Oregon and the Netherlands: Evidence 
Concerning the Impact on Patients in "Vulnerable" Groups' (2007) 33 Journal o f Medical Ethics 591.
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There is also evidence that women prefer a more passive method of death, with a substantial 
degree of physician participation. This is a phenomenon first identified in the Kevorkian 
suicides.47 It is significant that my analysis revealed the same pattern in the available data 
from three of the nationwide Dutch studies,48 in Oregon49 and in a nationwide United States
50survey.
Unlike Battin et al, my analysis of vulnerability looked not just at the quantitative evidence, 
but at a range of intersecting perspectives from feminism, criminology, literary criticism, 
classical history, epidemiology, suicidology, psychology and sociology. Although more 
research is certainly required, there is at least preliminary evidence that even if vulnerable 
populations do not disproportionately choose assisted death, the reasons or motivations for 
their decision may be indicative of vulnerability.
I argued one of the reasons for women’s choices for assisted death is that these deaths could 
reflect the wider patterns of male violence against women. The theme of control again 
emerged, this time as one of the motifs of male violence against female intimates. I identified 
its correlation with at least one form of assisted death, so called mercy killing. I argued that 
criminological studies raise concerns that the oppressive dynamics of women’s socio-cultural 
context, particularly male domination and possessiveness, could also motivate the decisions 
of some women for assisted death.51
I referred to the literature highlighting cultural stereotypes that uphold compliance and self-
52sacrifice as particularly feminine virtues. Thus women may decide for assisted death to
47 Kalman Kaplan, Martin Harrow and Mark Schneiderhan, 'Suicide, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia 
in Men Versus Women around the World: The Degree of Physician Control' (2002) 18 Ethics and Medicine: a 
Christian Perspective on Issues in Bioethics 33, 33.
48 van der Maas et al, above n 28. Paul van der Maas et al, 'Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Other 
Medical Practices Involving the End of Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995' (1996) 335 New England Journal o f 
Medicine 1699; Bregje Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al, 'Euthanasia and Other End-of-Life Decisions in the 
Netherlands in 1990, 1995, and 2001' (2003) 362 Lancet 395.
49 Oregon Public Health Division, Table 1. Characteristics and End-of-Life Care o f596 DWDA [Death with 
Dignity Act] Patients who have Died from Ingesting a Lethal Dose o f Medication as o f February 29, 2012, by 
Year, Oregon, 1998-2011 (29 February 2012) Oregon Health Authority
<http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Documen 
ts/yearl4-tbl-l ,pdf>.
50 Diane Meier et al, 'A National Survey of Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the United States' 
(1998) 338 New England Journal o f Medicine 1193.
51 See also Katrina George, 'A Woman's Choice? The Gendered Risks o f Voluntary Euthanasia and Physician- 
Assisted Suicide' (2007) 15 Medical Law Review 1.
52 See, eg, Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Harvard 
University Press, 1982).
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relieve their families -  especially men -  of the burden of care, particularly in light of 
evidence that undiagnosed depression in male caregivers can trigger the homicide of female
n
patients. I examined research from suicidologists which suggests assisted death can be seen 
as a socially acceptable method of suicide for women, arguably reflected in women’s 
preference for passive, structured methods of death which I identified earlier. 54 Finally, some 
research shows that women’s relative social and economic disadvantage could motivate their 
decision for death.55
None of the evidence presented in chapter 5 of women’s vulnerability to assisted death is 
conclusive. However, my analysis provides disturbing ‘food for thought’: the motivations of 
some populations for assisted death could be inimical to genuine autonomy and indicative of 
vulnerability to controlling influences such as structural inequalities in power, social and 
economic disadvantage and oppressive cultural stereotypes. At the very least this should 
extend the vulnerability debate beyond purely quantitative arguments and be a catalyst for 
further research.
Ill DIGGING UP THE UNDERGROUND
During the last 20 years the reality of the so called euthanasia underground, where assisted 
death is practised surreptitiously under prohibition, has begun to be documented. In chapter 7 
I examined the existing quantitative and qualitative research about this phenomenon. The 
interview studies, pioneered by Ogden,56 are significant because, going beyond the statistics, 
they reveal what illicit euthanasia and assisted suicide actually look like in practice. The 
picture is disturbing: botched attempts and recourse to violent methods when drugs fail, 
hidden decision making, arbitrary clinical judgments or hasty involvement by doctors, a lack
57of transparency and accountability and non-voluntary euthanasia.
53 See, eg, Patricia Weiser Easteal, Killing the Beloved: Homicide between Adult Sexual Intimates (Australian 
Institute of Criminology, 1993).
54 Silvia Sara Canetto, 'Elderly Women and Suicidal Behaviour' in Silvia Sara Canetto and David Lester (eds), 
Women and Suicidal Behavior (Springer Publishing, 1995) 215.
55 See, eg, Silvia Sara Canetto and Janet Hollenshead, 'Gender and Physician-Assisted Suicide: An Analysis of 
the Kevorkian Cases, 1990-1997' (1999) 40 Omega: Journal o f Death and Dying 165.
5<1 Russell D Ogden, Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in Persons with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS) or Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) (Peroglyphics Publishing, 1994).
57 See, eg, Roger S Magnusson, Angels o f Death: Exploring the Euthanasia Underground (Melbourne 
University Press, 2002).
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My data in chapter 6 is an important addition to this body of work. First, my interviews 
described the practice of illicit euthanasia within a discrete clinical unit of a hospital. In this 
sense my study offers a different perspective to the research of Ogden and Magnusson which 
focussed on co-operative euthanasia in the community, assisted by an informal network of 
health professionals. Secondly, my study provided insights into the organisational culture 
which facilitated the illegal practice of euthanasia, remarkable given the risk of exposure is 
ever-present in a collegial setting.
The literature highlights the importance of the leader in forming an organisation’s culture.' 
The charismatic influence of Dr Blackburn, a senior clinician, was key to explaining the 
practice of what may amount to euthanasia in the middle of a large public hospital. Dr 
Blackburn emerged as one of the ‘revisionist’ practitioners identified in Magnusson’s 
research,obeying his own clinical judgment in preference to any legal or medical authority. 
Dr Blackburn’s guiding principle was commitment to patient comfort. His re-definition of the 
professional role required him to define the criteria for his involvement in a hastened death. 
However, consistent with Magnusson’s findings about the ‘revisionists’, he was unable to do 
so with any clarity or consistency.
My interviews provided new insights into the nature of the underground as it operates within 
an institution. In an effort to manage potential opposition by staff, patients and families, Dr 
Blackburn sought consensus in decision-making, while steering a decisive course, hallmarks 
of his style as a self-described ‘navigator’. This was reinforced by the deferential attitude 
towards Dr Blackburn by nursing and junior medical staff. This is consistent with the 
literature where it has been observed that such a hierarchy is common W) As a result, 
problematic or unprofessional practices are more likely to persist without effective scrutiny. 
Moreover, my interviews revealed that when there is no clear definition of the values guiding 
a clinical team, divergent and contradictory understandings of patient care may emerge. Thus 
Dr Blackburn’s philosophy of euthanasia as an integral aspect of palliative care co-existed 
with a ‘care not kill’ ethic among most of the team. This ambiguity facilitated arguably illicit 
practices.
58 See, eg, Edgar H Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership (John Wiley & Sons, 3rd ed, 2004).
59 Magnusson, Angels o f Death: Exploring the Euthanasia Underground, above n 57, 104.
60 See, eg, Helga Kuhse, Caring: Nurses, Women and Ethics (Blackwell Publishers, 1997).
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My interviews demonstrated how risk management strategies are a feature of organisations 
where questionable end-of-life practices occur. Some of these strategies are reflected in 
Ogden and Magnusson’s accounts of euthanasia in hospitals.61 Dr Blackburn’s chosen 
method of death, usually a gradual increase of Midazolam-morphine, allowed what was likely 
an intentional death to masquerade as routine palliation. ‘Concordance’ was a technique Dr 
Blackburn used to maintain good relationships with families and particularly staff, ‘diffusing 
dissent’ so as to minimise conflict and complaints. This was illustrated in his account of the 
nurse who challenged the excessive dose of Midazolam-morphine. My interview with Dr 
Blackburn also revealed the strategy o f ‘deflection’, used to parry incriminating questions.
My interviews revealed the culture of silence which pervaded the Chronic Care Unit. An 
attitude of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ on the part of some staff facilitated hastened deaths within 
the Unit. It was evident Dr Blackburn made assumptions about the ‘dual complicity’ of his 
patients in a hastened death, without seeking their clear direction about this critical decision. 
This was despite the Unit’s apparent commitment to honest and informed patient decision 
making. Silence does not necessarily equate to consent. I argued this ambiguity meant that 
some patients were unaware that their death would be hastened. This suggests the possibility 
of the most notorious abuse of the underground: non-voluntary euthanasia.
IV IS LEGALISATION THE ANSWER?
Ultimately the objectives of this thesis come down to one overriding question: what is the 
preferable macro policy response to the demand for voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide 
among patients and the associated phenomenon of the underground: legalisation or 
prohibition? I provided a comparative analysis of prohibition and legalisation in the 
Netherlands and Belgium. I argued that the symbolic influence of prohibition plays a critical 
role in shaping the social norm which proscribes intentional killing.
A Indicators o f Legal Control
‘Control’ again emerged as a key theme because critical to any evaluation of different legal 
approaches to assisted death is the meaning of legal control. In chapter 7 I identified three
61 Magnusson, Angels o f Death: Exploring the Euthanasia Underground, above n 57, 133; Ogden, above n 56, 
76.
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key indicators of control: voluntariness, visibility and accountability. In chapter 8 I presented 
a comparison of prohibition and legalisation measured against these indicators. Evaluating 
the evidence in light of these indicators provides a new contribution to the literature.
I adopted the Netherlands and Belgium as case studies of legalised regimes. The first 
indicator of voluntariness measures how effectively the law safeguards against the intentional 
termination of life without explicit patient request. The voluntariness of the request for 
assisted death is a legal condition of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in the 
Netherlands and Belgium. Nevertheless, an important finding was that the intentional 
termination of life by the use of drugs without explicit request is higher in these countries 
since legalisation, compared to most places where euthanasia and/or physician-assisted 
suicide are prohibited. Certainly there is no evidence that the risk of non-voluntary death is 
higher where assisted death is a criminal offence. This was a surprising finding given the 
clandestine nature of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide under prohibition.
When all methods of intentional non-voluntary termination of life without request (such as 
treatment withdrawal) were factored in, my analysis found that the rate of intentional non­
voluntary termination of life was significantly higher than the restrictive Dutch definition 
suggests. This was summarised in table 3. I also found that the rate of non-voluntary 
termination of life grew significantly in the Netherlands between 1990 and 1995, as indicated 
in table 4, which coincided with an increasingly liberal political and legal culture. More 
research is required to establish whether this trend has continued. Non-voluntary termination 
of life does occur under prohibition. However, there is no evidence that the safeguards of 
legalisation, at least in the Netherlands and Belgium, effectively ensure the voluntariness of 
patient request.
The second indicator of control, visibility, measures to what extent assisted death is practised 
in the open to allow consultation, public oversight and auditing. My own interview study 
confirmed the obvious: under prohibition, assisted death remains hidden and therefore 
uncontrolled. The majority of cases of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in the 
Netherlands and Belgium are now reported and are more likely to be subject to professional 
consultation. However, many cases of intentional termination of life are still hidden, mis- 
classified by doctors as normal medical practice or deliberately unreported by the
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‘revisionists’ who reject formal scrutiny. Moreover, the problematic cases, which most 
deserve legal scrutiny, escape legalised control altogether.
Thirdly, I argued that accountability of doctors for their practice of euthanasia and assisted 
suicide is another control indicator. Under prohibition very few cases ever come to formal 
attention and therefore practitioners are rarely accountable. The declining number of 
prosecutions of ‘not careful’ cases in the Netherlands could suggest that legalisation asserts a 
high degree of control over assisted death as doctors know they will be scrutinised and held 
accountable. However, one of my unexpected findings was that the improved reporting rate 
has resulted in less, not more accountability in the Netherlands. My research synthesises the 
results of a number of Dutch studies published since 2008, as well as recent reports by the 
Regional Review Committees.
I demonstrated that as the role of the prosecutorial authority has been marginalised in an 
effort to encourage reporting, scrutiny of the reported cases by the review committees has 
decreased. While the prosecutorial guidelines state that lack of voluntariness and the absence 
of reasonable alternatives warrant prosecution, these are precisely the two areas that the 
review committees do not adequately scrutinise.
Any legalised system that seeks to assert control over assisted death must involve a system of 
self-reporting by doctors: it is simply not viable for authorities to independently assess every 
single death which occurs. A significant finding of my thesis is that the flaws I identified in 
the Dutch and Belgian control systems -  non-reporting, confusion about classification of 
clinical behaviour, the resistance of revisionist practitioners, lack of prosecutorial scrutiny -  
are likely to be weaknesses inherent to any system that relies on practitioners to self-monitor 
-  indeed, self-regulate -  their own behaviour. In sum, while it is no surprise that prohibition 
falls short of effective control of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, my thesis found 
that legalisation is unlikely to provide an acceptable regulatory alternative.
B The Symbolic Force o f Prohibition
Notwithstanding the obvious -  and disturbing -  limitations of a policy of prohibition, I 
argued that voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide should not be legalised. In 
chapter 9 I presented evidence that prohibition performs a symbolic function which shapes
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social norms and behaviour. The social norm which forbids deliberate killing is widely 
considered a foundation of civil society and this is expressed by the criminal prohibition of 
intentional killing. The legalisation of assisted death dilutes this symbolic force and I argued 
that this is likely to be associated with a gradual normalisation of the intentional termination 
of life and a creeping expansion of the categories of people considered suitable candidates for 
assisted death. This is not a new argument but my thesis has advanced it by presenting 
evidence which documents the reality of this phenomenon, namely an examination of 30 
years of legal and social transformation in the Netherlands.
I identified the major milestones in this transformation in table 5. First, my research identified 
a shift from euthanasia as a last resort to its increasing normalisation for ever-expanding 
categories of patients including those suffering so called ‘life fatigue’ and those who refuse 
medical alternatives to euthanasia. The second major shift is a growing acceptance of non­
voluntary euthanasia. Table 5 showed that the early insistence on the voluntariness of the 
patient’s request has gradually waned to allow the intentional termination of life without 
request in some circumstances, including patients in a persistent vegetative state and 
newborns with disabilities.
Whatever the ethical implications of this shift, I argued that the policy response must 
acknowledge there has been a discernible liberalisation of attitudes towards the intentional 
termination of life in the Netherlands. It is difficult to dismiss the implication that the 
legalisation of assisted death, by removing the symbolic taboo against deliberate killing, has 
contributed to this dynamic.
V RECOGNISING THE LIMITS OF LEGAL CONTROL: A ‘NON-LAW’ SOLUTION
Although I acknowledged the limitations of prohibition and the reality that prosecution can 
never fully control the underground, my research found that legalisation has its own risks and 
limitations. A purely legal strategy, in whatever form, will never be an adequate policy 
solution to the underground.
My thesis moves beyond the scholarly and popular debate by proposing an evidence-based, 
‘non-law’ strategy to address the euthanasia underground. The elements of this strategy 
emerged from my interviews and are supported by the literature. The first strategy is to
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address the underlying reasons for the involvement of doctors in assisted death. As Dr 
Richards explained in her response to Dr Blackburn’s possibly illicit activities, and as many 
studies confirm, two of the key motivators for doctors are the need for control and ignorance 
of palliative alternatives. I referred to an extensive body of international literature to 
identify the existing deficiencies in palliative care education64 and this was confirmed in my 
interview with Dr Richards.
Secondly, while only a very small minority of terminally ill patients actually consider assisted 
death as a personal option,65 research shows the desire can be minimised when the underlying 
motivators are addressed.66 As I identified in chapter 4, the primary motivators are the 
patients’ need for control, depression, hopelessness, self-perceived burden, low family 
functionality, lack of social support, anxiety and unrelieved physical pain. Unless doctors 
have the clinical skills to recognise and then address the root causes of a patient’s request for 
death, they are more likely to endorse a hastened death.67
This ‘two pronged’ approach demands a commitment from universities, healthcare training 
providers and the medical and health professions to expand education about palliative care. 
Improving palliative care education requires a multi-faceted approach, including increased 
access to specialist palliative care support, particularly in rural and remote areas; increased 
education for non-specialist palliative care providers; and an expansion of undergraduate 
education in palliative care.
68Increased investment by government in training places and programs is also required. I 
proposed educational models such as EPEC in the United States and PEPA and PCC4U in 
Australia that focus on the development of core clinical skills and attitudinal change. Nurses 
and allied health professionals must also be a focus of efforts, given the multi-disciplinary
62 Interview with Elizabeth Richards (6 February 2008).
63 See, eg, Kelly et al, above n 31; Ezekiel J Emanuel et al, 'Attitudes and Practices of U S Oncologists 
Regarding Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide' (2000) 133 Annals o f Internal Medicine 527.
64 See, eg, Rurik Lofmark et al, 'Palliative Care Training: A Survey among Physicians in Australia and Europe' 
(2006) 22 Journal o f Palliative Care 105.
65 See, eg, Ezekiel Emanuel, Diane Fairclough and Linda Emanuel, 'Attitudes and Desires Related to Euthanasia 
and Physician-Assisted Suicide among Terminally 111 Patients and Their Caregivers' (2000) 284 Journal o f the 
American Medical Association 2460.
66 Paul Bascom and Susan Toile, 'Responding to Requests for Physician-Assisted Suicide: "These Are 
Unchartered Waters for Both of Us. ...'" (2002) 288 Journal o f  the American Medical Association 91.
67 Ezekiel Emanuel et al, above n 63.
68 See, eg, Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Palliative Care in 
Australia (2012) 59, 95, 96.
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nature of palliative care. Social policies concentrating more on clinical strategies and less on 
divisive legal debates are a practical and compassionate response which will minimise 
patients’ demand for assisted death and the problems of the underground.
VI LIMITATIONS OF MY STUDY
This thesis is a synthesis of the current literature and my own qualitative research. As I noted 
from the outset, my interview study involved only a small sample so my findings are not 
generalisable. Nevertheless, the voices which most need to be heard -  terminally ill patients, 
their carers, their doctors and health professionals -  have elicited themes for reflection which 
might open up the debate to new insights.
I acknowledged the challenges of researching criminal behaviour. Indeed, as I listened to the 
at-times astonishing descriptions of illicit euthanasia within a hospital, one question 
resounded for me: are these people telling the truth? In chapter 1, I described the 
methodological strategies I adopted to verify the validity of the accounts provided by the 
participants who were involved in, or were aware of, possibly illegal activities, particularly 
those involving Dr Blackburn. The remarkable candour of the interviews, at considerable risk 
to the participants, and the opportunities I used for cross-verification of accounts, suggest my 
data is sound. Nevertheless, it is possible that the reliability of some of my findings was 
compromised by the reluctance of participants to disclose their participation in, or knowledge 
of, underground euthanasia or even by a desire to mislead me.
VII OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Throughout my thesis I identified gaps in existing knowledge and opportunities for further 
research. Given the criticisms I raised in chapter 7 about the terminological confusion in the 
empirical ‘numbers game’, the first opportunity for further research is my proposed survey 
instrument about the incidence and nature of end-of-life practices. This survey aims to 
facilitate the interpretation of data by researchers with diverse legal and ethical views, and to 
promote scholarly dialogue within a very polarised debate.
Secondly, I highlighted the need for further empirical research to understand the differences, 
if any, between the reasons women, as distinct from men, request assisted death. Because
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there is evidence that women prefer different methods of assisted death to men, it is important 
to report results separately for euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Most studies to date 
have failed to distinguish between these two different methods when presenting the data.
Thirdly, there is evidence in some countries that disproportionate numbers of women decide 
for assisted death. In other countries, this is not the case. Research is needed to explain why 
the gender ratios vary across different jurisdictions.
Fourthly, because of the size of my study, I could only conduct a single interview with each 
patient, carer and healthcare professional. Therefore my data represents a snapshot in time. It 
would be instructive to conduct a study which followed patients, their carers and doctors over 
an extended period, through the trajectory of diagnosis, illness and death. Such a study could 
identify any shift in the attitudes and goals of patients over time and the reasons for such a 
shift. The study could compare the circumstances of a patient’s eventual death with their 
expressed preferences, in particular, whether and how a desire for a hastened death was 
granted. With evidence that palliative care strategies can address the underlying motivators of 
involvement in euthanasia, a longitudinal interview study could shed light on how this works 
in practice and the impact of such a strategy on end-of-life care, family dynamics and the 
doctor-patient relationship.
VIII FINAL REMARKS
According to Steinbock, ‘the question confronting society is not whether a particular 
individual is justified in wanting [assisted death]. The broader question is the impact the 
change in the law will have on society.’69 The assisted death debate lays bare the complex 
conundrum of all social policy: whether individual choice can be balanced with the public 
interest. Although the legalisation of assisted death might expand the range of choices for 
some patients, its wider availability could pose special risks to vulnerable populations and 
weaken the social norm which proscribes intentional killing, the cornerstone of law and civil 
society.
<>l) B Steinbock, 'The Case for Physician Assisted Suicide: Not (Yet) Proven' (2005) 31 Journal o f Medical 
Ethics 235, 237.
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The findings of this thesis support a policy of the criminal prohibition of voluntary euthanasia 
and physician-assisted suicide. Prohibition has serious shortcomings, but legalisation also 
fails to achieve effective control. Because palliative care and expanded medical education 
could significantly reduce the demand for assisted death, and considering the significant 
social risks of removing the symbolism of criminal prohibition, legalisation for the sake of a 
small minority of patients cannot be justified.
It is often said that ‘hard cases make bad law’.70 Even with extensive education about 
palliative care among physicians, even if most requests for assisted death do abate by 
addressing the underlying motivators, there will still be patients who want a hastened death. 
There will always be doctors like Dr Blackburn who will facilitate it. I admit that this exposes 
some hard realities for all concerned: for the patients who are exposed to the risks of the 
euthanasia underground; for the doctors who face possible prosecution -  as unlikely as it is -  
for what they consider a compassionate response to patient distress; and even for the lawyers 
who feel uncomfortable at the thought that some things are just beyond legal control.
However, the focus of social policy is necessarily the wider common good and it is naive to 
expect the law to solve every personal tragedy. The ‘hard cases’ confronted by Dr Blackburn 
and by patients like Melanie, Joshua and Jackie may be the price we pay for a policy that 
works well -  most of the time.
70 This adage was first set down in the judgment of Judge Rolfe in Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 10 M&W 
109. See David Luban, 'Law's Blindfold' in Michael Davis and Andrew Stark (eds), Conflict of Interest in the 
Professions (Oxford University Press, 2001) 40.
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